

लाल बहादुर शास्त्री प्रशासन अकादमी
Lal Bahadur Shastri Academy
of Administration

मसूरी

MUSSOORIE

पुस्तकालय

LIBRARY

अवाप्ति संख्या

Accession No. ~~88289~~ 105324

वर्ग संख्या

Class No. 327.5

पुस्तक संख्या

Book No. BUS

The Far East



THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
NEW YORK • CHICAGO
DALLAS • ATLANTA • SAN FRANCISCO
LONDON • MANILA
BRETT-MACMILLAN LTD.
TORONTO

The Far East

A HISTORY OF

*Recent and Contemporary
International Relations in East Asia*



By CLAUDE A. BUSS

PROFESSOR OF HISTORY, STANFORD UNIVERSITY



NEW YORK : THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

COPYRIGHT, 1955, BY THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

Published simultaneously in Canada

All rights reserved -no part of this book may be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher, except by a reviewer who wishes to quote brief passages in connection with a review written for inclusion in magazine or newspaper.

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Second Printing 1957

PREFACE AND INTRODUCTION

This book is an inquiry into the meaning of our lives and our times. The approach is through the study of different peoples in scattered lands and the international relations which have affected their welfare and shaped their destinies. It is assumed that this generation demands no further demonstration that the events and conditions which are most vital to its own experience have roots which are deeply imbedded in the political soil of the Far East.

The fundamental human similarities between East and West—as well as distinctive characteristics—are underscored as they contribute to the process of understanding and appreciation. The peoples of the East and the institutions which they have developed are diverse and individualistic. Our world is richer by Eastern cultures and our way of life is enhanced by their contributions. They are not mysterious or beyond our powers of comprehension. Their behavior patterns have resulted from the same interaction of historical forces which has produced our own. Their languages may seem difficult and their customs strange, but their reactions of pleasure and pain and their natural responses to war and peace are to be measured according to norms which are universal.

The emphasis on the recent period is neither to underestimate nor to distort the heritage of the distant past. The richest function of history is to disclose the sources of the problems and promises of the contemporary world. The most elementary precaution against another Pearl Harbor, or another day which will live in infamy, is to transplant the seeds of conflict in East Asia from the fringe of our consciousness to the very center of our attention.

The diplomatic history of the Far East unrolls gradually like an Oriental scroll. It reveals a wealth of intricate detail which must be considered in relationship with the part of the picture which has already gone and the unknown part which is yet to come. The task of interpretation reflects the viewpoint of the observer in spite of every effort to be unbiased and ob-

jective. The task is of necessity incomplete and imperfect because the scroll is so big and unrolls so fast.

The author cannot begin to express adequately his debts of gratitude. He offers a heartfelt "thank you" to his teachers in Philadelphia, Paris, and Peiping; to his colleagues in the Department of State, the United States Legation in Peiping, and the United States Consulate in Nanking; and to the High Commissioner's Office in Manila, the Office of War Information, the University of Southern California, and Stanford University.

Acknowledgments of obligations are also due to distinguished scholars in the field, to writers of previous textbooks on the Far East, and to fellow teachers.

At the time of World War II, it was the author's privilege to serve primarily in the Far East in humble capacities with men who themselves wrote pages in the record book of history—the High Commissioner to the Philippine Islands, Francis B. Sayre; President Quezon; and General MacArthur. He discussed the problems of the Far East with President Syngman Rhee, Premier Yoshida, Premier Ch'en Ch'eng, Foreign Minister George Yeh, General Romulo, and with lesser-known civil servants of the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands in Asia. He spent one academic session at the National War College in Washington, D. C., as Civilian Director of Studies, a position which brought him in contact with General Harold Bull, Admiral George Dyer, General O. P. Weyland, and as distinguished a "student body" as this world has to offer. With the encouragement and support of General MacArthur, the Rockefeller Foundation, and Presidents Sterling of Stanford University and Nambara of the Tokyo National University, he initiated the Seminars in American Studies in Japan. These experiences created a deeper insight into the forces in conflict in the Far East and a more profound sympathy for those in positions of responsibility. They curbed the easy tendency to criticize and quickened the desire to understand.

A final word of appreciation is reserved for those wonderful students (two in particular) who year after year with their youthful enthusiasm bring immeasurable joy to the teacher's profession, for those nonacademic friends who serve as sounding boards for opinions and somehow give the courage to go on, for responsive lecture audiences, for the family which tolerates the hermit existence of the writer, and for those who saw the manuscript through the press. For faults, mistakes, and omissions, the author begs for mercy tempered with justice.

Contents

PART ONE

GEOGRAPHIC SETTING AND HISTORICAL BEGINNINGS

1. Half of One World	3
2. China and the Chinese	25
3. Japan and the Japanese	42
4. The Expansion of Europe	60
5. China and the Unequal Treaties	79
6. The Rise of Russia in Asia	97
7. The United States in the Far East to 1900	117

PART TWO

DIPLOMATIC HISTORY TO WORLD WAR II

Introduction	141
8. The Modernization of China	143
9. Anti-Imperialism and Nationalism in China	159
10. The Rise of the Japanese Nation	173
11. The Foreign Policies of Japan	191
12. Manchuria, Prelude to Pearl Harbor	213
13. Japan in China	230
14. British Policies in East Asia	249
15. France, Germany, and the Netherlands	268
16. The Far East in Soviet Politics	286
17. The Soviet Union and China after 1917	305
18. The Soviet Union and Japan	326
19. Japan in World Politics	344

20. The United States in the Far East, 1900-1931	364
21. The Fateful Decade, 1931-1941	388

PART THREE

WORLD WAR II IN THE FAR EAST

Introduction	411
22. World War II in the Pacific	412

PART FOUR

A DECADE OF TRANSITION

Introduction	437
23. The Occupation of Japan	439
24. The Peace Settlement with Japan	459
25. Back in the Family of Nations	477
26. The Rise of the Chinese Communists	498
27. Internal Policies of the Chinese Red Regime	518
28. International Policies of Communist China	540
29. Nationalist China and Its Diplomacy	562
30. Independent Countries of Southeast Asia	583
31. The Republic of the Philippines	606
32. The Decline of Imperialism	627
33. Korea and the Quest for Security	652
34. The USSR and Communist Imperialism	674
35. The United States and the Far East	696
Index	725

PART ONE

**Geographic Setting and
Historical Beginnings**

CHAPTER 1

Half of One World

The Far East, or East Asia, extends from the northeastern extremity of Siberia to the borders of India. It spans frigid, temperate, and tropical climates, and its land areas include mountains, plateaus, deserts, and fertile valleys. It is the homeland of Russia in Asia, Korea, China, Japan, the continental countries of Southeast Asia, the Philippines, and Indonesia.

Eurasia is one vast land mass. The central backbone of mountains is a continuous system extending from the Pyrenees through the Apennines, Carpathians, Caucasus, and ending in the Himalayas. Parts of Asia correspond with more familiar geographic features of Europe: the Malayan Peninsula with the Balkans; India with Italy; Tibet with Switzerland; and Japan with the British Isles.

Approximately half of one world lives in the eastern and southern fringes of Asia. In terms of the modern industrialized world, these people may be considered poverty-stricken and underdeveloped. But until comparatively recent times they extracted an adequate living for themselves and their families from the soil and from the sea. They evolved their own standards of value and gave the world its great religions. They produced mature civilizations and rich culture patterns. Their diverse ways of life were rooted in remote antiquity and managed to survive the impact of Western weapons, machinery, and democratic ideas.

China and Adjacent Areas

China is the heart of the Far East. The ancient Chinese Empire was larger than the United States and Europe combined. It was completely self-contained and isolated by high mountains and inhospitable seas. For

many centuries China was a world apart. The sea led nowhere, and the land only threatened invasion. Its territories once comprised Korea, Manchuria, Mongolia, Turkistan, Tibet, Burma, and Indo-China. Tribute-bearing missions came to Peking from such distant lands as Nepal, Siam, and Ceylon.

Manchuria, or the three traditional northeastern provinces of Heilungkiang, Kirin and Liaoning, is twice as big as Germany. It is Chinese in culture and speech, but it has a strong sense of regional autonomy. It has been the historical stake of diplomacy between China, Japan, and Russia because of its strategic borders with Siberia, Korea, and China. It has the large and prosperous cities of Harbin, Mukden, Dairen, and Changchun (Hsinking).

It is generously served by railroads and highways. It is rich in coal and iron, gold and forest reserves, wheat, millet, and soya beans. With adequate capital and technical skills it could support twice its population and form the industrial heart of a new Asian economy.

Mongolia is divided by the Gobi Desert into Outer Mongolia and Inner Mongolia. Outer Mongolia, with forests and grazing lands, inclines politically and geographically to the Soviet Union. Organized politically as the Mongolian People's Republic, both Communist China and the Soviet Union have affirmed their guarantee of its independent status. Its major cities are Ulan Bator (Urga) and Uliassutai. Inner Mongolia, including the provinces of Jehol, Chahar, Suiyuan, and Ninghsia, is a rocky, barren tableland producing primarily iron and sheep, and is a more integral part of China. The Mongols are independent, hard-riding, fierce-fighting nomads, culturally united but politically divided. Under Genghis Khan their sway extended from Korea to the Danube. The Mongol resentment of the Chinese is the typical resentment which the grazer has against the farmer and the merchant and which outdoor people feel against the encroachment of the magistrate and the tax collector.

Sinkiang, or the New Dominion, south and west of Mongolia, is twice the size of Texas and is like Utah and Nevada in appearance. Farmers and merchants cluster near the desert oases and shepherds wander the lower reaches of the mountain ranges. Most of the inhabitants are Turkish in speech and Mohammedan in religion. Less than 10 per cent of the population is Chinese. The Chinese emigrated to Sinkiang under protest. The climate was considered atrocious, the food worse, and the way of life completely barbarian. Chinese officials were offered special incentives by way of extra pay or short terms of office. The Chinese government preserved the nominal authority, but tended to be acquiescent while Russia and Great Britain struggled for primacy of influence in this Chinese border territory. Sinkiang is primarily wasteland, thwarting pioneers from within and

invaders from without. Nevertheless it produces textiles, rugs, sheep, horses, and the finest fruits and vegetables in China. Its ancient caravan routes were once the silk highway to Europe; now they are the avenues between Soviet Asia and Greater China.

Tibet has 1,000,000 square miles of plateau comparable in height to Mt. McKinley. The plateaus are topped by the most formidable mountains in the world. Tibet is a cold, mysterious Lamaland, more of a barrier than a bridge between China and India. The borderlands between China on the one hand and Burma and Indo-China on the other are equally impassable. Naked height or tangled jungles isolate native tribes from any intruders. Here is a region which for countless centuries has had its own form of government, its own religion and social customs, which lives in the same spiritual and material environment that existed in Marco Polo's day.

China proper—exclusive of these mountainous and pastoral borderlands—is about half the size of the United States. Its landscapes are diversified and its temperate climate is controlled by the seasonal winds. During the summer monsoon, the winds are hot and moist and bring abundant rainfall from the south. During the winter monsoon, the winds are dry and biting cold, bringing the dust storms from the Siberian plains and the Gobi Desert.

Politically, China is disunited and boasts the traditions of a hundred kingdoms. Culturally, it is an intricate symphony wherein subtle harmonies from the frigid North blend perfectly with the tones and rhythms of the semitropical South. Any part of China might well be anywhere else in China, although at least four regions—North China, the Yangtze Valley, the coastal provinces, and West China—possess distinct geographic characteristics.

North China—Hopei, Honan, Shantung, Shansi, Shensi, and Kansu—is the political center of China. A few Chinese words contain clues to the location of Chinese provinces. *Hu* is a word for river, and *shan* for mountain. *Pei*, *nan*, *tung*, and *si* (or *hsi*) are “north,” “south,” “east,” and “west” respectively. *Hopei* is “river—north” or the province north of the Yellow River. *Shantung* is “mountain—east,” or the province east of the mountains bordering on the Yellow Sea. *Shensi* is the province west of the pass. Shensi and Kansu are isolated, connected by a narrow corridor with the rest of China, and they shade off into the grasslands and deserts of Central Asia. Much of the land is barren and plagued with famine but, if given water, could be as productive as some of the formerly arid lands in California. The loess soil in these provinces, as in neighboring Shansi and Honan, stands in great walls. It erodes easily so that ordinary highways cut deep canyons through the fields. Some inhabitants, like the Communists for-

merly at Yen-an, live in caves cut out of the sides of the loess walls and farm the fields on top of their dwellings.

Peking ("north-capital"), Tientsin ("heaven-ferry"), Tsingtao ("ever-green-island"), and Sian ("west-peace") are flourishing cities in North China, adequately served by a network of railways and highways. They are situated on plains which are watered by the sluggish but temperamental Yellow River. The Yellow River is literally yellow from the abundance of loess silt which it carries. The river, depending upon the rainfall, alternately runs shallow and overflows the dikes pouring death down on the surrounding countryside.

The fatalistic farmers of North China produce wheat, millet, beans, peanuts, yams, vegetables, and fruits. They make a little money on the side by raising cotton or tobacco. The industrial workers find employment in the coal or iron mines, they pull rickshas or run pedicabs in the off season, or they become craftsmen or clerks in the city stores.

Central China—Hupeh, Hunan, Anhwei, Kiangsi, and Kiangsu—is the thickly populated valley of the Yangtze, well watered by the river, its lakes and its tributaries. *Hu* means "lake" and *kiang* means "river" (the Yangtze in particular). Hankow, Kiukiang, Wuhu, Nanking, Chinkiang, and Shanghai mark the course of the Yangtze to the sea. These cities are markets for wheat, rice, tea, peanuts, eggs, yams, Sesamum, rapeseed, wood oil, and ramie. They are the *entrepôts* through which imported foodstuffs, luxuries, and delicacies dribble into interior homes.

South China—Chekiang, Fukien, Kwangtung, and Kwangsi—is the lush, green land of rice, tea, mulberry leaves, bamboo, and water buffaloes. Torrential rains and a long, steamy growing season coax three crops annually out of the fertile soil, but hills and marshes make marketing and transportation difficult. The seaports of Canton, Swatow, Amoy, Foochow, and Ningpo first sheltered ships from the Occidental world.

West China—Szechwan, Yünnan, and Kweichow—is high and wild. The Red Basin of Szechwan, with its natural capital at Chengtu, is the agricultural reservoir of West China. It feeds 70,000,000 people and yields a surplus of silk, China grass, salt, coal, iron, and tin. The mountains of Yünnan look down on the clouds, and canyons are deep. The mighty Yangtze, Mekong, and Salwin rivers flow within a lateral distance of 100 miles, yet they roar through parallel gorges 10,000 feet below intervening peaks. International travel to Yünnan is possible only over the Burma Road or the railway from Indo-China. Kweichow is among the poorer provinces in China where it is said: "Three things you will never see: three miles of level road without a hill; three consecutive days of sunshine; or a man with three dollars in his pockets."

China's greatest resource is its people. Teeming masses characterize the Chinese scene, whether along the crowded waterfronts of Shanghai or Canton, in the streets or alleys of smaller Chinese cities, or in the market places at the country crossroads. About 580,000,000 people (according to the census of 1953) live in China—nobody knows exactly how many. In spite of wars, famine, disease, droughts, and floods, they increase from four to five millions per year. They cluster 5,000 to the square mile in the river valleys and along the coastal plains, and they scatter less than two to the square mile in the mountains and in the deserts. The distribution of population for the whole of China ranges from the sparseness of Nevada to a congestion which dwarfs the extravagant claims of Japan.

The Chinese are energetic. They can work steadily for long hours, but it is useless to try to speed them up. They are good-humored and they have a genius for friendship. In their incredible poverty they have become acclimatized to simple thinking and hard living. They are shrewd, self-respecting, equalitarian in their attitudes, and they preserve a deep-rooted sense of personal dignity. Their traditional honesty is often strained in the moment of crisis or in the face of rare opportunity.

Provincialism is strong in China, often constituting the only loyalty beyond that of the family. Given regions have also endowed the inhabitants with common characteristics. Northerners have been described as "hale, hearty and humorous, onion-eating and fun-loving, the raw material for which the characters in Chinese novels of war and adventure are drawn." Down the southeast coast, according to Lin Yu-tang, one meets a different type, "inured to ease and culture and sophistication, mentally developed but physically retrograde, loving poetry and comforts, shrewd in business and cowardly in war." In Kwangtung, people are enterprising, carefree, spendthrift, adventurous, pugnacious, quick-tempered, and progressive. Southerners are agile and volatile, most intimately acquainted with foreign business methods and alien ideologies, and most susceptible to change, reform, and revolution. In Central China, the native peoples are most noteworthy for their conservatism, soldiery, ways that are dark, and dogged persistence.

Geographic features contributed to China's cultural dominance in the Far East. The seclusion and security which China enjoyed made intercourse difficult with the outside world. The Great Wall in the north was intended to complete the barriers endowed by Nature. Those who came to China were usually culturally inferior and were absorbed into the Chinese culture pattern. China was a "sea which makes all rivers flowing into it salty."

Comparative ease of inland communications contributed to China's cul-

tural unity. From Peking to Canton is 2,200 miles, and China is as broad as it is long. Water transportation by river or canal was possible throughout the length and breadth of the empire. The Yellow River linked the provinces of the north and the Hwai River provided an avenue from Honan through Anhwei and Kiangsu. The Grand Canal carried junks traveling north and south. In addition to the Yangtze system in Central China, the Hsi Kiang (West River) formed a West-East highway from Yünnan through Kweichow, Kwangsi, and Kwangtung. The Canton Delta area became one of the most thickly populated areas in China.

This intricate water transportation system was supplemented by highways and, at a later date, railways. The mandarin roads led to Peking, as spokes to the hub of a wheel, the better to transport taxes and tribute to the capital city. Although mountain barriers on the rim of China tended to separate China from the outside world, neither the mountains nor the plateaus within China were high enough to prevent China's cultural unity. China, when approached by the first emissaries from the West, presented the inspiring spectacle of one fifth of the human race speaking the same language, living its own life, and held together not by political tyranny but by a community of ideas, customs, and traditions.

Formosa, the island which "shall be restored to China in due course," has an extreme length of 243 miles and a breadth ranging from 60 to 80 miles and is approximately equal to Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut combined. It has been described as an unsinkable aircraft carrier lying between Japan and the Philippines less than 100 miles off the coast of China. It is about 350 miles west and south of Okinawa, 1,000 miles west of Iwo Jima, 1,500 miles northwest of Guam, and 225 miles north of Luzon.

From a military point of view, Formosa is well protected by the configuration of its coastline and the topography of its land area. The eastern coast of Formosa has comparatively good harbors, but its steep cliffs and high mountains make for difficult access to the interior. The west coast is a succession of sand dunes and swamplands. The Formosa channel is shallow and dangerous for navigation. Seagoing vessels cannot even enter into sight of Formosan land except at a few selected places. Formosa has only three well-developed natural harbors: Keelung (Kiryū) in the north; Suao (Suo) in the northeast; and Kaohsiung (Takao) in the southwest. The Tamsui River is navigable for small junks as far as the capital, Taipeh (Taihoku), twelve miles inland.

Almost two thirds of Formosa is mountainous. Because of the rugged nature of the eastern slopes, most of the cultivated land area lies along the western coastal plain, stretching toward the straits. The climate is

tropical or semitropical, controlled by the monsoons and the Japan Current. Agricultural production consists of rice, sugar, vegetables, fruits, and tea. Forests of pine, oak, camphor wood, and bamboo abound. Mineral resources are lacking, but the surrounding seas teem with edible fish.

The population of Formosa in 1940 was slightly in excess of 6,000,000 of whom 5,500,000 were domiciled Chinese, 350,000 Japanese, and 150,000 aborigines. In 1945 nearly all the Japanese were repatriated, but by 1950 more than 1,500,000 Chinese refugees came to Formosa with the establishment of the Chinese government. From the standpoint of size, population, and resources, Formosa is tiny when compared to the giant mainland of China.

Japan

Japan consists of nearly four thousand islands, about fifty of them marked on ordinary maps and nearly a dozen with names which should be remembered. The land area of Japan is equal to the size of Montana, less than Texas or California, and about three times as big as Pennsylvania, New York, or Virginia. Japan would fit into the continental United States twenty times over. The four largest islands of Japan are Hondo or Honshu (main island) about the size of Kansas, Hokkaido (north sea island), Shikoku (four provinces), and Kyushu (nine provinces).

Japan is particularly noted for its picturesque scenery and its kindly climate. Whether in the fishing villages along the coast, in the rice-terraced slopes of northern Honshu, in the snow-covered heights of the Japanese Alps, in the hot springs or blue lakes of the mountain resorts, among the tiny islets of the Inland Sea, or at the classic Shinto or Buddha shrines, Japan is a paradise for a color picture enthusiast. The climate varies from humid subtropical to the humid continental, with Tokyo roughly comparable to New York or Philadelphia. The summer monsoon brings heavy rains with occasional floods and typhoons. The winter monsoon is offset by the warm *Kuroshio* (Black Current or Japan Current) which flows northward along the west coast of Japan and modifies the seasonal rains. This does for Japan what the Gulf Stream does for England.

As a result of World War II, Japan lost title to the Kuriles (Chishima or Thousand Islands), Southern Sakhalin (Karafuto), the Ryukyu (Liu-ch'iu) Archipelago where Okinawa and Sakishima are located, Formosa (Taiwan), the Pescadores (Hokoto), the Bonins (Ogasawara, restored to Japan in 1953), and the mandated Caroline, Marshall, and Mariana Islands, in the South Seas, known to the Japanese as Nanyo. Japan also

lost Korea (Chosen) and its special status in China, including Manchuria (Manchukuo), the Kwantung leased area with Dairen and the naval base at Port Arthur, its special concessions in the treaty ports and open ports, and its special economic privileges throughout the whole of China. At its height, Japan controlled an area of 750,000 square miles and a population of 130,000,000; at the end of World War II Japan's area was approximately 150,000 square miles and its population about 80,000,000.

The Japanese Islands are long and narrow. They would reach from the mouth of the St. Lawrence to Cuba, or from Vancouver to the southern tip of Lower California. They screen the Asian mainland from Vladivostok to Shanghai. They are not less than 50 nor more than 200 miles wide at any place, but they cover an east-west distance equal to Chicago to San Francisco. They are bisected by a ribbon of high mountains (Mount Fuji is 14,000 feet high) which include active volcanoes that terrorize Japan with frequent earthquakes. The rivers are short and turbulent. They are excellent for irrigation and water power, but practically useless for transportation.

About 25 per cent of Japan's total acreage is absolute wasteland. Sixty per cent is covered by forests which provide fuel, building materials, food, fruit, and fibres. These forests are not adequate to supply Japan's needs and are necessary for the prevention of soil erosion. Without possibility for significant expansion, 15 per cent of Japan's land is called upon to provide the agricultural livelihood for all of Japan's people. The limited amount of arable land has determined the fragmentary nature of Japanese land holdings and the intensive procedures of Japanese farming. Each arable acre provides for about 3,000 people (the comparable figure in the United States is 229). The average farm is only 2.7 acres. Less than 1 per cent of the population owns ten acres or more. It is seldom that all of the family's holdings are in a single or continuous plot. The usual pattern is the holding of small strips in different fields. Fifty per cent of all gainfully employed people in Japan are still in agriculture, but the percentage is declining. Fifty per cent of all Japan's agricultural production is devoted to rice or other cereals.

With all the human labor which it is possible to invest, with all the multiple cropping which Japanese genius can devise, and with the maximum application of natural or chemical fertilizer, it is doubtful if Japan can meet more than 80 per cent of its own food requirements. The best agricultural regions are the Kwanto plain near Tokyo and the Mino-Owari or Nobi plain at the head of Ise Bay. Every available plot of ground seems to be called upon for its contribution to meet Japan's food requirements. Parks and gardens are kept to a minimum. Squash vines crawl over the

humblest homes, and mulberry bushes and castor-bean plants line the narrowest path in the countryside. Vegetable gardens are more necessary than parking lots at the country railway stations.

The sea is a major determinant of Japan's economic and diplomatic history. Native waters abound in fish, and Japanese fishermen are among the best in the world. Fish supply the essential proteins in the national diet, and fishing provides the livelihood of 2,000,000 Japanese families. Fishing boats manned by Japanese crews formerly plied the seas from Borneo to Alaska. Japanese shipbuilders and sailors provided the nation with an excellent navy and a merchant marine which operated on every trade lane in both hemispheres before World War II.

Japan has 17,000 miles of coastline or one mile to every eight square miles of territory. (The United States has 12,877 miles by comparison.) Japan has 10,000 miles on the Pacific side, where the bays and harbors are excellent and the wind and currents are gentle. Here are located Tokyo, Yokohama, Nagoya, Kobe, Osaka, and Kyoto. The China side is lashed by the cold currents from the Sea of Okhotsk and the bitter winds from the Asian mainland. Only Kanazawa and Nagasaki have risen to prominence on the western coast. Japan always thinks of itself as having its back on China and its face toward the United States. The sea has bestowed upon the Japanese people a deep sense of oneness and has afforded a measure of security. On the other hand, the sea is a highway as well as a moat. Japan feels that it is particularly exposed to attacks from the sea. The Japanese islands are also uncomfortably close to the continental shoreline and within easy reach by air attacks or military expedition from Siberia, Korea, or North China. The 100 miles which separate Japan from Korea have caused Japan to regard Korea as a dagger pointing at the heart of Japan.

In Japan's view, geographic facts were at the heart of Japan's diplomatic and military policies before World War II. Japan looked upon the "inner bloc" of Japan, Korea, Manchukuo, and North China as the heart of its anti-Communist empire. Japan would supply the technical and management skills; Korea, the water power; China, the labor; and Manchukuo, the resources for a modern, industrialized, self-reliant economic entity. Together these four areas would approach self-sufficiency in food. Japan would cultivate cereals and potatoes; Korea, rice and beans; Manchukuo, soya beans and millet. The inner bloc would have been potentially self-sufficient in coal, iron, cotton, timber, synthetic petroleum, and vegetable oils.

Japan envisaged the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" as a further source for petroleum, coal, iron, tin, rubber, bauxite, and steel

alloys. Japan felt then, as it feels now, that industry and commerce must provide employment for those Japanese who cannot live off the land. Japan has not been content with its ancient industries of lacquer, ceramics, enamel, bronze, sword blades, and silk, in spite of its comparative poverty and lack of raw materials at home. Japan has only coal and copper in great quantities; it lacks practically every other requirement of modern industries. The entire annual output of petroleum in Japan is matched in the United States every six hours. Japan's known reserves of iron would not last in the United States three months. Japan must import most of its petroleum, iron, bauxite, zinc, tin, and lead and must also look abroad for cotton wool and wood pulp for its light industries. With all these handicaps Japan has built and hopes to expand factories turning out steel products, textiles, ships, paper, sugar, machine tools, automobiles, tanks, airplanes, and a million and one gadgets, associated the world over with the "Made in Japan" label.

Northeast Asia

Russian territory lies across from Japan on the Asian mainland. Siberia—named after the Sibirs, one of the native tribes near Mongolia—has outgrown its original stigma as the unwelcome stepchild of European Russia and has gained recognition as a political stronghold and economic storehouse of the Soviet Union. It is half again as large as the United States, reaching from the Arctic Ocean on the north to Central Asia on the south, and from the Ural Mountains on the west to the Pacific Ocean on the east. The territories of the USSR fringe all the northern frontiers and half of the western frontiers of China. In this tremendous territory the Soviet Union is seeking to establish complete agricultural, industrial, commercial, and military autonomy.

In spite of inhospitable climate and rugged terrain, Siberia promises unlimited development. It constitutes an overwhelming challenge to prospectors, scouts, geologists, engineers, and scientists who are engaged in uncovering its natural potentialities. Its fields of wheat, rye, barley, buckwheat, soya beans, and sunflowers are already yielding quantities permitting an exportable surplus. Its farmlands provide a haven for ex-soldiers and young pioneers who are lured eastward by the promise of generous loans, tax exemptions, and personal security in the shelter of the collective farms and state markets. The workers are allowed private property in fruit trees, vegetable gardens, and domestic animals. The timberlands of East Siberia are permanent rivals for Washington, Cali-

fornia, and Oregon in the markets of the Orient. The forests of Siberia shelter some of the world's richest fur-bearing animals: sable, ermine, mink, otter, and fox. Their furs formerly adorned the nobles of St. Petersburg, but now they drape the most expensive shoulders in the world through the great auctions of Leningrad, Leipzig, St. Louis, and New York. The seals and fishes off the Siberian coast furnish the livelihood for thousands of Russians who have displaced the Japanese.

The Soviet officials have scarcely scratched the surface of Siberia's mineral wealth. They are tapping oil reserves of Sakhalin and Central Asia to supply local demands. They have discovered coal reserves estimated at one fifth the entire reserves of the world and have found neighboring deposits of iron. They have unearthed tungsten, chromium, uranium, manganese, vanadium, magnesite, cobalt, and bismuth. They have already placed in production bauxite, copper, lead, zinc, and tin. They have at their doorstep large deposits of gold, silver, and platinum with which to pay the expenses of putting the mines into operation. Military secrecy hides reliable information about the industrial development of Siberia, but rumors have placed atomic energy plants in Siberia.

The Russians double-tracked and renovated the Trans-Siberian Railway. This involved the construction of new bridges, tunnels, stations, car-repair shops, and storage facilities for fuel and water. They linked the railways of Siberia and Turkistan. As an added economic asset and as another military guarantee, the Russians built the BAM—the Baikal-Amur-Magistral trunk line—200 miles to the north of the old Trans-Siberian. In East Siberia they joined Komsomolsk and Khabarovsk. To augment the railways they set to work on east-west highways between Moscow and Vladivostok. They serviced the leading cities—Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Blagoveschensk, Komsomolsk, Mogadan, Yakutsk, Chita, and Irkutsk—by telephone and telegraph lines, and they set up powerful broadcasting stations to feed the remotest corners of Siberia with news and propaganda. They established transcontinental airlines and carried air mail up and down the river valleys even beyond the Arctic Circle.

As the British geographer, Sir Halford MacKinder, pointed out:

Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; who commands the Heartland commands the World Island (Eurasia); who rules the World Island commands the World.

This underscored the military value of Siberia, which was made abundantly clear by World War II. The 18,000,000 people in Siberia fortified their frontiers and took steps to erase vulnerable spots in the hinterland.

When Japan built railways like the fingers of an outstretched hand through Korea and Manchukuo to the Siberian border, the Russians countered with fortifications and military encampments. Highways which had been a continuous panorama of detours and dead ends were completed quickly for the movement of trucks and tanks. Pillboxes, gun emplacements, naval and air bases, checked the offensive of Japan and constituted the jumping-off places for the quick Russian advances into Manchuria and Korea. Air bases were built near Vladivostok which were less than one hour's flying time to any part of Japan. Supplies were delivered to Siberia from the west coast of the United States, and airplanes were ferried continuously from the United States and Canada through Alaska to Siberia. Siberia dominates North Korea and Mongolia. It menaces Japan and, although it is the great avenue for supplies to China, it challenges the Chinese position in Manchuria and Sinkiang.

Korea shares a sixty-mile border with Siberia. The Yalu River, Whitehead Mountain, and the Tumen River separate Korea from Manchuria and the Maritime Provinces of the USSR. The Korean Peninsula is 600 miles long and 135 miles wide at its wasp waist. It is larger than Minnesota, about the same size as Great Britain, and half as large as Japan. It is the historic bridge between Japan and the continent of Asia. About two thirds of its 30,000,000 people live south of the Thirty-eighth Parallel, although South Korea is one-third smaller in area than North Korea. The Korean climate is like the eastern seaboard of the United States between Maine and South Carolina. The summers are hot and humid; the winters are bitter cold, without benefit of the moderating effects of any ocean current.

Three fourths of the country is mountainous. No GI will ever forget:

There is a bleak, unadulterated misery about this land and its people, that wears at one's fiber and chills the bloodstream. . . . Beyond the mountain there is only another mountain. Off the flank of the next ridge there is only the next ridge . . . but the greater part of Korea is upended in a complex of ridges, hogbacks, sugar-loaf peaks, and barren domes too low to be called mountains and too formidable to be classified as hills. . . . God got tired when he was making the world, hence Korea.¹

Near the east coast the mountains are steep and the peaks are near the shoreline. On the west coast the plains slope more gently toward good harbors on the China Sea. The agricultural wealth of Korea is primarily in the south. Most of the industrial potential is in the north. The arable land is no more than one quarter of Korea's total surface.

¹ Colonel S. L. A. Marshall, "Our Army in Korea—The Best Yet," *Harpers*, August, 1951.

*Mountains with their forests and minerals (UPL) in
cent of the population derives its livelihood from rice; three out of
farm workers are tenants.*

The people of Korea speak a common language and have a long cultural tradition of their own. They have their own national dress and their own customs. They were under the political and cultural domination of China until 1895. Then they became pawns in the power struggle between Russia and Japan. After 1905 they were subject to Japan, but they kept alive their intense nationalism. Because of their internal dissensions and their fiery individualism they are often referred to as the Irish of the Far East. Their cities, once comparatively unknown, became integral parts of world history after 1950. Seoul (also called Keijo and Kyongsong) and Pyongyang (Heijo) were rival capitals of South and North; Chongjin, Sengjin, Hamhung, and Wonsan symbolized victory and defeat in the northeast; Inchon, Kaesong, Chinnampo, and Sinuiju traced the path of the railway to the Yalu; and Suwon, Taejon, and Taegu were landmarks on Heartbreak Highway to Pusan.

Southeast Asia, the Philippines, and Indonesia

The southeast corner of the mainland of Asia contains four political subdivisions: Thailand, Indo-China, Burma, and Malaya. It sprawls over 1,000,000 square miles and houses half as many people as the entire United States. It is marked by high north-south mountain ranges which are massive and unexplored. Their forests shelter tigers, elephants, monkeys, pythons, cobras, leeches, and mosquitoes. They permit none but the slightest travel parallel with their own general direction and they preclude every ordinary effort to cross the jungle from range to range. The mountain chains separate the systems of the Red, Mekong, Menam, Salwin, Sittang, and Irrawaddy rivers. These rivers are raging torrents in the headlands. In mid-course they rush pell-mell through rapids in impassable descents. They flatten out as they approach the sea, and they soak vast delta lands where millions of people cultivate rice.

In tropical rice countries, the weather is hot and humid. It is hottest from February through May; wettest from June through September; and euphemistically called freshest or coolest from October through January. Actually, very few degrees divide hot and cool, or night and day. A headline is likely to boast, "Mercury tumbles from 92° to 89°" or "Yesterday cooler at 88°." Necessarily the tempo of life is slow and cautious, and inhabitants are constant victims of tropical fevers.

Siamese, Burmese, Cambodians, Annamese, and Malays have intermixed

profusely, between themselves and with Indians, Arabs, Mongolians, and Indonesians. Each brown group revels in its own tradition and spurns every political proposal to submerge its individual identity in a Pan-Malayan League. Native peoples are poor and patient. They slip easily from one extreme to another of shallow emotion. They have learned the superiority of chicanery over fighting. They would much sooner earn their food by pulling strings than by physical exertion. They are deeply religious and they spend days and days throughout the year in fiestas. Buddhism has given them their beliefs, superstitions, dances, drama, architecture, and a good part of their scholarship. Mohammedanism has taken hold wherever Arab traders have anchored their ships. Almost every little town along the coast of the Malay Peninsula boasts a mosque and a few faithful who have made the pilgrimage to Mecca. Catholicism has flourished since the advent of the Portuguese and the Spanish, and Protestantism since the coming of the Dutch and the English.

With no aid at all from their government, the Chinese have moved into fields of economic opportunity in the South Seas. The Chinese number 1,000,000 in Thailand, 1,250,000 in the Netherlands East Indies, 2,500,000 in British Malaya and Singapore, 350,000 in French Indo-China, 200,000 in the Philippines, and 150,000 in Burma. They dominate, or at least occupy influential places in, those areas in wholesale and retail trade, money-lending, agriculture, mining, labor, and the professions. This comparative energy on the part of the Chinese has alarmed the native populations and the colonial governments. Rich overseas Chinese pay the taxes and the bills for the jingoistic secret societies and, regardless of political conviction, derive an intense satisfaction from the prestige of the Chinese nation.

More than 1,000,000 mountain people—the Shans of China, Thailand, and Burma, or the Mois of Indo-China, for example—are primitive and isolated. They associate little with one another unless it is to engage in one of their constant wars. They challenge any government or body of men to penetrate their mountain fastness and to force upon them strange and new methods of living. Their languages and dialects are distinct. They preserve their animistic religions: witchcraft, medicine men, and tattooed bodies to keep the devils away. Their habits and customs are exactly as they were a thousand years ago. Curiously enough, women are at a premium. Women rule the household and even take the initiative in proposing marriage. A girl offers her intended a quid of betel nuts and a couple of cakes. If he tastes the precious gifts that is his way of saying, "I do."

The resources of Southeast Asia are so distributed that no one starves but very few enjoy more than mere subsistence. Burma, Thailand, and Indo-China are among the great rice exporters of the world, but the Malay

Peninsula does not produce enough to sustain itself. Little rice is carried over anywhere from year to year as a reserve, so there is much suffering when a growing season is marred by famine, drought, war, or the pest of army worms. Rice, flavored with fish sauce, is the staff of life, but diets are augmented by corn, wheat, millet, tapioca, barley, sweet potatoes, eggs and chickens. Fruits and vegetables are exuberant and varied: bananas, oranges, mangoes, pineapples, papayas, foul-smelling but sex-stimulating durians, mangosteens, and coconuts. For a bit of luxury, farmers grow tobacco, leechee nuts, betel nuts, and hashish. Religious tabus, hot weather, and lack of grazing land reduce the local consumption of meat. Capital crops are sugar, tea, coffee, camphor, pepper, cinnamon, cloves, nutmeg, and allspice. Clothes, scanty as they are, are woven from home-grown textiles and dyed in striking colors by means of local indigo, aniline, wood, or vegetable dyes. Shelter is a simple matter where nipa palms, coconut trees, and bamboo groves abound. For centuries native peoples have taken from the earth gold, silver, tin, iron, coal, copper, and semiprecious stones for their own skilled craftsmen to turn into beautiful ornaments.

Thailand, or Siam, with 18,000,000 inhabitants was sandwiched between the British in Burma and the French in Indo-China. It has lost some of its people to both neighbors and has preserved its independence more because of the conflicting jealousies of France and Great Britain than because of the sagacity of its own leaders. The Thai race includes the Siamese, the allied Shans of China and Burma, and the Laos of Indo-China.

Thailand is as big as New England and the Middle Atlantic States combined. It disputes with Indo-China the border provinces of Siemreap (Angkor Wat), Sisophon, and Battambang, and retains an irredentist longing for its former provinces of Kedah, Kelantan, Trengganu, and Perlis. It has strong ties with Laos and Cambodia, which it would like to join in a Buddhist federation. Thailand is strategically important because its southern extension at Kra offers the right of way for a canal. Thailand also controls the highway and railway approaches to Singapore, Saigon, and Rangoon.

The Menam River is the Nile of Thailand. It catches the torrential rains of the southern monsoon and it spills over the surplus water into the irrigation ditches which distribute the life-giving floods to the bordering rice lands. The Menam brings the products of forests and mines from Chiangmai to the sea. Thailand is particularly rich in teak, oak, ebony, and dye woods. Furthermore, any trans-Pacific clipper arriving at San Francisco is likely to have in its mail-sacks rubies, sapphires, zircons, or topazes which had originally been dug out of the good earth of Thailand.

Indo-China, almost the same size as Thailand, is a third larger than France and has been thought of by the French as their balcony on the

Pacific. The nation did not come into being as a product of natural evolution but was an administrative creation of the French. Its subdivisions were Annam, Tongking, Cochin China, Cambodia, and Laos. The first three of these were brought together to form the state of Viet-Nam after World War II. Viet-Nam has often been represented as "a carrying-pole with two bags of rice" or a forbidding mountain chain between the deltas of the Red and Mekong rivers. Viet-Nam, Cambodia, and Laos were designated as Associated States of France in the French Union. Cambodia and Laos lie on the western side of the mountains close to Thailand and are dominated by the spiritual influence of Buddhism. They have their own separate kings and are as hesitant to establish close relations with Viet-Nam as with France. The Thai minority groups of Indo-China might be worked upon to form a political union with their relatives across the border.

The Annamese who live in the east-central part of Indo-China are courageous, high-spirited, and intelligent. They are patient, capable of great endurance, uncomplaining, small of stature, and agile as cats. They are cursed with an incurable strain of idleness and indifference. They are the main support of the Viet-Minh, the so-called revolutionary group originally headed by Ho Chi Minh. Those with a smattering of political sophistication tend to regard all foreigners with suspicion and see no justification for their privileged presence in Indo-China. French conservatives think of the Annamese as the Indo-China malcontents, revolutionists, Communists, and *mauvaises têtes*.

Saigon is the most important city in Indo China. Together with the neighboring Chinese city of Cholon, it is the center of the rice trade. The naval base at Camranh and the central Viet-Nameese cities of Hué, Tourane, and Dalat are as important as Hanoi, Haiphong, and Langson in the north. Tongking's capital, Hanoi, is lively with the buzz of political gossip and the bustle of trade among the most industrious people in Indo-China. It contrasts with the primitive, easy-going mannerisms of the Laotian cities of Luang Prabang and Vientiane and the Cambodian capital at Pnom Penh. The cities of Indo-China flourish because of the trade in the rich resources of rice, rubber, tea, tin, and coal which made this colonial possession an economic asset to France.

Burma is a Buddhist country, with only two large cities—Rangoon and Mandalay. Its western coastland is tropical jungle, washed by the waters of the Bay of Bengal. On the north, its frontiers disappear into the mountains of India and Tibet. On the east and south it forms a continuous part of the mountain system of China, Indo-China, and Thailand. The Hump, the Burma Road, and the Stilwell Road are among the most poignant

memories of the veterans who served in the *CBI* (*China-Burma-India*) theater in World War II. The inhabitants of Burma belong to many races and speak many tongues. Burma is in the interesting position of being an underpopulated country (roughly sixty persons to the square mile) capable of unpredictable development, lying between two of the most densely populated countries in the world, India and China. The Burmans are the most advanced peoples that occupy the fertile lowlands. The other races, including Arakanese, Chins, Kachins, Shans, and Thais, are restricted to the hills. More than 1,000,000 Indians have emigrated to Burma. Burma is comparatively wealthy, producing exportable surpluses of rice, Sesamum, millet, peanuts, cotton, teak, petroleum, minerals, and semiprecious stones.

The Malay Peninsula is physically a part of the mainland of Asia, but in every cultural aspect it belongs to the island world of the Malay Archipelago. The long, skinny "gooseneck" of Southeast Asia extends beyond Lower Burma and Thailand and eventually to the island of Singapore. It is 1,000 miles long and from 45 to 200 miles wide. Because of its mountain backbone, its transportation facilities are limited to short, turbulent rivers, and to a railway system which goes from Singapore through Kuala Lumpur and Ipoh to Bangkok. Branch-lines connect with Malacca and with the Province Wellesley, opposite the island of Penang. The Japanese took advantage of the rail connection to Kota Bahru on the east coast to make that city their main landing point for the invasion of the Malay Peninsula.

The Malay Peninsula is universally noted and coveted for its tin and rubber. Five million people, about equally divided between Chinese and Malays, with strong minorities of Indians and Europeans, live in this transition-land between Buddhist, Mongoloid Southeast Asia, and the Mohammedan Malayan Archipelago off its shores. The Malays are the farmers and the fishermen; the Chinese are the tin miners and the city merchants; the Indians are the workers on docks and plantations; and the Europeans own and manage the large-scale estates, the shipping and financial interests associated with modern imperialism.

Indonesia, the "Land Below the Wind" (that is, below the typhoon belt), stretches along the equator across the convergence of the ocean routes from Europe to Asia and from Asia to Australia. It resembles a giant serpent, with its skeleton exposed, bent double by ponderous weights upon its back. The islands forming the serpent are called the Sunda Islands. The head of the serpent is Sumatra, the trunk is Java, and the vertebrae are Bali, Lombok, Sumbawa, Flores, Timor, and Wettar. New Guinea (Irian) is the tail. The ponderous weights are Borneo, Celebes, and the Moluccas or Spice Islands. Indonesia covers almost 750,000 square miles of land area and spreads over a distance comparable to the range from San Fran-

cisco to Bermuda. Sumatra compares in size with New England and the Middle Atlantic States combined. Borneo is as large as Texas, and Irian is the size of California.

Sumatra boasts the cities of Palembang, Padang, and Medan and is noted for petroleum, coal, and tobacco. Its fighting hill-tribes cost the Dutch a century of headaches and a mint of money for pacification. Its neighbor islands, Billiton and Bintan, are rich in tin and bauxite. Java, the densely populated heart of Indonesia, contains the cities of Djakarta, Jogjakarta, Semarang, Bandung, and Surabaya. Forty per cent of Javanese soil is arable and 60 per cent of its agricultural land is in rice. Still, Java has to import rice to feed its own millions. Borneo—with a remnant British colony in the north—is more famous for its forests, plantation crops, gold, coal, and petroleum than for its better-known head-hunters. The Celebes—with four peninsulas shaped to suggest a cat with its tail in the air—has the cities of Menado at the northeast, Kendari at the southeast, and Macassar at the southwest, all valuable for exports of copra and for general shipping. The Spice Islands including Gilolo (Almahera), Ternate, Sula, Buru, Ceram, Banda, and Amboina are known the world over for cloves, nutmegs, cinnamon, copra, and naval bases. The Lesser Sundas—from Bali to Timor—are splattered over every cruise advertisement because of their temples and exotic dancers. Irian is as yet unexplored but contains promises of significant economic development in spite of its climate and topography.

The population of Indonesia is about 70,000,000, made up primarily of Malays and Indonesians, generously mixed with each other and with later immigrant Caucasians or Mongoloids. The hodgepodge of races in Indonesia—and throughout the Malay Archipelago—worked against economic co-operation and political progress, and made European conquest and administration comparatively easy. Two thirds of the people live in Java and Madura, on only 7 per cent of the land surface of Indonesia, and resist government schemes which would move them to the Outer Districts where life is hard and labor is scarce. Most Indonesians are Mohammedans, and in ordinary times about 5,000 per year make the pilgrimage to Mecca. Fezzes are almost as common sights as sarongs.

Local inhabitants meet the demands of their simple level of living from their immediate environment. They raise their own staple foods: rice, sago, tapioca, corn, millet, cabbage, sweet potatoes, and peanuts. They vary the diet with fish—sometimes produced in ponds in their own backyards—chickens, eggs, fruits, and vegetables. The Mohammedans will not touch pork, the Indians consider beef as sacred and untouchable, the Buddhists are complete vegetarians, yet Indonesia is noted for its livestock. For ploughing or transportation, the native people use water buffaloes, bullocks,

or oxen. For their houses and furniture they resort to bamboo, rattan, coconut, and nipa palms. For their clothes they grow cotton. They dye the cloth with indigo, cochineal, or wood dyes. To gratify their personal desires, they manufacture ice, soap, and mineral waters; and they distill wine from rice or coconuts.

The wealth of the Indies does not amount to too much when it is divided by so many people. Furthermore, outsiders participated greatly in sharing that wealth. A million and a quarter Chinese call Indonesia their home. They constitute a rich *bourgeoisie*, ranging all the way from ordinary workers and farmers to planters, usurers, and merchant princes. The European population of Indonesia reached 240,000, of whom 220,000 were classified as Dutch. Anybody was counted Dutch who had any Dutch blood in his veins. Only one of the Dutch in three was a "hundred percent." These Dutch through the years developed the economy of the country and monopolized the best political positions.

The geography and the way of life in Indonesia have their counterparts in the Philippines. The Philippines cover an area of 1,000,000 square miles, 115,000 of which are land. This is equal to two thirds the size of Japan or the whole of Italy. If the northernmost point of the Philippines were placed on the northern border of Maine, the southern limit of the Philippines would reach the middle of Florida. The Philippines have a coastline double that of the United States. Exactly the opposite of Japan, the windy, treacherous side of the Philippines is that toward the Pacific. The good harbors are those which, like Manila, face the China Sea.

The Philippines consist of five main island groups: Luzon, the Visayan Islands, Mindanao, Palawan, and the Sulu Archipelago. On the map they resemble the head of a donkey: Luzon forms the ears and the forehead, the Visayan Islands the face, Mindanao the mouth, and Palawan and the Sulu Archipelago the upper and lower edges of the neck. Luzon contains one third of the land area of the Philippines and one half the people. With its large cities, Manila, Albay, Tarlac, and Baguio, it is foremost in political importance and commercial activity. It is lavishly blessed with natural resources, much more so than the Visayan Islands which depend primarily on sugar. Mindanao, with its rich soil and untapped resources, is often referred to as the land of the future.

The people of the Philippines are divided into the Christianized Malaysans or Filipinos, the Indonesian mountain tribes, the Moros, and the remnant Negritos. The atmosphere of Manila is like that of almost any American city, but the way of life in the provinces is similar to that of Indonesia. A local family usually has its own little plot of ground, perhaps a carabao, and if it is lucky can produce almost enough to live on from

harvest to harvest. If it is not lucky, it seeks relief, either by a job on a sugar plantation or from the kindly hand of the Red Cross or the parish priest. At the other end of the social scale are the rich Filipinos, the prosperous mestizos or persons of mixed parentage, the wealthy Chinese, Spanish, and Americans. In the Philippines—as in the whole of East Asia—a small aristocracy dominates the political and economic stratosphere; the masses are beginning to stir; and a potent, enlightened middle class is more of a challenge than a reality.

East Asia in Its World Setting

For centuries, East Asia was a world apart with only infrequent adventuresome contacts between East and West. Today East and West are neighbors, each representing half of one world. The avenues of intercourse are as important as the factors of location in understanding the geographic foundations of the Far East in world affairs.

The land approach to the Far East, whether from the Soviet Union, Central Asia, or India is long and hazardous. India and China exert little influence upon one another in spite of contiguous land frontiers. In the past the smaller nations of Southeast Asia had reason to be grateful for the formidable mountain barriers which served to block possible expansionist activities on the part of imperial China. The desert roads through Turkistan were passable highways for intrepid merchants, zealous missionaries, or the fighting hordes of Huns or Mongols, but they could not provide easy or extensive communication or commerce between Europe and Asia. Modern highways, railways, and air routes join China and the Soviet Union, but they do not eliminate the extraordinary difficulties of the land approaches to the Far East. As Russia looks to the Far East it looks across the vast stretches of Siberia and appreciates the need for the development of that area.

It sees tremendous strains on its inadequate transportation systems and it sees its power potential conditioned by its logistic demands. It looks to the south and to the east in order to see China, and it sees very few passes through which to move goods or men into Chinese territory. The routes are difficult, whether from Vladivostok into North Korea; from Siberian border points into North Manchuria; from Ulan Ude to Khiakhta and Urga; or from Central Siberia into Mongolia or Chinese Turkistan. Any spectacular development of any of these routes, or of the regions which they serve, would make a great difference in the control of Sir Halford MacKinder's Heartland or World Island.

The recent diplomatic history of the Far East discloses the unusual importance which has attached to the ocean approaches to the Far East. When land routes were interdicted, the Spanish and the Portuguese charted the sea lanes which the Dutch, the British, and the French exploited. First around the Capes and then by the shorter route through the Suez Canal, they sent their fleets to the Far East. Ships plied from port to port; ships opened the isolated nations; and ships carried the goods—and the ideas—which flowed between East and West. Cities which were separated by land—Calcutta and Rangoon, Singapore and Saigon, Canton and Shanghai—were joined by sea. Distances were measured in nautical miles and accessibility was judged in terms of the ocean highway. Ships of war followed ships of commerce, and those nations were accepted as great in the Far East which were able to implement their policies and pretensions with ships of the line, or their allies.

With the coming to maturity of Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the United States and Japan, the broad Pacific rivaled the historic route to India as an approach to the Far East. The "Far East" to Europe became the "Near North" to Australia and the "Farther West" to Seattle and San Francisco. China and Japan no longer seemed to be so far away. As was so desperately driven home in World War II, the Pacific could no longer be regarded as a symbol of isolation and protection. What happened in the Pacific was recognized as just as vital to the security and welfare of nations as the more familiar events of Europe and the Atlantic basin.

The development of airways to Asia revolutionized our concepts of time and distance. Travel and transportation were measured in terms of hours rather than statute miles. "From any point in the world to any other point in sixty hours" indicated the degree of shrinkage. Long, tedious, coastwise trips in the Far East became short, pleasurable, airplane hops—a single day from Toyko to Formosa to Manila, or from Hongkong to Bangkok to Djakarta. National governments and private companies hastened into the air transport business. The British speed-birds and the Pan-American clippers were challenged by Canadians, Australians, Scandinavians, Dutch, French, Thais, Filipinos, and Japanese. World War II and the war in Korea emphasized further the value of air transport for military operations, but it also showed clearly some of the things which airplanes cannot do. To operate one airplane across the ocean, or even one commercial company in transoceanic flying, is vastly different from conducting an air war 8,000 miles away.

The air age has necessitated new maps of the Far East and new maps of the polar regions. Only the new maps show why the closest route from New York to Chungking is over the North Pole, why the shortest route

from San Francisco to Tokyo is north by way of Seattle and the Aleutians, and why Alaska on the ferry route from Canada to Siberia is so important for national defense. Cities, ports, and strategic areas which were of unquestioned value from the standpoint of naval war or the sea approach to the Far East appear in a new light when re-examined from the standpoint of the approach to the Far East by air. The value of the Far East in the war or peace relations between the powers of the Western world or, conversely, the relative value of the Western powers in possible wars in the Far East will have to be estimated from the viewpoint of the air as well as the land and sea.

Suggested Reading

- DANIEL R. BERGSMARK, *Economic Geography of Asia* (New York, 1935).
GEORGE B. CRESSEY, *Asia's Lands and Peoples*, 2nd ed. (New York, 1951).
———, *China's Geographic Foundations* (New York, 1934).
OWEN LATTIMORE, *Inner Asian Frontiers of China* (New York, 1940).
———, *Pivot of Asia* (Boston, 1950).
R. H. TAWNEY, *Land and Labor in China* (New York, 1932).
HANS W. WEIGERT AND VILHJALMUR STEFANSSON eds., *Compass of the World, A Symposium on Political Geography* (New York, 1944).
GERALD F. WINFIELD, *China, the Land and the People* (New York, 1948).

CHAPTER 2

China and the Chinese

When China made its entrance upon the stage of modern international relations, it meant more in the Far East than Greece and Rome together symbolized in the Western world. It represented an ancient civilization with a glorious past long before it became a modern nation-state enmeshed in the grip of revolution. It numbered far more people than any other political or cultural group, and it established an empire which comprised a larger territory and which persisted without fundamental change for a longer period of time than any other empire the world has ever known. Whether from the north, the middle part of China, or the south, the Chinese had a common way of life, a rich historical heritage, and a singular cultural vitality. They developed a complex social organization and a maze of economic institutions which enabled them in their own opinion to cope successfully in their relentless struggle with the forces of nature. Their theories of politics and government came from the fertile brains of their own sages and gave them a system of government which they accepted as the perfect expression of their own genius and the optimum satisfaction of their own needs.

The Chinese possessed a fanatical conviction that in all these respects they were superior to the Western barbarians who came to their shores. This conviction—this devotion to the incomparability of their history and culture—gave rise to many of the misunderstandings and conflicts which marked the entire sweep of contacts between the East and the West.

Chinese Historical Backgrounds

The compilation of history was always important to the Chinese, whose historical literature extended over 3,000 years. History writing was not

left to the whims of a few historically minded individuals but was the prime responsibility of the ruling monarchs. The first duty of a new dynasty was to compile the history of the preceding dynasty, in the hope that the record of the past would serve as a guide to the future. Histories were not bald narrations of political events, but they were essays on economics, law, irrigation, astronomy, bibliography, geography, and biographies.

Recent archeological discoveries show that Chinese culture began to develop on the dusty plains of North China. Coping with the treachery of the Yellow River gave the Chinese the strength and sagacity to conquer the warlike tribes of the north and to spread rather easily over the territories of the weaker peoples who inhabited the Yangtze Valley and southwards. China expanded less by military prowess than by migration of people and their culture. Scholars, statesmen, and aristocratic adventurers from older China became the tutors of the barbarous chieftains of the frontiers. *Divided politically but vigorous intellectually, China was never parcelized like Europe and was never erased or eclipsed by its barbarian invaders.*

The story of China usually begins with a mythical Hsia Dynasty, somewhere around 2000 B.C., but its authenticated foundations go only as far back as the Shang Dynasty, usually dated 1766 to 1122 B.C. By that time the Chinese had acquired written characters, a vigorous and by no means crude art, and a political organization of some complexity. They worshiped their ancestors, depended upon agriculture for their existence, and used bronze for utensils and weapons. China was stereotyped before the time of Christ. The age of the Chou rulers was a classical age, 1122–256 B.C. It was an age of warring feudal lords which gave rise to the professions of soldiery and statesmanship. It was the golden age of Chinese philosophy, which produced China's social and ethical ideals, institutions, and customs. The great philosophers, Confucius, Lao Tzu, and Mencius, were the approximate contemporaries of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle.

The name China itself comes from the Ch'in Dynasty, 221–207 B.C. The Ch'in emperor, the first unifier of the entire Chinese state between the Great Wall and the Yangtze, destroyed the ancient feudal system and substituted a centralized bureaucratic administration. He ruled China with an iron hand and taxed the people ruthlessly. He caused the burning of the books which he hoped would blot out the memory of the past and enable him to mold the future according to his own totalitarian ideas.

The excesses of the Ch'in Dynasty led to its own downfall. After the Ch'ins came the Han rulers, 202 B.C.–220 A.D. The Chinese often call themselves the sons of Han. The new dynasty rejected the philosophy and practice of tyranny and adopted Confucianism as the cult of the state. These

political ideas dominated China for nearly 2,000 years. The Han leaders extended the empire to South Manchuria, Outer Mongolia, Turkistan, and Indo-China. A hundred and fifty years before Christ, a Chinese traveler, Chang Ch'ien, reached the cultural fringes of the Mediterranean world. Chinese silk, hides and skins, furs, rhubarb, and cinnamon moved across the routes of Central Asia in exchange for glass, jade, precious stones, ivory, tortoise shell, wool, and linen.

China's first "New Deal" was attempted by a usurper-emperor, Wang Mang, A.D. 8–23. He nationalized and redistributed the land. He monopolized salt, iron, coinage, wines, and mines. He had the state put a floor under prices by purchase of surplus agricultural commodities and generally tried to protect the interest of the farmer against the merchants. Wang moved too fast for his republican contemporaries and died a sudden and violent death.

The great Han Empire was the universal state of the ancient Asian world, as its contemporary, the Roman Empire, was the universal state of the Western world. Like the Roman Empire, the Han Empire weakened because of barbarian attacks and broke into a congeries of succession states. During these Dark Ages, Buddhism took its place in China alongside the earlier teachings of Confucianism and Taoism. The old elements of civilization declined, to re-emerge in the brilliance of the T'ang, A.D. 618–906. T'ang China showed very few basic differences from Han China. T'ang re-created the glory of the Han and by constant wars spread its splendor far into Central Asia. People from all parts of Eurasia and adherents of many faiths—Nestorian Christian, Zoroastrian, Manichaean, and Moslem—flocked into the capital city of Ch'ang An, the modern Sian. Persians, Arabs, Jews, and merchants from India came to China by sea and settled in Canton. Chinese goods adorned the bazaars of Baghdad, Cairo, and Constantinople. China excelled any state in Europe in glamour and general advancement.

The cultural brilliance of the T'ang Dynasty belied its military weakness, political division, and economic depression. With the fall of the T'ang Empire, China again passed through a period of chaos before its new period of glory in the Sung Dynasty, 960–1279. Under the Sung emperors, who had their seat of government in South China, there was little improvement in the lot of the common people. A reformer, Wang An-shih, 1021–1086, kept China in controversy for an entire century by his second "New Deal" program. His reforms contemplated a thoroughgoing reorganization of state policies with regard to finance, military affairs, education, agriculture, and internal commerce. His system proposed a state budget, a state monopoly of commerce, cheap state loans to farmers, land redistribution,

equitable distribution of land taxes, taxation of all property whether real or personal (movable), abolition of forced labor, compulsory military service to replace the professional army, and the shifting of the emphasis in the civil service examinations from the classics to current problems. Wang's reforms did not take root, but they did represent a recurrent tendency of the conservative Chinese to experiment in statecraft and economics.

Influences from the outside did not penetrate too deeply the fabric of Chinese culture. The items of foreign commerce were handled for the benefit of the very few at the top of the social ladder. Foreigners in China were treated liberally. They were permitted to settle their own disputes and they intermarried with Chinese exactly as they pleased. Chinese and more or less Sinicized non-Chinese of North China traveled westward as officials or envoys for the Mongols. One Arab rose to high position in the Chinese official hierarchy. Buddhist pilgrims went to India until the middle of the eleventh century, when the roads were closed by the spread of Islam. *The Sung period was marked by a renaissance in art and education, but it did not bring the physical strength to stand up against the Mongols.*

The Mongols looked upon China as the richest part of their vast empire, which extended across the heart of Asia to the borders of Arabia and far into Europe and Russia. The Mongol, or the Yüan Dynasty, 1260–1368, was at the height of its power when visited by Marco Polo. When that Venetian traveler told his fantastic stories in Europe, the Westerners had the same feeling of disbelief and awe about China which Chinese peasants in a later age displayed at the stories of the jet planes and the atom bombs of the West. The Chinese often say, "You can conquer a country on horseback, but you cannot rule it on horseback." The Yüan Dynasty fell before an uprising of exploited tenant farmers against the officials, nobles, and landlords of both Chinese and Mongol stock. After a century of alien rule, native conservatism became intensely nationalistic. After the fall of the Mongols and the new closing of the overland routes to Asia, Chinese eyes again turned inward and Chinese efforts concentrated on the development of their own culture.

The succeeding dynasty, the Ming, 1368–1644, was continually plagued by depredations of the Mongols, incursions of Japanese pirates, the appearance of Europeans by sea, and the rise of the Manchu power in the northeast. The first Europeans who came to China in the modern period created an unfavorable impression and foreshadowed centuries of misunderstanding. Portuguese, Dutch, and British adventurers were looked upon as uncivilized brigands and half pirates. The Westerners regarded the Chinese as pagans, in dire need of the Christian gospel and entitled to no amenities

of decent treatment. The earlier Jesuit missionaries won their way into the hearts of the Chinese and the inner circles of the court, but they lost their privileged position because of their conflicts with other orders and the political overtone of their religious activities.

When the Ming Dynasty fell apart because of internal intrigues, it succumbed to the invading Manchus, who set up the Manchu or Ch'ing Dynasty, 1644–1912. The Chinese regarded the Manchus essentially as foreigners and thought of themselves as being under an alien dynasty when they crossed the threshold into modern history. The early years of the Manchus found China at the height of its power. Two monarchs, K'ang Hsi, 1662–1722, and Ch'ien Lung, 1736–1796, together gave China over a century of prosperity. K'ang Hsi was the Chinese counterpart of Louis XIV, and Ch'ien Lung's reign the life span of George Washington. To the liberals who led the enlightenment in Europe in the eighteenth century, China was a kind of utopia, but just as Europe began its career of growth and expansion China entered its era of steady decay. At the end of Ch'ien Lung's reign, China was still in outward appearance a great, powerful, and well-ordered country, but within ten years the whole empire had degenerated into a miserable state of brigandage, piracy, corruption, and misgovernment. Dissension and revolution gnawed at the vitals of the Manchu Dynasty and paved the way for the Chinese Republic.

China's Cultural Vitality

The Chinese themselves long recognized the relative unimportance of race and the overwhelming importance of culture. They accepted as a civilized human being, as one of themselves, anyone who understood Chinese ways and behaved like a Chinese. Writers, teachers, and philosophers, rather than emperors or generals, shaped the mind of Chinese society.

China had many different schools of philosophy and offered many examples of creative individual thought. That which is generally understood as Chinese philosophy was fundamentally the thought of Confucius as interpreted, modified, and expanded through the ages. China accepted the fundamental goodness of man and the desirability of living in harmony with nature. The emphasis on fundamental moral virtues like benevolence, love, goodness, and rationality created a Chinese common denominator of poise, equanimity, and tolerance. Chinese philosophy was preoccupied with this-worldliness: man's place in life and his duties and obligations. "We have not yet learned to know life, how can we know death?" or, "There

are no gateways to calamity or blessing save those which men open for themselves," and, "The recompense of good and evil follow as naturally as the shadow follows the substance," were typical Confucian tenets.

Chinese philosophy was much more intellectual than religious. Emphasis was placed upon learning, understanding, and wisdom. "Study widely, inquire minutely, think carefully, analyze clearly, and then practice earnestly." Attitudes toward religion were the opposite of the attitudes of ancient India. China seemed relatively unconcerned with gods, otherworldliness, rewards and punishments, and immortality. The concept of sin was unknown in China; evil or crime was looked upon as a temporary deflection from the essential harmony of the universe. The simplest religious rites in China were associated with folk religion, springing from *individual or social tensions or from some relationship connected with nature or agriculture*. China knew no pantheon, no priesthood, and contented itself with venerating its ancestors or paying some homage to abstractions of heaven, earth, mountains, or rivers. The Chinese experienced no difficulties in being at the same time Confucian, Taoist, Buddhist and, if the missionary permitted, Christian also. Perhaps for precaution or insurance, a practical Chinese was likely to invite or hire representatives of all religions to participate in the funeral ceremony of a loved one. Lacking any belief in a jealous god, the Chinese felt no hostility toward a neighbor for his religion.

The Chinese were credited with the invention of paper, printing, the compass, and gunpowder. They invented paper in A.D. 105, and they printed the first book from wooden blocks, a Buddhist sutra from the grottoes of Tunhuang, in 868. As late as the eighteenth century, China contained more books than the rest of the world put together. The immense Chinese literary production contained short stories, folk songs, poetry, dramas, novels, and great quantities of translations. One Buddhist monk, Hsüan Tsang, during the T'ang Dynasty, brought back with him from India and translated material twenty-five times as voluminous as the Christian Bible. The Chinese possessed a wealth of dynastic histories, dictionaries, encyclopedias, and collections of every type of work of reference.

Chinese art during 4,000 years expressed itself through an infinite variety of media: jade, bone and ivory, stone, bronze, wood, enamel, lacquer, silk, pottery, porcelain, and calligraphy. Chinese art was not mysterious and exotic, but it was intrinsically beautiful and endowed with universal appeal. The Chinese considered the highest art to be a triple masterpiece of calligraphy, poetry, and painting and pointed with most pride to its golden age in the T'ang Dynasty. Ceramics—or chinaware—ranged from the crude pottery remains of earliest times and the funerary figurines

of the Han and T'ang dynasties to the fine porcelains of the Sung period. Sculpture was never esteemed by the Chinese as by the Greeks, but the tombs of emperors were often marked by huge figures of men or animals carved in stone. The Chinese landscape was dotted with artistic bridges and picturesque temples with their beautifully curved roofs and huge columns. Homes and gardens with their moon doorways, pavilions, and arches were symphonies in form and color. The Chinese gave an unmistakable character to fundamental arts and craftsmanship, whether lacquer, bronze, jade, cloissoné, silks, furniture, or rugs and carpets.

Social Organization and Economic Institutions

Social organization was based on obligations rather than rights. Each individual from earliest childhood was taught about the obligations of the five basic relationships: prince and minister, father and son, older brother and younger brother, husband and wife, friend and friend. Correct form and ceremony were prescribed for every circumstance. Departure from the rule meant loss of face and dignity. Bluntness, or hurrying to get to the point, which foreigners often take pride in, was alien to Chinese social behavior. Many diplomatic and commercial deals fell through because a foreigner either unwittingly or deliberately disregarded or violated the accepted social code. A Chinese proverb stated, "He who knows not the rites has nothing to shape his character."

There was no rigid stratification of Chinese society. There were no hereditary lords or dukes or social distinctions accruing to anybody except the direct descendants of Confucius. One generation achieved prominence only to have the next generation lose it. "From shirtsleeves to shirtsleeves in three generations" was the ordinary rule in China as well as in the United States. The squirearchy was based on education and was open to rich and poor alike. Wealth, social position, and power were the attributes of the most learned. Teachers or scholars and farmers were at the head of the social order. Below them came the artisans, the craftsmen, the traders or merchants, and the soldiers. Actors, beggars, and servants were at the bottom of the social list.

The family and its extension, the clan, was the basic social unit in China. The family included the *lao yeh*, the old grandfather and grandmother, their sons and sons' wives, uncles, aunts, cousins, children, and servants. The individual was important only as he was part of the family. The family carried out the sacrifices to its ancestors. It cared for its aged and provided for its descendants. It was the protective group for its own and

discharged many of the responsibilities which in the Western world the state provides for the handicapped or unfortunate. It placed a premium upon loyalty and filial piety. In law it was jointly responsible for the failures or crimes of any of its members. It was the root cause of nepotism which characterized Chinese politics. The Chinese argued that it was the duty of the successful to provide for the less fortunate. To them it was better to pad the payroll with their own relatives than to pay unemployment levies to the state. Even in modern times, every employee of a great bank or business house, down to the coolies, was likely to be a relative or a fellow townsman of the proprietor.

The sexes did not mingle freely in China. Men and women moved in a different realm. Schools were for boys, and the husband was alleged to be the head of the house. The women were given little status politically, but the pages of Chinese history are marked by the will and achievement of outstanding female characters. A woman's place in the home depended *much more on her own ability than upon any written rules and regulations*. Marriages were universal and came early in life. They were arranged by go-betweens or professional matchmakers. The Chinese argued that you fell in love because you were married, rather than vice versa. They also believed that the cold calculations of the families involved were more reliable guides to future happiness than eyes blinded by stars. Betrothals were serious and divorces difficult. A man was entitled to one legal wife and to a concubine or two. Chinese novels were filled with stories of philandering and singsong girls. Since the root of the family system was the son, the marriage was deemed successful when the woman produced a son.

As individualistic as the Chinese are admitted to be, nonetheless they exhibited through the years an unusual urge to organize into groups. In the cities it was primarily noticeable in the guilds. These guilds performed very important and powerful economic and social functions. Employers and employees all belonged and paid their dues. There were guilds for merchants, bankers, masons, carpenters, cooks, beggars, jade cutters, storytellers, and the blind. They regulated the working conditions of the craft. They provided unified opposition to oppressive officials and they protected the craft from ruinous competition. The guildhalls were social centers and the guild treasury could always be tapped for the benefit of needy members. The capacity for organization was shown by successive boycotts, and the susceptibility of the Chinese to mass psychology was experienced by all who were unfortunate enough to be caught in the middle of an anti-foreign riot or demonstration.

In the countryside the Chinese formed all kinds of co-operatives: socie-

ties for crop-watching, for irrigation, and for marketing and credit. The village, not the individual farmhouse, American midwestern style, was the center of rural life. The walled village located on high ground, safe from the floods and safest from military attack, was grouped about a guildhall, an ancestral temple, a magistrate's office, or a seignorial mansion. It offered the best protection against the winter winds. Near the crossroads at the center could be found the market place or the public grounds for grand festivals or wandering theatrical players. In grim times it might even serve as an execution ground. Secret societies were important in Chinese community life. A Chinese adult was likely to belong to two or three. Like the Yellow Turbans, the Long Knives, the Elder Brothers' Association, the Red Spears, or the White Lily, they were organized primarily for some religious, business or benevolent purpose, but they usually dipped deeply into politics.

Economic life in China centered in agriculture. Life on the Chinese farm changed but little over the span of Chinese history. The farmer consumed most of what he raised and exchanged only a small part of his product for necessities. Even as late as the Communist accession in China, 80 per cent of the Chinese people were still dependent upon agriculture. The average Chinese farm was 4.18 acres in area compared with the average American farm of 157 acres. On the Chinese farm 6.2 persons lived compared with 4.2 persons on the American farm. Each Chinese farmer produced only one fourteenth as much as one American. Eighty-three per cent of China's population lived on 17 per cent of the area. The land suitable for agriculture was only 20 per cent of the total, and there was not much prospect for bringing additional land under cultivation. The amount of cultivated land available to each Chinese citizen was one-half acre compared to fifteen acres available to each American. These facts explain why Chinese history was marked by peasant revolts and talk of agrarian reform. Politics and economics went hand-in-hand. The main problem of the Chinese government under the Hans, as well as under the Kuomintang and the Communists, was to keep the farmers well fed, well clothed, and contented. Overpopulation and the grinding poverty which accompanies it made stable government difficult. Discontented spirits preferred rebellion to starvation.

Many of China's agricultural problems stemmed from natural causes like population pressure, uncertain rainfall, poor varieties of plants and animals, pests and disease, soil exhaustion, and difficult transportation to markets. Others came from man-made causes like bad political administration, inequitable taxes, unequal land ownership, expensive credit, uneconomical system of farm layout, inadequate agricultural education, and lack

of co-operation among the farmers. In spite of these conditions the farmers of China for forty centuries served the primary needs of their people. They led the world in production of rice, soya beans, millet, barley, sweet potatoes, and kaoliang, and were among the leaders in the production of tea, silk, wheat, tobacco, and cotton. They cultivated every little valley, every slope, and every scrap of marginal terrain. Nearly half the land under cultivation was irrigated, about a quarter was terraced. Although in the hoe-culture stage and thoroughly prescientific by our standards, their agriculture was surprisingly efficient in terms of yield per acre. China produced an average of sixty-seven bushels of rice per acre, compared with forty-seven in the United States; sixteen bushels of wheat compared to our fourteen; and twenty-one bushels of corn compared to our twenty-five.

The main political problem stemming from China's agricultural make-up *was the problem of tenancy and its overtone, the domination of the gentry.* A survey under the Kuomintang revealed a farm population made up of 40 per cent owners, 25 per cent part owners, and 29 per cent tenants. The big landlords (those owning more than fifteen acres) made up 5 per cent of the population and owned 43 per cent of the cultivated land. The prosperous middle-class farm owners (those owning from two to fifteen acres) made up 50 per cent of the population and owned 50 per cent of the land; the poor farmers (those owning less than two acres) were 45 per cent of the population but owned only 7 per cent of the cultivated land. A rich family averaged approximately 350 acres, while a peasant family averaged 2.5 acres. Through the years the gentry maintained their positions of power by providing sons for the bureaucracy (they had the money to pay the bills for education). They supplied the funds for the local credit institutions or pawnshops, and they saw to it that some member of their family carried on the business of the rice trade. They always maintained connections with the local officials and war lords.

In the modern period less than one quarter of China's population made its living from industry, commerce, or the arts. No gigantic industrial system was able to develop in China because of the lack of resources, the dearth of capital, the general satisfaction with the agricultural system, and the power of local customs and superstitions. The Chinese developed mines for coal, iron, lead, copper, antimony, tungsten, and tin, and for gold and silver. In the field of transportation they worked wonders with wheelbarrows and carts and by water—"wherever a boat can go, the Chinese can take it." They built and sailed ocean-going junks for 300 people and they made sampans light enough "to float on a heavy dew."

Ninety-five per cent of the business in China was carried on by the old-style shop. One store or one street would deal with one type of commodity.

The workers were poor, regulated by the guilds, and turned out everything from the crudest home products to the most intricate and elaborate luxury goods. Shops and factories in China made the same things and often by the same methods as those utilized in the West before the advent of power machinery. The individual Chinese possessed an unerring business instinct, a genius for banking and finance. He operated on a small margin of profit and took every advantage of the variety of coinage and currency, weights and measures, which existed in China. The practice of joint responsibility prevented the formation of joint-stock companies or large corporations. When a Chinese enterprise went bankrupt, the owner lost not only all that he had invested, but everything in addition which he and his relatives possessed. No families of merchant princes were able to perpetuate themselves in the face of government exactions which restrained their power and curbed their wealth.

Political Doctrine and Government

Confucianism was a theory of ethics and morality, and it was also a guide to political action. It was intended to harmonize all activities, government and otherwise. In China the doctrine was more important than the government which it created. If the facts fell out of line with the theory, the Chinese procedure was to change the facts to fit the theory. Confucianism lasted for 2,000 years as the orthodox political doctrine. It was entirely Chinese to be loyal to a doctrine and to profess faith in a single world order beyond which there was only barbarism and treason.

According to Confucian doctrine the state was a large family predicated upon paternalism and loyalty. It was not a legal machine intended to secure individual rights. The process of government was to be carried out by education and exhortation. Moral virtues must be demonstrated by the prince.

When the ruler is pious, none among the people will dare to be irreverent. When the ruler loves justice, none among the people will dare to be otherwise. When the ruler loves good faith, none among the people will dare not to keep faith. When the ruler is of such sort, the people of the four quarters will flock to him with their children strapped on their backs.

The emperor was looked upon as the state. There was no patriotism for China. The dynasty was China, and China the civilized world. The Chinese could not appreciate that there was learning outside their own classics, that there was civilization beyond their own borders, and that there were

whole worlds which had never heard of Confucius and which held him in low esteem. From ancient times the emperor was king and priest, the performer of sacrifices, and the intermediary between heaven and earth. He ruled by the mandate of heaven as long as he gave the people good government. "Heaven sees as the people see, heaven hears as the people hear." At another time the sage said, "To gag the voice of the people is more dangerous than to dam the flow of a river: the wise engineer of the river deepens its basin and facilitates its flow; the wise ruler encourages men to speak out freely." On still another occasion

Tzu-kung asked about government. The Master said, Sufficient food, sufficient weapons, and the confidence of the common people. Tzu-kung said, Suppose you had no choice but to dispense with one of these three, which would you forego? The Master said, Weapons. Tzu-kung said, Suppose you were forced to dispense with one of the two that were left, which would you forego? The Master said, Food. Danger of enemies, danger of starvation, such were recurrent perils . . . which could be overcome if confidence were unshaken. But once let confidence go, neither arms nor food can save the country.¹

Confucian dogmas decried violence and strife. The Chinese preferred reason, arbitration, and compromise to resort to force. In Chinese literature the hero was more often the worthy scholar than the returning general. Every soldier was proof of a lack of virtue. The perfect prince would be victorious without fighting. The Chinese were good sailors, yet they never concerned themselves about a navy. They were constant fighters, yet their professional soldiers were totally useless and incompetent until most recent times. The Chinese proverb said, "Good iron is not beaten into nails, and a good man does not become a soldier."

Confucianism had its dissenters and objectors. One group, the Legalists, preached totalitarianism in its crassest form. They argued that the rule of law is the only rule which men respect and that the sole duty of government should be agriculture and fighting. The Taoists were the most vigorous opponents of Confucianists. The Taoists despised the world, said all government is tyranny, and argued that the very existence of institutions proves the decline of virtue. "Govern a great state as you would cook a small fish—that is, hardly at all." The Taoists were pacifists, taught the folly of war, and deprecated the Confucian emphasis on ceremony. The great Taoist slogan was, "Do nothing and all things will be done." Resignation was not a duty, it was the ultimate wisdom. The Taoists

¹ Quoted from the *Analects of Confucius* in Maurice Collis, *The Great Within* (Faber and Faber Ltd., London, 1941), p. 140.

were more political realists than moral idealists. They insisted that heaven and earth are not humane but treat people and things like herbs and beasts. The universe is neither kindly nor righteous but goes its way regardless of human desires or standards of conduct. The reformer is wasting his time, because it is useless to cultivate virtue. Unless you know evil, you cannot recognize the good. The teaching of benevolence and proper conduct is opposed to the original Tao or way of the universe, which is neither good nor bad. One man's meat is another man's poison. The Taoists somewhat cynically pointed out that when a ruler lives in luxury, his people live in poverty. They had no faith in a brain trust. "The people are difficult to govern because too much learnedness is employed: to govern the state with learnedness is the spoiling of the state; to avoid the use of learnedness in government, that is the happiness of the state." Confucianism was the ideal philosophy for those in power or when things were going well; Taoism was the ideal philosophy for the recluse or for times of chaos.

The Chinese were more interested in political doctrine than in the form of government. It was taken for granted that the form was perfect or in need of only slight renovation or modification. The central government at Peking consisted of the emperor and an administrative apparatus which made the fullest possible use of the Chinese bureaucracy. The machinery of the imperial government consisted of a Grand Council, a Grand Secretariat, and six boards like modern cabinet offices respectively called Civil Affairs, Revenue, Rites, War, Punishments, and Public Works. A Censorate, the eyes and ears of the emperor, had the highest duties of advice and criticism, and an Imperial Academy was the final word on all literary controversies or improvements. There was no elected assembly in Peking and no special cabinet office to deal with foreign affairs. Too often the imperial court was a hotbed of sorcerers, eunuchs, and concubines.

The provinces were ruled over by a dual administration of a Tartar general for military affairs and a viceroy or governor-general for civil affairs. The subdivisions of a province, called prefects or circuits, were run by officials known as *taotai*, with whom foreigners often came in contact. The real government in China was the magistrate of the local district, or *hsien*, the approximate equivalent of an American county. No member of the imperial family held office in the provinces, but the soldiers or banner men were usually of Manchu origin. Chinese officials were jealous of their ranks, which were indicated by the color of the button on the cap or the insignia embroidered on the long gown. Chinese local governments were unusually democratic. The villages were controlled by the Council of Elders, who selected a *ti pao* or headman. The magistrate considered

himself fortunate if he was able to avoid controversies with the family groups or the local secret societies.

The long existence of the Chinese system of government was undoubtedly due to the civil service examinations which enlisted the intellectuals in the service of the state. The examinations were based on the classics and were graded according to mastery of the thought and style of the ancients. For 2,000 years the subject matter did not change. The candidate first competed at the county seat, next at the provincial capital, and finally at Peking. His reward was official position, and he could have no greater honor than to be designated a mandarin in the service of the emperor.

The survival of the Chinese system was a distinct tribute to the sterling worth of the Chinese masses as well as to the intellect and ingenuity of the ruling elite. The Chinese expected the government to collect the taxes and keep the peace, but not to extend relief or interfere in personal affairs. The typical attitude toward government was to want as little as possible.

Work, work,—from the rising sun
Till sunset comes and day is done
I plough the sod
And harrow the clod,
And meat and drink both come to me
So what care I for the powers that be?

The concept of law in China was entirely different from that in the West. All litigation was discreditable, not only to the plaintiff and the defendant, but to the official in whose court the case was tried. Law was primarily an exhortation or standard of conduct, and it was designed for criminals, bandits, and swindlers. These were not expected to have the status of decent citizens when on trial, so they were subjected to torture, barbarous punishment, and cruel death. The courts were corrupt because influence and money were more effective than evidence.

The legal theory of responsibility was thoroughly alien to the common-law concept that no man should be punished for the crime of another. In China, the governor of a province was held responsible for a catastrophe of nature; a family, for the misdeeds of one of its members; an employer, for the crimes of his employees. If the guilty person could not be found, then some other responsible person must accept the consequences, whether father, family head, employer, village elder, magistrate, or viceroy.

The standards of official conduct were vastly different between China and the West. Nepotism and corruption were standard practices. Salaries were low and expenses were high. Squeeze seemed natural and unavoidable.

If a man spent half a lifetime and a family fortune in obtaining a position, he felt entitled to adequate rewards. Those who handled money automatically kept what they considered to be reasonable deductions. No official received appointment in his native province (too many relatives), and no official would ordinarily stay in the same job more than three years. Local officials were subject to constant investigations by imperial commissioners and were often the subject of secret reports or petitions sent to Peking by their subordinates. It was difficult to persuade Chinese officialdom to accept responsibility or make decisions. Compromises seemed greatly to be desired. If a dispute was not settled locally but was referred to Peking, the official concerned was liable to be reprimanded, dismissed, or punished. Because of this system, China often suffered: a local official would prefer to compromise rather than to take a strong stand against a foreign diplomat, consul, businessman, or missionary.

Each new Chinese dynasty came in with a flourish, swept with a new broom, brought prosperity, and then faded away as a consequence of rebellion. The dynasty was considered to enjoy the mandate of heaven as long as it ruled in the interest of the people, but any ruler who violated the principles of benevolence and righteousness was properly subject to the wrath of the people. "In case a ruler treats his people as if they were grass or dirt, the people should regard him as a bandit and an enemy." The ruler was responsible for wars, pestilence, and starvation, and must accept the punishment of heaven. Hungry mobs drove out Wang Mang, the T'angs, and the Mings, and had a part in the overthrow of almost every other group of rulers. When rebellions failed, they were looked upon as treasonable; when they succeeded, their leaders were accepted as the new heirs to the mandate of heaven. A change of dynasty was not a profound revolution, it was a change of administration. The scholars and the people flocked to the successful faction and deserted those whose greatest fault was failure.

China in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries faced the difficult transition into the modern world. It cherished its sense of harmony and balance, its grace of living and spiritual poise, but recognized the necessity for adapting itself to the Western concepts of progress. The Chinese experienced humiliation and spiritual travail, but they avoided greater losses and greater embarrassments by their complacency, essential contentment of mind, and general indifference to aggression and ambition. Then the main pillars of the old order in China collapsed. The orthodox doctrine of Confucianism overlooked too many modern problems, and the moral concepts of the Chinese looked unreal and illusory in the light of the

legalism of the West. China's agricultural basis of civilization seemed hopelessly inadequate in a feverish, technological age.

The Manchus were not merely obdurate and arrogant, but they were totally unprepared to cope with the new forces with which they were confronted. If they had permitted foreigners to reside in Peking, they would have confessed weakness and invited rebellion. Accustomed to receiving tribute and to thinking of themselves as the center of the world, they were unable to conceive of the doctrines of state sovereignty and national equality. Outsiders were barbarians and should be kept at a respectable distance lest they corrupt the only civilization worthy of the name. The mandate of Ch'ien Lung to George III revealed the gap in understanding between East and West:

Swaying the wide world, I have but one aim in view, namely to maintain a perfect governance and to fulfill the duties of the state: strange and costly objects do not interest me. . . . Our dynasty's majestic virtue has penetrated unto every country under Heaven, and Kings of all nations have offered their costly tribute by land and sea. As your ambassador can see for himself, we possess all things. I set no value on objects strange or ingenious, and have no use for your country's manufactures. This then is my answer to your request . . . It behooves you, O King, to respect my sentiments and to display even greater devotion and loyalty in the future, so that, by perpetual submission to our throne, you may secure peace and prosperity for your country hereafter. . . .

. . . Tremblingly obey and show no negligence.²

The empire was forced into the stream of world affairs not because of internal discontent but because of outside pressure. China stood still while the West advanced. China was no match for the machines or weapons of the West. Chinese thinkers did not bother to estimate the causes of their own weakness or the sources of Western strength. Rather than work hard to reform or fight fiercely for their freedom, they preferred to rely on their traditional ability to straighten themselves out and to take captive their conquerors.

Suggested Reading

PEARL BUCK, *The Good Earth* (New York, 1931).

H. G. CREEL, *The Birth of China* (New York, 1937).

———, *Confucius, the Man and the Myth* (New York, 1949).

² Quoted in H. F. MacNair, *Modern Chinese History, Selected Readings* (Commercial Press, Ltd., Shanghai, 1927), pp. 1-11.

- WOLFRAM EBERHARD, *A History of China from the Earliest Times to the Present Day* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1950).
- C. P. FITZGERALD, *Revolution in China* (New York, 1952).
- H. A. GILES, *A History of Chinese Literature* (New York, 1927).
- I. CARRINGTON GOODRICH, *A Short History of the Chinese People* (New York, 1943).
- ARTHUR W. HUMMEL, ed., *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period, 1644-1912*, 2 volumes (Washington, 1943, 1944).
- F. H. KING, *Farmers for Forty Centuries* (New York, 1926).
- OLGA LANG, *Chinese Family and Society* (New Haven, 1946).
- K. S. LATOURETTE, *The Chinese, Their History and Culture*, 3rd ed., rev. (New York, 1946).
- OWEN AND ELEANOR LATTIMORE, *China, A Short History* (New York, 1947).
- MARION J. LEVY, JR., *The Family Revolution in Modern China*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1947).
- LIN YUTANG, *My Country and My People* (New York, 1935).
- H. F. MACNAIR, ed., *China* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1946).
- H. B. MORSE, *The Trade and Administration of the Chinese Empire* (London, 1908).
- W. E. SOOTHILL, *The Three Religions of China* (London, 1913).
- ARTHUR WALEY, translator, *A Hundred and Seventy Chinese Poems*, 2nd ed. New York, 1936).
- KARL A. WITTFOGEL AND FENG CHIA-SHENG, *History of Chinese Society: The Liao (907-1125)* (Philadelphia, 1949).

CHAPTER 3

Japan and the Japanese

Japan was even less known and understood than China, when the Black Ships from the United States forced open the doors of Japan to the Western world. Marco Polo had reported that the people of the great island of Chipangu were white, civilized, and well favored, idolaters, dependent on nobody, and possessed of endless quantities of gold. As Japan lay isolated and secluded, its people developed distinctive characteristics and behavior patterns. In the course of a comparatively short historical span, they evolved a rich culture and perfected a social organization which enabled them to pursue an economic and political way of life of their own design. The national peculiarities of Japan and the Japanese—as in the case of China and the Chinese—accounted for the resistance to the incursions from the West more than a century ago, just as subsequently they have gone far to explain the complex and shifting role of Japan in world affairs.

The Japanese People

Uncomplimentary analyses of the Japanese flavored American propaganda during World War II, but Americans who served in the Occupation ordinarily testified to the physical vigor, the discipline, the patience, and the stoicism of the Japanese. Geographic isolation made them a highly homogeneous race, but no more different from the Chinese and Koreans than the English are different from the French or Germans. In spite of individual variations, the Japanese displayed from earliest times characteristics which stamped them as apart from the rest of the world. This uniqueness was a source of embarrassment as well as pride. The constant comparison with

China in size, age, and prestige gave them a sense of insecurity and inferiority. Sometimes the Japanese showed themselves humble and sometimes aggressively self-assertive. Lacking the poise and self-assurance of the Chinese, they seemed fearful of the scorn of the outside world or eager for its applause. Their sentiment of nationalism was ancient and deep and as important to the Japanese as respect for culture was to the Chinese and as reverence for religion was to India.

The individual Japanese showed conspicuous contradictions in habits of thought and patterns of conduct which defied Western understanding. He seemed to be torn between a dynamic drive toward self-expression and the social necessity to conform. He was not intrinsically dead-pan, but his reservoirs of emotion were bottled up by the social code. Fear of ridicule and shame made him a natural conformist.

Prior to the seventeenth century, the Japanese "loved and brawled with abandon, bore obligations lightly, were not overawed by ancestors or Emperor, and manifested no taut preoccupation with ceremonial suicide." The Confucian insistence on decorum and the doctrine of the mean, made little impression upon them. The Portuguese and the Spaniards did not find them more repressed emotionally than the Europeans themselves. Three centuries of regimentation and dictatorship changed all this and placed a premium on constant vigilance and meticulous conformity. Lack of privacy made it difficult to step out of line, particularly in the cities where people lived in crowded conditions with nothing between them and their near neighbors except a flimsy paper partition and under the watchful eye of a totalitarian regime.

The police state endowed the Japanese with the traits usually associated with them: hiding of emotions and attitudes, perseverance and persistence, fanaticism and arrogance, hypersensitivity and sentimentality, and ceremoniousness and conformity. According to the social code, proper conduct depended upon no universal ethic, but upon the specific status of the individual person and his particular relationships. Life was a complicated mass of specific obligations, but it was most complicated when a new or unexpected situation would arise which was not provided for in the book of rules. The Japanese learned how to die, but not how to surrender; how to live in victory, but not how to conduct themselves in defeat.

The Japanese idea of politeness differed from the concept of courtesy. Politeness consisted of knowing the right thing to do and then doing it. Conventions outweighed emotions, so behavior patterns were unreliable guides to sentiment. Attitudes could be reversed overnight if the situation demanded. Whether the Japanese welcomed the foreigner or fought against him, whether they decided to resist to the last man or surrender

en masse, were not emotional matters but rather obligations depending upon the command of the emperor. The Japanese were painfully aware of their obligations—to themselves, their families, their social in-groups, and above all to the emperor. The Emperor Meiji's Imperial Rescript to Soldiers, which was memorized as Christians memorize the Lord's Prayer, stated:

The soldier and the sailor should consider loyalty their essential duty. Who that is born in this land can be wanting in the spirit of grateful service to it? . . . A soldier or a sailor in whom this spirit is not strong, however skilled in art or proficient in science, is a mere puppet; and a body of soldiers or sailors wanting in loyalty, however well-ordered and disciplined it may be, is in an emergency no better than a rabble. . . . Neither be led astray by current opinions nor meddle in politics, but with single heart fulfil your essential duty of loyalty, and bear in mind that duty is weightier than a mountain, while death is lighter than a feather. Never by failing in moral principle fall into disgrace and bring dishonor upon your name.

Spartan virtues were cultivated as a means of strengthening character. The Japanese made life hard for themselves by cultivating the pleasures of the flesh and then sacrificing them to duty. The strong were those who disregarded personal happiness and conformed to the rigors of prescribed conduct. Unlike the Chinese, the Japanese approved conduct was to accept the difficult and the unpleasant rather than to rebel against it. The Japanese waged constant war within themselves between a stern frugality and extravagant frivolity. In the Genroku period, which was at the end of the seventeenth century but which might have been any time, "a young man-about-town would wear a sober-looking robe but its lining would be of rich material; or his sister might seem to be clad like a servant-maid, but her underclothing would be of the brightest and most expensive silks." The way the Japanese overcame the obstacles of nature in developing their own land and nurtured their faith in victory in World War II testifies to their dogged belief in the power of the will and the superiority of the spirit.

Japanese Historical Backgrounds

Anthropologists and archaeologists are beginning to unearth factual evidence to add to the references in Chinese chronicles about Japan's historical beginnings. Compared to China, the history of Japan is a brief story. According to the *Kojiki* or "Records of Ancient Matters," and the *Nihongi* or "Chronicles of Japan," completed respectively in A.D. 712 and

720, the God *Isanagi* and his Goddess *Izanami* created the Sun Goddess, who sent her grandson to rule the earth. This grandson, the Emperor Jimmu, bearing the sacred mirror, sword, and jewel as emblems of his divine mission to rule Japan forever, created the state of Yamato on February 11, 660 B.C. February 11, *Kigensetsu*, is still one of the great holidays in Japan. This Japanese myth of creation inspired innumerable works of art and drove home the idea that the emperor, the land, and the race were themselves divine.

By the fifth century, when Japanese chronicles became reasonably reliable, an imperial clan which claimed its descent from the Sun Goddess ruled over the Yamato people. While clans battled for prestige, China's civilization, coming primarily by way of Korea, issued its challenge to indigenous Japanese culture. The Soga family championed Buddhism and Chinese learning in general and overpowered the protagonists of native Shinto, or the "way of the gods."

Shotoku Taishi, as regent in 604, promulgated a code which enunciated a new set of ideals of government inspired by new learning from abroad. This called for the reverence of Buddhism and the adaptation of the Confucian ideas of loyalty to the emperor. The *Taikwa*, or Great Reforms, of 645-650 were intended to strengthen the power of the central government and to lay the foundations for a new political and economic life. These articles introduced new systems of land tenure, local government, and taxation.

While reform was in full swing, hereditary chieftains opposed the strengthening of the central authority. They fought among themselves, not to see who would become the new emperor, but rather to determine who should control him and name his successor. A permanent capital modeled on the Chinese capital at Sian was located at Nara. The Nara Period 710-784, typified "the blossom-time of Japanese civilization, the few bright decades of political ardor, aesthetic awakening, and religious exaltation." The power of Yamato expanded throughout Japan and the government in the capital city adopted the forms of the brilliant T'ang Dynasty. All was new and glittering but distinctly foreign. Chinese architecture, Chinese costume, Chinese laws and ordinances, and Chinese ideographs gave new prestige to the native language, script, and literature. Chinese teachers were welcomed, and frequent missions were sent to China to study models and precedents. But in the countryside peasants grew their rice, fed their silkworms, grudged their taxes, and worshiped their native gods.

Nothing shows the antiquity of the Far East more vividly than the family records of the Fujiwara, whose founder, Kamatari, lived at the time

of the *Taikwa* reforms. The Soga family began a diarchy or dual system of administration: an emperor for prestige and a ruling family for actual government. The emperor should not be bothered by affairs of state or degraded by contacts with common men. The emperor's prime responsibility was to guarantee unbroken succession for ages eternal. With the systems of concubinage and adoption, the emperor usually provided too many claimants to the throne. The Fujiwara clan furnished all the consorts for the emperor, and as regents or mayors of the palace, they monopolized the high civil and military posts and ran the country to suit themselves. They relied upon their prestige and wealth, rather than upon military methods. They designated subordinates or allies to do the actual work, and they banished recalcitrant rivals either to frontier posts or to Buddhist monasteries. They dominated the emperors who usually passed their lives in the midst of an inane and luxurious court. Fujiwara support of the emperor helped to establish the imperial office and dynasty in such a firm position that there never was a serious challenge to either.

The Heian period of Japanese history lasted for four centuries, 784–1185. The capital was shifted to Heian-kyo (“Capital of Peace and Tranquillity”), the modern Kyoto, and it remained there until 1868. Kyoto like Nara, was copied after Sian, and became one of the world's most beautiful cities. (It was ordered out of bounds and was consequently spared by American bombers in World War II.) While the emperor and his entourage dawdled in elegant debauchery and while the Fujiwara spent their strength in putting down peasant rebellions, curbing the power of the Buddhist priests, or fighting against the Ainus, a new group of strong, ambitious, feudal barons came into prominence in the provinces outside Kyoto. By various means they acquired great manors and built the foundations of a frontier military society in striking contrast to the civilian effeminacy of the Kyoto aristocracy. Their loyalty was unreliable, and their services were obtainable only for a price.

Civil strife between two of these great clans, the Minamoto and the Taira, ushered in the Kamakura period, 1185–1338. A struggle to the death between these rivals established beyond question the dominance of the military families and created the samurai or warrior caste which cultivated as supreme virtues fidelity and contempt of death. The whole country was convulsed by battle, famine, and pestilence. Until 1868, Japan was governed by successive dynasties of military dictators, nearly all of whom sprang from Minamoto stock. From that time dated the Cult of the Sword, by which the sword was invested with mystical properties which stood for the honor of the soldier.

The successful Minamoto leader, Yoritomo, took for himself the title

of *Sei-i-tai Shogun*, or "Barbarian-Subduing-Great-General," and established his capital at Kamakura, farther to the east on the outskirts of Yokohama. As distance from Kyoto increased, respect for the imperial court diminished, and Kamakura was about as far as Yoritomo could go. He called his government the *bakufu* or "tent-government." He made his father-in-law, Hojo Tokimasa¹ (a Taira), regent, and he did not hesitate to utilize Fujiwara administrators of talent and experience for his constables and stewards.

Under the Hojo regents, foreign affairs were unstable and dangerous. No Japanese mission had gone to China since 890, but Japanese monks and students had gone to Chinese seats of learning. The Japanese had continuously carried out depredations against Korea, but because of financial embarrassments and domestic problems, had avoided large-scale war. In 1263 Kublai Khan made Korea his vassal and aspired to the conquest of Japan. Mongol fleets were twice shipwrecked by the kamikaze, or divine winds, and the invaders driven off at terrible cost of lives.

As the frugal simplicity of the *bakufu* vanished and economic hardships throughout the country increased, wars between the feudal clans multiplied. Abdication was so general that five ex-emperors were living, and their rivalries increased the fighting between the Hojo regents and their none-too-loyal followers. By the summer of 1333, Kamakura had been captured and destroyed by fire, and the regent and more than 200 of his loyal retainers committed *hara-kiri* rather than surrender. The Ashikaga period, 1336-1603, was an interlude of complete anarchy. Some 260 daimyo or feudal lords were reduced within a century to a mere dozen, and new families rose to replace them. The Ashikaga family climbed from moderate circumstances to a position of great power by absorbing the land and rights of others, including even imperial estates. No member of the imperial family showed himself capable of mastery or leadership. The imperial institution reached its lowest ebb in 1500 when the body of an ex-emperor remained unburied for six weeks and the enthronement ceremony of his successor was postponed for twenty years because there was no money in the treasury. In the meantime, the peasants' lands were trampled over, the crops were destroyed or requisitioned, and the taxes increased. The traditions of the military caste were destroyed by the rabble which took to arms to fight for anyone who would supply food. The central government exhausted itself in this domestic turmoil and had neither the strength nor the sagacity to cope with the Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, and British who sought a foothold in Japan.

¹ In Japanese, the family name appears first: Hojo was the family name, Tokimasa the given name.

The stage was set for three great heroes of Japanese song and story: Oda Nobunaga, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, and Tokugawa Iyeyasu. Of the personality of the first it was said, "If the cuckoo doesn't sing, I'll kill him"; of the second, "If the cuckoo doesn't sing, I'll make him"; and of the third, "If the cuckoo doesn't sing, I'll wait till he does." In 1567, Nobunaga was invited by the court to restore order in Kyoto. He was an uncompromising individual and made many personal enemies in his campaigns against the Buddhist monasteries and his political rivals. He was killed by a disgruntled daimyo. Hideyoshi, who was of humble birth but took the name of Toyotomi, a relative of the Fujiwara, was appointed regent in 1584 and succeeded in pacifying most of the country. He was afraid to demobilize his troops for fear of renewing civil wars; so he risked the unsuccessful conquest of Korea and China. In 1592 he transported 200,000 men to Korea and fought his way to modern Pyongyang and the extreme northeast frontier on the Tumen River. He withdrew and five years later attempted a second invasion. He slaughtered thousands of Chinese and Koreans and sent their ears and noses back to Japan, where they were buried in the famous ear mound at Kyoto. He died, and his expedition collapsed. His son and successor, Hideyori, was defeated at the battle of Sekigahara, October 21, 1600, by Iyeyasu, the founder of the Tokugawa Shogunate.

Japan was entirely refashioned during the Tokugawa period, 1603–1868. The capital was established at Yedo (Tokyo), away from the imperial court. It became the military, administrative, economic, and cultural center of Japan. The entire country was dominated by a line of shoguns who adopted a strict legal code designed to guarantee peace and stability and perpetuate the shogunate in power. Feudalism did not pass away as in Europe but reached its peak of development. The government became more centralized and autocratic than ever, but power was exercised by a paramount feudal chieftain and not by the emperor. Like their predecessors, the Tokugawa shoguns tried to turn back the hands of the clock and arrest the march of progress in Japan. Economic pressures, spiritual unrest, and internal political rivalry meant that the old system in Japan was ready to explode when the coming of the West ignited the fuse.

Japan's Cultural Vitality

While Japan's checkered political history unfolded, it disclosed a vital and unmistakably individual culture pattern. Japan's geographic insularity reinforced by stringent police controls and a language which made international communication difficult contributed to a remarkably homogeneous

culture. Furthermore, as early as the seventeenth century, the *sumurai* were authorized to behead anyone whose behavior was other than expected.

The scarcity and infrequency of contacts with the outside world stimulated the Japanese interest in things strange and foreign. People eagerly and recklessly leaped to welcome new things and new notions, but at the same time they clung desperately to their native standards and institutions. From the dawn of its history, Japan submitted to wave after wave of foreign influence and established contacts with distant cultures. By 1600, there were few places in the East that Japanese travelers had not visited or where Japanese pirates and mercenaries had not fought.

The Japanese were not blind imitators. They selected that which suited their own environment. They improved and adapted that which was suitable and rejected the rest. They strove constantly to outstrip their teachers. From the Chinese they borrowed language and script, but they evolved from the Chinese models a complicated native system of writing. They borrowed Confucianism, but they soft-pedaled its ethics and adjusted its political doctrines to fit neatly into their own scheme of things. They ignored Mencius's theory of revolution and Confucius's teaching that examinations should be open to everybody and not just to the sons of the nobles. The Japanese accepted Buddhism, but they molded completely its austere and ascetic Indian characteristics to satisfy their own spiritual demands.

The natural beauty of their island home, together with their religious heritage, developed in them a rare appreciation of the beautiful. Religion, poetry, and art were the great outlets for Japanese aesthetic expression. In politics, in painting, in every aspect of life, religion was important.

Thus, religion in Japan, whether Shinto or Buddhist in form, is largely aesthetic in expression. A code of ethics and a system of philosophy are secondary, or perhaps entirely irrelevant. What is important is the sense of awe and wonder, the act of worship, the comforting sense of belief. Religion means the gay shrine festivals, where sake flows freely to help break down the emotional inhibitions of the celebrants. Religion means a feeling of awe before the plunging waterfall and the half-instinctive bowing of one's head and clapping of one's hands before something superior, with little thought of direct benefit or any clear rationale for one's act. Religion means praying before a mysterious image of the Buddha, while the priests chant the liturgy and the beauty of serenity enters one's heart to match the beauty of the world outside.²

The Japanese could be Shintoist, Buddhist, and Confucianist at one and the same time, and their homes often had two shrines, one Shinto and one Buddhist.

² E. O. Reischauer, *The United States and Japan* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1950), pp. 131-132.

Originally, Shinto was a simple pantheistic worship of the forces of nature. Sacrifices were offered to the *kami*, or spirits who resided in the sun, the moon, the mountains, the streams, and everywhere about. Simple shrines were built in the style of the ancient thatched-roof peasant home. There was no place for worship or for a congregation. The ceremony consisted of the worshiper washing his hands, clapping them or ringing a bell to attract the attention of the gods, casting a coin to the *kami*, praying for material blessings, and making a farewell bow. The religious core was in the ideas of fertility and purity. It was based on appreciation, not fear, and sensibility to the beauties of nature; and the purpose of the rites was to praise and to thank as much as to placate and to mollify.

Under the later influence from China, Shinto was formalized and institutionalized. The ancestors of the family, the clan, and the emperor were added to the list of *kami*. The central theme of Shinto became "Thou shalt honor the gods and love thy country, revere the emperor, and obey his will." Thus it became the central creed for strong nationalistic parties and the rallying point for all those disgruntled elements under the Tokugawa Shogunate who brought about the restoration of the emperor.

Shintoism, with some 20,000,000 registered adherents, was the backbone of Japanese religion, but for a thousand years Buddhism, with twice as many members, was its flesh and blood. Buddhism brought spiritual comfort and promise of paradise. Buddhism was introduced into Japan early in the sixth century by a Chinese monk from Korea. From the first, it stimulated Japanese artistic production. The Japanese copied Buddhist sutras, built temples for the carved figures of the gods, and painted pictures for religious adornment. The priests lived in large monasteries, acquired lands, and became powerful politically as well as spiritually.

Buddhism, like Christianity, split into many sects. Some taught salvation through Buddha; others taught that enlightenment came only through introspection, meditation, and self-purification. The advocacy of frugality and complete mastery of self complemented the code of the samurai. Buddhism provided an emotional outlet and a spiritual stimulus for the entire nation. But at the time Japan entered the modern stream of world affairs, Buddhism gave way to neo-Confucianism and the political resurrection of the ancient Shinto.

Poetry was the greatest of the literary forms and was least influenced by the cultural wave from China. The *Manyoshu* or "Collection of Myriad Leaves" and the *Kokinshu* or "Poems Ancient and Modern" were compiled by imperial command and were more than 500 years old when Columbus discovered America. Poetic ability in ancient times was perhaps more highly prized by the upper classes than any other skill. "Love-making without

the composing of poems at each meeting and parting was unthinkable." In time, other forms of literature became popular: the sentimental diary, romantic novel, the deeply Buddhistic *No* plays, and the more dramatic and realistic puppet and *Kabuki* plays. But throughout, poetry remained the most highly regarded literary expression of the ages. Religion, poetry, and the arts were not only for specialists and patrons, but they were also the common coin of all cultivated men. Even warriors were encouraged to spend half their time in scholarly or artistic pursuits.

Painting, was originally the handmaiden of religion and nature, devoted to the lives of Buddha or the saints, and to landscapes, flowers, and animals, usually Chinese-style. Later, it became fashionable to paint political subjects like battle scenes or portraits of great warriors, and the art tended to become more decorative than profound. Delicate wood-block prints and gold-leaf screens showed a combination of manual dexterity and aesthetic sensitivity which was peculiarly Japanese.

The earliest Japanese efforts at sculpture were crude grave figures in clay and larger hollow figures modeled in dry lacquer. There was no early work in stone, perhaps because Japan is of volcanic origin with no marble or other fine grain stone available, but Buddhist statues in bronze and wood were carved in the seventh century. At least one piece, the so-called Yumedono Kwannon at Horyuji, near Nara, is rated among the great statues of the world. The most vigorous Japanese sculpture was not in the human figures or the more conventional Buddhas, but in the semihuman guardian-divinities like those seen at the entrance of the Buddhist temples.

Although Japanese architecture was heavily indebted to China, there was no mistaking the Japanese quality in the temples at Nara and Kyoto, the gold and silver pavilions at Kyoto, the lavish shrines in Nikko. Those masterpieces testified to Japan's cultural vitality, but no more so than the more commonplace and universal evidences of Japan's creative genius, like the torii or arches which dot the Japanese landscape, the simple arts of flower arrangement and the tea ceremony, and the ingenious blending of Japanese homes and gardens into their natural surroundings.

Social Organization and Economic Institutions

Japan conceived the state as a great patriarchal family. The earliest Japanese patriarchal unit was not a family as we know it today, but rather a clan which was made up of various households claiming common ancestry, together with their workers and slaves. As it became more difficult to hold the clans together, the family became the dominant unit. The family owned

the real estate and settled domestic matters like conflicts over wills, divorce, or illegitimate children. The father and the most capable son were the most important members of the household because of their obligations in worshipping the ancestors and providing for the family lineage. Adoption was a common practice. If there was no son, one was adopted. He could have been a younger brother, cousin, husband of a daughter, or maybe a total stranger. The *koseki*, or family record, recorded vital statistics and served for police identification and supervision. Legal marriage consisted of the formal transfer of a bride's registration by her father to the *koseki* of the groom's house.

The family pattern of benevolent paternalism, as in China, extended to local government committees and even to large industrial corporations. Blood relationship was important in getting a job, assistance, and consideration. Adjacent households were organized by fives and tens into *tonari gumi* or neighborhood associations. Every house was responsible for every other house in the group. Theoretically there were ten groups to one official, ten such officials to the next higher functionary, and so on to the imperial apex. In practice the *tonari gumi* in the cities were organized into ward associations of various sizes and in the country into village and town associations. These associations made it easy for the local groups to provide for their own community needs and for the central government to exercise the closest supervision over the humblest individual.

The Japanese class structure was a rigid social hierarchy. At the top was the imperial family, and immediately below it were the nobles. Each succeeding generation descended in rank by one grade, but the nobles were constantly reinvigorated by new appointments. Beneath the nobles were the gentry and the warriors, then the commoners including professional classes, the intelligentsia, the farmers and the merchants, and finally the outcasts who were at the base of the pyramid. The outcasts were the butchers, the undertakers, the executioners, and the beggars.

Just as the scholars were the aristocracy in China, the military caste was privileged in Japan. There was a sharp distinction between the officers and the privates. In Nara times it was written, "The wretchedness of a soldier is not different from that of a slave" and "of all forms of forced labor that of a soldier is most bitter." The ordinary soldier was but little better off in recent times, but with the samurai it was different. Their tradition became the national pattern of loyalties, and their code was accepted as the basis of practical ethics. Their virtues of loyalty, frugality, courage, and generous treatment of a fallen foe were reinforced by the self-discipline taught by the Zen Buddhists. A new name, *bushido*, or the way of the warrior, was given to this idealized concept of samurai behavior. In fact, the samurai

occupied a different place in the Japanese social fabric from that occupied in theory. By the time Commodore Perry came to Japan, most of the samurai had not done any fighting for years, and then only against hapless peasants revolting in desperation. They lived on a pension and had become too fat to squeeze themselves into their ancient uniforms. Many tended to be troublesome and querulous; others fell in with the spirit of the times, took up the new occupations offered by the opening of Japan, and made possible Japan's spectacular national growth.

Editorials in Japanese newspapers in Japan's day of victory illustrate the traditional Japanese attitude toward their military classes. On March 10, 1943, it was stated:

The Japanese army and navy represent the whole of the nation in a way that other armies and navies cannot do. Constituted on the basis of universal service, the army of Japan comprises the essence of the manhood of the nation. The professional armies of Britain and America in times of peace are composed of hirelings who enlist to avoid the bread lines or the police . . . in times of war, the levies are green. In Japan, the universal service is in fact the modern extension of the privileges and honors of the ancient highborn Samurai. The army is the nation in arms and the nation is a nation of knightly warriors.

On April 23, 1943, in an editorial entitled "The Spirit of Yasukuni," the *Nippon Times* said:

Fitting indeed are the ceremonies which are being conducted this week at the Yasukuni Shrine. No other nation matches our own in the supreme honor it accords to its warrior-dead. There is nothing in all the world to match the awesome solemnity of the utter silence and pure darkness around which the sacred arch is borne into the inner sanctuary to complete the apotheosis of the honored spirit. No boisterous valhalla, no hollow cenotaph, localizes the souls of our departed warriors. The whole universe their paradise, and the hearts of all Japanese their shrine.

In Japan, peasants and agricultural workers were slightly less important than soldiers. As in China, the key to Japan's policies was often found in the pressure of the people on the land. Overpopulation in Japan was a more recent phenomenon. Japan had 26,000,000 people at the time of its first census in 1721, and this figure remained stationary until 1850. In another century, it had tripled, approaching 90,000,000 in 1955.

No group of people worked harder under more difficult conditions than the Japanese farmers. Every scrap of land was utilized. Farming was really gardening as the plots were too small or too hilly for machines. A long growing season, ample rainfall, and unstinting application of human effort,

enabled Japan to get from its soil the highest yield of rice in the world, about fifty bushels per acre. Still the farmers were not able to supply all Japan's food needs nor to achieve a satisfactory level of living for themselves. Feudalism licensed the farmer to live in contented humility but crushed him without scruple when he attempted to assert himself or dared to be dissatisfied with the role of a plodding, well-fed beast of burden. High rents and taxes and ever-increasing prices working to the disadvantage of the farmer drove thousands from the farm to serve in the army or to the cities. Constant worry over paying the family bills gave rise to common practices of killing the aged and unwanted infants. Earthquakes, famine, floods, and pestilence complicated the farmer's life and drove him constantly to the verge of desperation.

The countryside was the stable and conservative element in Japan's social structure. The peasant was tied to his paddy and hamlet; to him foreign affairs meant typhoons, floods, earthquakes, or government. The things which really mattered were the weather, festivals, taxes, land rents, and water rights. Wars, revolutions, and new ideologies were important only if they took his sons or emptied his rice bowl. His pleasures were simple, but to the sophisticated city dwellers, farm life was drab and onerous. One Tokyo official in being sent to the provinces in the last century wrote, "I have fallen unawares into hell."

Population pressure in Japan was relieved by the development of industry and commerce. The ancient records spoke of the hereditary guilds and corporations of sericulturists, construction workers (particularly for temples), yeast brewers, diviners, and highway workers. Handicrafts flourished, not only among full-time artisans and craftsmen, but among peasants who had to augment their meager incomes. At a later period, the Japanese learned to mine gold and silver, and to manufacture small articles such as swords, textiles, sake, armor, and furniture.

The merchants were never accorded very much social prestige, but their wealth was important. Merchant guilds were given unusual political privileges and unlike Europe did not unite against the nobility. Under the Ashikaga, foreign trade brought profits and a new group of wealthy merchants, but their loyalties were divided among several clans. Under the Tokugawa, the shogunate would have preferred foreign trade, but could not interest its own vassals in that undignified occupation.

It was written that the samurai still had their dignity and the consciousness of high social standing, but the townspeople had most of the money and most of the fun. Consequently, many of the samurai became merchants and flocked to the large cities which became the centers of liberalism and change. In them were found the extremes of poverty and wealth, the

rebels against ancient tradition, and the younger sons and daughters who were not treated too kindly by the family system. Population in the cities increased at an alarming rate, but with earthquakes and depressions (or later, bombing), the expendables could move back with their country cousins.

Economic conditions in 1853 contributed to the undermining of the position of the aristocracy and the downfall of feudalism. The privileged classes sank ever deeper into the debt of the merchants, and the lot of the peasants became increasingly hopeless. The policy of the government never penetrated into the heart of the economic crises, but limited itself to inadequate restrictions, manipulations of the price of rice, revision of the system of taxation, and the cancellation of debts.

Government and Administrative System

The traditional system of dual administration, emperor and shogunate, reached its peak of development under the Tokugawa. The state was one great big family and the government was supposed to be carried out by superior men and not by laws. The emperor remained at Kyoto, surrounded by the kuge or court nobles. His honor and prestige were only hollow pretenses, as his budget was at the mercy of the shogunate. The Tokugawas lived in the huge castle in Tokyo, which became the imperial palace. The shogun and his bureaucracy ruled directly over one quarter of Japan, including its most important cities, Yedo, Kyoto, Osaka, Sakai, and Nagasaki. His officers were chosen from the vassals of his own clan and their samurai. One half of the rest of the country was ruled by the *fudai* or inside lords (those who gave their loyalty to the Tokugawa before the battle of Sekigahara, roughly similar to the pre-Chicago supporters of Roosevelt in his first nomination to the presidency). These fudai were given the best estates near Tokyo and the strategic spots along the highways leading to and from the capital. They were ordered to check for "guns going in and women coming out," for these were supposed to be the two most telling indications of impending revolution. The rest of the country was ruled by the *tozama* or outside lords whose loyalty was of a later date. All vassals had to sign a loyalty oath to the Tokugawa. The outside lords, like Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa, Hizen, lived at a greater distance from the capital and consequently were more independent and self-reliant. They were wealthier and, being closer to the shores of China, were more exposed to the Western world. They were obliged to spend half their time at Yedo, and when they returned to their own fiefs they had to leave their families

in Yedo as hostages. They were forbidden to visit Kyoto or to make alliances among themselves. When they amassed much wealth, they were given the honor of building new shrines, improving highways, or contributing to national relief.

Each daimiate was a microcosmic government by itself. It administered its own laws, levied its own taxes, and maintained its own army. It had its own departments of Treasury, Justice, Census, Military Affairs, Coinage and Currency, and Public Works. Respective departments took care of the rice storehouse, taxes and pensions, prisons, theaters, weights and measures, books and religion, the census, and the arrow and spear arsenal. Later their responsibilities were extended to the powder mill, rifle factory and artillery train, the issue of paper money, copper and iron cash, the erection and care of the castle, mills, breakwaters, bridges, roads, and schools.

The Tokugawa administrative machine, which applied only to the Tokugawa estates and not to the whole country, was so efficient that it could operate even without a strong personality at the head. The chief policy-making group was a Council of State, consisting of four or five Elders, and the chief administrative group was a Junior Council of four to six Junior Elders. Commissioners took charge of political jobs like finance, revenues, temples, and the clergy. Censors and inspectors known as the eyes and ears of the shogun reported to the central government what the people and nobility were doing and thinking. The chief magistrates in the cities and the shoguns' representatives in the villages and countryside had few privileges and duties, because of the position of the household elders and the village headmen. Police and spies were common, with the result that individual or group activity was severely curbed. Secret societies were not so common as in China. So-called secret societies were doomed unless their purposes were congenial to the administration.

For 250 years Japan was ruled by a kind of peacetime martial law. Laws for the imperial court and the court nobles were to prevent intrigue, and the laws of the military houses were to forestall rebellion. Laws for the people were general admonitions or maxims, and the judges could interpret them to suit themselves. The whole government was based on paternalism, force, and regimentation. The people were told what clothes should be worn, what kinds of food to serve, what religion to support, what price could be charged for rice, and what debts could be collected from the samurai. The purpose of government was to freeze the social order and to maintain the Tokugawa in power.

Astute statecraft, coupled with exclusion and seclusion, gave Japan two centuries of precarious peace. But the Tokugawas were not superior men and they collapsed because of their shortcomings. They did not open jobs

to people outside their own families. Their official bureaucracy became notoriously inefficient and corrupt while brilliant commoners went into the priesthood or the army. The shogunate was shrewd enough to realize that its shaky structure was doomed unless it could keep its rivals weak and exclude itself from any strong influences from outside.

From 1640 until 1853 the doors of Japan were closed, primarily because of the complications which had arisen with the early missionaries and traders. In 1542—a whole century before the enforcement of the seclusion policy—three Portuguese in a Chinese junk were driven ashore at Tanegashima, in the estates of the Lord Satsuma on Kyushu Island. They were welcomed hospitably and theirarquebuses aroused excitement. In the midst of feudal wars, trade in guns was worth at least 1,000 per cent profit. Other Portuguese traders, accompanied by Jesuit priests, arrived from Macao and Goa. Francis Xavier landed in 1549. At first the missionaries were treated with great respect and forbearance, possibly because their religion seemed to be something like Buddhism. Peasants in a living hell-on-earth took to the idea of a paradise hereafter, even if the doctrine of eternal damnation seemed bizarre and unbelievable. The Jesuits became friendly with Nobunaga because he saw in them personal friends and potential supporters against the hated Buddhists.

Nobunaga's successor, Hideyoshi, who was reported to wear a rosary himself, did not disapprove of the religion or the missionaries as such, but he sensed the political and economic dangers in Christianity. It increased the power of his feudal rivals, who profited from the foreign trade associated with the missionaries and who acquired foreign guns. The missionaries converted his most distinguished barons and ablest commanders and he feared that Christianity might form a hostile bond to unite his vassals. In 1587 he ordered the Christians banished, but he was too busy in Korea to enforce his orders. After he became more convinced that his "irritating and meddlesome" guests were deeply involved in politics and economics, he took sterner measures against them.

Hideyoshi's successor, Iyeyasu, had seen the Jesuits intriguing to have the Spaniards expelled and the Spaniards pressing for the exclusion of the Dutch. He had learned of the bitter quarrels between Protestants and Catholics and between Franciscans and Dominicans. He feared that the Spaniards and the Portuguese might work with his rivals to overthrow his government and he was afraid that some Europeans might try to do in Japan what the Spanish did in the Philippines, the Portuguese in Macao, the Dutch in Batavia, and the British in India. Furthermore, his own reports informed him about the bitter enmities which were at that time fomenting the thirty years' religious wars in Europe. Therefore Iyeyasu

issued further edicts against the Christians in 1612 and 1613. Churches were demolished, Christian missionaries were persecuted and expelled, and the native converts were hunted down, tortured brutally, and burned at the stake. The orgy culminated in the Shimabara Rebellion when perhaps as many as 37,000 Christians were put to the sword.

The shoguns wanted no part of the missionaries but they would have welcomed foreign trade. They appreciated the goods of Europe and the goods of Asia—silk yarn, Chinese textiles, books, pictures, porcelains, drugs, spices, gums, and perfumes. They welcomed the knowledge which they gained about maps, astronomy, shipbuilding, and metalworking. So they turned to other sources for trade. They permitted the Dutch to establish a factory at Hirado and the English to do likewise at Yedo. But trade and religion seemed inseparable. The Spanish were ordered out of Japan in 1624, the Portuguese some fourteen years later. When the Portuguese emissaries returned to press for the reopening of trade relations, they were summarily beheaded. The Portuguese were warned that should the king of Portugal himself, nay, the very God of the Christians, presume to enter the dominions of Japan, he would be served in the same manner. The final seclusion decrees, in 1636 and after, ordered that no foreigners could come to Japan except Dutch, Chinese, and Koreans and these under rigorous restrictions. Japanese were not permitted to build ocean-going ships and were warned that if they left the country, they would be beheaded on their return. Thus the Japanese habit of friendliness to strangers and their strong sense of hospitable duty, plus their desire for gain, gave way to fear. For more than 200 years, Japan's only communication with the outside world was through the handful of Dutch who were practically imprisoned on the small island of Deshima in Nagasaki harbor and the Dutch ships which paid them their annual visit. No efforts to break down this seclusion policy were successful until Commodore Perry knocked at Japan's doors in 1853.

Suggested Reading

- G. C. ALLEN, *A Short Economic History of Modern Japan* (London, 1946).
RUTH BENEDICT, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* (Boston, 1946).
HUGH BORTON, ed., *Japan* (Ithaca, 1951).
F. BRINKLEY and D. KIKUCHI, *A History of the Japanese People from the Earliest Times to the End of the Meiji Era* (New York, 1905).
BASIL H. CHAMBERLAIN, *Things Japanese*, 4th ed. (Kobe, 1905).
JOHN F. EMBREE, *The Japanese Nation* (New York, 1945).
—, *Suyemura: A Japanese Village* (Chicago, 1939).

FORTUNE MAGAZINE, *Japan* (Special Issues of September, 1936 and April, 1944).

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, SCAP, CIVIL INFORMATION AND EDUCATION SECTION, *Education in the New Japan*, 2 vols. (Tokyo, 1948).

K. S. LATOURETTE, *The History of Japan* (New York, 1947).

J. A. MURDOCH, *A History of Japan*, 3 vols. (New York, 1926).

EDWIN O. REISCHAUER, *Japan, Past and Present*, rev. ed. (New York, 1953).

SIR GEORGE B. SANSOM, *Japan, A Short Cultural History* (New York, 1943).

———, *The Western World and Japan* (New York, 1950).

ARTHUR WALEY, translator, *The Tale of Genji* (London, 1935).

CHITOSHI YANAGA, *Japan Since Perry* (New York, 1949).

CHAPTER 4

The Expansion of Europe

Recent events are rooted in the distant past. Historical memories are deep and long, and they condition the psychological attitudes which characterize the contemporary Far East in world affairs. Very often what we overlook and excuse in the distant past, others emphasize; what we would like to forget, others insist upon remembering. We are likely to act as if the past is gone and forgotten; they are prone to think that the more we change the more we are the same.

Early Contacts between East and West

At the time of Christ, silk, cotton, hides, spices, glass, dyes, precious stones, and medicines found their way from China to the Roman world. Embassies were exchanged with Marcus Aurelius and commercial contacts continued overland until the Moslems acquired control of Central Asia in the sixth century. Arabs, Ceylonese, and Jews frequented the China coast. As early as the eleventh century, Arabs settled in China, took Chinese wives, established an extraterritorial political community, and in some cases rose to high political office in the Chinese administration. Arab vessels carried the products of India and the Far East toward Europe, while the West exhausted its wealth and strength in the Crusades.

A beautifully carved stone monument in West China perpetuated the record of the earliest missionary activities in China. When the Nestorians were driven out of Europe, some wandered to the T'ang capital at Sian in 635. They flourished for two centuries until they were commanded by the Chinese emperor to renounce their priestly calling and to cease perverting the institutions of the country.

When the Mongols swarmed across the Eurasian continent in the thirteenth century, they reopened the overland trade routes and rearoused European interest in the commercial possibilities of the Far East. The fantastic tales of Marco Polo further fired the lively imagination of the Europeans.

After three and a half years of exciting travel, Marco Polo arrived in Peking in 1275, when he was eighteen years old. He served the great Khan for twenty years before he returned to Europe in rags, but with emeralds, sapphires, rubies, and diamonds in the seams of his clothes. His riches were powerless to keep him out of jail, when his city-state, Venice, was defeated by Genoa in 1298. As a prisoner he dictated his fabulous account of China's millions.

Christian missionaries made repeated attempts to reopen activities in China. Early in the thirteenth century, a Franciscan delivered a papal letter to the Great Khan, only to receive a reply to the effect that the Pope himself should come to the Far East and pay homage to the Mongol power. Two emissaries from Louis IX reached the Mongol capital at Urga. Although they were not successful in soliciting Mongol aid against the Turks, they brought back to Europe a great deal of information about the Far East. Another Franciscan friar was made Bishop of Peking in 1307 and succeeded in making about 30,000 converts. It was once thought that Kublai Khan was on the verge of becoming a Christian, but it is much more likely that he favored the Christians as a counterpoise against his Chinese Confucian subjects. With the decline of the Mongols, these sporadic Christian efforts subsided.

Expansion by Sea

The eclipse of the Mongols plunged Central Asia into political darkness which halted the commerce along the caravan routes. The attention of Europe shifted to the sea route to the Indies. The Portuguese, in an extraordinary burst of national energy, suddenly founded a new empire and became the richest nation in Europe. In defiance of fears and superstitions, Prince Henry the Navigator launched the exploration of the West African coast and the trade in Negro slaves. Bartolomeu Diaz rounded the Cape of Good Hope in 1486, and Vasco da Gama reached the Malibar Coast of India in 1497. Under Alfonso de Albuquerque and his successors, the Portuguese achieved the greatest extent of their political power and control and established themselves at Malacca on the Malayan Peninsula in 1515. They sent their merchants and fighters all over Southeast Asia. They

pushed on to China and even reached the shores of Japan. They went to the most distant ends of the world and "did the world extend farther, they would have gone there too."

Up to 1400, Asians knew more about navigation and they followed the sea in far greater numbers than Europeans. There was more traffic on the Yangtze than there was on the Thames. The Chinese dominated commerce from the coast of China to Malacca; and the Arabs, from there to the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. Although the waters of China were comparatively peaceful, violence was the rule in the Indian Ocean. The Portuguese used cannon to revolutionize naval warfare and to defeat the Arab traders. They blocked off the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf and forced all traffic around the Cape of Good Hope. Too often the Portuguese committed cold-blooded atrocities against Moslems and Hindus who were beyond the pale of Christian mercy.

In 1517 the Portuguese sent an official mission headed by Thomas Pires to Canton in a pepper-laden sailing ship. The Cantonese liked him and the profits of trade and expedited his visit to Peking. Unfortunately, the Portuguese continued to act in China as they had acted against the Arabs. They conducted themselves with insolence and cruelty, and looked upon the Chinese, too, as heathen and legitimate prey. Pires was ordered back from Peking to Canton where he was imprisoned until he died. The Portuguese were driven out of all Chinese ports, but they managed to establish themselves by means of well-placed bribes and the payment of an annual rental at a desolate spot, Macao, near Canton in 1557. The end of the greatness of Portugal came when Philip II annexed Portugal to Spain in 1580.

Spain exploited the alternative route to the Far East by sailing westward to the New World and thence across the Pacific. Ferdinand Magellan, a Portuguese navigator who had been disgraced and repudiated by his king, sailed in the service of the king of Spain, in command of the first ships to go around the world. Magellan died in the Philippines in a battle that he had no excuse for fighting. Adventurers, grandees, and churchmen established the power of Spain in the Philippines, and lowly traders wrote some of the most romantic pages in the history of Spain in the Far East with the story of the annual galleon which threaded its way back and forth across the Pacific between Manila and Acapulco.

The Spanish were barred from China because China was in the Portuguese sphere of influence. Some Spanish in Manila chafed at the prohibition and dreamed about a conquest of China. In 1574 they estimated that it could be done with 100 men, but two years later they increased the figure to 6,000. After a sobering decade of experience, they multiplied

their estimates to a suggested total of 12,000 Spaniards, 6,000 Japanese, and an equal number of Filipinos. Neither men nor money in those quantities were available to the Spanish after the disastrous defeat of the Armada in 1588.

Thomas Swift described the early colonizing activities of Spain and Portugal in biting satire. To him, "a crew of pirates went ashore, they knew not whither, to plunder and rob a harmless people who had treated them with kindness. They gave the country a new name, took formal possession of it for the king, set up a rotten plank or a stone for a memorial, murdered two or three dozen natives, brought away a couple more as a sample, and returned home to be rewarded. Plunder preceded trade, extortion, and a free license to all acts of inhumanity and lust." Swift thought of a modern colony, not as a pious expedition to convert and civilize an idolatrous and barbarous people, but as an "execrable crew of butchers."

In spite of cruelty, the haughty attitude of *todo blanco es caballero*, and even the massacre of *Indios* (as the Spanish called the Filipinos) and Chinese, Spain left a permanent imprint on its colonies. Like Rome, Spain impressed upon its conquests Spanish culture and language, religion, and political institutions. Perhaps Spain did more than any other European nation to convert and civilize the native peoples both in the New World and the Far East.

Missionaries came to the Far East with the Portuguese and Spanish. St. Francis Xavier died in 1552 in Macao before reaching the China mainland. In 1580 Martin Ignatius set forth to see the emperor of China and got only as far as a Canton prison. Two years later an Italian Jesuit, Matteo Ricci, a student of mathematics and astronomy, came to Macao. At first he dressed as a Buddhist monk and later as a Confucian scholar. He studied the Chinese language and after twenty years he was invited to Peking. He brought gifts of clocks, gauges, glass prisms, and books on literature, science, geography, architecture, and mathematics. He aided the court astrologers, revised the calendar, and prepared a new map of the world on which he wisely placed China in the center. He instructed the Chinese in the use of the astronomical instruments which the Mongols had brought from India, and he taught the court the casting of cannon. He never met the emperor, but before he died in 1610 he converted many princes and mandarins.

Other distinguished Jesuits followed him, one of whom, Adam Schaal, became the chief adviser to the first Manchu emperor. The Jesuits were the transmitters to China of the scientific advancements contributed by the galaxy which included Da Vinci, Copernicus, Galileo, Newton, Boyle, and Descartes. By 1644 missionaries in China had published more than 150 books on mathematics, natural sciences, physics, philology, astronomy, geog-

raphy, philosophy, and ethics. They sent back to Europe glowing accounts of the Chinese and their country and were largely responsible for the creation of the glamour-myth of China and the Far East.

Missionaries from other orders followed the Jesuits into China: Dominicans, Franciscans, and Augustinians. The Franciscans and Dominicans deplored the compromises which their predecessors had made with Chinese culture and social customs and engaged the Jesuits in the so-called "Rites Controversy." Jesuits tolerated Chinese ancestral rites as civil and commemorative ceremonies and used the Chinese character *P'ien* ("heaven") as the equivalent of God; their critics denounced the rites as idolatrous and insisted on the characters *P'ien chu* ("lord of heaven") for God. Since the dispute involved the interpretation of Chinese ideographs, the emperor considered himself the final appeal. The emperor supported the Jesuit *P'ien*, but the Franciscans appealed to the Pope, who ruled in favor of *P'ien chu*.

The emperor, who had granted freedom of worship to Roman churches throughout the empire, was insulted and angered by the appeal to outside authority. He expelled the missionaries, but he could not eradicate the continuing intellectual influence of the Church in China. Many Chinese Catholic converts retained and preserved the faith. In 1724 a new emperor prohibited any Chinese from becoming a Christian and repeated the expulsion orders against all missionaries except those in the service of the Imperial Court. He feared participation by the Christians in rebellion or secret societies. Those decrees remained on the list of imperial mandates, but they were not implemented by rigorous measures of enforcement. In some respects the policies of China were less drastic than the intolerance which governments and the Church itself pursued in Europe.

Dutch, French, and British

The Portuguese and the Spanish constituted a first wave of imperial expansion; the Dutch, the French, and the British, a second wave. When the Dutch won their independence from Spain, they lost their right to buy and sell spices in the free market of Lisbon. Since they had worked as geographers, pilots, bankers, and cartographers for the Portuguese, they determined to get into the lucrative Far East trade for themselves. In 1602 they founded the United East India Company to challenge the monopoly of Portugal and to get the jump on the English. At the same time Henry Hudson sailed up his river and his countrymen bargained for New Amsterdam, other Dutch nationals rounded the Cape of Good Hope and Cape

Horn en route to the Indies. Dutch explorers wandered among the islands of the South Pacific, and proved the island nature of the continent of Australia. Wherever they went they avoided warfare with the native peoples and contented themselves with trading stations along the coast. Their instructions were to be considerate to the natives, try to find out what their country yielded, inquire after gold and silver, make them believe that "you are by no means eager for precious metals, so as to leave them ignorant of the value of the same; and if they shall offer you gold or silver in exchange for your articles, you will pretend to hold the same in slight regard, showing them copper, pewter or lead, and giving them the impression as if the minerals last mentioned were by us set greater value on."

The Dutch sought only such political power as seemed necessary for trade, but they never avoided a fight with the Spanish or the Portuguese, whether at Malacca, Madagascar, or Macao, in India, Ceylon, or Cambodia. They founded Batavia in 1619 and expanded into Sumatra, Java, the Celebes, the Moluccas, the Sunda Islands and even into Borneo and New Guinea. At its height, the Dutch Empire in the East Indies was fifty-eight times the size of the mother country and contained eight times its population. With a primary interest in tea, silk, and porcelain, the Dutch tried desperately to trade with China. They attacked the Portuguese in Macao but were unsuccessful. Then they moved up the China coast and established bases in the Pescadores and Formosa. They sent four embassies to Peking (1655, 1667, 1685, 1795) seeking a formal political contact with the Manchu court and commercial concessions for their traders.

The first embassy consisted of two ambassadors, Their Excellencies Peter de Goyer and Jacob de Keyzer, four merchants, six servants, a steward, a secretary, a doctor, two interpreters, a trumpeter, and a drummer. The account of the embassy written by the steward, John Nievhoff, *An Embassy from the East India Company of the United Provinces to the Grand Tartar Cham, Emperor of China*, which appeared in London in 1669 was the most provocative book about China since Marco Polo. It foreshadowed later accounts of Chinese complacency and contempt. The Imperial Grand Secretary asked the Dutch if there really was such a place as Holland and if the Dutch were not mere sea rovers without a country, living on their ships, and only landing to plunder and to furnish for themselves the maintenance of their rebellion at home. The emperor was neither impressed nor pleased with the Dutch choice of presents—not scientific equipment but armor, ornamented guns, an optical tube, cloves, nutmegs, cinnamon, carpets, beads, quilts, and a parrot—but he graciously permitted an audience after the Dutch performed the kowtow. The Dutch received

no privileges or promises, and they too had to content themselves with the usual regular trade at Canton. All the while the Dutch operated their exclusive trading station at Nagasaki in Japan.

The British were slower to penetrate into the Far East. In the sixteenth century, British freebooters stalked the Pacific to plunder the Spanish; in the seventeenth century merchantmen entered the picture. The first English ships, under Captain John Weddell, appeared in China in 1637, seven years before the fall of the Ming Dynasty. These ships did not belong to the East India Company which had been established in 1600, but they came to China on a private venture in which the financially embarrassed king was interested. The first encounters between the British and the Chinese were prophetic. The Chinese thwarted the British desire to do business in their own way, and the four tiny British ships, with ridiculous ease, blasted their way past the Chinese forts. When these ships came home, they brought new ideas about the Chinese, not so laudatory as those popularized by the Jesuits.

In 1699 the first company ship came to Canton, and in 1715 the British established a factory and a consulate there. In 1742 the first British man-of-war at Canton, the "Centurion," under command of Captain John Anson, captured the Spanish galleon worth about £400,000 in loot and brought his prize to Macao. Captain Anson's activities were of doubtful legality, but his experiences created in him a lower opinion of the Chinese than that entertained by his predecessor a century earlier. One of Captain Anson's officers observed that "in artifice, falsehood, and an attachment to all kinds of lucre, many of the Chinese are difficult to be paralleled by any other people." He gave examples of the extreme ingenuity of the tradespeople: they increased the weight of the daily provisions sold on board by feeding stones to ducks and chickens and by injecting water into the carcasses of pigs. He reported that the magistrates were corrupt, their people thievish, their tribunals crafty and venal. Captain Anson pointed out that China could not even defend its own state, that it had been conquered by a handful of Tartars, and that the "Centurion" alone was an overmatch for all the naval power of that empire.

The French failed to build up extensive material interests in East Asia. The French populace never generated any genuine enthusiasm for colonial expansion and left it to their kings and bishops to look out for national fortunes in distant places. French ships explored the Pacific, and the great minister, Colbert, established trading posts in India. After the French defeat by the British in India and the New World, French imperial interests were primarily nurtured by Roman Catholic missionaries enjoying the protection of the government. In 1787 the efforts of a great French

missionary, Pigneau de Behaine, Bishop of Adran, led to the signature of a treaty between the king of Cochin China and King Louis XVI of France, giving the French a foothold at Tourane in Indo-China. This treaty opened Cochin China to trade and guaranteed to the French religious freedom and the right to propagate the gospel. The French helped the Annamese prince, who became the Emperor Gia Long, to regain his throne in 1801. But his successors were averse to French influence and began persecution of French missionaries and Christian natives. Problems arising out of these persecutions, and concern for the welfare of Roman Catholics, provided the occasion and the opportunity for a French empire in Indo-China and for the further extension of French political and commercial interests in the Middle Kingdom.

The sixteenth century was the century of the Portuguese, the seventeenth belonged to the Dutch, but the eighteenth and nineteenth were the centuries of the British. The Industrial Revolution added new motives for overseas expansion and colonial conquests. The single setback was the United States. British ships circumnavigated the globe, Captain Cook completed his famous explorations in the Pacific, and the British dominated completely the route to India. The British extended their power beyond Singapore and riveted their attention on China. Europe had been reading Jesuit books about exotic China, its landscape and its architecture, and had successfully launched silk, lacquer-ware, and chinaware industries of its own. With the ousting of the missionaries from China, Europe shifted its interest in China from culture to commerce. Merchants became the only bridges between East and West, and China's relations with the outside world became essentially its relations with the East India Company, limited and restricted as they were. The British in particular began to dream dreams of the huge profits which could be made if the trade with China could be placed on a regular and open basis. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, colonialism was not yet a major facet of Western policy in East Asia. The Spanish had a foothold in the Philippines, the Dutch in Java, the French in Indo-China, and the British in Malaya. The Dutch in Nagasaki and the Portuguese in Macao were under the jurisdiction of the local authorities. The interests of Russia and the United States and the tremendous growth of British imperialism were matters for the future.

Conditions of Anglo-Chinese Trade

Fundamentally, the Chinese regarded all traders as of low order and looked upon foreigners as the lowest. Europeans meant nothing but trouble.

They were ignorant of Chinese laws, notoriously turbulent, disrespectful, and unreasonable. They were of a piratical nature like the Japanese

and of a new influx of men of barbarous breed, with a language no civilized tongue could master; beards black, brown or even red; eyes not a decent black or brown, but like those of cats, blue and grey; and of a manner ferocious. It was high time that China shut itself into itself, and excluded foreign wares which it did not need.¹

A highly placed Chinese scholar asked:

Why do you come here? We take in exchange your articles of produce and manufacture, which we really have no occasion for, and give you in return our precious tea, which nature has denied your country; and yet you are not satisfied. Why do you so often visit a country whose customs you dislike? We do not invite you to come among us; but when you do come and behave well we treat you accordingly. Respect then our hospitality, but don't pretend to regulate or reform it.²

The British were convinced that the Chinese, and not the British, were in need of enlightenment and that the Chinese, as an obligation to the civilized world, should reform their onerous conditions of trade. In the early nineteenth century, British traders found China "as difficult to enter as Heaven and as difficult to get out of as the Chancery." The British could trade only with Chinese hongts ("shops") or merchants who belonged to the *co-hong*, a kind of Chinese Chamber of Commerce, with membership sanctioned only by the emperor. In addition to the viceroy, the emperor had in Canton a hoppo or Superintendent of the Customs for the control of trade and the collection of fees. Every foreign vessel was secured or assigned to a security merchant, a member of the *co-hong*, who was responsible for the sale of inbound cargo, the provisioning of outbound cargo, and for every operation connected with the arrival and departure of the ship. The *co-hong* was the sole medium of communication between foreign merchants and any Chinese authority. It was the channel for transmitting to the government the stream of wealth in which the officials expected to share. The hong merchants were among the world's greatest businessmen, amassing fortunes running into the millions. The hoppo's take in 1804 was estimated at £200,000 sterling. They were labeled as shrewd bargainers: "they will cheat you if they can—therefore your business is to see they shall not."

Ch'ien Lung's tariffs were designed to encourage imports to China and

¹ W. E. Soothill, *China and the West* (Oxford University Press, London, 1925), p. 77.

² John Barrow, *Travels in China* (T. Cadell & W. Davies, London, 1804), p. 413. Barrow was private secretary to the Earl of Macartney.

to discourage exports which constituted the more lucrative source of British profits. The tariffs fixed by Peking were kept secret from the traders and were applied and interpreted by the local authorities without any possibility of checking their accuracy or legality. Foreigners paid the unauthorized charges, unpredictable extortions, and bribes—with much complaining but not too much—because over-all operations returned handsome profits.

Six years after the British defeat at Yorktown, Lieutenant Colonel Cathcart was nominated as special envoy to the court of Peking to negotiate improvements in trading conditions. The merchants wanted a commercial depot where they might store their goods pending sale and where Chinese merchants might come for the transaction of business. In this depot, they wanted the Chinese under Chinese jurisdiction and the British under British jurisdiction. Cathcart died before he reached Peking.

Because the wars against France magnified the importance of the China trade, the British sent another mission in 1792–1793. Lord George Macartney, son of an Irish country gentleman, friend of Burke, Reynolds, and Voltaire, and member of Dr. Johnson's literary club, was named chief of mission at a salary of £15,000 plus expenses because of his distinguished achievements as ambassador to Russia and governor of Madras. Sparing no effort to make a magnificent impression, he went to China on a man-of-war accompanied by two merchantmen. He carried presents including telescopes, lenses, guns and swords, globes, clocks, and a planetarium. His credentials were addressed to the emperor of China and were signed by *vester bonus frater et amicus* George, "by the Grace of God, King of Great Britain, France and Ireland, Sovereign of the Seas, Defender of the Faith." This was scarcely an awe-inspired way to address the Dragon Throne and boded ill for the successful accomplishment of Lord Macartney's mission.

The ambassador was to make certain requests touching conditions of trade at Canton. He was to seek a commercial treaty; opening of other ports, for example, Ningpo, Chusan, and Tientsin, where ships might call and merchants might reside; a clear statement of all tariffs, duties, and other levies; the right for an English diplomatic representative to reside at Peking; an island similar to the Portuguese island at Macao; and the liberty for Christians again to disseminate their religious beliefs. Lord Macartney was required to give a full and free communication of any art, science, or observation, either of use or curiosity, which the industry, ingenuity, and experience of Europeans might have enabled them to acquire. He was instructed to procure an audience conforming to ceremonials which might not commit the honor of his sovereign or lessen his own dignity.

On the last leg of his trip, up the Grand Canal, his barge flew a pennant identifying him as a "Tribute-bearing Embassy from the Red Barbarians."

The emperor might have regarded the British as the most gullible and the wealthiest of the tribute bearers, but he was slightly apprehensive about them. Their empire in India was a source of disquiet, while the audacity and skill of their seamen, their novel inventions, and the superiority of their artillery, were no less disturbing. Moreover, they had intimate relations with the Cantonese, who were the most distant and the least loyal of the emperor's subjects. A rebellion there, abetted by the British for their own purposes, would not be easy to suppress. Therefore, "the ambassador was received with the utmost politeness, treated with the utmost hospitality, watched with the utmost vigilance, and dismissed with the utmost civility." They "entered Peking as beggars, they stayed there as prisoners, and they were expelled as thieves." None of the British requests was entertained, and the ambassador was warned that "if the English should attempt to trade elsewhere than at Canton, they will be expelled."

Lord Macartney was entertained by the Imperial Grand Secretary, Ho Shen, a favorite of the emperor, Ch'ien Lung. After the death of Ch'ien Lung, Ho Shen was impeached by the Censorate, not only because he had accumulated three hundred millions by corrupt practices, but also on the ground that he aspired to the purple. He was found guilty on innumerable counts and permitted, by a signal act of grace, to commit suicide. His enormous fortune was confiscated by the emperor.

Lord Macartney was unsuccessful in his mission, but he condensed a great deal of political wisdom in his report. He reflected on the possibility of using force to bring China to terms. He foresaw the ease of military conquest, but he asked "to what end if profitable trade were destroyed"? He reasoned that the circumstance of greatest embarrassment to an invader would be the immense numbers of the Chinese, not on account of the mischief which the Chinese could do to an invader, but because the invader would find no end of doing mischief to the Chinese. The slaughter of millions would scarcely be perceived, and, unless the people themselves soon voluntarily submitted, the victor indeed might reap the vanity of destruction, but not the glory or use of dominion. He philosophized:

The Empire of China is an old, crazy, first-rate Man of War, which a fortunate succession of able officers have contrived to keep afloat for these hundred fifty years past. . . . But whenever an insufficient man happens to have the command on deck, adieu to the discipline and the safety of the ship. She may, perhaps, not sink outright; she may drift sometime as a wreck, and will then be dashed to pieces on the shore; but she can never be rebuilt on the old bottom.³

³ Maurice Collis, *The Great Within* (Faber and Faber, Ltd., London, 1951), pp. 296 and 297.

Then his lordship concluded "our reason and our humanity equally forbid the thought of any offensive measures while a ray of hope remains for succeeding by gentle ones."

The British repeated their gentle measures by sending another diplomatic mission to Peking, just as soon as the successful conclusion of the Napoleonic wars permitted the British again to turn their attention to the China trade. Lord Amherst, accompanied by Mr. Henry Ellis, who kept the official diary, and the precocious young Mr. Staunton, who had by the age of thirty-five become one of the outstanding authorities on things Chinese, arrived in Peking in late summer, 1816. If Lord Macartney's mission had been a failure, Lord Amherst's was a fiasco. The emperor wanted the envoy to kowtow in recognition of his position as sovereign of the universe, but Lord Amherst was stubborn. After a comic scene, worthy of Shakespeare, the emperor dismissed the envoy without an audience and sent a letter to King George IV which ended with the admonition:

Living at such a distance these embassies must cause you great trouble. Nor are they less troublesome to US on account of the indecorous scenes to which they give rise. The presents they bring are of no interest or use. In future do not bother to despatch them, for they are merely a waste of time. You will be better employed admonishing your subjects and improving your defences. If you loyally accept OUR sovereignty there is really no need for these stated appearances to prove that you are indeed OUR vassal.⁴

New Commercial Complications

New complications aggravated the issue whether to continue trade at Canton under the old humiliations or to force a showdown. The first complication followed the abolition of the East India Company's monopoly of the China trade. When in 1833 the British Parliament refused to renew the charter of the East India Company, the position of the chief factor of the company at Canton was no longer adequate to represent British interests. Country ships became more numerous and more important than company ships, and national British interests included more of the small traders. The British now wanted a commissioned political and diplomatic representative of the Crown, not merely a commercial official, who would serve as the protector of His Majesty's subjects as well as the overseer of their commercial activities. Such a person could not be treated by the Chinese as a mere chief merchant of the foreign devils.

On December 10, 1833, Lord Napier, a Scottish peer, was commissioned

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 324.

as the First Superintendent of British Trade—all British trade and not just that of the East India Company. Lord Napier arrived in Macao in July, 1834. According to his instructions he was to announce his arrival to the viceroy by letter, not through the co-hong by petition. Yet he was not to arouse Chinese prejudices or endanger trade and he was not to call for armed resistance unless absolutely necessary. He was reminded that establishment of direct communication with the Imperial Court would be desirable. He was told to use utmost caution and moderation and to convince the Chinese authorities of the sincere desire of the king to cultivate the most friendly relations with the emperor of China.

The second complication stemmed from the issue of extraterritoriality. The British in Canton grew increasingly concerned over the matter of legal jurisdiction over their own subjects. A few bitter experiences underscored the traditional British opinion of Chinese justice. Contracts were at the mercy of a Chinese magistrate, and British persons were as good as dead if they fell into the clutches of Chinese criminal law. There were thousands of sailors in port, all too frequently abusing their liberty, but scarcely deserving the punishments which the Chinese threatened or administered. The British became more insistent in their demands for jurisdiction over their own subjects.

The third new complication resulted from the quarrels over the opium traffic. The trade was illegal and repugnant, but it was highly profitable. All countries participated in the trade. In Bengal, the East India Company and later the Crown itself were deeply involved in the opium monopoly and the revenues which came from it. The foreigners had great difficulty in finding means of payment for Chinese goods before the Chinese took up the opium habit. Silk and tea were paid for in specie, Spanish silver, or Mexican dollars, then furs, ginseng, sandalwood, and cotton goods. The balance of payments swung violently against the Chinese with the expansion of the opium trade and began to drain the Chinese specie away from them. Economic compulsion obliged the emperor to enforce the prohibition decrees which had been dormant for over a century. The opium trade was so voluminous and so mixed up in the regular trade that any attempt at strict prohibition could only lead to serious consequences.

The opium was delivered to armed receiving ships at Lintin Island, in the delta off Canton, where it was stored and delivered on order to smugglers. The emperor prohibited the trade by repeated edicts—both viceroy and hoppo enjoined the hong merchants to obey the law—but from the viceroy down to the smallest person with the slightest connection with a government office, all connived at the breach of the law for their personal profit. The merchants protested the hypocrisy but they took part in the

game. They branded the officials as imbecile and corrupt, but they might have added that it was an attractive kind of imbecility and corruption because of the welcome profits. The issue became one of reconciling Chinese concern with modifying and controlling the opium traffic in the interest of their own welfare and the vested interests which the foreigners of all nationalities had accumulated in the possible profits of the trade.

All of these complications were inherently difficult to solve, the more so because of the dynamic personal factors which influenced the British attitudes. The Old China Hands exerted a certain amount of influence on British Far Eastern policies. In the fourth decade of the nineteenth century, merchants at Canton pressured their own government to ease the "hardships" under which they were conducting their affairs. Their factories (that is, their showrooms, warehouses, business offices, and residence quarters) were confined to an area a quarter of a mile square with a small open space where they might take the air. Their esplanade was "generally so choked up with barbers and fortune-tellers, venders of dogs and cats, quack medicines, and trinkets, with a host of strangers, come to gaze at the foreigners, that it is difficult to move."

The English factories were imposing and luxurious and the English company was noted for its scale of living and the princely character of its hospitality. But to the merchants of Canton their factories were only a gilded cage. They had to live in the factories during the trading season, from October to March or April, and then retire to their summer homes in Macao. They could not have their wives "or other foreign women" with them, and they could hire servants only with the connivance of the local officials. They could not visit the walled city of Canton and could not ride in sedan chairs on any occasion. They could not row on the river, and only once in a while could they visit the flower gardens on the opposite bank of the river. The accumulated effect of these irksome restrictions was to exhaust the British tempers and to increase the demand for action.

The Opium War

Arguments over trade were surface symptoms of deep conflicts of culture. China was a shell of its old self. It was a mummy of a once vital civilization, but its desiccation was in no sense a reflection on the excellence of its past. Yet the emperor spoke and thought as if the world had stood still for three thousand years. China never did trust the barbarians; so it was not surprised when threats of war clouded the horizon. The Chinese officials believed that stoppage of the trade would bring the British to

reason, and some officials, whose intelligence should have taught them better, scorned the British strength. They could not see why people were dazzled by the name of England just because her vessels were sturdy and her cannons fierce. "Because she is extravagant and squanders lavishly, they call her wealthy, yet they do not know that the warships of the said barbarians are very heavy, taking water to depths of ten feet." One Chinese believed that the British soldiers did not know how to use fists and swords and could not conveniently stretch because their legs were firmly bound with cloth. The Chinese believed that what was called British power could be controlled without difficulty.

On the British side, they were fed up with China and the fancy tales about it. They were through with concession and compromise and were convinced of the justice of war, if war were to come. They could see no other means to make China abandon its ancient pretensions of superiority and to enter into the modern practice of diplomacy as between equal nation-states. The British considered China, with all its merits in civilization, resources, courage, and the arts such an anomaly that "we cannot contemplate its long duration when the scales have fallen from the eyes of the barbarian nations, who for so many years have in ignorance bowed the hull to a power which as to efficient strength is no more than the shadow of a shade." The British were conscious of the driving force of their dynamic power. They were not blind to the immediate importance of opium, but they hoped to find a long-term source of profit to replace the iniquitous drug traffic. They believed that the patient, thrifty, dexterous assiduity of private and untrammelled enterprise constituted a force poised like an avalanche to supply any quantity of manufactured goods.

When Lord Napier arrived in the Far East in 1834 he ushered in a five-year period of tension which ended in war. He sailed into Canton in a British frigate without waiting for the customary permission from the viceroy. He announced his arrival by a letter, instead of a humble petition, and invited thereby the viceroys's retaliation. Lord Napier became one of the first to learn how difficult it was to use force on Chinese officials. He held the military power of the Chinese in contempt: "What can an army of bows and arrows and pikes and shields do against a handful of British veterans?" He was unable to cope with the tactics of delay and procrastination. Exasperation aggravated the torments of his tropical fever and led to his untimely death.

The crisis exploded in 1839, exactly one century before the outbreak of World War II in Europe. A new imperial commissioner, Lin Tse-hsü, came to Canton "to scrub and wash away the filth of opium." He ordered the foreign merchants to surrender every ounce of opium they owned and

give a bond on penalty of death that they would import no more. Here was a spectacle of a Chinese official honestly attempting to enforce a Chinese law. On order of Captain Elliot, more than 20,000 chests were surrendered, valued at \$6,000,000. Before an unbelieving public, 500 Chinese coolies mixed the whole lot with salt, lime, and water, and dumped it into the creek. A disconsolate band of British merchants retired to Macao on May 24, 1839, leaving their factories in the hands of the American merchants.

The problems of conflicting jurisdiction contributed to the crisis. A Chinese was killed at Kowloon in a riot involving American and British sailors. Commissioner Lin accused a British sailor of murder and demanded his surrender. The new Superintendent of Trade, Captain Charles Elliot, refused. Commissioner Lin ordered closure of the trade and descended on Macao with a body of troops. The British evacuated to the fifty merchant ships anchored off the barren island of Hongkong. The British prepared for a long siege and wrote to their agents in Manila to "send up poultry and pigs, also some of your best beer, with some moderately good French claret and some Seltzer water, if it be had with you." Commissioner Lin ordered all the people living at Kowloon and in the neighborhood opposite Hongkong to stop working for the British and wholly to cut off from the English all supplies. He anchored his fleet of war junks menacingly close to the British merchant fleet.

On November 2, 1839, two small British frigates fought and defeated the entire Chinese naval force. This encounter, the Battle of Chuenpi, did not begin an actual war, as it would have anywhere else in the world. In spite of actual fighting, lawful import trade went on as usual, the season of 1839-1840 being the most advantageous since 1834. The hong merchants found ways to get around Commissioner Lin, and the Americans earned substantial and unusual commissions in acting for the discommoded British. The drug business also did exceedingly well. As a matter of fact, the merchants did not register too much protest against Captain Elliot's order to surrender the opium. They were heavily stocked, prices were soft, and His Majesty's superintendent of trade had promised compensation for the stocks destroyed. In the new season the smart traders bought heavily because of increased prices. As often happens, the prohibition enforcement hurt the small man most, because the large opium concerns turned Commissioner Lin's activities to their own advantage.

William Jardine, a partner of Jardine, Matheson and Company, the EWO of the China coast, the largest and most influential trading company in the Far East, had just been elected to the British Parliament. He championed the British position before that august body and took his cause to Lord Palmerston, the Foreign Minister. Jardine suggested the British

should demand redress for the seizure of British property—the opium—in the form of an official apology, indemnity, and a new treaty. He hinted that a naval demonstration would arouse the Chinese from their slumbers and said that the American traders in Canton supported his belief that a show of force would produce a new treaty basis for the conduct of trade. Most British merchants concurred in Jardine's views.

In February, 1840, after the British ordered to China sixteen vessels of war and transports with 4,000 troops from India, the British government took their case to Parliament. For the government's position, the thirty-nine-year-old, "handsome, animated, but essentially simple" Secretary of State for War Thomas MacCaulay argued:

. . . The place of this country among nations is not so mean that we should trouble ourselves to resist every petty slight, but there is a limit to that forbearance. I was much touched, and I believe others were also, by one passage contained in the despatch of Captain Elliot, in which he communicated his arrival at the factory at Canton. The moment at which he landed he was surrounded by his countrymen in an agony of despair at their situation, but the first step which he took was to order the flag of Great Britain to be taken from the boat and to be planted in the balcony. This was an act which revived the drooping hopes of those who looked to him for protection. It was natural that they should look with confidence on the victorious flag which was hoisted over them, which reminded them that they belonged to a country unaccustomed to defeat, to submission or to shame—it reminded them that they belonged to a country which had made the farthest ends of the earth ring with the fame of her exploits in redressing the wrongs of her children; that made the Dey of Algiers humble himself to her insulted consul; that revenged the horrors of the black hole on the fields of Plassey; that had not degenerated since her great Protector vowed that he would make the name of Englishman as respected as ever had been the name of Roman citizen. They felt that although far from their native country, and then in danger in a part of the world remote from that to which they must look for protection, yet that they belonged to a state which would not suffer a hair of one of its members to be harmed with impunity. And he concluded: I beg to declare my earnest desire that this most rightful quarrel may be prosecuted to a triumphal close, that the brave men, to whom is entrusted the task of demanding that reparation which the circumstances of the case require, may fulfill their duties with moderation, but with success, that the name, not only of English valour, but of English mercy, may be established.⁵

A young Tory from the opposition bench, Mr. William Gladstone, was not impressed. He spoke as follows:

⁵ Maurice Collis, *Foreign Mud* (Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1947), pp. 265–266. By permission also of Faber & Faber, London.

. . . The great principles of justice are involved in this matter. You will be called upon, even if you escape from condemnation on this motion, to show cause for your present intention of making war upon the Chinese. They gave us notice to abandon the contraband trade. When they found that we would not, they had the right to drive us from their coasts on account of our obstinacy in persisting in this infamous and atrocious traffic. I am not competent to judge how long this war may last, but this I can say, that a war more unjust in its origin, a war more calculated in its progress to cover this country with permanent disgrace, I do not know, and I have not read of. The right honourable Gentleman opposite spoke last night in eloquent terms of the British flag waving in glory at Canton. We all know the animating effects produced when that flag has been unfurled on a field of battle. And how comes it to pass that the sight of that flag always raises the spirit of Englishmen? Because it has always been associated with the cause of justice, with opposition to oppression, with respect for national rights, with honourable commercial enterprise, but now, under the auspices of the noble Lord that flag is become a pirate flag to protect an infamous traffic. No, I am sure that Her Majesty's Government will never upon this motion persuade the House to abet this unjust and iniquitous war.⁶ . . .

By a majority of nine votes, the Parliament passed the motion for punitive action. The British had, as their war aims, payment for the seized opium, a treaty which would accord British nationals and officials treatment consistent with the usages of civilized nations, and the cession of an island where the British would be protected against arbitrary caprice. Without opposition, the British force, which never amounted to more than 7,000 effectives, overpowered Canton, blockaded the mouth of the Yangtze and the Yellow rivers, landed at chosen points up and down the China coast, and forced the Chinese to surrender. Poor Commissioner Lin was exiled to the cold frontier town of Ili in disgrace when the emperor realized that Lin's policy had led the barbarians almost to the gates of his capital.

You have dissembled to Us, . . . disguising in your despatches the true colour of affairs. So far from having been of any help, you have caused the waves of confusion to arise. A thousand interminable disorders are sprouting. You have behaved as if your arms were tied. You are no better than a wooden image. And as We contemplate your grievous failings, We fall a prey to anger and melancholy. Your official seals shall be immediately taken from you and with the speed of flames you shall hasten to Peking, where We will see how you may answer Our question. Respect this! The words of the Emperor.⁷

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 268, 269.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 284.

In August, 1842, after many fine speeches and much consumption of cherry brandy, the Chinese and British signed a peace treaty on the deck of the British ship "Cornwallis," anchored at Nanking. It was the end of one era and the prelude to another. The days of the old China were numbered. During the centuries before, the traders from distant lands subjected themselves to the rules prescribed by the Son of Heaven. During the century ahead, the "barbarians" would dictate the terms on which China would trade and conduct its political and diplomatic relations with the rest of the world.

Suggested Reading

- MAURICE COLLIS, *Foreign Mud* (New York, 1947).
 ———, *The Great Within* (London, 1941).
 HENRY H. HART, *Sea Roads to the Indies* (New York, 1951).
 G. F. HUDSON, *Europe and China: A Survey of Their Relations from the Earliest Times to 1800* (New York, 1931).
 P. C. KUO, *A Critical Study of the First Anglo-Chinese War* (with documents) (Shanghai, 1935).
 K. S. LATOURETTE, *A History of the Christian Missions in China* (New York, 1929).
 CHRISTOPHER LLOYD, *Pacific Horizons: The Exploration of the Pacific before Captain Cook* (London, 1946).
 H. B. MORSE, *The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China, 1635–1834* (4 volumes, Oxford, 1926, and a supplementary volume, 1742–1774, 1929).
 CHARLES MCKEW PARR, *So Noble a Captain [Magellan]* (New York, 1953).
 M. PASKE-SMITH, *Western Barbarians in Japan and Formosa in Tokugawa Days, 1603–1868* (Kobe, 1930).
 EARL PRITCHARD, *The Crucial Years of Early Anglo-Chinese Relations, 1750–1800* (Pullman, Washington, 1936).
 LADY RAFFLES, *Memoirs of Sir Stamford Raffles* (London, 1830).
 W. E. SOOTHILL, *China and the West* (London, 1925).
 SIR GEORGE STAUNTON, BART, *An Authentic Account of an Embassy From the King of Great Britain to the Emperor of China* (London, 1797).

CHAPTER 5

China and the Unequal Treaties

The diplomatic heritage to China of the nineteenth century was one of humility and bitterness mingled with hope and determination. Unequal treaties—unequal in the sense that they were not based on the give-and-take of negotiations as between equals—adjusted the trading system for the benefit of the West. They extracted indemnities from China, sliced off parcels of Chinese territory, and forced from China political and economic concessions. Treaty settlements, or series of separate treaties imposed upon China by victorious powers as a consequence of war or incidents, covered the span of almost a century.

The Chinese concluded treaties grudgingly because of the contrasting effects of treaties in China and in the West. In China a foreigner enjoyed only those rights which were conceded by treaty; in the West a resident Chinese enjoyed all rights except those specifically denied by treaty. From the Chinese point of view the most vicious part of the treaty settlements was the “most-favored-nation” clause. By this clause *every* treaty power demanded and received from China every right and privilege originally extended to *any* treaty power. What China granted to one, it automatically granted to all.

This early intercourse between China and the Occident flavored bitterly the Chinese interpretation of its position in the contemporary world. During the nineteenth century most Chinese knew nothing about the conflict between the desires of Chinese officialdom and foreign traders. Those Chinese who appreciated the divergencies in outlook admitted the reasonableness of commercial regulations, but they condemned the extraneous political concessions obtained in the guise of commercial protection.

China was treaty-bound to the system of extraterritoriality. It was forced to give paramount consideration to the economic desires of foreign powers

when fixing its tariff schedule and collecting or dispensing its maritime customs or internal revenues. It was obliged without compensation and against its will to surrender privileges which other nations jealously guarded as economic monopolies or rights of sovereignty. Modern Chinese, in reviewing the results of more than a century of contact with the Western state system, minimized its positive contributions to China and emphasized its indignities.

The First Treaty Settlement, 1842–1844

After the disastrous Opium War with England, the emperor, Tao Kuang, instructed his peace commissioners in 1842 to make such arrangements as should cut off forever all causes of war. His government was eager to conclude peace with the British, not only because of the military defeat, but also because of its apprehension of general revolution. On August 29, 1842, the Chinese delegates and the British signed the Treaty of Nanking which provided:

- (1) There shall be peace and friendship between England and China and their respective subjects, who shall enjoy full security and protection within the dominions of the other.
- (2) British subjects may reside for the purpose of carrying on their mercantile pursuits at Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo, and Shanghai, where there shall be a Superintendent of Trade or consular officer to be the medium of communication between the Chinese authorities and the said merchants, and to see that just duties are collected.
- (3) The island of Hongkong shall be ceded by China to Great Britain to be possessed in perpetuity.
- (4) Indemnities totaling \$21,000,000 shall be paid in four annual installments; \$6,000,000 for the value of the opium destroyed, \$3,000,000 for debts owing by Chinese merchants, and \$12,000,000 on account of the expenses of the British military expedition.
- (5) The co-hong shall be abolished and the foreign merchants shall trade with whomsoever they please.
- (6) Prisoners of war shall be released, amnesty shall be granted to all Chinese who collaborated with the British, and British troops shall be retired when the indemnities are paid.
- (7) Communications between British and Chinese officials shall be on the basis of diplomatic equality.

- (8) The Emperor of China shall in agreement with the British establish at all open ports a fair and regular tariff, which tariff shall be publicly notified, and when British merchandise shall have once paid the regular tariff at the port, such merchandise may be conveyed by Chinese merchants to any province or city in the interior of the empire of China, on paying a further amount as transit dues which shall not exceed a fixed per cent of the tariff value of such goods.¹

In the confused atmosphere which followed war and defeat, the Chinese signed other treaties which completed the first treaty settlement.

By the supplementary Treaty of the Bogue in 1843, also with Great Britain, the Chinese granted most-favored-nation treatment, a limited right to travel in the open country surrounding the treaty ports, and extra-territoriality. They also signed the Treaty of Wanghsia with the United States on July 3, 1844, which spelled out details about the extraterritorial system, gave the Americans most-favored-nation treatment, and specified that the treaty should be revised at the end of twelve years. By additional treaties the Chinese gave all these rights and privileges to France, Belgium, Norway, Sweden, and Portugal. The French envoy asked the viceroy to memorialize the emperor, to permit Roman Catholic missionaries to build churches in the treaty ports, and to tolerate missionaries and native Christian converts. In his memorial, the viceroy suggested, "If there be any who seduce wives and daughters or deceitfully take the pupils from the eyes of the sick . . . or are otherwise guilty of criminal acts, let them be dealt with according to the old laws."

In spite of this treaty settlement, difficulties marred relations between Chinese and foreigners. More than ever convinced of its inherent superiority, the court at Peking underestimated the strength of the West and adopted a sullen attitude of evasion of responsibility. The few Chinese on the fringes of the empire who came in contact with foreigners acted for the most part with indifference or resentment. In some of the new treaty ports, the Chinese made adequate provisions for the residence of foreigners and the conduct of trade. Their arrangements for residence at Shanghai marked the beginning of the system of concessions and settlements as foreign residential districts. The Chinese set aside plots of land, often undesirable and outside the limits of the native city, for exclusive development and autonomous administration by foreigners. They made ground available on which to build living and business quarters, churches, hospitals, cemeteries, schools, and colleges.

The officials and populace at Canton continued to be most recalcitrant.

¹ Paraphrased from text of treaty quoted in H. F. MacNair, *Modern Chinese History, Selected Readings* (Commercial Press, Ltd., Shanghai, 1927), pp. 175-178.

Their tradition of superiority lingered on. The officials denied the right of residence to foreigners *in* Canton. They interpreted the treaty words "at Canton" to mean "at the factories" and not "in the walled city." The Cantonese would not permit direct official intercourse on terms of equality. They attempted to conduct trade on a disguised continuation of the old co-hong system, and they refused to acquiesce in the extraterritorial provisions of the treaties. Their actions and attitudes were condemned by the foreigners as unsympathetic. On the other hand, the officials were targets for abuse by the populace for opposite reasons. A placard in Canton read:

In the fifth moon of the present year, many Chinese have been slain by foreigners; their bodies have been flung into the river, and buried in the bellies of fishes; but our high authorities have treated these affairs as though they had never heard of them; they have looked upon these foreign devils as though they were gods; they have despised the Chinese as though they had the flesh of dogs; and have not valued the life of men more than the hair which is shorn from the head.²

Another placard read:

Our Celestial Dynasty is rich in the possession of the whole world, all, even the smallest of insects, are suffered to receive life and attain full growth under the canopy of heaven; why then should the uncivilized of human beings be excluded, and not even a small portion of the earth spared to them! These rebels, however, regard China with contempt, they have been false and wanton in every respect, the wickedness of their crimes has risen up to the heavens, and it is utterly impossible to permit their rapacity and cruelty, and their molestations and injuries to China.³

Between 1845 and 1855 new questions and complications arose. Protestant missionaries came in large numbers from England and America. The era of the clipper ships increased and glamourized the trade in tea and silk. The illegal opium trade flourished. Portuguese and British ships forced Chinese junks plying along the China coast to pay protection money to convoy them safely through the pirate-infested waters. The demand for Chinese labor in California, the West Indies, the Straits, Australia, and South America gave rise to the inhuman coolie traffic. Coolies were kidnaped, huddled together in barracks in Macao until a boatload was procured. The coolies were often months in transit through the tropics in appalling conditions, and the death rate en route was often as high as 15 per cent. In some instances the pay for those who survived amounted to two changes of clothing a year and a wage of 10 cents per day. The extraterritorial system tended to work out to the advantage of foreign law-

² *Ibid.*, p. 224.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 227

breakers. Merchants served as consuls, and they hesitated to use their judicial powers. As the authority of the Chinese central government degenerated, the Chinese indulged in repeated attacks against the person of the foreigners. Lord Palmerston came to the conclusion:

The Chinese must learn and be convinced that if they attack our people and our factories, they will be shot and that if they ill-treat innocent Englishmen . . . they will be punished. . . . Depend upon it, that the best way to keep any men quiet is to let them see that you are able and determined to repel force by force; and that Chinese are not in the least different, in this respect, from the rest of mankind.⁴

The Second Treaty Settlement, 1858–1860

Great Britain, the United States, France, and Russia sought treaty revision, but China resisted. A new Chinese emperor came on the throne in 1850, but he could be no more pliant than his predecessor. It became apparent that nothing short of war would bring the Chinese to terms. The British discovered a convenient excuse for action in 1856 when a Chinese official removed sailors from the lorcha "*Arrow*" and when the British community at Hongkong discovered arsenic in the bread. At the same time, the French developed a mood for drastic action because of the murder of a French priest, Père Chapdelaine, in Kwangsi Province far beyond the bounds of any treaty port. Although the British were preoccupied in India with the mutiny of the Sepoy regiments, and the French with wars in Europe, they decided upon war in China. They invited the United States and Russia to co-operate, but the invitation was declined.

Hostilities were one-sided. Canton was occupied, the viceroy was taken prisoner, and the city was administered for three years by a puppet government under a committee of the allies. An expedition to the north occupied Tientsin where the allies negotiated treaties with the same imperial commissioner they had dealt with in Nanking and Canton. On facing this commissioner, the British interpreter presented him with a copy of a secret report which had been taken from the captured files of the yamen (official residence) at Canton. The commissioner was shown his own report to the emperor in which he confessed that he had soothed the barbarians so as to deceive them. The commissioner was crushed in spirit. He returned to Peking and told the emperor his sad story. The emperor graciously gave his commissioner a silken cord with which the disgraced mandarin hanged himself.

Treaties were signed in 1858, but before ratifications were exchanged,

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 222.

Tientsin was occupied, the summer palace of the emperor at Peking was deliberately put to the torch, and the Chinese court was obliged to flee from the capital. Strange things occurred in the course of these hostilities in China. While fighting disrupted the ancient Chinese tenor of life in the north, trade flourished in the south. Cantonese coolies helped the allies against their own people. The foreign expeditionary force got along famously with the curious Chinese crowds which assembled to look at these strange creatures from the outside world. At the same time the allies fought against the imperial armies in Peking, they assisted the imperial forces against the rebels in Shanghai and the Yangtze Valley.

The second treaty settlement consisted of five new treaties, three conventions, and a series of new agreements on tariff and trade. Kowloon on the mainland of China opposite Hongkong was ceded to the British. New indemnities were imposed by Great Britain and France. Diplomatic representatives were allowed to reside in Peking and to conduct foreign relations with a newly created Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The same ceremonies were to apply which were used between independent and equal European nations. The term "barbarian" was forbidden in official intercourse. Consuls were permitted in all open ports and were to be treated with dignity and respect. Eleven new treaty ports were opened which permitted access to North China, the Yangtze Valley, Formosa, and Manchuria. The Yangtze was opened to foreign merchant ships. Warships were permitted to call in all Chinese ports if "coming for no hostile purpose or being engaged in the pursuit of pirates." Foreigners were given the right to travel for pleasure or trade in the interior, if provided with passports. Missionaries were given the right to receive protection in peaceably pursuing their calling. Tariff schedules were revised, and the opium trade was placed on a taxable, and therefore legal, basis.

In the years which followed, the attitudes of mutual antagonism increased. China was torn by internal dissension and came under the influence of the notorious Empress Dowager, Tz'u Hsi. China was by no means in any mood to improve its attitudes or ease its tensions with the West. Tz'u Hsi refused to honor the Chinese promise to receive diplomats because she thought that the foreigners were too barbarous to face the emperor or to view the artistic treasures in the imperial palaces. Therefore she built in the midst of her luxurious gardens a plain, foreign-style house which she considered adequate to receive the ministers who were accustomed to nothing better than the vulgar environment of their own homes.

The Chinese could not avoid arguments with the missionaries over their mysterious and aggravating medical and educational activities. The quest for land and buildings gave rise to innumerable legal arguments. Mis-

sionaries were accused of demanding preferred treatment for native Christian converts and of fostering local rebellions against the dynasty. Outrages against the missionaries provided the excuse for political demands from the protecting country. The worst incident occurred in Tientsin in 1870. Rumors spread to the effect that Chinese children were being kidnaped and taken to an orphanage where the sisters used hearts and eyes of children to concoct an elixir of life. The orphanage and the cathedral and the French consulate were burned, while several of the sisters, the French consul, and some Chinese Christians were put to death. The Chinese government was obliged to decapitate the ringleader of the riots, pay a substantial indemnity, and send to Paris a mission of apology.

In 1876 a young member of the British consular service, Mr. Margary, was murdered in Southwest China. The murder of this official was seized upon as the occasion for a far-reaching modification in the treaty relations between China and the powers. The British demanded and received satisfaction in the form of the Chefoo Convention, signed September 13, 1876. An indemnity was exacted which included claims of British merchants against the Chinese government. A letter of apology was sent to Queen Victoria by a special envoy. A British officer was permitted in Yünnan Province. Trade rules were revised and new ports of call were opened along the Yangtze.

Before 1890 the weakness of China was thoroughly exposed, and the rapacity of the powers was equally apparent. The British had taken away Hongkong and part of Kowloon, and the Russians, the territory north of the Amur River and the Maritime Provinces east of the Ussuri. The Russians had exerted new pressures in China's Far West. The Japanese had established their right to control the Liu Ch'iu Islands. The French had deprived the Chinese of their claims to suzerainty over Tongking and Annam. The British had also taken away the last Chinese pretensions to Nepal and Sikkim and forwarded their own position in Tibet. The Portuguese had finally established the legality of their title to Macao. The Chinese saw their ancient glories disappear, their boundaries shrink, and their territories pass into the hands of unworthy aliens.

The Treaty of Shimonoseki, 1895

The crowning insult to China was the advance of Japan. China recognized Japan, the historic land of the "little black dwarves," as an equal rather than a vassal by the treaty of 1871. Two years later the emperor, T'ung Chih, accorded the first private audience to a foreign representative

to the Japanese ambassador. In 1874 the Chinese recognized the disputed Japanese sovereignty over the Liu Ch'iu Islands as a consequence of a Japanese naval expedition to Formosa to avenge the murder of some shipwrecked Okinawan sailors. During the two decades which followed, China chose to drift into war with Japan rather than to accept the implications of a Japanese-Korean treaty by which Japan attempted to establish the independent status of Korea.

Everyone believed that the Chinese giant would crush easily the upstart Japan, but Japan's "school-boy patriotism" overwhelmed the Chinese "undisciplined rabble of tramps." Japan won an unbroken series of victories in Korea, Manchuria, China proper, and the high seas, and concluded with China the Treaty of Shimonoseki, April 17, 1895. The Chinese negotiator was Li Hung-chang, and his adviser was the American John W. Foster (the grandfather of John Foster Dulles). The Japanese negotiators were Count Ito Hirobumi and Viscount Mutsu Munemitsu and their adviser was also an American, Henry Denison. By this treaty, China recognized the independence and autonomy of Korea; gave to Japan title to Formosa, the Pescadores Islands, and Liaotung Peninsula; agreed to an indemnity of 200,000,000 taels; opened four new treaty ports; gave Japan most-favored-nation treatment in China; and promised a new commercial treaty.

The commercial treaty was signed July 21, 1896. By its terms Japan obtained the privilege of extraterritoriality in China, and the commutation of inland taxation on exports and imports. Japanese were permitted to engage in manufacturing in the open ports. By an agreement of October, 1896, the Japanese were assessed only the same taxes on their products which the Chinese would pay on similar articles locally made. This treaty settlement was less complicated than the others, but equally significant in its effects. China was saddled with its first foreign debt. Here began the factory system for all foreigners in China and the general demand for "national" treatment. And most important, the treaty settlement with Japan ushered in the diplomatic free-for-all which is usually referred to as the "scramble for concessions" in China.

The Scramble for Concessions, 1895-1898

The ink was scarcely dry on the Treaty of Shimonoseki before the representatives of Russia, France, and Germany in Tokyo told the Japanese that their possession of Liaotung would menace the peace of the Far East. These three forced Japan to give up Liaotung and to accept an additional

indemnity of 30,000,000 taels as consolation. They proceeded out of no love for China, but a determination that the newborn power of Japan should not thwart their own schemes in China. During the next five years, China was subjected to a series of agreements which filled to overflowing its cup of diplomatic bitterness.

The French took the initiative in wresting from the Chinese thank offerings in the form of concessions for the Triple Intervention for railways and mines, and the designation of large parts of Chinese territory as a special "sphere of influence" or "sphere of interest." In July, 1895, the French and the Russians—to the exclusion of the Germans—for handsome commissions and substantial interest payments, pressed a loan upon China of 400,000,000 francs at 4 per cent for thirty-six years, secured on the maritime customs, to pay the first installment on the Chinese indemnity to Japan. As compensation, the French obtained a rectification of the Chinese-Tongking boundary in favor of France, better trade terms for the Tongking overland trade, and a promise that China should apply first of all to French manufacturers and engineers for the exploitation of mines in the provinces of Yunnan, Kwangsi, and Kwangtung. China further agreed to the extension of railroads and telegraphs from French territory into South China, and to the nonalienation of the island of Hainan.

The French ally, Russia, made haste slowly. Russia invited Li Hung-chang to attend the coronation ceremonies of the czar. A delegation of welcome, under Prince Ukthomski, met Li at the Suez Canal in order to make sure that no one else would talk with him en route to St. Petersburg. Li hated Japan not only for its national policies, but because a would-be assassin had shot him in the cheek during the negotiations at Shimonoseki. He saw in Russia a check for Japan's continental designs. He was easily persuaded by Russian entertainment and Russian bribes to grant to Russia the right to build the Chinese Eastern Railway across North Manchuria, and to enter into a fifteen-year defensive alliance with Russia which would become operative if Japan were to attack either China or Russia in China or Korea.

China was next obliged to face up to the diplomatic initiative of the Germans. The Germans wanted more than loans and railways. They needed, so they said, a coaling station and a fleet anchorage on the China coast. On November 1, 1897, two German missionaries were killed in Shantung Province. Within two weeks the German fleet appeared at Kiaochow and the Germans disclosed their hand. On March 1, 1898, the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank floated a loan to China of £16,000,000 at 4.5 per cent for forty-five years secured on the likin or transit tax and a portion of the revenues of the salt monopoly. The German political demands were

granted in a treaty signed March 6, 1898. Kiaochow Bay was leased to the Germans for ninety-nine years, the surrounding territory was declared a neutral zone by the Chinese government, and the whole of the sacred province of Shantung, with its rich mining districts and opportunities for railway, industrial, and commercial development, was designated as a German sphere of interest. Naturally the Chinese were incensed at this brutal method of penetrating into China whereby incidents were utilized as excuses for undisguised imperialism. China found no friends among the great powers. No one dared to criticize Germany openly, and the foreigners in China seemed to approve the German action.

The Chinese retained the nominal sovereignty over the leased area in Shantung, but they gave over its future administration and prosperity completely to the Germans. German engineers flocked into Shantung, built their homes, clubs, and churches in a style reminiscent of the Rhineland. German banks controlled local finances. Very shortly German shipping lines dumped steel, concrete, and manufactured goods of every kind into the province of Shantung at rates with which other foreign nationals could not hope to compete.

The British knew what was going on behind the scenes. They could not make up their minds whether to protest or join in the game. They had the uncomfortable feeling that their diplomatic future in the Far East would be with Japan rather than China. British on the spot reported that the whole administration of China was rotten to the core, and that with the possible exception of one in a thousand, every Chinese official was either a liar, a thief, or a tyrant. "A more hopeless spectacle of fatuous imbecility made up in equal parts of arrogance and helplessness than the central government of China is impossible to conceive." British merchants clung to their visions of unlimited trade and expected the British government to go the limit in supporting them. They felt that it was the task of the government "to force open the Chinese oyster with a sword, and of business to gather the pearls." They insisted upon further extension of their time-honored business procedures, enforcement of their treaty rights, and maintenance of British prestige.

On the strength of these convictions, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation in 1896 provided for China a loan of £16,000,000 at 5 per cent for thirty-six years. The British government was less sanguine than the merchants and investors and in connection with loan negotiations in February, 1898, extracted from China promises that the inspector-general of the customs would be British as long as British trade should be predominant and that China would never cede any territory in the Yangtze basin to any other power.

By two agreements in 1898, March 27 and May 7, the Russians obtained leases on Port Arthur and Dairen, the right to extend the Chinese Eastern Railway southward to Dairen, and mining rights in South Manchuria. On April 10 the French obtained new concessions which provided for a ninety-nine-year lease of Kwangchowan (a naval base on the southern coast of China near Indo-China), a nonalienation agreement covering the Chinese provinces bordering Tongking, the extension of the Indo-China Railway into Yünnan, and the right to designate French advisers to the Chinese Post Office. On April 26, the Japanese got a declaration that China would not alienate Fukien or any part of the Chinese coasts to any power.

In June and July the British announced the last of the lease agreements as "cartographic consolation" and "for the preservation of the balance of power." They leased Weihaiwei for as long as the Russians were to be in Port Arthur, and they leased for ninety-nine years the remainder of the Kowloon Peninsula between Deep Bay and Mirs Bay, with its neighboring islands and waters. In midsummer, 1899, the Italians put in a bid for a leased area, but the Italians were weak and the Chinese refused. By the scramble for concessions, China lost more to the intervening powers than it would have lost to Japan. By November, 1898, Britain obtained nine concessions for 2,800 miles of railway; Russia three for 1,500; Belgium one for 650; and France three for 300.

At the turn of the century the Chinese saw the Western powers seeking their own profits in China through financial imperialism just as an earlier generation had witnessed the struggle for the expansion of commerce. There was China, a country nearly the size of Europe, with a densely populated agricultural area, generously interspersed with conveniently placed urban centers seeming to offer an investor's paradise. The countryside between the cities of North China was very flat and cut up by few rivers. It was an El Dorado for construction engineers because railroads promised huge and continuing fortunes. Concession seekers and bargain hunters with well-filled pocketbooks flocked into Peking. They cultivated the right people: their own diplomats and the Chinese officials. They entertained lavishly and they distributed cautious gifts. They did their best to find out what their rivals were doing and to conceal their own achievements and prospects even from their own secretaries. Personal interests were all too easily identified with national interests, and the quest for profit precipitated the gunboats-and-ultimatum methods of diplomacy. The interests of China were incidental and secondary, as they were at Yalta a half century later.

International moneylending was profitable business. For example, if a

British company obtained a contract for a railway in its own sphere of interest, it was implied that a British investment house or a bank had sent a representative to carry out negotiations with officials in China or that its head office in London had dealt directly with the Chinese minister. Human contacts played a significant role in any negotiation. After the contract had been signed, the British company in England would deposit the equivalent of \$5,000,000 in its own or some other British bank, and would give to the Chinese government in Peking or to its minister in London a check for \$5,000,000 less commissions and fees. Then, in accordance with the loan contract, China would place its order from British factories for rails or sleepers or locomotives to the amount of \$5,000,000 less the accrued charges. It would be understood that a British shipping company would transport the physical materials to China and a British insurance company would underwrite all the risks involved. It was assumed that the railway when completed would earn enough money to pay all interest and amortization charges on the original loan. China would pay all the bills by means of checks drawn against its account on the British bank in London. No actual money crossed the ocean and very frequently not even the checks left London. International loans meant increased business and consequent profits for salesmen, bankers, manufacturers, shippers, and brokers. If a British investment house obtained a contract, British mills would get the business and British investors would make a profit. If a French concern were successful, every national of France who had the slightest interest in the transaction would receive a share of the benefits. This explains why the international rivalry was so keen and why the diplomats were usually at the beck and call of the concession hunters. It also explains why the Chinese felt themselves imposed upon and exploited by their ostensible friends.

A British group obtained a concession for the Pei-Ning Railway from Peking to Mukden; a Belgian syndicate for the King-Han Railway from Peking to Hankow; an Anglo-German combine (which outsmarted American competitors) for the Tsin-Pu Railway from Tientsin to Pukow on the north shore of the Yangtze River opposite Nanking; an American company for the Han-Yüeh Railway from Hankow to Canton; a French syndicate for the Cheng-T'ai Railway from Shihchiachwang to T'aiyüan; and a Franco-Belgian group for the Lung-Hai Railway, which was to parallel the valley of the Yellow River from Loyang to Haichow on the shores of the Yellow Sea. Some of these railways were never built or badly built and others were primarily wildcat financial schemes. Every railway contract provided for foreign auditors, managers, directors, or engineers, with the result that China was practically frozen-out of its own transportation systems.

The rivalry between the concession hunters was so intense from the beginning that in order to make certain of profits Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia (and in a timid manner Japan) entered into a series of agreements, promising to confine themselves to their own spheres of interest. These interpower agreements also prevented China from aligning itself with one power as against another or from playing off one power against another. In the meantime, the powers extended their old-time trading privileges. New ports were opened for trade by the Chinese government and additional inland waters were opened to steam navigation. The international settlement and the French concession at Shanghai were enlarged, and many new concession areas were developed at treaty ports, including Tientsin, Hankow, Newchwang, Amoy, and Foochow.

Treaties Following the Boxer Uprising, 1901–1903

The powers were careless or stupid in underestimating the intensity of Chinese reactions. Some Chinese were “so angry as to make their hair stand on end and their eyes stare out of their sockets.” One Chinese official wrote, “Let no one think of peace but let each strive to preserve from destruction and spoliation his ancestral home and graves from the ruthless hands of the invader.” Another memorialized the throne:

If your Majesty will not decide, or will prefer to remain in the old grooves of the Conservatives, then your territories will be swallowed up, your limbs will be bound, your viscera will be cut up and your Majesty will scarcely manage to retain your throne or to rule over more than a fragment of your ancient Empire.⁵

Growing fear and hatred focused on the missionaries. The Chinese were convinced that every foreigner at heart was a land-grabber, that missionaries were the advanced agents of the government, and that the Bible was the forerunner of the gunboat. Native Christian converts were regarded as traitors. The railways also were particularly objectionable because the right of way often violated grave mounds and the new methods of transportation threw coolies, porters, and boatmen out of their jobs.

When the partition of China seemed to be just around the corner, the American State Department entered the picture with the Open Door policy. The commercial aspects of this policy were of little immediate

⁵ Quoted in P. H. Clyde, *The Far East* (Prentice Hall, New York, 1928), p. 270, from Wen Ching (Lim Boon-keng), *The Chinese Crisis from Within* (London, 1901), pp. 53, 54.

benefit to China because they merely regulated the game which was just about played out by the powers. The Open Door notes did not abolish the spheres of interest and they exercised no important influence in retarding the antifeign uprising of the Boxer secret society which reached its climax in the summer of 1900. More than 200 missionaries were killed, churches were burned, and the capital city of Peking was taken over by the Boxers. Foreigners were besieged at various places in Peking and were under intermittent attack for 100 days. During the hostilities, the German minister, von Ketteler, and the Japanese chancellor, Sugiyama, were killed. It was necessary to despatch an international military expedition of 15,000 troops, in which the Americans participated, to effect the relief of Peking. Once again the Imperial Court was driven away and the city was looted. *While North China seethed against the foreigners, Chinese laborers co-operated with the allies and the southern Chinese viceroys agreed to keep the peace in their respective districts.*

The making of peace was not an easy thing for China, not because China was unwilling, but because the powers could not agree among themselves as to the demands to make. Some feared the overthrow of the Manchu Dynasty, but some would not have been averse to the complete break-up of China. The final protocol, signed September 7, 1901, obliged China to pay an indemnity of 450,000,000 taels over a period of thirty-nine years and to mortgage practically all of its revenues as security. The money was to be divided proportionately among the victors: Russia 29 per cent, Germany 20, France 15, Great Britain 11, and Japan and the United States each 7. By the protocol the Chinese government agreed to reserve a special Legation Quarter in the heart of Peking and to recognize the right of the powers to station troops at various points along the railway in order to maintain free communication between the capital and the sea. The Chinese government also engaged to negotiate revision of its treaties of commerce and navigation.

By this time China had most-favored-nation treaties with nineteen powers. China proposed that a round-table conference be held with all the powers at once, but the general sentiment was for separate negotiations. An awakening Chinese nation took advantage of international jealousies and rivalries and perhaps of faint qualms of conscience. The British treaty was signed September 5, 1902; the American and Japanese treaties were both signed on October 8, 1903. When the other powers presented their special demands to China, China at last balked. China suspended negotiations which were never resumed.

The British and American treaties represented new points of view. They continued to define the commercial code to which China was required to

conform, but they emphasized the idea that the code might be revised as China improved its internal conditions. These treaties made new rules for tariff and trade and provided for full protection to missionaries and converts in all matters regarding their faith. Other provisions were intended to guide China in the path of reform: currency and coinage, copyright laws, administration of justice, and mining rules. The word "reform" was interpreted in the light of advantage and convenience of the foreigners, not the Chinese.

The Chinese felt deeply that although there might be nothing objectionable in the substance of these provisions, there was everything objectionable in the procedure by which they were obtained. *The Chinese wanted the right to put these measures into operation as a matter of their own free will, and not as the result of obligations saddled upon them by the devious diplomacy of strangers within their gates.*

The Unequal Treaties with Japan, 1905 and 1915

After 1903 China faced a basically different treaty situation. Great Britain and the United States became more confident in their economic power to compete against all possible rivals and they tended to a policy of political hands-off. France and Germany were fundamentally preoccupied with their rivalries in Europe, Africa, and the Near East. Only Russia and Japan continued the intense backdoor rivalry for special privileges at the expense of China, primarily in Manchuria. China opened Manchuria for Chinese immigration, organized local governments, and sought international economic assistance to offset the danger of outright Russian or Japanese annexation.

China was the neglected victim of the war between Japan and Russia. China took the position that it was excused from its obligations as an ally of Russia because Russia was the aggressor. China declared its neutrality but its soil could not escape the blood bath of the actual hostilities. The terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth disposed of China's nominal possessions without China's assent. Japan took from Russia in 1905 exactly what Russia had stopped Japan from taking from China ten years before. By the Treaty of Peking, December 22, 1905, between China and Japan, the Chinese gave their consent to the terms of the transfer. By additional articles, new ports were opened in Manchuria, the strategic railway between Antung and Mukden was to be rebuilt, other railways constructed, and the forests along the Yalu River were to be developed by Chinese-Japanese joint-stock companies. In the unpublished minutes of this conference at Peking it was

recorded that China should grant no concessions to foreign capital for construction of railways parallel to the South Manchurian Railway.

During the next decade Japan and Russia entered into secret agreements delimiting their spheres of interest in Manchuria and Mongolia. China was not consulted and met only resistance when it endeavored to extend its influence and administrative rights into those rich areas. Japan was not contented to limit itself to Manchuria and to Inner Mongolia, but expanded its ambitions to the China mainland.

On January 18, 1915, in the midst of World War I, Japan presented to China the Twenty-one Demands. Yüan Shih-k'ai, the president of China, believed these were diabolically designed to place China in the grip of Japan. The demands were delivered to the president personally, not to the minister of foreign affairs, and they were printed on the Japanese War Office stationery ominously watermarked with guns and artillery pieces. Long and futile negotiations could not prevent the Chinese acceptance on May 25, 1915, of two treaties and thirteen notes representing the most humiliating of the unequal treaties.

The treaty regarding South Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia provided that the leases on Port Arthur and Dairen and the terms of the South Manchurian and the Antung-Mukden Railway agreements should be extended to ninety-nine years; that Japanese subjects might reside and travel in South Manchuria, engage in business and manufacturing and lease land outside the treaty ports for trade or agricultural purposes; that the Chinese government should give its permission to any joint Chinese-Japanese enterprises; that Japanese subjects be given limited extraterritoriality; that China should open to foreign trade and residence suitable places in eastern Inner Mongolia; and that the Kirin-Changshun Railway loan agreement should be revised in favor of Japan. By separate notes China conceded that Japanese should have the right to open new mines, should be given the first chance to supply foreign capital for railway construction, and should supply advisers in South Manchuria if foreigners should be necessary.

The treaty regarding Shantung provided that China should acquiesce in whatever agreement Japan and Germany might reach with regard to the German assets in Shantung, that Japanese capitalists might build the Chefoo-Weihsien Railroad, and that additional places for foreign residence and trade should be opened in the province. China agreed not to alienate any territory within the province or islands along the coast to any foreign power, and Japan indicated its intention of restoring the leased territory of Kiaochow Bay to China under certain conditions.

In a separate exchange of notes, the Chinese gave to Japan the right to

participate in the Hanyehp'ing Steel Company, which was the largest industrial enterprise in the Yangtze Valley. In a formal statement regarding Fukien Province, the Chinese government said that it had given no permission to foreign nations to construct on its coast dockyards, coaling stations for military use, or naval bases, and that it had no intention of doing so.

The original Japanese demands called for the employment of effective Japanese advisers in political, financial, and military affairs; joint Chinese-Japanese organization of the police forces in important places; and the procurement of Chinese arms from Japanese sources. These were successfully resisted by the Chinese and set aside for future consideration.

After the successful conclusion of the treaties following the Twenty-one Demands, Japanese hegemony in China was incontestable. The Japanese star rose to take the place previously occupied by the British constellation for more than a century. To China it was the replacement of an imperialism which had largely spent itself with a new and immature aggression. It was a new reign of force, equally callous with the old in its disregard of China's agonies in entering the environment of the modern world.

From beginning to end the Chinese resented the recent period of their international relations. They blamed the foreign powers for disrupting the economic system and sidetracking Chinese political evolution into the groove of semicolonialism. They lost one quarter of their railroads, three quarters of their iron, one half of their coal, half of their light industries, and most of their utilities to the control of foreigners. The Chinese entered the modern period of diplomatic history sworn to the abolition of the unequal treaties as a means of salvaging their national self-respect and of allocating to themselves a greater share of the profits to be derived from the development of their own economic resources.

Suggested Reading

- MINGCHION JOSHUA BAO, *The Foreign Relations of China* (New York, 1921).
W. C. COSTIN, *Great Britain and China, 1833-1860* (Oxford, 1937).
FOSTER R. DUILLES, *The Old China Trade* (Boston, 1930).
RODNEY GILBERT, *The Unequal Treaties* (London, 1929).
E. R. HUGHES, *The Invasion of China by the Western World* (London, 1937).
PHILIP JOSEPH, *Foreign Diplomacy in China, 1894-1900* (London, 1928).
G. W. KEFTON, *The Development of Extraterritoriality in China*, 2 volumes (London, 1928).
THOMAS E. LA FARGUE, *China and the World War* (Stanford, 1937).

- ALEXANDER MICHIE, *The Englishman in China*, 2 volumes (Edinburgh, 1900). (This is an account of the life of Sir Rutherford Alcock.)
- MARQUE DE MOGES, *Recollections of Baron Gros's Embassy to China and Japan in 1857-1858* (London, 1860).
- H. B. MORSE, *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, 3 volumes (Shanghai, 1910, 1918).
- L. OLIPHANT, *Narrative of the Earl of Elgin's Mission to China and Japan in the Years 1857, 1858, 1859* (Edinburgh, 1859).
- G. NYE STEIGLER, *China and the Occident: The Origin and Development of the Boxer Movement* (New Haven, 1927).
- SSU-YÜ TENG (TENG SSU-YÜ), *Chang Hsi and the Treaty of Nanking* (Chicago, 1944).
- B. L. PUTNAM WEALE, *Indiscreet Letters from Peking* (London, 1906).
- W. W. WILLOUGHBY, *Foreign Rights and Interests in China*, 2 volumes, rev. ed. (Baltimore, 1927).
- G. ZAY WOOD, *The Twenty-One Demands* (New York, 1921).

CHAPTER 6

The Rise of Russia in Asia

Russia, the gigantic heartland of the Eurasian continent, required three centuries to rise to its full influence on the shores of the Pacific. Russia neglected the East in its struggle to become a great power in Europe. In spite of the fact that the Ural Mountains are an insignificant geographic barrier, about half as high as the Sierras and not nearly so forbidding as the Pennsylvania mountains, the Russians were unbelievably slow in crossing the great stretches of Siberia and in coming to appreciate the value of their Far Eastern possessions.

The narrow corridor of the Trans-Siberian Railway formed the political axis of Russian power in Siberia. Pressures for expansion, before the era of industrial development, pushed Russia toward warm-water outlets, either along the Korean coast or on the Yellow Sea in the Far East or on the Persian Gulf off the south of Asia. Until recent times, no Asian nation was in position to stand in the way of Russia; and the naval power, Great Britain, assumed the leadership in resisting the challenge of the land-based power, Russia. The nationalistic and dynamic policies of Russia sought to expand the grandeur of Russia and the glamour of the czar into the political vacuum with which the country was fringed.

A totalitarian form of government and an ideological driving force, both under the czars and under the Soviet Union, accounted for mercurial ups and downs, for sudden twists and turns, and for an extraordinary callousness and ruthlessness in the pursuit of the Russian national interests. One czar and his court could urge the Russians to forget the East; another with his inner circle could gamble the fate of the empire on the distant, frigid plains of Manchuria. Nobles, traders, and adventurers—sometimes with the tacit approval but more often with the sullen opposition of St. Petersburg—advanced the destinies of Russia in Asia. Events in Asia

were like ripples on the surface, without deep significance to the national body politic, until after the Russian revolution. Czarist Russia was the symbol of universal reaction, a bugbear to its national rivals and anathema to the liberals, just as Soviet Russia became the symbol of international communism and anticapitalist world revolution.

Before Muraviev

In 1847 Nikolai Muraviev was named Governor-General of Eastern Siberia. His appointment marked the turning point in Russian emphasis on the Far East. The first part of the Russian story in the Far East may be conveniently called "Before Muraviev."

Oriental influences, both Mongolian and Byzantine, contributed to the molding of the Russian national character. When Stalin kissed Matsuoka good-by at the railway station after concluding the neutrality pact in April, 1941, he whispered, "We understand one another, we are both Orientals." The long period of Russia's domination by the Mongols (1237-1480) taught the Russians how to deal with their Oriental overlords and also brought them into contact with China and the Chinese. As soon as the Mongol yoke was cast off, the Russians began their push across Siberia. In some respects, it was like the saga of the American trek across the Great Plains: vast distances, cruel privations, intense heat and bitter cold, and inhospitable native peoples.

An ex-pirate, Yermak, on a fur-hunting expedition for the Stroganoff family, crossed the Urals and in 1581 met and defeated the native Sibirs on the banks of the Irtysh River. In 1638, when the British were settling the east coast of North America and British ships were coming into Canton, the Russians reached the shores of the Pacific. An explorer, Kharbarov, built a fort at the junction of the Amur and Ussuri rivers and in 1651 founded there the city which bears his name. During the years which followed, the rovers who claimed Peter the Great as their sovereign and the more numerous Manchus in the service of the illustrious Chinese emperor, K'ang Hsi, clashed repeatedly at the borders in the region of the Amur River.

In 1689 the Russians and the Chinese signed their first treaty, the Treaty of Nerchinsk. The haughty Chinese were inclined to regard the Russians as weak nomads, more Asian than European, and no more than savages in the traditional land of savages on the northeastern frontier. However, since Manchuria was the ancestral homeland of the Manchu Dynasty and since it was unprotected, uncolonized, and undeveloped, the Chinese were

particularly disposed to enter into a treaty for Manchuria's protection. On their side, the Russians understood that in dealing with the Chinese, they were not dealing with a primitive people. "In Kitai [the Russian word for China, from which comes the English, Cathay] there are churches with bells that ring. The people live like Russians, possess weapons, and trade with different countries from which they obtain precious objects from all parts of the world." The Russians were quite pleased to have in Manchuria a neutral buffer state between China and Siberia.

The Treaty of Nerchinsk provided for restoration of peace, or cessation of the half-century of border warfare, for the regulation of trade, and for the delineation of the boundary. The Russians were eager for trade, but the Chinese looked upon traders as "rascals who come to hunt, plunder and kill." The Chinese were most interested in the border, which was fixed at the watershed north of the Amur River. The treaty also provided for mutual right of extradition of lawbreakers and for a modified mutual right of extraterritoriality. The document was drawn up in Latin, with the benefit of the Jesuit advisers.

Between 1689 and the next important event, the Treaty of Kiakhta in 1727, a dozen Russian caravans and a half-dozen diplomatic missions visited Peking. They obtained information but no political recognition. It was the old story of no kowtow or no tribute, then no audience. By the Treaty of Kiakhta, the border town between Siberia and Mongolia, the boundaries in the neighborhood of Kiakhta were delimited and arrangements were made for the conduct of transfrontier trade. Permission was granted for the opening of a legation in Peking, where might reside four Russian orthodox priests and four youths and two adults who were to study the Chinese language.

Every three years, a camel caravan with traders and diplomatic mail came to Peking. In 1730 and 1733 the Chinese sent diplomatic missions to St. Petersburg, the first that China sent anywhere to the West and the only missions which were established before 1870. Russia's contacts were thus of long standing, and Russia's information about China was presumably comparable to that of the West. Russia's estimates of political conditions and possibilities were based on the focal point of Peking and not on the commercial metropolis of Canton.

Russia's relations with Japan, before Muraviev, were sporadic, exciting, but uncritical. Russians explored Kamchatka and learned of the Kuriles. They founded Petropavlovsk, discovered Alaska, and visited ports in Japan. Russians came to North Japan to fish and hunt, to colonize, and to trade. In 1799 the Russo-American Fur Company began its operations in Kamchatka, in the Kuriles and the Aleutians, in Alaska and down the American

coast as far as the Fifty-fifth Parallel. The fabulous Nicolai Rezanov, the president of the fur company, who subsequently met his romantic Waterloo in his love for the daughter of the commandant of San Francisco, arrived in Nagasaki in 1804 as the first Russian ambassador, but he was rebuffed in his efforts to conclude a treaty. In revenge his men terrorized the northern islands, and the shogun himself took over the defense responsibilities. During the first half of the nineteenth century, frequent incidents intensified the hostility between Japanese and Russians in the northern regions of Japan.

From Muraviev to Nicholas II (1847-1896)

Toward the end of the reign of Czar Nicholas I, some Russians, including Muraviev, determined that Asia had been neglected too long and that Russia in Asia should develop its own position and counter the hegemony of Great Britain. Frustrated and humiliated in the Near East, the czardom craved an easy success in the Far East to restore its prestige and self-confidence. Furthermore, it needed to protect the Russian coastline in Siberia and the mouth of the Amur River against a possible attack from a combined Anglo-French fleet. The Russians proceeded to solidify their holdings in Northeast Asia, participate in the unequal treaties with the other Western powers in China, acquire for themselves all the privileges available in Japan, and push their penetration into Central Asia and toward the western frontiers of China.

Russian settlement of Eastern Siberia was slow business. The country was a place of exile for political prisoners, criminals, and religious non-conformists. Few farmers and Cossacks dared to establish homes in the far-off places. By 1860 the population density of the whole of Siberia was less than one person per square mile, and the settlements or villages were few and far between. The czar believed that the time had come to divide Siberia into eastern and western segments and to name the energetic Muraviev as governor-general of the eastern segment. The czar warned Muraviev that he must not be impatient, because even news from Siberia required six months to reach the Russian court. The Foreign Minister, Count Nesselrode, added his caution that any ventures in the Far East which would jeopardize Russia in Europe or antagonize the British would be frowned upon. Muraviev had no love for the British; he wanted the Far Eastern region divided between Russia and China, and he foresaw only Russia and the United States as the great powers of the future in the entire Pacific region.

Muraviev, with his indefatigable assistant, General Nevelskoi, explored and consolidated the administration of the entire Amur basin. He created the government of the Maritime Provinces of Eastern Siberia and he moved the Russian naval base from Okhotsk southward to Petropavlovsk. He outmaneuvered the British and French fleets during the Crimean War in the Far East and he laid the basis for later Russian claims to Sakhalin. He perceived the weakness of the Chinese, and he pressed to advance the borders of Russian territory to the south. In May, 1858, he negotiated the Treaty of Aigun with China, which established a new international boundary, not the watershed of the Amur to the north, but the Amur itself from the mouth of the Argun to the mouth of Amur. Trade was permitted across the border. The Amur, the Sungari, and the Ussuri rivers were opened to ships of Russia and China. The Maritime Provinces were to be jointly occupied by both nations.

The signature of a treaty by a Chinese representative was no guarantee of Chinese imperial ratification. The Russians obtained ratification by a classic move in devious diplomacy. In November, 1857, Count Putiatin, the Russian diplomatic envoy, arrived from St. Petersburg at the mouth of the Peiho, near Tientsin, in a paddle-wheel steamer of minute dimensions. On his overland journey across Siberia he had applied for permission to enter Peking via Kiakhta. Upon refusal, he passed through Muraviev's territory and learned of Muraviev's plans, and turned up with the allied expeditionary force in North China. Since he was unable to work his way alone into Peking, he decided to cast in his lot with the allies. He gave it as his opinion the allies should strike terror into the capital and thus give irresistible force to the arguments of diplomacy. After the victory over the Chinese, he presented a mild front toward the Chinese in order to win their friendship and contented himself with a general, most-favored-nation treaty.

After the renewal of hostilities against China in 1859 and 1860, General Ignatiev represented Russia as a member of the international diplomatic corps which imposed its will upon Peking. The Manchu Dynasty appeared to be in total collapse. Central and South China were in the hands of the *T'ai P'ing* rebels and Peking was at the mercy of the allies. The summer palace was looted and burned and the renegade court was in flight to Jehol. Russia had already opened the Manchurian and Mongolian frontiers to its traders and was in the process of advancing its boundaries along the Amur and down the Pacific coast toward Korea.

General Ignatiev knew of allied plans and knew that the allies had no intention of spending a cold winter in Peking. Nonetheless he approached the Chinese negotiator, Prince K'ung, and revealed the only way of salva-

tion. According to General Ignatiev, nothing would arrest the schemes of the allies but the intervention of a strong power friendly to China. He would make such representations for a nominal consideration, only the rectification of a frontier giving Russia a sterile region "inhabited by robbers and infested by tigers, where no mandarin could make a living, fit only for a penal settlement, with a rugged seacoast where no Chinese sail was ever seen."

The Chinese signed a Treaty of Peking with the Russians in 1860. This confirmed the Treaty of Aigun and in addition signed over the Maritime Provinces, not for joint occupation, but to the exclusive ownership of Russia. This was the first of critical occasions where in desperation China turned to Russia: Prince K'ung charted a costly path which was to be traversed by *Li Hung-chang*, *Chiang Kai-shek*, and *Mao Tse-tung*. Russia gave counsel and help but extracted payment in full. Russia added 600 miles to its coastline and founded the naval base and city of Vladivostok which in Russian means the "master of the East."

Japan was more perturbed than China by the southward advance of Russia, perhaps because China was morally despondent and on the way down while Japan was ambitious and eager and on the way up. After the Russians firmly closed their grip on the peninsula of Kamchatka, the czar ordered the Russo-American Fur Company to take over Sakhalin and not permit any alien settlements there. Sakhalin commanded the delta area of the Amur River, directly across the narrow seas on the mainland of Asia.

The Russian fleet, stoked with borrowed American coal, followed in the wake of Perry to force most-favored-nation treaties upon Japan. Perry was furious at the Russians, and he wrote that he could foresee the day when Saxon and Cossack, the antagonistic exponents of freedom and absolutism, would eventually meet in fierce and final encounter on the coasts of China and Siam to determine the freedom or slavery of the world. The Russians ignored Perry's hostility and signed two treaties with Japan, in 1855 and 1857, which granted to Russia most-favored-nation treatment, reciprocal extraterritoriality, and the opening of three Japanese ports to commerce. In 1875 Russia gave up its claims to the Kuriles in exchange for Sakhalin. Japan was glad to be given the honor to sign any treaty on a basis of diplomatic equality and gave up Sakhalin because of Russia's superior military strength.

In the meantime, Russia pushed into Central Asia, on the western approaches to China. By the Kuldja Convention in 1851, Russia obtained rights to trade at Kuldja (Ili) and Tarbagatai (Chuguchak). Trade at both towns would be duty-free and under the control of Russian consuls. Rus-

sians acquired the rights to purchase lands for factories, churches, and cemeteries and well-defined rights of extradition and extraterritoriality. By the Treaty of Peking in 1860, Russians and Chinese began the process of delimiting their western boundaries and agreed upon a trade mart in the south at Kashgar. These special considerations which applied to Russian-Chinese borderlands were granted to Russia in addition to the most-favored-nation privileges obtained through Russian participation in the general, unequal treaty settlements.

As the Russians surged into Central Asia, they created the government of Russian Turkistan. When that area was threatened by a Mohammedan rebellion, they occupied the Chinese territory of Ili. After a great Chinese general, Tso Tsung-t'ang, had defeated the Mohammedan leader, Yakub Beg, the Chinese sent an ignorant, easygoing mandarin, Chung Ho, to St. Petersburg to negotiate the return of Ili. The nostalgic diplomat signed the Treaty of Livadia in 1879, which resigned to Russia most of Ili with the strategic pass to Kashgar. The Treaty of Livadia also surrendered commercial privileges to Russians and obligated China to pay indemnities. Chung Ho was sentenced to be decapitated for his stupidity but was spared when the Chinese were able to get the treaty revised.

The revised treaty, the Treaty of St. Petersburg, signed in 1881, remained the basis of Russian-Chinese relations in Central Asia until the end of the empire. It was renewed in 1891, again in 1901, and unilaterally by Russia in 1911. Russia returned the major part of the Ili cession for an increased indemnity and received the right to open consulates in Turkistan and Mongolia. Russians were permitted to buy land, to erect residences, shops, and warehouses, and to trade as far as the Great Wall without the payment of duties. All duties were reduced on overland trade, and trade was duty-free for fifty versts on either side of the border. "The subjects of Russia shall enjoy the faculty of engaging in commerce under franchise and rights in the towns and other localities of the Provinces of Ili, Tarbagatai, Kashgar, Urumchi, and others located in the northern and southern slopes of the T'ien Shan range up to the Great Wall." This treaty structure was entirely adequate for Russia to push its political schemes to the limit of its power in Central Asia.

After the Triple Intervention: Manchuria

Russia's activities in Asia became singularly spectacular after the conclusion of the Franco-Russian alliance in 1893. Russia chose to postpone its quarrels with the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria, and Italy) in the

Balkans and to turn to the Far East. Germany and France were relieved by the *volte face*, but England and Japan were disturbed. The Russian diversion lasted for ten years, from 1895 to 1905, and culminated in its own disaster at the hands of Japan. After 1905 Russia redirected its expansive energies toward the Balkans and generated one crisis after another until the general explosion of World War I in 1914.

The Dreibund—Russia, France, and Germany—intervened against Japan's claim to the Liaotung Peninsula in the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895. Russia was the prime mover, although France took the initiative in extracting compensations from China. The Russian note informed Japan:

The Government of His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, in examining the conditions of the peace which Japan has imposed on China, finds that the possession of the peninsula of Liaotung, claimed by Japan, would be a constant menace to the capital of China, would at the same time render illusory the independence of Korea, and would henceforth be a perpetual obstacle to the peace of the Far East.

Consequently the Government of His Majesty the Emperor would give a new proof of their sincere friendship for the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan by advising him to renounce the definite possession of the peninsula of Liaotung.¹

The Russian action was not so much against Japan as against Great Britain, and not so much for China as for Russia. Russia had thought in terms of strategic railways into East Siberia and China since Muraviev established Russia's power in the Amur region, but Russia had no capital for railway construction. Then the new czar, Nicholas II, who as the csarevitch had toured Japan and the Far East and had nearly lost his life in Kyoto when someone giggled at a serious Shinto ceremony, put life into the Trans-Siberian Railway project. At Vladivostok, in 1891, Nicholas II turned the first spadeful of sod at the eastern terminus of the Trans-Siberian, and he later became the chairman of the imperial committee for the building of the railway. By the time of the Triple Intervention, the railway had been completed eastward from the Urals to Irkutsk on Lake Baikal and westward from Vladivostok to Kharbarovsk. The Russians began to cast about for the best routes and means to link their lines with the railways which the Chinese, with British help, had extended northward from China into Manchuria.

In 1892 Sergei Witte became the Russian Minister of Finance and the chief architect of Russia's Far East economic policy. Immediately after the signature of the Treaty of Shimonoseki by China and Japan, Witte

¹ Quoted in D. J. Dallin, *The Rise of Russia in Asia* (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1949), p. 39.

engineered the formation of a Russo-Chinese Bank (with heavy participation by French interests) for loans to China. The Russian government guaranteed the original loan in 1895 and for its collateral established a prior claim on Chinese revenues.

Then Li Hung-chang went to Moscow to attend the coronation ceremonies of the new czar. Naturally he talked about bank loans, railways, and a treaty of alliance. For the second time China turned to Russia, just as it had done in the incident of Prince Kung and General Ignatiev. On June 3, 1896, Russia and China signed a fifteen-year treaty of alliance, the Li-Lobanov Treaty, promising to aid one another if either were attacked in China or Korea. Russia was given the right to use Chinese ports in the event of war and the right to build railways in China so that Russian land troops could be rushed to the menaced points. Prince Lobanov-Rostovsky as Foreign Minister signed the treaty, although Witte, the junior Minister of Finance, conducted the negotiations. Witte scornfully remarked that the Foreign Minister knew no more about the Far East than the average schoolboy.

Li was not willing to let the Russian government build the railways, but he did consent to an agreement between China and the Russo-Chinese Bank for the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway. This agreement was signed in Berlin in September, 1896, by the Chinese ambassador to Russia who was concurrently ambassador to Germany. By its charter from the Russian government, the bank's rights included:

the collection of duties in the Empire of China, and the transactions relating to the State treasury of the respective place, the coinage, with the authorization of the Chinese Government, of the country's money, the payment of interest on loans concluded by the Chinese Government, the acquisition of concessions for the construction of railways within the boundaries of China, and the establishment of telegraph lines.²

The agreement between the Chinese government and the Russo-Chinese Bank provided that the Chinese government was to pay 5,000,000 taels to the bank, and the bank would build the railway from Chita on the following terms:

- (1) A Chinese Eastern Railway Company would be formed to build and operate the railway.
- (2) Only Russians and Chinese would own shares in this company.

² Texts of the various agreements are in J. V. A. MacMurray, *Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China, 1894-1919* (Oxford University Press, New York, 1923), Vol. I, pp. 74-91.

- (3) The president would be named by the Chinese government but paid by the company.
- (4) The road should have the wide Russian gauge and should be completed in six years.
- (5) The Chinese government would be responsible for the protection of the line and the safety of the personnel.
- (6) The company would be given the right to acquire land necessary for its construction and effective operation, and would have the absolute and exclusive right of administration of these lands.
- (7) China could rebuy the railway in thirty-six years or obtain it free of charge at the end of eighty years.

The Russian government, with the agreement of the bank, issued the required charter for the operating company, the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, on December 4, 1896. The government of Russia guaranteed the bonds and in return it expected the company to be guided by the Ministry of Finance. Shares were opened for sale at 1:00 P.M. in St. Petersburg and closed five minutes later. No one ever saw the shares and the shareholders were certified as such at subsequent meetings of the Russo-Chinese Bank.

The Russians were apparently having unbroken diplomatic successes in the Far East. One slightly bitter Englishman remarked that the art of European diplomacy seemed to have degenerated into the monotonous occupation of watching the progress of Russia. The Russians were having their own difficulties in choosing a satisfactory right of way and in persuading the Chinese to allow the Russians to connect the Chinese Eastern with the railway systems in China proper. Prince Ukthomski—a Russian lobbyist sent to Peking—with all his diplomatic finesse, charm, and a million rubles for bribes, could not bring the Chinese into complete accord with the Russian desires.

At this juncture, the powers engaged in their scramble for concessions. The czar seemed possessed with an unreasoned desire for a port in China, but Witte recommended against immediate territorial acquisitions. The Germans leased Kiaochow Bay, and the Russians acquired leases on Port Arthur and Dairen.

The Russians immediately plunged into the development of the strategic naval base at Port Arthur. They deepened the harbor and built the docks at Dairen. They erected factories. They spent as much money on railways as they could borrow from their European allies, the French, and monopolized all the white-collar jobs which their penetration into Manchuria

had created. With Russia and Germany on both sides of the Yellow Sea, the kaiser wired the czar that they might be represented as St. George and St. Michael shielding the Holy Cross in the Far East and guarding the gates to the continent of Asia. Russia obtained the right to build a southward extension of the Chinese Eastern Railroad to its newly leased areas but promised that it would not use this railway agreement as an excuse to encroach upon Chinese sovereignty. China agreed that in the districts traversed by the branch lines it would give no foreign concessions and that it would grant no prior rights for railways in Manchuria and no more open ports in Manchuria without the consent of Russia.

Russia had no further worries from Germany, because the Germans took the position that "your enemies whether they be called Japanese or English have now become our enemies." It was different with the British. Some British feared that these Russo-Chinese lease agreements were merely opening wedges, just signals of more aggressions to come. The British ambassador in St. Petersburg wrote to Marquis Salisbury on New Year's Day, 1898:

Producing from a carefully locked desk a map of China, the Minister [Sergei Witte] proceeded to draw his hand over the Provinces of Chihli, Shansi, Shensi and Kansu and said sooner or later Russia would probably absorb all this territory.³

The British cabinet took the attitude that "Asia is big enough for us all" and argued that the Russian development of Manchuria would expand the market for the humming British mills. Therefore Russia had little trouble in getting Great Britain to delimit their areas for railway concessions: Russia would stay out of the Yangtze Valley, and Great Britain would not operate north of the Great Wall. The Russians violated the spirit of this mutual agreement by handling the finances for a Franco-Belgian group which penetrated into the British sphere. The leader of the Belgian group was an agent of Russia working for Russia in the specific area where Russia agreed not to act.

The Boxer uprising forced Russia to re-examine its policies in Manchuria. The czar had his own ideas, seeking particularly a warm-water port and casting covetous eyes toward Korea. The Foreign Minister, Prince Lobanov-Rostovsky, and his successor, Mikhail Muraviev, a "fast liver and an ignoramus," left the details to Witte and the Minister of War, General Alexei Kuropatkin. When the news of the Boxer uprising reached St. Petersburg, Kuropatkin expressed his joy in having an excuse to seize

³ G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, editors, *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1894-1914* (Foreign Office, London, 1926-1938), Vol. I, p. 8.

Manchuria. More extreme and intransigent personalities rose to power. Ivan Bezobrazov and Vyacheslav Plehve, the Minister of the Interior, emerged as exponents of the policy that "bayonets, not diplomats have made Russia; by bayonets and not by diplomatic pens must the Far Eastern problem be solved." Cautious voices in the Foreign Office were stilled, and the avowed idealists like Prince Ukthomski were pushed aside.

As a consequence of Boxer attacks in 1900 against the railways, Russia brought the whole of Manchuria under its military control. Russia seized a concession area in Tientsin and contributed 4,000 men to the relief forces. Russia co-operated with the allies in China proper but played a lone hand in Manchuria. Again Russia posed as the friend of China, distributing packages of food and clothing to the hungry Chinese in Peking. Russia advised a soft policy and suggested that the allied armies should evacuate before the negotiation of the Boxer protocol. With the allies Russia was stubborn, demanding and receiving the major portion of the Boxer payments. This double-dealing prompted an American comment: "Her vows are as false as dicer's oaths when treachery is profitable."

Russia showed no softness whatever in handling the Manchurian problem. Russia presented demands which would have made Manchuria a protectorate of Russia as conditions for the withdrawal of Russian troops. These demands aroused the verbal antagonism of the United States and prompted the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Russia backed down slightly and concluded a convention with China on April 8, 1902, which provided for the re-establishment of Chinese authority in Manchuria and the re-establishment of the *status quo* which existed before the Boxer incidents. This convention also provided that in the future the Chinese would be responsible for the protection of Russian subjects and their undertakings and that "if no disturbances arise and if actions of other powers do not prevent it," the Russians would withdraw their troops in three stages at six-month intervals. September, 1903, was the target date for the completion of the evacuation.

Russia simultaneously persuaded France to extend the terms of their alliance to cover the Far East. When time came for the first stage of Russian withdrawal, the Russians withdrew their troops to barracks in the railway zone and in some cases just changed the shoulder straps of the soldiers to make railway guards out of them. Russia did not even pretend to carry out the second stage of the evacuation, on the grounds that China had failed to comply with further Russian conditions. Russia intimated that it could not be completed until China agreed to seven new demands: no new treaty ports or foreign consuls could be allowed in Manchuria, no foreigners other than Russians could be employed in public service in

North China, no change must be made in the administration of Mongolia, the customs receipts at Newchwang must continue to be deposited in the Russo-Chinese Bank, the sanitary commission at Newchwang must be dominated by Russians, Russia should retain control of the Port Arthur-Yingkow-Mukden telegraph line, and no territory in Manchuria should be alienated to any power.

The Russian court became more bellicose. An uncle of the czar, Grand Duke Nicolai Alexandrovitch, Admiral Alexei Abaza, Prince Vonliarliarski, and General Eugene Alexeiev strengthened the cult of the bayonet. On July 30, 1903, General Alexeiev was named Viceroy of the Russian Far East and he was made responsible to the czar, not through the traditional channels of the Foreign Office or the War Office but through a Committee of Far Eastern Affairs headed by Bezobrazov and Admiral Abaza. On February 8, 1904, the czar telegraphed Alexeiev: "It is desirable that the Japanese and not we be the ones to start military operations. But if their navy should cross the Thirty-eighth Parallel on the western coast of Korea, with or without a landing, you are hereby given discretion to attack them without waiting for the first shot from their side. I rely upon you. God help you." Two days later, the Japanese shelled the Russian ships in Port Arthur. Japan opposed Russian aggression in Korea more than in Manchuria. As late as 1903 the Japanese would have been willing to make a deal—Manchuria to Russia in exchange for Korea to Japan. Russia played for both areas, and paid dearly for its greed.

Russia in Korea

Japan's first booming shots at Port Arthur signaled its own intentions and ambitions and the end of its patience against the encroachments of Russia in Manchuria and Korea. Russia tried time and again to move its Pacific naval base to the south. In 1854 Russia surveyed and named Port Lazarev in northeast Korea, and in 1860 Russia moved into Vladivostok. In 1861 some Russian ships occupied Tsushima Island but retreated because of the opposition of the commander of the British Far East squadron.

In 1884 and 1885 at the height of Anglo-Russian tension over Afghanistan and Chinese-Japanese tension over Korea, an anti-Japanese adviser at Seoul, P. G. von Möllendorf, engineered an agreement between Korea and Russia. Since Chinese-Japanese rivalry was so bitter, the king of Korea invited officers of a third nation—Russia—to train his troops. Russia seized the opportunity to occupy Port Lazarev, but the British immediately sailed into Port Hamilton in South Korea to counter the Russian position

in North Korea. Russia was in no mood to court trouble and let it be known to the Chinese that Russia did not intend to seize any part of Korea's territory or to make any encroachments on Korea's sovereignty. Both Russia and Great Britain pulled out of their respective naval positions.

In 1894 Russia was less tractable and on its own account was apprehensive about the emerging power of Japan. Wishing to make sure that Japan would live up to the revised version of the Treaty of Shimonoseki (without Liaotung and with an added indemnity), the Russian squadron in the Far East sailed to the port of Chefoo where the Chinese and Japanese were to exchange ratifications. On the appointed day, May 8, 1895, as each ship came to anchor, it donned dark gray war paint, stripped for action, and stored its surplus gear on the shore just in front of the hotel where the Japanese peace mission was staying.

When the Japanese moved too quickly to implement their reforms in Korea after the victory over China, the Korean dynasty turned against the Japanese. In October, 1895, with the connivance of the Japanese Resident, the queen was murdered and the king was placed in the protective custody of the pro-Japanese cabinet. On February 11, 1896, the king fled to the Russian legation where he lived for more than a year. When he emerged, he lived in a new palace which the Russians built for him near their own legation. During this period, Russians were given mining concessions on the Tumen River and timber rights in the valley of the Yalu. A French syndicate was given the rights to build the railroad north from Seoul to the Manchurian border.

The Japanese were uneasy. They sent Prince Yamagata as their delegate to the coronation of Nicholas II. He proposed to Prince Lobanov-Rostovsky that Japan and Russia should divide Korea at the Thirty-eighth Parallel for their respective spheres. Russia declined but offered a joint protectorate for all Korea as a substitute agreement. By the Lobanov-Yamagata Protocol, signed June 9, 1896, just six days after the Li-Lobanov Treaty of Alliance, both nations agreed to support the king's efforts to restore order and establish financial stability. A secret article provided that if troops were to be moved into Korea by Russia and Japan, prior agreement would be reached on their respective spheres of action.

Prince Lobanov-Rostovsky might not have known more about the Far East than the average schoolboy, but he knew how to play three games at once with highly skilled Far Eastern diplomats. He arranged the alliance with China, while against China's interests he negotiated a joint protectorate over Korea with Japan. At the same time, he double-crossed Japan by entertaining the Korean delegate to the coronation and promising

him unilateral financial aid and Russian help in training the royal Korean bodyguard.

After this triple dealing, Russia in Korea provided training for an army of 10,000 men and a royal bodyguard of 800. Russia provided weapons, directed the construction and operation of a Korean arsenal, and had its vice-consuls become Korean commissioners of the customs. For a time, an aggressive new Russian ambassador to Korea persuaded the pro-Russian Korean administration to oust the very British Mr. Brown as head of the Korean customs, but Mr. Brown got his job back when nine British cruisers called at the Korean port of Chemulpo. The Russians indicated that they would like a coaling station for their ships somewhere near Fusan harbor. The timing coincided exactly with the Russian leases in Port Arthur and Dairen, and Russia used a compromise with Japan over Korea to cushion the crisis in Manchuria.

In a convention signed April 23, 1898, the Japanese Foreign Minister Nishi and the Russian ambassador in Tokyo, Baron Rosen, recognized the sovereignty and independence of Korea and agreed that neither would help Korea in matters of the army or finance without consulting the other. Russia, however, took the first steps in according primacy to Japan in Korea by agreeing not to obstruct the development of commercial and industrial relations between Japan and Korea.

The diplomatic tug of war continued as if the agreements had not been concluded. In 1899, the very next year, the Russians tried to get Masampo for their naval base. They marked an area for purchase, but when they went to sign the final papers, they discovered the land had already been bought by the Japanese. The Japanese completed the railway from Fusan to Seoul at about the same time the construction of the Chinese Eastern was finished. In 1901 Russian soldiers were sent into the Yalu area as timber cutters, and the Russian government converted their economic concessions into aggressive instruments for political domination.

To Japan, Korea was the dagger pointing at its heart, and Manchuria was the economic hope of the future. Russia had to be stopped, even at the cost of the Russo-Japanese war. The Japanese were ready and eager; the Russians believed that Japan would not dare to assail them. Japan was seething with militarism, Russia was fermenting with revolution. Japan had 850,000 trained men, five times as many effective reserves, and before the war was over had landed 1,500,000 men in Manchuria. Russia had less than 100,000 men in the Far East when the war began, and because the eastern railway was completed only as far as Lake Baikal, was never able to place more than 1,000,000 men in the field. The Japanese armed services were efficient, the Russians were notoriously corrupt. Japan had public

opinion on its side, Russia was practically alone. President Theodore Roosevelt's opinion was that those responsible for managing Russia's foreign policy betrayed a brutality and ignorance, an arrogance and shortsightedness, which were not often combined.

Japan, feeling that the Russian policy menaced its own national interests and sensing a certain security in the newly formed Anglo-Japanese alliance, made war on Russia. As at Pearl Harbor, Japan fired on the Russian ships first and declared war later. Russia was badly beaten on the high seas and in Korea and Manchuria. The climactic battle of Mukden established Japan once and for all as a great power. Not once in all the long battle did the Russian commander make any timely effort to control and dominate the situation; from first to last he was as wax in the hands of the enemy. "Troops, guns, priests, ikons, women—all became involved in one disorderly rout." But Japan never entered Russian territory nor encountered the effective fighting force of Russia in Europe.

As the costs of the war mounted, the Japanese were glad to accept President Roosevelt's tender of good offices. Japanese and Russian diplomats met on American territory and signed the Treaty of Peace at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, on September 5, 1905. Russia recognized the paramount political, military, and economic interests of Japan in Korea; agreed not to interfere or place obstacles in the way of any measure of direction or protection and supervision that the imperial government of Japan might deem necessary to adopt in Korea; undertook to evacuate Manchuria and to transfer to Japan its leases in the Liaotung Peninsula; ceded to Japan its railways and ancillary economic rights in southern Manchuria; surrendered the southern half of the island of Sakhalin; paid an indemnity; limited its naval forces in the Far East; and gave up to Japan fishing rights off the coast of Siberia. The treaty also provided for the mutual evacuation of troops from Manchuria and for the retention of the railway guards. It stated that neither Russia nor Japan should obstruct international measures for the development of Manchuria; and that the railways of Manchuria should be commercial, not strategic, except in Liaotung. The Russo-Japanese War reduced Russian power for the time and stamped Japan as the strongest power in the Far East.

Last Years of the Czarist Empire in Asia

Russia's setback was damaging but not catastrophic. Russia's prestige was dimmed, but its army remained formidable and its resources were undiminished. In victory, Russia had been shunned and feared; in defeat, it

was welcomed in Europe as an ally against the rising power of Germany. Russia might also have been called upon in the Far East as an ally against Japan, had Russia itself not chosen to convert its historic enmity toward Japan into a policy of co-operation and alliance. During the decade between the Russo-Japanese War and the outbreak of World War I, diplomats guided their policies as if Europe and Asia were separate worlds with distant, if any, relationship to each other. In Europe, the Triple Entente (Great Britain, France, and Russia) took gradual shape against the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria, and Italy). In Asia, England allied itself with Japan, but opposed Japan in China. The traditional trading powers—the United States, Great Britain, France, and Germany—adopted a policy of co-operation and peaceful penetration into China which opposed directly the continuing policies of force and special privilege pursued by Japan and Russia. The trading powers dedicated themselves to the territorial integrity of China; Japan and Russia schemed to prevent the burgeoning of modern China. It was millions of dollars against millions of soldiers.

As soon as the Russo-Japanese War terminated, Russia and Japan patched up their quarrels and turned their thoughts to co-operation. On July 30, 1907, they signed a public political convention, paying the customary, perhaps cynical, lip service to the independence and territorial integrity of China and to the principle of equal commercial opportunity and engaging themselves to sustain and defend the *status quo*. Japan agreed that it would not infringe on Russia in North Manchuria; Russia agreed that it would not infringe upon Japan in South Manchuria. Japan recognized the position of Russia in Outer Mongolia and Russia recognized the political solidarity of Japan and Korea. This was a very effective delimitation of spheres of activity. Japan would be unhampered in Korea; Russia likewise in Outer Mongolia. The two together would divide Manchuria and present a solid front against third powers like the United States or Great Britain which might have ideas of their own about helping China in Manchuria. In the same year, 1907, Russia patched up its quarrels with Great Britain in Central Asia and tightened its agreements with France. Russia rid itself of embarrassing complications in other quarters and devoted its major attention in foreign policy to the Far East. Russia began the construction of the Amur Railroad around the northern borders of Manchuria as an alternative route from Chita to Vladivostok.

After the American, E. H. Harriman, tried to purchase railway interests in Manchuria, and after the American secretary of state supported ideas for the neutralization or internationalization of the Manchurian railways, Russia and Japan announced new and more intimate understandings on July 4,

1910. In the event the special interests of Russia or Japan should come to be threatened, the two nations would agree upon the measures to be taken with a view to common action. Russia was torn between conflicting ideas. The Foreign Minister, Sazonov, held the point of view that "our state emerged and thrived not on the shores of the Black Irtysh but on the banks of the Dnieper and the Moskva." He looked upon expansion in Asia as "expensive, adventuresome and weakening of our position in Europe." More extreme groups held the opinion that "it would be criminal folly not to take advantage of the break-up of China to achieve our imperial ideals, our time-honored policy founded on the axiom that Russia must expand at the expense of neighbors."

As the Chinese revolution approached, Russia worked its way into the international financial combination called the Consortium and from the inside managed to destroy the effectiveness of that instrumentality. In 1912 Russia approached Japan for a precise understanding about Mongolia, and on July 8 it signed an agreement recognizing Japan's claim to a sphere of economic interest in that part of Inner Mongolia east of the meridian of Peking. Russia continued to build up its own particular interests in Sinkiang, northern Manchuria, and Mongolia, and toyed with a toe hold in Tibet.

In Sinkiang, the Russians had always been careless in their recognition of the boundary line. The commercial treaties and the resultant close economic ties gave the Russians all the excuse they needed to back up any autonomous moves against the Chinese. After the Chinese revolution, Sinkiang was helpless in its exposure to Russian intrigue. In North Manchuria, the Russians had an area of operations four times as large as South Manchuria, and the entire Manchurian region took on the stamp of its Russian manipulators. On the basis of the clause which gave the Chinese Eastern Railway Company the right to lease lands, the Russians leased the right of way for the railway itself and in addition lands for schools, hospitals, churches, and industrial enterprises. Municipal areas, like the city of Harbin, were administered by Russian officials. Mines, telegraphs, forests, and river shipping were developed by the Russians. The Russians had 100,000 immigrants in the area and 30,000 troops in the guise of railway guards and frontier police.

The greatest Russian activity centered in Mongolia. After-dinner conversations at Peking glowed with tales of the bacchanalian days in Harbin and Mukden when opulent czarist hosts regaled their guests with rivers of champagne served in goblets of gold. Those were the days when Japan scarcely amounted to a serious competitor in southern Manchuria and when the Chinese were servants of the Russians instead of the Japanese.

The Russians took advantage of the ancient Mongolian hatred of Chinese traders, officials, and farmers, and supported and directed anti-Chinese independence movements.

After the Chinese revolution, on December 16, 1911, the religious head of Mongolia, the Hutukhtu, was proclaimed head of Mongolia and informed the Chinese that he was going to declare his independence from China as the United States had declared its independence from England. In 1912 Russia sent in arms, increased its consular guards, extended recognition to the new regime, and offered its services as mediator both to China and Mongolia should there be any dispute between them. Then Russia cleared the decks with Japan by the afore-mentioned agreement of July 8, 1912. On November 3, 1912, Russia negotiated a new agreement with Mongolia. In exchange for commercial rights Russia promised assistance to preserve the national army and the autonomy of Mongolia.

One year later, November 5, 1913, Russia signed a treaty with China which recognized China's suzerainty but tied China's hands in the exercise of any effective authority. China was prohibited from sending troops or colonists to Mongolia and from interfering with Mongolia's internal politics. Outer-Mongolian and Chinese relations were not to be solved except with the approval of Russia.

Russia then called a conference of all three (Russia, China, and Outer Mongolia) which concluded the Tri-Partite Treaty of Kiakhta on June 7, 1915. This was the definitive treaty in the status of Outer Mongolia before the Russian revolution. Chinese sovereignty was recognized but neither Russia nor China was to interfere in the internal affairs of Outer Mongolia. A Chinese dignitary at Urga would bestow the Hutukhtu's title upon him and see that there would be no impairment of China's nominal sovereignty. Outer Mongolia would make no political treaties with foreign powers, and China would consult Russia on all political and territorial questions. Russia and China would have limited military detachments in Mongolia; nationals of both countries would pay all internal taxes. To all intents and purposes, Outer Mongolia was a joint protectorate of Russia and China.

Imperial Russia made timid advances into Tannu Tuva and the Barga region on the Manchuria-Mongolia frontier, but by 1916 it had reached the turn of the road in Asia. War in Europe thrust the government of the czar into alliance with Japan. On July 3, 1916, Russia and Japan agreed not to enter into any political agreement opposed to one another, to give mutual assistance in the event of war, and if engaged in war together to enter into no separate peace. On this date, Russia was the junior partner, contented with its solace in northern Manchuria, Sinkiang, and Outer

Mongolia, resigned to the program of Japan in China, and blissfully unaware of the tragedies ahead—in Asia, in Europe, and at home.

Suggested Reading

- HECTOR CHEVIGNY, *Lost Empire: The Life and Adventures of Nikolai Petrovich Rezanov* (New York, 1937).
- D. J. DALLIN, *The Rise of Russia in Asia* (New Haven, 1949).
- TYLER DENNETT, *Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War* (Garden City, 1925).
- FRANK A. GOLDER, *Russian Expansion on the Pacific, 1641-1850* (Cleveland, 1914).
- R. ISWOLSKY, *Recollections of a Foreign Minister* (Garden City and Toronto, 1921).
- A. LOBANOV-ROSTOVSKY, *Russia and Asia* (New York, 1933).
- ANATOLE G. MAZOUR, *Russia, Past and Present* (New York, 1952).
- LEO PASVOLSKY, *Russia in the Far East* (New York, 1922).
- BARON ROSEN, *Forty Years of Diplomacy*, 2 volumes (London, 1923).
- VLADIMIR (VOLPECCELLI Z.), *Russia on the Pacific and the Siberian Railway* (London, 1899).
- VICTOR A. YAKHONTOFF, *Russia and the Soviet Union in the Far East* (New York, 1931).
- ABRAHAM YARMOLINSKY, editor and translator, *The Memoirs of Count Witte* (London, 1921).

CHAPTER 7

The United States in the Far East to 1900

The policy of the Open Door, or equality of commercial opportunity or most-favored-nation treatment or whatever it may be called, is as old as relations with Asia. When the United States was very young, its traders relied upon their own Yankee wit and shrewdness for their welfare and profits. When the government turned its official attention across the Pacific, it was not motivated by altruism or philanthropy, but by the right and proper concern for the interests of the nation and its citizens. Each administration sought the most effective tactics to implement its objectives, either by strong words and strong action or by soft words and international co-operation. No single or consistent line of action was associated with either political party, and no presidential election marked a sudden or abrupt change in American attitudes and activities.

The execution of policy was nonpartisan rather than bipartisan and was shaped by individuals who were sufficiently outstanding to leave their imprint in the record books of history—Caleb Cushing, Matthew Perry, Anson Burlingame, William H. Seward, and John Hay. Thousands of other diplomats, consuls, naval officers, writers, merchants, and missionaries—some wise and some not so wise, most God-fearing and unselfish but a few slightly better than scoundrels, all with an intimate acquaintance with the Far East—contributed to the formation and guidance of America's destinies. The great American public was for a long time indifferent or uninformed, but the actors and forces behind the scenes were no less effective and enlightened than those of other nations with whom they had to deal.

Among Americans themselves, the give-and-take of conflicting ideas

caused inconsistencies and delays in policy-making, but sharpened the judgment and heightened the wisdom of policy-makers. Some Americans advocated fearlessly and argued vigorously for measures which were officially scorned or rejected, such as joining the British and the French in the wars against the Chinese or annexing bits of territory for the United States in the Far Pacific. Neither public acclaim nor official acceptance was taken as a standard of devotion to the public welfare.

Early Interests of the United States

At the close of the Revolutionary War, American knowledge of Asia was based more on pirate tales spread by Dutch smugglers than on the thousands of books on China listed in the catalog of Harvard University. Only two Americans had been there, John Gore and John Ledyard, who had been on Captain Cook's third expedition. Ledyard's stories of buying furs in the United States for a dime a skin and selling them in Canton for \$100 a skin prompted Robert Morris and Daniel Parker to invest \$120,000 in the purchase and outfitting of a 360-ton ship, the "Empress of China." Because Ledyard was too wild, John Green was named captain and Samuel Shaw the supercargo. The "Empress of China" sailed on Washington's birthday, 1784, with a cargo of ginseng (a root which the Chinese prized very highly) and an assortment of just about every commodity which was found in a New England country store—leather goods, pitch tar, sugar, flour, rice, tobacco, snuff, beer, wine, rum, port, brandy, bar-iron, lead, pewter, soap, and candles. She returned May 12, 1785, disposed of her tea, silks, nankeens, straw mats, and chinaware, and paid off a neat profit of \$37,000. John Jay of the Continental Congress expressed his peculiar satisfaction at the success of this first American attempt to establish direct trade with China, and shortly afterward, Samuel Shaw was selected to be the first American merchant-consul at Canton.

Towns along the Atlantic seaboard plunged deeply into the China trade. Ships were small, crews were young, and profits were handsome. The "Betsy," ninety-three tons, with a crew of thirty, all under twenty-eight years of age, on her 1797 voyage cleared \$120,000 on an \$8,000 investment. Yankee traders plied the waters to China, Mauritius, India, Batavia, Mocha, and Manila and gained their reputation for shrewdness and as much honesty as expediency demanded. Business was ruined by the Napoleonic wars and the War of 1812, but Americans were as determined as the British to gain a full share of its revival.

Americans were also interested in commerce elsewhere in the Pacific

basin. Before 1800 their ships had explored Hawaii, the South Pacific, and the Bonin Islands near Japan. Sea captains were in search of whales, seals, and furs. Quiet seas bred monotony and mutiny, storms meant physical wrecks and financial catastrophes. Sailors and natives tended toward excesses of understanding or misunderstanding, and the American government felt obliged to intercede to restrain or protect its own nationals. After the looting of the "Friendship" in Sumatra in 1830, Edmund Roberts was commissioned as a special agent to negotiate treaties with Cochin China, Japan, and Siam. Mr. Roberts would not follow the demands of etiquette for Cochin China and he would not proceed to Japan because he believed his presents were inadequate. However, he concluded the first American treaties with Oriental nations—with Siam on March 30, 1833, and with Muscat on September 21, 1833. These treaties provided for little more than most-favored-nation treatment.

An appreciation of the fact that the Pacific washed American shores, and was not just a distant ocean from the Atlantic center of the world, gradually developed. In 1792 Captain Robert Gray discovered the mouth of the Columbia River, which he named after his ship. In 1805 Lewis and Clark paddled their canoes down the length of the Columbia. In 1811 John Jacob Astor founded Astoria, which he saw not as an isolated post for furs, but as a link in a vast chain of commodity exchanges stretching from the Great Lakes to the northwest and across the Pacific to Japan, China, and India. The United States fought to make its territorial claims in the northwest valid against Spain, Russia, and Great Britain. Thanks in part to the vision of the Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, President Monroe in his famous message to Congress, December 2, 1823, asserted "as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers." He meant Russia in the North American continent as well as Spain in South America. Within six months the United States and Russia formally agreed to "fifty-four forty" as the boundary line between their establishments and agreed that the great ocean commonly called the Pacific Ocean or the South Sea would be equally open for the navigation and fishing of both nations.

From the beginning, missionaries were of prime concern in American policy in Asia. Dr. John Robert Morrison, Reverend Elijah Bridgham, S. Wells Williams, and Dr. Peter Parker possessed linguistic ability and deep understanding of the people among whom they worked. Reed in China, Perry in Japan, and Shufeldt in Korea had to depend upon mis-

sionaries as interpreters for the negotiation of treaties. Missionaries served often as advisers, and became consuls and diplomats in their own right. They were accused of being political agents, in foreign lands, of their governments, and they were in fact often exactly that.

When the French took strong stands in favor of the Catholics, the Americans felt obligated to do no less for the Protestants. The missionaries were zealous and aggressive by nature and not prone to limit their activities to the treaty ports. They wanted to expose the whole empire "to the blessings of God," and they often compromised their religious potentiality by their political maladroitness. Their teachings worked against the age-old political *status quo* in the Orient—this helped to account for the hostility and persecution they met—but they also assisted in the long and continuing process of regeneration. Missionaries expressed their ideas fervently to the American government and the American public. The government in its turn assumed the protection of missionary interests in the quarrels and misunderstandings which inevitably occurred with the Oriental governments and peoples.

The Security Interest in the Pacific

Immense unsettled lands and unexplored regions at home dampened American enthusiasm for overseas expansion or for voyages of discovery and exploration. In 1838, after years of debates and preparations, an expedition under the command of Charles Wilkes set out on a journey which included South America, Samoa, New South Wales, Wilkes Land in the Antarctic, the Fiji and Hawaiian Islands, the Philippines, the Sulu Archipelago, Borneo, Singapore, and Polynesia. Captain Wilkes surveyed harbors, charted strange seas, negotiated agreements for the reception of foreign ships, consuls, and nationals, and asserted the title of the United States to Wake Island. The importance of voyages of this nature was not appreciated until later when Americans needed naval bases, landing places for cables, and island bases for trans-Pacific aviation. It was a long time before the possession of tiny dots in the Pacific came to be recognized generally as vital to American security.

The establishment of American sovereignty in the Oregon territory, the succession of the United States to Spanish claims in the southwest, the discovery of gold in California, the possibility of a canal across Mexico or Central America, the completion of the transcontinental railway, and the vital surge of the westward movement brought new emphasis to manifest destiny in the Pacific. Secretary of State Seward personalized America's

new faith in the future of the Far East and he supported vigorously every proposal regarding Japan, China, or Korea which seemed to him to increase American influence in that area. He committed "Seward's folly" in paying perfectly good money for the purchase of Alaska—actually, of course, an incredibly good investment.

Hawaii was regarded with unbelievable nonchalance in the nineteenth century. In 1819 fourteen American missionaries sailed to Hawaii from Boston, and four years later an American consulate opened for business. American seamen and naval officers personally and officially appreciated the islands, but the American government showed no unusual eagerness either to guarantee its own position or to forestall the ambitions of Great Britain and France.

In 1843 a British naval officer asserted authority over Hawaii for a short period until he was ordered to restore the Hawaiian flag (which looks very much like the Union Jack). In four instances, French naval officers presented demands with menacing ulterior motives. The American government would go no further than to insist upon the independence of Hawaii and to assert that it would never consent to see those islands taken possession of by either of the great commercial powers of Europe. When in November, 1843, the English and the French governments adopted a self-denying pact, declaring that they would never "directly or under the title of protectorate, or under any other form" possess themselves of the islands, they were not joined by the American government. In 1854 the Hawaiian king and the American commissioner negotiated a treaty of annexation, which was not even submitted to the Senate. Secretary of State Marcy considered the annuities to be paid Hawaii too high, and he objected to the admission of Hawaii as a state.

American interest in Hawaii increased with the expansion of missionary, commercial, and military activities, and with the ominous challenge of Oriental immigration. In 1875 a treaty provided for reciprocity in commercial relations, nonalienation of Hawaii, and preferential treatment for Americans. Later Secretary Blaine declared:

The Hawaiian Islands cannot be joined to the Asiatic system. If they drift from their independent station it must be toward assimilation and identification with the American system to which they belong by the operation of natural laws and must belong by the operation of political necessity.

In 1884 a second reciprocity treaty was ratified, Pearl Harbor was leased as a naval base, and the United States refused to join England and France in guaranteeing Hawaiian neutrality. It was obvious that the United States intended to absorb Hawaii—the only questions were "when" and "how."

In January, 1893, a bloodless revolution practically made by Americans deposed the queen and sent a group of American citizens to Washington to represent Hawaii in the negotiation of a treaty of annexation. After his inauguration, the new Democratic president, Grover Cleveland, called the Americans' action an outrage and declined to send the treaty to the Senate. He said the United States could not, under the circumstances disclosed, annex the islands without justly incurring the imputation of acquiring them by unjustifiable methods. The approach of the Spanish-American War, however, emphasized the military value of the islands and revealed suspicious intentions toward Hawaii on the part of Japan. Hawaii, without opposition on its own part, was annexed to the United States by unilateral American action—by a joint resolution of the Congress. A new bilateral treaty, although drawn up, would have required an impossible two-thirds vote for approval in the Senate. On July 8, 1898, Hawaii became a part of the territory of the United States.

Shortly after the annexation of Hawaii, the United States, Germany, and England reached a settlement on the status of Samoa. This picture-postcard island group lies strategically at the crossing of the trade routes from Panama, California, and Hawaii to Australia and New Zealand. The navy, earnestly desiring a station there for coal and other supplies, arranged with a local chief to relinquish exclusive control of the magnificent harbor of Pago Pago in exchange for the friendship and protection of the United States. The Washington government shied away from the bargain.

Until 1889 local chiefs in Samoa fought among themselves, trade rivalries continued among Americans, English, and Germans, and diplomatic struggles verging on warfare were carried on by these three governments and their representatives. In that year a treaty was signed by the three parties which provided for the independence and neutrality of Samoa and a condominium intended to safeguard the rights of all. A smoldering crisis erupted in 1898 with the contemporaneous conclusion of the Spanish-American War and the death of the Samoan king. The Americans and British favored one successor; the Germans another. After the Anglo-American ships bombarded the towns and areas friendly to his rival, the Anglo-American candidate won. The incident called for a new understanding, which was reached in Washington on December 2, 1899. The condominium was ended and Samoa was divided—that part east of the 171st meridian going to the United States, the remainder to Germany. Great Britain received its compensations elsewhere, and the German protectorate became a mandate under New Zealand by the Treaty of Versailles. In 1900 and 1904 the chiefs in the American sector ceded their territory formally to the United States. This territory was ruled by the Navy De-

partment for a generation, but the American Congress did not get around to the legal acceptance of the Samoan cession until February 20, 1929.

The annexation of the Philippines was an afterthought of the American victory over Spain. When the war began, Commodore Dewey was at Hongkong. He was ordered by Assistant Secretary of the Navy Roosevelt ("the very devil was in Theodore that Saturday afternoon," according to his chief) to attack the Spanish force in the Philippines. He destroyed the enemy squadron at Cavite on May 1, 1898, but he did not occupy Manila until August 13. He encountered complications in the ambitions and activities of the powers and in the aspirations and sensibilities of the Filipinos. The Germans were inimical but the British and the Japanese were friendly to the appearance of the United States as a factor in the western Pacific. The Filipino *insurrectos* accepted American help against Spain, but they insisted upon their right to independence, from the United States as well as from Spain.

The United States had been satisfied with most-favored-nation treatment for its citizens and had been identified with the principle of territorial integrity in the Far East. The unashamed carving up of the carcass of China created a new balance of power, and the victory over Spain offered the United States opportunity to enter upon an unprecedented and decisive role. President McKinley denied having any original thought of complete or even partial acquisition of the islands, but strategic, commercial, and religious considerations pointed toward annexation. By the Treaty of Paris, on December 10, 1898, the United States acquired ownership of the Philippines and Guam, and paid \$20,000,000 to Spain, not as a purchase price, but as compensation for the permanent works of value in the archipelago and in lieu of the assumption of Spanish debts in Cuba and the Philippines. The annexation of the Philippines followed sound and sober considerations of national policy, but as if to salve his conscience, President McKinley told a group of Methodist bishops visiting the White House:

There was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God's grace do the very best we could by them, as our fellow men for whom Christ also died.

The anti-imperialists decried this desertion of traditional American principles and the expansionists hailed the bold, new era of America's rightful place in the world. But American public opinion as a whole developed very little interest in a philosophy of empire and very little understanding of its new responsibilities.

By 1900 the American territorial position in the Pacific was well estab-

lished. Alaska and the Aleutian Islands had been purchased. Americans were in legal possession of Midway and Wake islands. Hawaii had been annexed and Samoa was under the paternalistic eye of the navy. The Philippines and Guam flew the American flag, but the other former Spanish possessions—the Carolines, the Marianas, the Marshalls, and the Pelews—had passed to the control of Germany. The protection of the Pacific Ocean area and the western shores of the United States and the route to the Far East seemed well assured. The way was open for the expansion of American commercial interests in the Orient.

Interests and Policies in China

The first Americans in Canton asked for nothing more than equality of opportunity in their trade with China. They wanted no part of gunboats—since gunboats embarrassed traders who depended on their own wits to get along with their competitors, the British and the Chinese. As the industrial revolution changed the nature of the China trade—China became more important as a potential market than as a source of imports—the British tended to outdistance the Americans even in the lucrative opium trade. On May 25, 1839, in the face of impending war between England and China, a group of American merchants gave up their *laissez faire* inclinations and memorialized Congress for assistance. They confessed their disapproval of the opium trade but they asked for government action in concert with Great Britain, France, and Holland to obtain diplomatic representation in Peking and to establish commercial relations on a safe and honorable footing. They sought the appointment of an agent or commissioner with a sufficient naval force to protect their commerce and to assure most-favored-nation treatment. They expressed their candid conviction that the appearance of a naval force would suffice to avoid hostilities and bloodshed. In spite of their convictions, the war came.

During the war, the sympathy of most Americans at home was with the Chinese. In the Congress, Caleb Cushing accused the British of base cupidity, violence, and highhanded infractions of all law, human and divine. While he orated, American merchants on the China coast falsely registered American vessels, carried British cargoes, and disregarded Commissioner Lin's opium decrees. John Quincy Adams, as an ex-president with no further political ambitions, dared to oppose public opinion and declared that opium was no more the cause of the China war than the throwing overboard of the tea in Boston harbor was the cause of the American Revolution. He stated:

The cause of the war is the kowtow!—the arrogant and insupportable pretensions of China, that she will hold commercial intercourse with the rest of mankind, not upon terms of equal reciprocity, but upon the insulting and degrading forms of the relationship between lord and vassal.¹

As a result of the petition of the American merchants to Congress, Commodore Lawrence Kearny was sent to the China coast to protect Americans and take any actions necessary against Americans in the opium trade. His task was hopeless, but he took advantage of the opportunity to let it be known that in the coming peace, American citizens would demand to "be placed upon the same footing as the merchants of the nations most favored."

Caleb Cushing, a Tyler man in the Congress "who voted for every bill and then justified every veto" was named as peace plenipotentiary. He arrived with an imposing retinue at Macao on February 24, 1844. When the merchants saw the pompous diplomat in the uniform of a major general, they were not so sure that they were happy about having asked the government for assistance. Cushing's instructions were not to allow himself to be ranked in China as a tribute bearer and to assert and maintain on all occasions the equality and independence of his own country. His presents included pistols, spyglasses, thermometers, barometers, and an *Encyclopedia Americana*. On July 3, 1844, he signed the Treaty of Wanghia, the first treaty between the United States and China. This treaty contained the desired most-favored-nation clause, which gave without cost to the Americans every privilege the British had won by fighting. It provided for theoretical recognition of equality in official intercourse, defined conditions of extraterritoriality, placed upon the Chinese the responsibility for collecting duties and controlling the opium trade, and made it lawful for officers and citizens of the United States to employ scholars and purchase all manner of books in China.

For the next ten years, the Chinese Empire was ravaged by rebellions. The survival of the imperial dynasty and the integrity of its possessions were seriously threatened. Russia and Great Britain were tempted to establish protectorates in the northern and central sectors of the country. The American officials on the spot saw clearly the need for a policy of bolstering the Manchus against their own weakness and against the encroachments of the European powers. Washington cautiously limited itself to avoidance of intervention in China's domestic affairs and participation in every effort to open China to increased commercial intercourse.

The American, French, and British envoys were ordered to co-operate in persuading China to revise its treaties in 1854. The American commis-

¹ Speech quoted in *The Chinese Repository* (quarterly), Canton, Vol. XI, pp. 274-289.

sioner and former missionary, Dr. Peter Parker, had experienced an exasperating decade of Chinese evasion and procrastination and was convinced that China would not consent to new treaties without a show of allied force. He proposed that Great Britain, France, and the United States should seize positions in Korea, the Chusan Archipelago, and Formosa. In May, 1857, William B. Reed succeeded Dr. Parker, not as commissioner but as the first envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary from the United States to China. He was warned against a policy of territorial aggrandizement or acquisition of political power, but he and his successor, John Ward, were permitted to co-operate diplomatically in the treaty settlements of 1858 and 1860. Again the United States received all the new rights (including trade at the new open ports, a diplomatic envoy at Peking, and toleration of Christianity) accorded the most favored nations without the cost or stigma of participating in the hostilities. It seemed that "England shook the tree and the United States helped to pick up the fruit."

China's humiliation became the salvation of the Manchu Dynasty. Shattered by internal rebellion, the ruling regime was salvaged by the enlightened policies of the first diplomats to take up their stations in Peking. Anson Burlingame, sent to Peking by Abraham Lincoln, persuaded his colleagues to adopt attitudes of restraint and encouragement. His vigorous, if at times overoptimistic, championship of China's rights slowed the tempo of China's descent to political chaos. Owing largely to him, the powers informally agreed not to ask for nor take concessions of Chinese territory at the treaty ports, not to interfere with the jurisdiction of the Chinese government over its own nationals nor ever to menace the territorial integrity of the Chinese Empire, and not to take part in the internal struggles of China beyond what seemed necessary for the maintenance of treaty rights. On the positive side, the powers agreed to "unitedly sustain" treaty rights, to maintain order together in the treaty ports, to guarantee the neutrality of China, and to give moral support to that party in China which would most favor a stable government. This psychological support was bolstered by the continuation and extension of the system of the maritime customs, which actually returned revenues in substantial sums to the depleted coffers of the imperial treasury.

Anson Burlingame resigned as American minister in 1867 and headed a Chinese friendship mission to explain China's difficulties abroad and to bespeak forbearance by the powers in their relations with China. On July 28, 1868, he, as the representative of China, signed a treaty with Secretary Seward, whose own philosophy was that the Pacific Ocean, its shores, and the vast regions beyond would become the chief theater of events in the world's great future. This Burlingame Treaty provided for maintenance

of China's sovereignty over tracts of land and certain waters to which foreigners had been granted access for residence and trade; for Chinese control of their inland trade; for the appointment of Chinese consuls in American ports; for reciprocal freedom from persecution for religion; for encouraging the immigration of Chinese coolies into the United States, but with a prohibition of contract emigration; for reciprocal rights of residence and travel; for most-favored-nation treatment for Americans in China and for Chinese in the United States (naturalization excluded); for access to the schools of either country; and for freedom from interference in the development of China. By this last article the American government expressed its determination not to intervene in the domestic administration of China in regard to construction of railroads, telegraphs, and other material internal improvements. It reserved the right to provide engineers and technicians if China should request their services. The Chinese were pleased at this commitment which implied assistance without any element of force.

At the time of the Burlingame Treaty, Chinese labor was welcomed in the United States. In 1848 the first Chinese immigrants reached San Francisco; by 1852 they were arriving by the thousands. They worked in the mines and on the transcontinental railways. The Burlingame Treaty recognized the inherent and inalienable right of man to change his home and his allegiance, but the immigration of too many Chinese meant abuse and attacks on the persons of Chinese, primarily in California. The federal government therefore negotiated a new treaty in 1880, in which China agreed that "the Government of the United States [might] regulate, limit or suspend such coming or residence, but [might] not absolutely prohibit it." The limitation was to be reasonable and was to apply only to laborers. Without too many scruples for strict treaty adherence, the Congress passed an act on May 6, 1882, which prohibited for ten years the coming to the United States of Chinese laborers. In the face of demands which were made continuously of the Chinese government for the treaty protection of American citizens in China, the sting of this legislation seemed exceeding painful. However, China agreed to a third immigration treaty with the United States in 1894 which provided that "the coming except under the conditions hereinafter specified of Chinese laborers to the United States [is] absolutely prohibited for ten years." In extreme bitterness this treaty was denounced at the end of the specified period by the Peking government. From 1904 to 1943, Chinese immigration was handled as an exclusively domestic matter by the Congress of the United States.

After the end of the Burlingame ministry in Peking in 1867, America's interest in the Far East declined. The American share in trade and shipping

diminished, and the Civil War made it impossible to contribute advisers or capital to assist in the industrial and financial development of China. While explosive economic energies in America were concentrated on reconstruction and rehabilitation at home, the European powers ran the entire gamut of imperialist practices to enhance their own position in China. Washington knew of the battle for concessions, and in the flush of its newly won situation of strength in the Philippines, it was not disposed to sit idly by. It had little inclination to join in the game itself; the best prizes had already been given away and it had little prestige, experience, or capital for concessions of its own. Its problem was to find effective methods to safeguard its own interests, without trying to undo that which was already done.

The equal opportunity for trade, or the most-favored-nation treatment, had been relied upon by the strong trading nations, particularly Great Britain and the United States, since the first treaty settlement. This seemed inadequate to cope with the new surge of unrestrained activity. In 1898 Lord Charles Beresford, a representative of the Associated Chambers of Commerce of Great Britain, on tour through China and Japan, warned of the impending break-up of China and urged an alliance of Great Britain, the United States, Japan, and Germany with a definite understanding on the integrity of China so that the door could be kept open. Lord Salisbury, the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, had discussed similar ideas with John Hay while Hay was ambassador to Great Britain. After Hay became Secretary of State, he matured his ideas about the Open Door in conversations with his friend and adviser, W. W. Rockhill, and with an English commissioner in the Chinese customs, Alfred F. Hippisley, who was visiting in the United States.

On September 6, 1899, less than five months after the ratifications of the Treaty of Paris had been exchanged, Secretary Hay instructed the American ambassadors to Great Britain, Germany, and Russia to seek from the governments of these countries formal assurance concerning each in its respective spheres of interest or influence to the following effect:

First: [That it] will in no wise interfere with any treaty port or any vested interest within any so-called "sphere of interest" or leased territory it may have in China.

Second: That the Chinese treaty tariff of the time being shall apply to all merchandise landed or shipped to all such ports as are within said "sphere of interest" (unless they be free ports), no matter to what nationality it may belong, and that duties so leviable shall be collected by the Chinese Government.

Third: That it will levy no higher harbor dues on vessels of another na-

tionality frequenting any port in such "sphere" than shall be levied on vessels of its own nationality, and no higher railroad charges over lines built, controlled, or operated within its "sphere" on merchandise belonging to citizens or subjects of other nationalities transported through such "sphere" than shall be levied on similar merchandise belonging to its own nationals transported over equal distances.²

On November 13, 17, and 22, the same assurance was requested from the governments of Japan, Italy, and France. These notes did not demand abolition of the "spheres of interest" but they defeated the exclusive-monopoly aspect of the "spheres." They also slowed down the tempo of European penetration, an effect which suited the purposes of the United States and China. The British accepted these proposals immediately, the French, Germans, Italians, and Japanese agreed conditionally, but the Russians hedged. The Russian hedges made the whole acceptance precarious.

With the intensification of Boxer antforeignism, Secretary Hay foresaw the danger of a military occupation of China and a fragmentation of its territory. He decided to act *concurrently* with the other powers in the punitive expedition in order to forestall those consequences. He felt that American interests would be served best by preserving China's territorial integrity and by providing China with a new opportunity to put its house in order and effect fiscal and administrative reforms.

On July 3, 1900, during the Boxer siege of the foreigners in Peking, Secretary Hay dispatched a circular telegram to the American representatives in Berlin, Paris, London, Rome, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Brussels, Madrid, Tokyo, The Hague, and Lisbon, in which he defined the attitude of the United States:

We adhere to the policy initiated by us in 1857 of peace with the Chinese nation, of furtherance of lawful commerce, and of protection of lives and property of our citizens. . . . If wrong be done to our citizens we propose to hold the responsible authors to the uttermost accountability. . . . The purpose of the President, is . . . to act concurrently with the other powers; first, in opening up communication with Peking and rescuing American officials, missionaries and other Americans who are in danger; secondly, in affording all possible protection everywhere in China to American life and property; thirdly, in guarding and protecting all legitimate American interests; and fourthly, in aiding to prevent a spread of the disorders to the other provinces of the Empire and a recurrence of such disasters. It is of course too early to forecast the means of attaining this last result; but the policy of the Government of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about

² U. S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1899, pp. 132, 133.

permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire. . . .³

In spite of expressions of approval of this policy, several of the powers continued to enlarge their demands and to press for new concessions. As the twentieth century moved along, the United States became more adamant in its efforts to substantiate the Open Door.

Interests and Policies in Japan

At least twenty-five times before Perry, ships had come to Japan from the nearest neighbor to the east, and sailors from both coasts of North America had set foot in Japanese ports. In 1791 the "Lady Washington" and the "Grace" failed in their efforts to trade furs in Japan, and in 1815 Captain David Porter, the hero of the War of 1812, tried to persuade President Madison to introduce the Japanese people to the world. Edmund Roberts bore a letter from President Jackson to the Japanese emperor and would have tried to open Japan if his untimely death had not prevented the completion of his mission.

In 1837 C. W. King, an American businessman in Canton, organized a good-will mission to repatriate seven Japanese sailors. He took his wife and three enterprising Protestant missionaries with him to demonstrate the peaceful nature of his endeavor. He was not permitted to land. In 1844 Caleb Cushing was authorized to treat with Japan, but he had left China before the instructions reached him. Two years later Commodore Biddle with two ships tried to get to Tokyo, but his misadventures made the United States Navy the laughing stock of the Japanese. In 1849 Commander Glynn in the "Preble" at Nagasaki regained the navy's lost prestige and bullied the Japanese into surrendering to him some fifteen seamen who had been months in irons in Japan.

By 1851 the United States was fired by the gold fever in California, the dreams of transcontinental railways and transisthmian canals, and the prospects of profits in the markets of Asia. President Fillmore's cabinet decided upon a somewhat formidable and imposing naval force to wipe out previous rebuffs and to open commercial intercourse with the empire of Japan.

Other nations had also tried without success to open Japan, but Russia, England, and France were then distracted by the complications which led

³ U. S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1901, Appendix, p. 12.

to the Crimean War. On July 8, 1853, Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry, Commander of the East Indies fleet, arrived off the Japanese port of Uraga aboard one of a squadron of four armed paddle-wheel "Black Ships" of a type never before seen in a Japan that had been isolated from the outer world for more than two centuries. Six days later Commodore Perry landed on Japanese soil and handed to the Lords of Izu and Iwami, representatives of the shogunate, a message from President Fillmore. This message proposed that the United States and Japan should live in friendship and have commercial intercourse with each other. The president wisely pointed out: "The Constitution and laws of the United States forbid all interference with the religious or political concerns of other nations. I have particularly charged Commodore Perry to abstain from every act which would possibly disturb the tranquillity of your imperial majesty's dominions." The primary American interests were the welfare of shipwrecked American sailors and the provisioning of American vessels with coal and other supplies.

Perry's fundamental attitude was that Japan was the enemy of mankind and that soft words would probably be wasted. He would try the velvet glove policy first. He sailed directly into Tokyo Bay, side-stepped deliberately Nagasaki and the Dutch, and notified the Japanese that he would deal only with officials of rank equal to his own. He presented the president's letter and said that he would be back next year, with more ships, for his answer. Perry wanted a treaty with Japan as a part of his own personal conviction that the United States should have a foothold in Japan, Korea, the Liu Ch'ius, and Formosa and should have friends throughout Southeast Asia. He desired counters to Russian schemes and to the eastward expansion of the unconscionable government of England.

After spending the winter of 1853 at Hongkong and Macao, he returned, as promised, and on March 31, 1854, signed the Treaty of Kanagawa, the first treaty between Japan and a Western state. As England had taken the lead in the opening of China, the United States took the initiative in breaking down Japan's doors of seclusion. The Perry treaty was short. It provided for peace, for the opening of two ports for supplies (Shimoda and Hakodate), for good treatment for shipwrecked sailors, for a limited trade under Japanese regulations, for supplies for American ships, and for the most-favored-nation principle. Perry did not worry about the details of the treaty. He wanted to sign a treaty, any treaty, and to get out before the French, Russian, and British squadrons could sail into Japan and take advantage of the presence of the American ships. The fleets of seventeen nations followed Perry into the Bay of Tokyo; the representatives of the Dutch, Russians, and British obtained within two years treaties

similar to the American treaty. The most-favored-nation clause made the following provisions the common property of the four powers: permission to take on supplies at Shimoda, Hakodate, and Nagasaki; permission to trade through Japanese officials and under their regulations at these ports; right of residence at Nagasaki; permission to appoint consuls at Shimoda and Hakodate; and a limited extraterritorial jurisdiction.

On August 21, 1856, an urbane bachelor merchant of New York, Townsend Harris, arrived in Shimoda to become the first consul-general of the United States in Japan. He had a long acquaintance with the Far East and had negotiated a treaty with Siam. He arrived alone, unknown and unwelcome, and received no instructions for eighteen months. His own patience overcame Japanese annoyances and enabled him to conclude a commercial convention which granted formally to the United States all that was contained in the Dutch, Russian, and British treaties. Harris then asked for an audience with the shogun and a detailed commercial treaty. Harris went from his cockroach-infested temple at Shimoda to the shogun's palace in Yedo in a procession of 350 people and was asked to perform no humiliating ceremonies at the end of the road. He looked the awful tycoon in the face, spoke plainly to him, and heard his reply without trepidation.

Harris pointed out that the United States, unlike Great Britain and Russia, had no territorial ambitions, sought no alliances, and had no intention of mingling in the internal affairs of Japan. It only wanted Japan to strengthen itself. During the negotiations, Harris never deviated from the interests of his own country but he served as a kind of adviser and instructor in international law to the shogun as well.

The treaty was signed on July 29, 1858, on board the "Powhatan" in Tokyo Bay. The Harris Treaty provided for diplomatic representation at the capitals of both powers, for the opening of new ports where consuls might be stationed, for extraterritoriality, for the prohibition of the opium trade, for the freedom of foreigners to practice their religion, for a conventional tariff, and for the most-favored-nation treatment. European powers accepted the Harris Treaty as their own model, and it remained the fundamental document in the foreign relations of Japan until 1894.

These treaties did not mean that Japan abandoned its antiforeign prejudices. The Imperial Court sent orders to the Shinto priests at the Grand Shrine of Ise to offer up prayers for the contentment of the mind of the people, the restoration of tranquillity to His Majesty's bosom, and the sweeping away of the barbarians. Incidents, even murders, occurred. The British minister wrote:

The Japanese allow no distinction of nationalities to stand between them and their one object, which is the expulsion of the foreigner and a return to

their isolation. Their distrust of Foreign Powers is indiscriminate, and their hatred perfectly impartial. They slay the secretary of the United States Legation and attempt the massacre of the inmates of the British Legation with equal readiness and satisfaction.⁴

As long as Harris remained in Japan, he embodied a policy of forbearance and understanding. His successors lacked personal prestige, and they were embarrassed by the American Civil War. They could do no more than preserve friendly and intimate relations with representatives of other powers and seek no exclusive advantages for themselves. Americans co-operated rather servilely while the British determined the nature and the tempo of Western policies. Men like Sir Rutherford Alcock and Sir Harry Parkes were inclined to be arrogant because of their experiences in China, and they advocated a heavy-handed attitude toward all Orientals. In 1864 Americans participated in an allied attack on Choshu to open the Straits of Shimonoseki and to vindicate treaty rights in the face of Japanese attempts to abolish or ignore them. In 1866 the United States joined in a tariff convention by which revision of duties was made dependent on the approval of all the treaty powers.

The idea of international co-operation for the preservation of special privileges was repugnant to American sentimentality. Constant encouragement was given to Japan in its efforts to regain its complete sovereignty, and a cautious treaty was entered into in 1878 which had the effect of strengthening Japan's diplomatic bargaining position. The prestige of the United States in Japan climbed as the United States was hailed as the champion of understanding and good will in Japan.

Then the British policy also began to veer toward support of Japan. Great Britain appreciated the relative growth of Japan's strength and moved to displace the United States as the friend and champion of Japan. America's prestige and popularity in Japan declined as it opposed Japan's drive for special privileges in China. Tensions multiplied over the immigration issue.

Interests and Policies in Korea

The most important action of the United States in the Far East until the annexation of the Philippines may have been the conduct of its relations with Korea. After 1860 Korea was under an anti-Western, anti-Christian regent, the father of the infant king. The United States wanted a treaty to promote commerce like the treaties which had been concluded

⁴ Sir Rutherford Alcock, *The Capital of the Tycoon*, 2 volumes (Longman's, London, 1863), Vol. I, pp. 206, 207.

with China and Japan. In 1866 two American ships, the "Surprise" and the "General Sherman," were wrecked on the Korean coast and the government was interested in the fate of the sailors. Secretary Seward suggested a joint expedition with the French, who were determined to annex Korea if necessary to avenge the death of some French Catholic missionaries. The joint expedition did not materialize. In 1871 the American minister to China, Frederick F. Low, and Admiral John Rogers organized an expedition of five ships to break down the barriers to Seoul. The Chinese did not object to this American effort. Although the regent of Korea took the attitude that Korea was the vassal of China, the Chinese insisted that the relationship was only ceremonial. China did not want the responsibility for Korea's debts, disorders, and possible claims. The Low-Rogers expedition reached Kianghwa Island, surveyed the neighboring waters, fought pitched battles with mainland forts, but failed to establish diplomatic communications with the Korean court.

In 1876 Japan opened Korea, just as the United States had opened Japan. Japan signed a treaty which recognized the independence of Korea, opened Korean ports to trade, and provided for diplomatic intercourse. The United States wanted a similar treaty. Commodore Robert W. Shufeldt was sent by the Navy Department to seek, with Japanese aid, to establish commercial relations. Shufeldt went to Nagasaki, then to Fusan, but he failed to reach Seoul. He lost confidence in Japan's good faith and went to Tientsin to enlist the aid of Li Hung-chang as an intermediary in approaching Korea. The American government wanted the treaty, whether obtained by the good offices of Japan or China. Li had his own objectives in assisting Shufeldt. Li looked upon treaties with the West as a means for Korea to thwart Japan, one poison to counteract another. He believed that the Americans would be the most lenient of the Western powers and best disposed to champion Asians against the encroachments of the more ambitious Europeans (and Japan). Shufeldt was not too pleased to proceed through the Chinese, because he believed they mistook sympathy for weakness and pity for fear. He charged "they are conceited and hate barbarians; the only argument they understand is force." The negotiations were less than cordial, but the treaty of 1882, between the United States and Korea with the good offices of China, represented a happy conclusion. It provided among other things for the exchange of diplomatic and consular officers, for trade with Korea on the most-favored-nation principle, and included the provision:

If other Powers deal unjustly or oppressively with either Government, the other will exert their good offices, on being informed of the case, to bring about an amicable arrangement, thus showing their friendly feelings.


Li had asked and Shufeldt had refused to include a clause acknowledging the dependence of Korea upon China. Shufeldt stated that he sought the good offices of Li Hung-chang because a relationship of dependency existed, and the king of Korea wrote the president stating that the treaty had been made with the consent of China. The United States took the position that it "regarded Korea as *de facto* independent, and that our acceptance of the friendly aid found in China was in no sense a recognition of China's suzerain power." The principal European powers were quick to follow the example of the United States in concluding treaties through the good offices of China. The European powers subsequently accredited their ministers at Peking also to Seoul, but the United States followed Japan in commissioning to Korea a minister plenipotentiary, independent of the legation in Peking.

The United States proceeded to treat Korea as a sovereign and independent nation, much to the discomfiture of China and the delight of Japan. The United States protested against the privileged position of China in matters of internal trade and travel in Korea and objected to discriminatory duties in favor of China. Americans went to Korea as military and political advisers and they tended to resist the growing assertion of power on the part of the Chinese resident, Yüan Shih-k'ai. They took the attitude that they would not interfere in internal politics and thus aided the pro-Japanese factions at the court, because of the growing power and prestige of Japan.

When war broke out between Japan and China over Korea, Korea begged the United States in the name of the Shufeldt Treaty to use its good offices for the restoration of peace. Korea's illusions were rudely dispelled when it was bluntly informed that good offices depended upon the consent of both sides. In this instance Japan objected. The British took the lead in suggesting international intervention to block a complete Japanese victory, but the United States refused to co-operate. As if looking into the crystal ball, it reasoned that the interventionists might prove more voracious than the immediate aggressor. The United States which had been looked to as the Korean protector contented itself with cold neutrality. After the Treaty of Shimonoseki, Japan took over the Korean legation in Washington, but the American legation continued to function in Seoul. Although internal politics boiled over in the Korean capital, and international intrigues permeated the peninsula from Fusan to the Yalu, the United States clung to its correct formulae of independence for Korea, noninterference in internal affairs, and neutrality in international rivalries for the control of the "Hermit Kingdom."

Suggested Reading

- THOMAS A. BAILEY, *A Diplomatic History of the American People*, 4th ed. (New York, 1950).
- SAMUEL F. BEMIS, *A Diplomatic History of the United States*, rev. ed. (New York, 1932).
- PAUL H. CLYDE, *United States Policy Toward China, Diplomatic and Public Documents, 1839-1939* (Durham, 1940).
- TYLER DENNETT, *Americans in Eastern Asia* (New York, 1922).
- , JOHN HAY (New York, 1933).
- A. L. P. DENNIS, *Adventures in American Diplomacy, 1896-1906* (New York, 1928).
- FOSTER R. DULLES, *China and America: The Story of Their Relations Since 1784* (Princeton, 1946).
- , *Forty Years of American-Japanese Relations* (New York, 1937).
- J. W. FOSTER, *American Diplomacy in the Orient* (Boston and New York, 1904).
- WALTER MILLIS, *The Martial Spirit* (Boston, 1931).
- C. O. PAULLIN, *Diplomatic Negotiations of American Naval Officers, 1778-1883* (Baltimore, 1912).
- JULIUS W. PRATT, *Expansionists of 1898* (Baltimore, 1936).
- SAMUEL SHAW, *The Journals of Major Samuel Shaw, the First American at Canton* (Boston, 1847).
- W. R. THAYER, *The Life and Letters of John Hay*, 2 volumes (Boston, 1916).
- P. J. TREAT, *Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Japan, 1853-1895* (Stanford, 1932).
- EARL SWISHER, *China's Management of the American Barbarians* (New Haven, 1953).



PART TWO

Diplomatic History to
World War II

Introduction

World War II, or the War of Greater East Asia as the Japanese called it, was not an unexpected or sudden thing. It came upon us as a ship in a dense fog. For ten years we had known that the ship was ominously near and we ourselves had been groping through the fogs of diplomacy escaping collisions by the very narrowest of margins.

In 1937 China and Japan 'locked in combat. China was weak in terms of present strength but strong in promise of future greatness. Japan was mighty in the language of militarism but uncertain about its future. War seemed to be the only method by which Japan could retain hegemony in East Asia and destroy the Chinese challenge which loomed up beyond the Yellow Sea. Japan discovered that its tasks in China were part and parcel of its general relations with the rest of the world. It could not settle the China Affair without reference to the war in Europe or the antiaggression policies of the United States.

As China's chauvinism increased, China demanded the abolition of unequal privileges. The United Kingdom, France, the United States, and the USSR recoiled gradually rather than risk the possibility of war. In their estimation, a war would have been overcostly and victory would have guaranteed no more than a temporary continuation of a system which was of questionable justice. Japan took advantage of the mood of appeasement and outdid China in the drive to force the Westerners out of Asia. The entire basin of the western Pacific became a tinderbox of stored-up enmity and hatred. Nations rode roughshod over the rights of others in the pursuit of national interests and disguised their ruthlessness with the mask of self-defense. Grave warnings and counsels of common sense went

unheeded in a propaganda warfare of insult and uninhibited invective, until the screeches into trans-Pacific microphones became the frightful screams of shells and bombs spraying death and destruction. No nation was completely guiltless in failing to cultivate the affairs of the spirit in the relentless pursuit of the chimera of power and prestige.

World War II was an explosive force which was decades in piling up, cataclysmic in its eruption and universal and timeless in its effects. As China emerged from chaos, Japan became more apprehensive. As Japan perceived the challenge to its own totalitarian system, Japan lacked the courage to make internal adjustments and chose the easy path of more reaction and ultranationalism. Fearing its own eclipse, it abandoned the way of reason and gambled on war with the hope at least of a compromise peace.

CHAPTER 8

The Modernization of China

In recent times China changed from a civilization to a modern nation. The passing of the Manchu Dynasty marked the end of a system of government which had ruled China for 2,000 years. The political, economic, social, and intellectual way of life which had stamped China as one of the foremost countries in the ancient world was no longer adequate to cope with the demands of modern times.

Before the coming of the West, a change of dynasty meant simply that the Chinese settled back in the old grooves and recommenced the cycle of progress and decay. The nineteenth century with its defeats in war convinced China that the people beyond the seas possessed not only military superiority but an entire fabric of civilization which should be considered and adapted. The tremendous size of China made the job complex and long. The destruction of the old, condemned generations to misery and chaos; the construction of the new called for sacrifices from the Chinese and assistance from the outside world.

Under the Manchus the destructive process exposed completely China's inability to continue its ancient position of prestige and authority. The process of change was a painful one and plunged China into the depths of helplessness and impotence. Gradually China learned to reconcile the West and the East and progressed toward political and economic reconstruction. Changes were so fundamental and so swift that they constituted a thoroughgoing revolution in thought and behavior. After the chaos of the early years of the republic, the newborn nationalist regime launched China on a program of modernization which promised stability, security, and greater prosperity. The specter of a strong China alarmed Japan and precipitated the invasion of the Asian continent which led directly to World War II.

Decline under the Manchus

The Manchu dynasty was known to the Chinese as the *Ch'ing* or "pure" dynasty. It consisted of ten rulers:

Shun Chih	1644-1661
K'ang Hsi	1661-1722
Yung Cheng	1723-1735
Ch'ien Lung	1736-1796
Chia Ch'ing	1796-1820
Tao Kuang	1820-1850
Hsien Feng	1850-1861
T'ung Chih	1861-1875
Kuang Hsi	1875-1908
Hsuan T'ung	1908-1912

The rulers of China embodied almost all the relations with outside nations and nearly everything which mattered in internal political developments. When the ruler was strong, the country prospered; when the ruler was weak, the country suffered. K'ang Hsi was the contemporary of Louis XIV, Peter the Great, and Aurang-zeb in India, and was probably the greatest of them all. His grandson, Ch'ien Lung gave to China a reign more brilliant than either of his contemporaries, Catherine and Frederick the Great, gave to Russia and Prussia respectively. These two great Chinese emperors covered a span of nearly a century and a half.

The ancient institutions began to crumble under Ch'ien Lung's first successor, Chia Ch'ing. His attitude of arrogance toward the foreigners might well have been accentuated by the uncontrolled decay of China's own body politic. Pirates infested the coasts and bandits ravaged the interior. The army was cursed by mutinies and the bureaucracy was honeycombed with corruption. Secret societies flourished to capitalize on the dissatisfaction with the emperor. By the mid-nineteenth century it seemed as if the Manchu Dynasty was doomed. The court was stagnant and decaying, its moral fiber was softened by riotous and luxurious living. The affairs of state were in the hands of incompetent political advisers, eunuchs and concubines. Anarchy multiplied under the Tao Kuang emperor and culminated in the *T'ai P'ing* rebellion which took 20,000,000 lives and spread over twelve provinces under the weakling Hsien Feng and the infant T'ung Chih.

In South China a religious eccentric named Hung Hsiu-ch'üan dreamed that he went to heaven and was named as the younger brother of Christ with a mission to exterminate evil on earth. He organized a religious,

political, and social movement which was dedicated to the elimination of the Manchus and the substitution of another dynasty which would be called the *T'ai P'ing* or "Great Peace" Dynasty. Fighting broke out in 1848 and continued for the next five years in areas south of the Yangtze River. The *T'ai P'ing* rebels moved up the valley of the Hsiang River, the route followed later by Chiang Kai-shek, and established their capital in Nanking in 1853. They defeated easily the Manchu garrisons which were too frequently given to drunkenness and cowardice. The *T'ai P'ings* remained in power for twelve years before they were overcome by competent Manchu generals with the assistance of foreign armies under the command of an American, Frederick Townsend Ward, and a distinguished British officer, Charles George Gordon, "Chinese Gordon," who later met his death with Lord Kitchener in the Sudan.

In a sense the *T'ai P'ing* rebellion was a social and economic revolt. It involved an uprising of peasants, rural proletariat, hand workers, and poorer gentry against the landlords, rich peasants, merchants, and wealthy gentry. The ranks of the religious fanatics were swelled by malcontents as well as ordinary looters and adventurers. The *T'ai P'ings* argued for higher living standards for the poverty-stricken, but their excesses scuttled their own objectives. After defeat, many of their leaders managed to escape abroad and to keep alive the reform ideas which were to inspire other Chinese revolutionaries at a later date.

A stay of execution was gained for the Manchus by T'zu Hsi, the Empress Dowager, who was the wife of Hsien Feng, the mother of T'ung Chih, and the aunt of Kuang Hsü. She was ruthless and determined in her character. She did not hesitate to hasten her own son to his death and to imprison her nephew in order to make more complete and more unchallenged her power behind the throne. She compromised with the foreigners where necessary and permitted internal changes where she was powerless to stop them.

The influx of diplomats, merchants, and missionaries, together with Chinese emigrants, officials, and students who returned from overseas, exposed China to the beginnings of modernization before 1890. Some railways and telegraph lines were opened, and some coal mines were worked according to British methods. Machinery was imported for some modest factories, and the first foreign-style banks were founded. The China Merchants' Steam Navigation Company was organized. A few small war-craft were purchased, some weapons were bought for Chinese troops, and a few arsenals were built.

After China's disastrous defeat by Japan in 1894, certain influential Chinese officials added their voices to the demand for progressive action.

Some argued for reform, some for revolution, but all were for change in some manner. A progressive Yangtze viceroy, Chang Chih-tung, wrote an essay entitled "Learn," in which he charged that the present condition of things was not due to outside nations, but to China itself. He asserted three things must be done in order to save China from revolution: maintain the reigning dynasty, conserve the holy religion, and protect the Chinese race.

The emperor's party at court, opposed to the regency of the Empress Dowager or "the Old Buddha," espoused the cause of reform. During the Hundred Days' Reform after June 11, 1898, under the inspiration of K'ang Yu-wei, reform decrees were issued by the dozen. Foreigners and Chinese were left breathless with amazement at the sweeping orders for change. The Foreign Office was ordered to improve relations abroad; all officials were to learn political science and international law within six months; the legal system was to be reorganized; journalists were to be free to express criticism; a government translation bureau was to be set up for important foreign books; and ministries were proposed for the arts, commerce, and agriculture. All subjects were to be given the right to memorialize the emperor, and obsolete and surplus offices were to be removed from the administration. In the field of education, a national system was to be established with a national university at Peking. Agricultural schools were to be established in every province. The examination system which dated from the Han Dynasty was to be modernized and revitalized. With regard to commerce, important railway lines were to be completed without further delay, trade was to be assisted and encouraged, and government bureaus were to be inaugurated for railways, mines, commerce, and labor relief.

The military reforms called for the foundation of a naval academy and for the complete adoption of Western arms and drill methods. A conscription system was introduced and orders were issued aiming at better quality and regular pay for soldiers. To cap the climax, the emperor was persuaded by the reformers to imprison the arch-reactionary, the Old Buddha, and he commissioned Yüan Shih-k'ai to do the job. But Yüan turned informer and gave the plot away. On September 2, 1898, the Empress Dowager turned the tables and imprisoned the emperor himself. When she countermanded many of the reform edicts, the conservatives took over the court and the Boxers increased their activities throughout the countryside.

These Boxers, or "Righteous Harmony Fists," were local groups, organized for defense, who were intensely antiforeign and anti-Christian. Often in co-operation with secret societies, they were guilty of outrages which eventually led to foreign intervention. In 1900 international humiliation was an outward manifestation of inward corruption and distress.

Even the old Empress Dowager on her return to the capital recognized that the days of the dynasty were numbered unless radical changes could be effected. She could not accept the sudden radical reform measures of the emperor, but she saw the possibilities of strengthening her position by a gradual, more conservative, long-range program. She brought about changes in the administrative system, introduced a new code of law, and abolished completely the old civil service examinations. She projected fiscal reforms and ordered Yüan Shih-k'ai to reorganize and modernize the army. She promised a constitution and representative government.

Too often the reforms never progressed beyond the paper stage. Given more competent leadership, more thorough understanding, and more honest intention, the dynasty might have accomplished the needed transitions. On November 15, 1908, both the emperor and the Empress Dowager died. The infant heir apparent came to the throne (the same person who in later years as Henry Pu-yi was set up by the Japanese as the puppet emperor of Manchukuo). No individual or faction in the court had the wisdom or the strength to forestall or control the revolution which was to topple the Manchus and to spawn the Chinese Republic.

The Chinese Republic

For almost a century economic hardship had been the chronic lot of the Chinese peasant. In spite of droughts, famines, floods, wars, and disease, population increased steadily. The living conditions for the average farmer got worse instead of better. His taxes increased but he received less protection and fewer benefits from the government than ever. Peasant distress habitually led to rebellion against the political authority of the central government.

On two occasions it had seemed that the dynasty was doomed: in 1860 when the foreign forces had swept into Peking and in 1900 when the allied expedition had driven the court to Sian. In both instances, the latent popular feeling against the throne was too weak and amorphous to resist the Manchus' return to power. The attitude of the foreigners, which was based on their own interests rather than upon any attempted analysis of what the opinion of the Chinese might be, favored the restoration of the Manchus.

Subterranean forces of protest slowly gathered sufficient strength to overthrow the dynasty. Revolutionary secret societies, overseas students whose numbers were augmented by the return of the Boxer indemnities, graduates of the mission schools with their emphasis on Western political ideals, and

often the soldiers themselves joined in the popular clamor against the court and its dealing with the foreign financiers and railway builders. The Manchus were called the foreign slaves of foreign masters.

Riots, strikes, and general trouble accentuated the perennial misery of the Yangtze Valley in the early autumn of 1911. An accidental bomb explosion in a basement in the Russian concession at Hankow revealed a nest of plotters with substantial military support. Sporadic revolts spread throughout Shantung, Chihli (Hopei), and Central China. City after city and province after province threw off the Manchu yoke and set up independent governments. Manchu garrisons were often massacred. Before the end of the year a national council representing the revolutionists assembled at Nanking and on December 28, 1911, elected Sun Yat-sen, then in Europe, as provisional president.

The prince regent designated Yüan Shih-k'ai as premier, and empowered him to suppress the revolutionists. Yüan defeated them, but chose to negotiate with them for peace and future co-operation. On February 12, 1912, the dynasty abdicated and surrendered to Yüan its political power. The emperor was to retain his title for life, receive a large annuity, and continue to live in one of the imperial palaces. Manchus, Moslems, Mongols, and Tibetans were to be given equality with the Chinese.

Within a few days Sun withdrew from the presidency and the republican body at Nanking elected Yüan in his stead. So perished with scarcely a struggle a monarchical institution which had had its beginnings in pre-historic times. The republic started without determined opposition from the Chinese populace or the foreign powers. Yüan quickly crossed swords with his parliament, dismissed that helpless body, and depended upon large numbers of men under arms to sustain his position. Yüan ruled by spies and soldiers. Local war lords sprang up all over China. They recruited riffraff into their ranks and took charge of local finances in the areas under their control. Acting largely on the advice of Dr. Frank Goodnow of Johns Hopkins University, Yüan tried to re-establish the monarchy. Fake telegrams poured into Peking and the army conducted a nationwide poll which, of course, turned out unanimously for Yüan. A convention of citizens met in Peking and voted unanimously for the monarchy. The ballots were marked ahead of time and soldiers with fixed bayonets saw to it they were properly signed before the delegates left the hall. The country was too much of a political caldron by this time to permit Yüan to get away with these tactics. Rebellions flared up against him throughout the country and in the midst of the chaos, in 1916, Yüan died.

Throughout the period of Yüan's presidency, the people of China demonstrated their ability to get along without government interference in their lives. Except for the cutting of the queues and the prohibition on opium

smoking and foot-binding the people were scarcely touched by the continuing reforms. The tenor of village life remained undisturbed. The popular attitude was merely that the mandate of heaven had changed hands at Peking. To those who had even a slight amount of political sophistication, Yüan's experience gave them a bad impression of republicanism. Votes in the parliament were bought and sold on the open market; bribes or threats of force easily bent the people's representatives to the executive's will. The legislature enmeshed itself in personal rivalries and proved itself entirely incompetent to approach China's fundamental problems. For example, when it could not agree on a division of power between the provinces and the central government, it decided to omit that clause completely from its draft constitution.

Yüan's death introduced a decade of tuchuns or war lords. No single individual was able to control Peking, let alone the entire country. Peking was important because it represented the nation. It received and entertained the foreign diplomats and controlled China's able representatives abroad. It negotiated for foreign loans and received whatever financial surpluses existed after the obligations on the foreign debts were paid. A succession of ephemeral cabinets served as front men for individual war lords or coalitions behind the scenes. The constitution of the republic was a pious hope. The legislature and the judiciary were mockeries and laws existed only on paper. China was powerless against internal insurrection or foreign aggression, and it remained a state only because of the restraining influence of one outside state upon another. It was unrealistic to classify China with the democratic nations at the time of World War I.

Independent struggles for power were waged from Szechwan to Shanghai and from Peking to Canton. Generals recruited the unemployed and juvenile delinquents into their personal armies and were less interested in military victories than financial gains. They would attack a city or desert an entire area, depending upon the deals which they could conclude. They monopolized the opium traffic and controlled the appointment of local political officials. They collected taxes for as much as twenty years in advance, and they squeezed the merchants in the local chambers of commerce for all that the traffic could bear. When defeated or bought out, they would abandon their own soldiers, load their belongings and their concubines on trucks or coastal ships and seek havens of safety in Peking, in foreign concessions in the port cities, or in Hongkong.

Political anarchy and economic impoverishment went hand in hand. Undisciplined bandits and soldiers batted on the land. They pillaged, robbed, and murdered, with the result that neither landlord nor peasant was able to look to a government for relief or protection. The scholars and able civil servants deserted their posts and disclaimed any responsibility

for the deplorable state of affairs. Bandits flourished throughout the interior. No one could travel safely in many regions after dark, or even during the daylight hours if the cornstalks along the highways were tall enough to provide adequate hiding places for thieves and highwaymen. Public projects like irrigation and drainage works were neglected and transportation systems were permitted to deteriorate. The most ominous feature of this jungle condition was the association of this anarchy and poverty with the newly born republic—itself supposedly the crowning importation from the West. Democratic institutions and representative forms of government became disastrously associated with militarism, disorder, insecurity, and poverty.

The Rise of the Kuomintang

When it seemed as if China were about to disappear as a political entity and to collapse as a civilization, a new regenerative force coalesced and rose to power. This force was largely the creation of Sun Yat-sen or Sun Wen as he was called more often. He was born in 1866 or 1867, the son of a tenant farmer in South China. He was educated in Hawaii and was graduated as a medical doctor by the University of Hongkong. He was a Christian, revolutionary by instinct and by inclination, and was in constant difficulties with the local authorities. He liked politics much more than medicine.

Immediately after China's defeat by Japan he became bitter against the Manchus and advocated a republic as the only means of national salvation. For the next ten years he worked among the overseas Chinese. He organized a revolutionary league with headquarters abroad and with secret branch organizations in China. He obtained arms from Japan. His league eventually came to be called the *Kuomintang* or "Country-People-Party"—the Nationalists.

Sun returned to China in 1912 and until his death worked in and out of agreement with the militarists in order to implement his program. He was never distinguished as a practical administrator but he wielded great influence as a social philosopher, idealist, propagandist, and inspirer of revolutions. Sun's martyrdom and death in 1925 were of as much service to his cause and party as his life had been. According to his will, which was regularly read in public with great solemnity, the national revolution was to bring people to a position of independence and equality. Parks were named after him. His picture was pasted up everywhere and his mausoleum at Nanking became a national shrine. Chiang Kai-shek's most imposing armored train bore Sun Yat-sen's name. Sun's books were accepted as blue-

prints for national reconstruction. Some were vague and moralistic, others were inspiring and farsighted. His *San Min Chu I* or *Three People's Principles* became the party's manual. The principles were inspired by Lincoln's "government of the people, by the people, and for the people" and were translated in Chinese terms as nationalism, democracy, and a sufficient livelihood for all. The third term was sufficiently imprecise to leave it to the future to determine whether Sun advocated socialism, a welfare state, or merely an improved condition of capitalism. The program of the Kuomintang was easily propagandized by popular slogans. The red color of the Chinese flag and the blue and white emblem of the party became familiar sights throughout the length and breadth of China.

Sun advocated gradual accomplishment of his program in three well-defined stages: (1) the end of warlordism and the restoration of law and order, (2) the inauguration of a period of political tutelage during which the party would be in control of government affairs, and (3) the establishment of constitutional government as soon as the people should be ready for it.

The fundamentals of Sun's program included a typically Chinese emphasis on the importance of education. All Chinese should be educated to the responsibilities of citizenship and the most capable citizens should be given training for leadership. Patriotism and respect for law should be considered paramount. Revolution and evolution should be reconciled; that is, the revolution should not be allowed as an excuse for bad or immoral government and the stages of military government and political tutelage should never be permitted to halt the evolution toward the achievement of constitutionalism. The intimate connection between political and material reconstruction must be recognized. Foreign capital should be welcomed, but on the security of popular government rather than specific concessions.

Sun was influenced to a great extent by Russia in the formation of the Kuomintang. In 1920 the Soviet government approached China with an offer to renounce its special rights and privileges and in the next year sent an envoy, Adolph Joffe, to China to discuss the situation. Sun wanted support from the West but the West spurned him. Joffe and Sun met in Shanghai and agreed that although communism was not suitable to China, Russia would send advisers to the Kuomintang and the Kuomintang would accept the newborn Chinese Communist party as allies. The Kuomintang was then reorganized on the lines of the Russian Communist party, with political commissars, mass propaganda organs, and strict discipline. It gave up all pretense to democracy and worked for a party dictatorship which would govern the country for several years during the period of political tutelage. The quest for power, the re-establishment of order, and the

recovery of sovereign rights were the chief purposes of the new revolutionary party. The promotion of social revolution was secondary to these aims, both in time and importance.

In 1924 the First Congress of the Kuomintang committed itself to three great policies: alliance with the Soviet Union, alliance with the Chinese Communist party, and support of workers and peasants. Its manifesto outlined the history and the program of the party. The document called for a new birth of revolutionary ardor and a new expression of faith in the political capacity of the Chinese people. It addressed itself particularly to peasant-farmers, city workers, students, youth, and overseas Chinese. At the same time the party established the Whampoa Military Academy under the superintendence of the young general Chiang Kai-shek who had recently returned from a study and observation trip to Moscow. Many of the future generals, both in the Kuomintang and in the Communist armies, were fellow students in military tactics and in party doctrine while at Whampoa.

The Kuomintang at Canton, which numbered individual Communists among its members, created a new model army and a national government. These early struggles cost a great deal of personal bitterness and bloodshed. Sun Yat-sen himself was guilty of bloody action against the Merchant Volunteer Corps, and Chiang Kai-shek rose to power through his skill in compromising with some political enemies and exterminating others. The hope of contributing to the birth of a new China was exciting, and it attracted to the public service outstanding new personalities like C. C. Wu, T. V. Soong, and Wang Ching-wei. In the summer of 1926 Chiang Kai-shek decided that the time was ripe to launch a military campaign to oust the war lords of the North. Paced by political agitators and propagandists, the Kuomintang armies moved gradually toward Changsha, Hankow, and eventually Shanghai. Colorful posters rallied the masses to the banners of the Kuomintang. Some of these posters showed blind mandarins being kicked out of a Chinese house, others showed Northern generals caricatured as rats being driven into the Pacific Ocean, others showed foreign soldiers with ugly faces being turned upon by the peasants, and still others showed the Chinese people in an open boat on a stormy sea being rowed by a Nationalist crew and guided by the lighthouse of the Kuomintang.

While the military campaigns were still in progress, the Nationalist government moved from Canton to Hankow. On the crest of the revolutionary and antiforeign wave, the left wing of the Kuomintang and their Communist allies recruited great numbers to the workers' and peasants' unions and swelled the party rolls. In their enthusiasm they steered the "revolution" deeper into the channels of social reform. The more conservative party members, including Chiang Kai-shek, worried about Communist excesses and strengthened their conviction that China would be better

advised to progress with the enlightened support of landlords, merchants, and *bourgeoisie* rather than to risk revolution, Communist-style. Chiang also disliked the Russian orientation of the Kuomintang and distrusted the Russian advisers.

Incidents involving foreign powers forced the Kuomintang to trim its sails and determine its course for the future. When the Nationalists arrived in Hankow, a mob overran the British concession and forced the residents to flee to the safety of British ships in the harbor. When Nationalist armies attacked and captured Nanking, they killed various foreign residents. A general massacre was avoided only by a barrage from the warships on the Yangtze and a perilous escape over the city wall with ropes. Other incidents occurred and brought the revolutionary forces to the brink of war with the Western powers. The main Nationalist forces under Chiang took Shanghai, and there the Kuomintang was forced to decide whether to listen to the Russian advisers and attack the foreign interests or whether to listen to their foreign friends and seek stability first and reform afterward.

On March 26, 1927, Chiang broke with the Communists in Shanghai, putting to death those leaders whom he could catch. He denounced the Hankow government and formed his own right-wing Kuomintang government at Nanking. The Hankow faction then split with its Russian advisers, terminated its alliance with the Communists, and joined Chiang to establish a unified government under the reunited Kuomintang at Nanking.

The National Government under Chiang Kai-shek

In June, 1928, the Nationalists completed the apparent unification of the country by driving the old marshal of Manchuria, Chang Tso-lin, out of Peking. At a party meeting in Nanking, they reassessed their strategy and reorganized their forces. The important committees were staffed with Chiang men and the party ranks were filled by conservative-minded students, merchants, industrialists, bankers, landlords, and gentry. The peasants and the coolies were neglected. Chiang was placed in charge of the party, of the government, and of the army.

On October 10, 1928, the new government of the Republic of China was proclaimed with the blessings of the foreign powers. Its guiding principles were that the party should be supreme over the state, political power should be concentrated in a few organizations at the very top, and the party should assume the responsibility for guiding the people to a constitutional democracy. The supreme organs of the party were the National Congress, to meet every few years, and the Central Executive Committee (CEC), to meet every six months. Even the titles of these Kuomintang organs cor-

responded to the parent Russian Communist organization. The CEC was to allocate political responsibilities, guide national reconstruction, fix the principles of legislation, determine administrative and military policies, and make all major appointments. It was over and above the highest instrumentalities of the state, regardless of the titles which the latter assumed.

The government itself consisted of five yüan or "boards," designated as Executive, Legislative, Judicial, Examination, and Control. The Executive Yüan corresponded approximately to a cabinet, and its chief exercised the prerogatives of a prime minister. Above the yüan, but within the government structure, were a controlling council known as a Council of State and a National Defense Council. Again like its Russian counterpart, China was in the grip of an interlocking directorate of generals and politicians which made all the decisions for the party and the government.

This political system endeavored to reassert the supremacy of the civil over the military. In this it was unsuccessful because power remained in the hands of the most battalions. The local party headquarters were scorned or neglected except as they figured in petty intrigues or personal rivalries for favors and rewards. Hsien or district magistrates were still appointed by local war lords, although they were ostensibly subject to the Ministry of the Interior. Whether that control meant anything depended on Chiang's military control over the given district.

The patterns of government constantly vacillated between the modern ideas to which the Kuomintang was dedicated and the ancient Chinese traditions which were in the marrow of the bones of every Chinese official. Modern conceptions were made to fit in ancient Chinese molds. The spirit of Sun Yat-sen replaced the cult of the emperor; the new Western-trained bureaucracy enjoyed the ancient esteem of the mandarin; and the hsien magistrate still remained as the sole representative of government to the masses. However, the Kuomintang introduced a new spirit and a new scope to the process of government. The officials accepted and advertised their responsibilities; they went about their tasks with a discipline and an energy which made Nanking a bubbling, exciting place to live.

Serious limitations crippled the National Government from its inception. The party was dedicated to training for democracy but it made no provision for popular elections, not even of local officials. While draft constitutions sought the ideal democratic methods, political practices in the capital city drifted menacingly toward dictatorship. Civil rights were not guaranteed. Distinguished Chinese languished in house arrest, or disappeared in exile or worse. Officials had no tenure of office and the pleasure of the administration proved to be fickle. Salaries were ridiculously low; private incomes and public funds were often indistinguishable. No statement of relative powers

could be given to local governments; no political guarantees of any kind could be enforced against the encroachments of the military. Deliberate propaganda campaigns tried to bring a modest amount of political enlightenment to more and more people and to stimulate a greater degree of public interest in the problems and processes of government.

In the light of Chiang's political heritage, his problems were possibly beyond human solution. Division and disunity constituted his immediate challenge. Before the end of a year in office, Chiang faced a serious revolt in Central China. A coalition of northern war lords forced him to compromise in order to command the nominal allegiance of Peking and Manchuria. Rival generals continued their perennial struggles for the dominance of Szechwan without paying any attention to orders or suggestions from Nanking. Independent satraps in the southern provinces of Kwangsi and Kwangtung held undisputed sway over dominions as extensive as those of Chiang. Chiang was never a dictator over China. He was obliged to maneuver where he could not command and to compromise where he could not order. He had to bribe and to bargain when his bayonets were ineffective. When opposing troops were defeated, he could not disband them. He had to incorporate them into his own armies. He followed the ancient Chinese custom of giving a rebel commander a reward, a pension, or a trip abroad instead of a sentence of death before a firing squad. Chiang's actual authority extended only as far as the limits of his military power and that was primarily in the lower regions of the Yangtze Valley. Often when Chiang would telegraph orders to neighboring provinces, the orders would be tacked up on a tree or pole near the yamen where they would fade away or be blown to bits by wind or weather.

The chief executive was in a constant quarrel with his subordinates within the Kuomintang. At times Hu Han-min, Wang Ching-wei, Sun Fo, or T. V. Soong would co-operate with him. At other times they would oppose him, and each other. Some went so far as to set up an independent government at Canton which denied and defied the authority of Chiang. Again, the standard operating procedure was to cajole rather than to eliminate the political opposition.

The greatest obstacle to unity was the Communist cancer. The Communists operated from the underground in the municipalities and then from the wild hills south of the Yangtze. Chiang tried to exterminate the Communists by expensive military campaigns which baffled his German-trained army and exhausted his resources. From the moment he assumed office until he agreed to the United Front, he considered the Communists as a disease of the heart as compared with the Japanese whom he diagnosed as a disease of the skin. Chiang believed that no truce with them could ever

be more than temporary and that nothing short of extermination could ever take care of the Communist menace.

Although the Kuomintang was obliged to dissipate a large share of its energies in the quest of stability and unity, it pursued with vigor the twin objectives of complete sovereignty and internal modernization. The years of the National Government in Nanking were years of convulsive changes, but the emphasis was infinitely more on the welfare of the state than on the welfare of the individual. Changes—some clearly for the better and some of a more doubtful value—had been brewing for a long time. The Kuomintang made it a primary policy to expedite these changes but within the limits of the preservation of law and order.

In the economic realm, the government made timid efforts to enforce a laudable legislative program of agricultural reform. Farms were still small, farming methods primitive, and conditions of country life difficult and unattractive. Government decrees and laws called for improvement in landlord-tenant relations, rent reduction, more equitable taxes, and guarantees against requisitions. Encouragement was offered for co-operatives for seed improvement, marketing, and credits. Industrial co-operatives were promoted to encourage the added handicraft activities which usually mean the difference between poverty and prosperity on the farms. Schemes were projected for rural drainage, irrigation, flood control, flood prevention, and for the improvement of highways in the rural areas. Advisers were called in from India, New Zealand, Denmark, the United States, and the League of Nations. Plans were extensive and utopian; performance was limited or nonexistent. The failure to implement its agricultural program, whether through its own fault or through the compulsion of resisting Japan, was to cost the Kuomintang dearly in its struggle with the Communists.

Industrialization was a magic formula in China, as elsewhere in Asia. The government was inclined to regard industrialization as a panacea for its economic ills and a rapid transit to national greatness. It could hope for the beginnings of a substantial heavy industry, but it could not possibly blind itself to its own weakness. A few light industries—paper, textiles, cigarettes—existed in the cities, thanks primarily to foreign capital. Manchuria and North China possessed ample resources for an eventual heavy industry, but military conflict was stony ground for industrial seed to flourish in. One estimate suggested that it would require an investment of a billion dollars a year for twenty years to raise Chinese production to 1 per cent of that of the United States. The government endeavored to put its currency on a stable basis, invited foreign capital to invest in joint enterprises, improved its railway and highway systems, and pioneered in inaugurating air lines within China and overland to Europe; but with all its desire and good will, it could make no substantial progress in industrialization.

Nor could the Kuomintang do much about its foreign trade. The vast numbers of Chinese always enticed prospective exporters to China, but the low purchasing power of the Chinese quickly dissipated dreams of boundless wealth. The average Chinese bought only 25 cents' worth of American goods per year as compared with the average Japanese purchase of \$3.00 per year and British purchase of \$25.00 worth per year. China handled less than 1 per cent of the world's commerce, selling tea, silk, vegetable oils, agricultural products, metals, minerals, and a smattering of manufactured goods and buying raw materials, food, and some products of Western factories. Few of the articles of foreign commerce affected the daily lives of the Chinese in the interior, with the result that it made little difference to Chinese economy whether boycotts or blockades cut China off from the outer world. The China market was valuable to Great Britain and to Japan, and to a lesser extent to the United States, but sales were limited to China's infinitesimal capacity to pay.

China's most significant changes before World War II were in the cultural realm. These widened the gap between the intellectual Chinese and the common peasants, between the moderns and the old-fashioned Confucianists, between the city dwellers and the "old hundred names" who lived in the villages and on the farms. The modern intellectuals were permeated by the scientific method and the spirit of criticism and they were devoted to the study of the natural sciences and social sciences, psychology, and education. Education was considered more than ever essential for entry into public life and political position. Mission schools were matched by public schools, and the curricula of both were geared to Chinese experience and the Chinese environment. History lessons emphasized the indignities which the foreigners had heaped upon the Chinese and thus increased the fever-pitch of the Chinese revolution. Students considered political action as important as their studies. More students went overseas and returned to government jobs. Dr. Hu Shih and James Yen contributed to a sparkling literary renaissance. Writers dared to use the vernacular as a literary medium and based a mass education movement on materials written with a thousand basic characters. The press, magazines, radio, mass meetings, and even the movies introduced new facts and ideas to millions whom the stream of modern life had been passing completely by.

Telephones, electric lights, railways, and automobiles contributed to the modification of the social structure. The ease and cheapness of moving about, the financial independence of the city workers, and the general uprising of the modern girls against the restrictions of the marriage system hastened the collapse of the family institution. In spite of the fact that many of the leaders in the Kuomintang, including Chiang Kai-shek himself, were Christians, the religious props of the Chinese society were shaken by the

general skepticism throughout the world and by the professional atheism of the Communists. In 1936 the Protestants claimed 700,000 adherents in China and in 1941 the Catholics listed 3,250,000 members of the church.

Beneath the confusion and apparent anarchy could be detected the convulsions of a living nation which looked to its own philosophers for a new enshrinement of the ancient Confucian virtues of benevolence, sincerity, loyalty, and filial duty but which sought desperately for the outward symbols of modernization. The gardens of public buildings were converted into playgrounds, always with a makeshift basketball hoop and backboard; temples were used as patriotic museums, with pictures showing foreign gunboats shelling Chinese cities; and the Boy Scouts and Camp Fire Girls paraded with banners and slogans like "The Revolution is Not Yet Completed," "Smoke No Opium," "Plough the Land—Weave Cloth—Read Books," "Down with Imperialism, Militarism, and the Oppressors of the People," and "Execute the Last Will and Testament of Dr. Sun Yat-sen."

China was unfortunate in encountering its Renaissance, its Reformation, its Industrial Revolution, and its French Revolution at once; and in the midst of it all, it was engulfed by foreign invasion. In a few years the Kuomintang lost to Japan more prestige and resources than the empire lost in 100 years of decay. For China, World War II began at that time. Neither the Kuomintang nor any other regime in those circumstances could have guided its revolution into constructive channels and at the same time girded itself to meet the invader from across the Yellow Sea.

Suggested Reading

J. O. P. BLAND AND E. BACKHOUSE, *China under the Empress Dowager* (Philadelphia, 1912).

———, *Annals and Memoirs of the Court at Peking* (Boston, 1914).

MERIBETH E. CAMERON, *The Reform Movement in China* (Stanford, 1931).

CHIEN TUAN-SHENG, *Government and Politics in China* (Cambridge, 1949).

W. J. HALL, *Tseng-Kuo-fan and the Taiping Rebellion* (New Haven, 1927).

A. H. HOLCOMBE, *The Chinese Revolution* (Cambridge, 1930).

REGINALD JOHNSTON, *Twilight in the Forbidden City* (London, 1934).

H. F. MACNAIR, *China in Revolution* (Chicago, 1931).

T. T. MEADOWS, *The Chinese and their Rebellions* (London, 1856). Reissued by the Stanford Press, 1952.

T'ANG LEANG-I, *The Foundations of Modern China* (London, 1928)

TENG SSI-YÜ, *New Light on the History of the Taiping Rebellion* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1950).

E. T. WILLIAMS, *China Yesterday and Today*, 5th ed., rev. (New York, 1935).

CHAPTER 9

Anti-Imperialism and Nationalism in China

While China was struggling for modernization, it was at the same time struggling for the recovery of its sovereign rights. The former was slow-moving and comparatively unspectacular. The latter built up like a storm cloud, it burst with emotional thunder and lightning, and it deluged not only China but the whole of East Asia. In its negative phases, this movement was antforeign or anti-imperial. Somewhere along the way, it took on a positive character and became the keystone of Chinese nationalism.

The unequal treaties were regarded as legal but unjust, and as a source of irritation and humiliation. The treaties had been of great value to the Chinese and to foreigners, and it was the abuse of the system which had been the primary cause of resentment and misunderstanding. New treaty settlements increased China's indignities, and each new indignity generated a corresponding counterpressure. The counterpressures within China approached a point of near-explosion as the process of education and popular propaganda spread the knowledge of China's inglorious role in international relations and multiplied the numbers of those who were willing to parade and shout the slogan, "Down with the unequal treaties." The Kuomintang and the Communists whipped the sentiments of the masses into a frenzy, and the psychosis of antforeignism became the most dominant characteristic of China's political make-up.

The spread of democratic ideals in the Western world assisted the Chinese cause. The powers themselves were a bit remorseful about some aspects of their past behavior and they showed no disposition to cling to their quasi-imperialistic methods. They could not have done so—even if they had wished to—and the costs would have exceeded the possible gains.

As the Chinese became more insistent, the powers became more conciliatory, with the exception of Japan which chose the risks of World War II. Japan opposed the incipient tendency on the part of foreign nations to restore China's sovereign rights in a gradual, orderly process and inaugurated a policy which was to demand not merely equal privileges with other foreign nations, but a position of monopoly for itself. When Japanese diplomats faltered or failed, the Japanese military took over.

Historical Basis of Anti-Imperialism

Antiforeignism or anti-imperialism in China had its roots in the historical record of China's territorial losses and restrictions on its national sovereignty. In 1842 Hongkong, Indo-China, Burma, Tibet, Mongolia, Formosa, and Korea were either dependent upon China or were integral parts of the Chinese Empire. Within slightly more than a half century they were either whittled away, set up as independent countries, or incorporated into the colonial systems of other powers. Hongkong did not amount to much when it was ceded to the British, but thanks to British money and British effort it became one of the richest ports in the world. The Chinese came to regard Hongkong as rightfully theirs—not the barren rock of a century ago, but the thriving port city with its harbors and docks, busy thoroughfares, attractive outlying areas, and palatial homes on the peak.

The same feeling applied to the other lost territories. In the Chinese mind the legal rights of the outside powers rested on nothing more substantial than the power of the sword. It could be expected that, if the Western sword became dulled, the recovery of the lost territories would become a matter of Chinese convenience, of negotiation with the territories themselves, rather than the continued recognition of the fruits of earlier conquest.

The leased areas and spheres of interest deprived China of sovereign rights over some of its most strategic ports and richest provinces. The Germans established themselves in Tsingtao and the hinterland of Shantung; the Russians obtained control of Port Arthur, Dairen, and Manchuria; and the French secured Kwangchow and a priority of economic rights in the southern Chinese provinces bordering on French territory. The British received their compensations in Kowloon, Weihaiwei, and the Yangtze Valley. Then the Japanese arrived, partially to displace the Russians and the Germans, and to allocate to themselves the potential development of the entire Chinese coast. To many Chinese, these leased areas and spheres of interest meant jobs and opportunities for investment and offered

havens of refuge from China's political storms. At the same time they symbolized arrogance and injustice, the worst features of Western imperialism, and the bitterest stigmas on China's national pride.

The Chinese felt equally resentful of the settlements and concessions and of the Legation Quarter in Peking. The foreign residential and trading sections in the large cities were known as "settlements" if the foreigners therein leased land in perpetuity directly from Chinese owners. They were "concessions" if the foreign government leased the entire area directly from the Chinese government and then sublet the land in small parcels to its own nationals. The settlements and concessions were created for a double purpose: to limit the area of foreign penetration and to provide adequate living quarters for traders who did not want to live in the midst of Oriental slums.

The International Settlement at Shanghai, originally a combination of the British and American concessions, sprouted into a city of more than 3,000,000 people. Most of the inhabitants were Chinese, but they were as strangers or guests in their own homeland. The Shanghai Municipal Council, consisting primarily of foreigners, was responsible for taxes, public works, public buildings, policing, roads, sanitation, schools, hospitals, and parks. The power plant was American and the tramways system was British. Belligerent troops were not supposed to enter the Settlement. If a Chinese traitor, terrorist, or ousted war lord sought asylum in the Settlement, he could be ejected only by the Settlement police. The police might be Sikhs, Russians in the service of the Shanghai Volunteer Corps, Chinese in the employ of the Municipal Council, or the regular troops of the British, American, or Japanese armies; but in no case were the police subject to the direction of the government of China.

At the beginning of World War II, a second international settlement existed at Kulangsu, the island in the harbor at Amoy. There were British concessions at Canton and Tientsin, where the streets bore British names. The hotels were the Court House, the Palace, the Astor House, or the Victoria, and the stores were Whiteaway, Laidlaw and Co., MacKenzie and Robinson, Caldwell and Macgregor, or any one of a dozen other names which were British traditions east of Suez. The Japanese had concessions at Amoy, Hankow, Tientsin, Hangchow, and Soochow. The French had their own concessions in Shanghai, Tientsin, Hankow, and Canton, where gendarmes, patisserie shops, taxi horns, and priests in clerical garb tinged the heart of the Orient with the gay colors of Paris. The Italians had outposts of empire in a share of the International Settlement at Shanghai, a concession in Tientsin, and in the Legation Quarter in Peking.

The Legation Quarter consisted of choicest property in the heart of

Peking. Former residences of imperial dukes were assigned to the representatives of foreign powers. After the Boxer uprising, China agreed that "the quarter occupied by the legations shall be considered as one specially reserved for their use and placed under their exclusive control, in which Chinese shall not have the right to reside, and which may be made defensible." Armed guards were an integral part of each legation office.

In addition to these violations of Chinese sovereignty, the Chinese were obliged to accept treaty limitations on the ordinary functions of their government. They were bound to a system of extraterritoriality, so that a foreigner accused of exceeding the speed limit, violating a contract, evading taxes, homicide, forgery, drunkenness, or any other civil or criminal offense was tried before his own consul or before a court in China of his own nationality. Extraterritorial privileges were used to weight the legal scales in favor of the foreigner and were abused for munitions-running, passport-forging, and racketeering. The Chinese maintained that they could never open their entire country to trade as long as the foreigners insisted upon retaining their own laws. Extraterritoriality was also a matter of face, because it was felt that in spite of temporary backwardness China was as able as any other nation to dispense justice with dispatch and impartiality.

The chief target of anteforeignism, the imposition of the treaty tariff, was removed in 1928 when China recovered its tariff autonomy. At the beginning of World War II China still counted among its fiscal handicaps the foreign administration of the maritime customs and the extended services which it performed. The customs was intimately associated with the foreign loans which had been of questionable economic value and which had practically been forced upon China by the foreign nations for their own purposes. It was the job of the customs to collect the duties assessed by the government, to deposit the monies in native and foreign banks, to administer the monies received in accordance with treaty obligations, and to turn over the surpluses to the Chinese Ministry of Finance. The customs administration was also responsible for the national system of posts. A separate foreign administration was in charge of the Salt Gabelle, or the salt monopoly. Technical experts and financial advisers bolstered the staffs of the ministries of Communications and Railways.

The Chinese were obligated by treaties to modernize their legal system as soon as possible, to legalize the opium traffic, to enforce uniform standards of weights and measures, to establish a national system of coinage and currency, and to promulgate mining regulations which would not work to the disadvantage of foreign capital. The Chinese felt that the substance of these provisions was not objectionable but that the procedures involved

were unjust. The Chinese were also treaty-bound to permit free passage for foreign troops over their transportation systems, to acquiesce in the stationing of foreign troops at various key cities between Peking and the sea, and to accede to foreign soldiers a limited right (often stretched and abused) to engage in "rifle practice and field exercises."

With regard to foreign civilians, and without any favors received for favors granted, the Chinese permitted foreign travel in the interior upon receipt of proper visas and extended unusual rights to missionaries and mission societies. With material damage to themselves, the Chinese extended to foreign nationals the rights to engage in inland and coastal navigation and to build wharf, dock, and bonded warehouse facilities for commerce. It is impossible for Americans to imagine Chinese river steamers plying between St. Louis and the Gulf, yet Chinese faced every day the dominance of Japanese, British, and American steamers and tankers in the lucrative trade between Hankow and the sea.

The Chinese admitted the benefits of the foreigner and his capital, but they rebelled against the groove of semicolonialism into which they had been sidetracked. The cumulative effect of a century of unequal dealing with China was the nurturing of a deep antiforeignism, not against an individual or a nation, but against the type of treatment which was received.

Before Chiang Kai-shek

Earliest Chinese expressions of resentment against foreigners within their borders were in the nature of individual reactions against individuals and were limited to small localities. Traders, sailors, and missionaries were the ordinary targets. The easy victory of the Japanese in 1894 marked the national awakening of the Chinese to their own helplessness and to their true status vis-à-vis the foreign powers. An embryonic patriotism stirred in some Chinese breasts, "the prelude to a century of change and the keynote of the future history of the Far East." After the abortive Boxer uprising, Chinese students were encouraged by missionary teachers to protest against their humiliating inferiority. Superstitious peasants blamed the foreigners for accumulated ills. Workers objected to the discipline imposed in foreign factories. Merchants and bankers were filled with envy for the lucrative profits of foreign commerce. All these groups were swept up in a new tide of anti-imperialism which sometimes expressed itself in further outrages against individual foreigners and occasionally in boycotts against particular nationalities. The Kuomintang, with its emphasis on nationalism, became the rallying point for the anti-imperialists.

Japan's victory over Russia gave Chinese leaders a new confidence in themselves, as Orientals opposed to Occidentals. President Wilson's idealistic emphasis on the rights of weak peoples and self-determination gave an added philosophic justification for China's program.

When China entered World War I on the side of the Allies, it took the first significant actions against the privileges of the powers in China. China took over the territorial concessions of Germany and Austria, stopped payments on their share of the Boxer indemnity, withdrew their legation and consular guards, closed their post offices, sequestered their public properties and bank accounts, and denounced their treaties, including those which bestowed upon German and Austrian nationals the privilege of extra-territoriality. The solid front of the West was broken. China imposed these same measures upon Russia at the time of the Russian revolution. The Bolsheviks were shrewd in reading the signs of the times, and in 1919 they announced that "in order to free the people from the yoke of the militarists and to help the working classes, Russia would declare null and void all its former secret treaties."

Elated by these diplomatic victories over three great powers, China sent its delegates to the Peace Conference in Paris in a very reflective and hopeful mood. The Chinese were reflective because the West, heretofore their symbol of unity and strength, lay exhausted by four years of fratricidal fighting. Why should China strive to build up national strength as the West conceived it, if the ultimate purpose of that strength were suicide or murder? The Chinese were also hopeful because they believed that their program for the abolition of foreign limitations of every kind would be accepted and endorsed. The Chinese expected at least a declaration which would serve to establish a new world order upon the foundation of the principles of justice, equality, and respect for the sovereignty of nations.

The Chinese were doomed to disappointment. China received a vast amount of publicity, it obtained an unrivaled opportunity to air its case, and it enjoyed an unprecedented experience of sitting at an international council table as one of the concert of victorious powers. The Allies authorized an embargo on further shipments of arms and ammunition to China and sought the good will of China in their plans to penetrate the Chinese commercial market. The general atmosphere of war-weariness curbed any latent foreign desires to inflict new measures of exploitation upon China. Deep and pressing social problems at home made it doubly expedient for the Allies to gain the co-operation of China in coping with the universal communistic attack upon capitalism and imperialism.

The considerations of *realpolitik* dictated the sacrifice of Chinese aspirations upon the altar of Japanese appeasement. Great Britain, France, and

the United States could not afford to alienate the good will of Japan. They confirmed the Japanese in possession of Shantung and refused to vitiate the one-sided Sino-Japanese treaties which had resulted from the Twenty-one Demands. The Chinese were so angry at their shabby treatment that they refused to sign the Treaty of Versailles, although China became a member of the League of Nations by virtue of signing the Treaty of Saint Germain-en-Laye with Austria. The Chinese re-established peace with Germany by presidential proclamation on September 15, 1919, and signed a new treaty with the Germans on May 20, 1921, based on principles of equality and reciprocity. The Chinese subsequently nurtured a peculiar bond of friendship with the Germans because of mutually bitter memories of the Treaty of Versailles.

When the Chinese delegates returned from Paris, they were greeted by popular support of their stubborn stand. Student strikes and spontaneous boycotts were aimed at Japan for its seizure of Shantung and at the other powers for allowing themselves to be accessories to the crime. "Anti-imperialism" became a national rallying cry. The brilliant diplomats of the Peking regime contributed the brightest spots to the drab record of the Chinese Republic. They carried on their negotiations with force and dignity. They sought first the termination of the Sino-Japanese military agreements negotiated during the war and they refused to enter bilateral negotiations with Japan for the ultimate disposition of Shantung. They suggested to England the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance and they threw out constant hints that China's international position should be improved. They kept a cautious eye on developments in Russia, but they were little inclined to seek friendship or support from Russia. They distrusted Russia because of their own aristocratic background and because of their knowledge of the record of czarist Russia in China.

The Washington Conference

China faced the powers as a unit for the last time at the Limitation of Armaments Conference which assembled in Washington on Armistice Day in 1921, the day the Unknown Soldier of World War I was buried at Arlington. At Washington the Chinese program repeated the familiar appeals for the restoration of territorial integrity, for political and administrative independence, and for the effective application of the Open Door in all parts of China. The Chinese asked the powers to publish and disavow all their claims to special interests, to put time limits on their existing agreements, and to make public declarations that they would refrain from

future encroachments. The Chinese wanted specific relief from nonalienation declarations, from the fourteen interpower understandings concerning their respective interests in China, and from the Sino-Japanese treaties which followed the Twenty-one Demands. The Chinese also wanted declarations that no treaties in the future would be made concerning China unless China was invited to participate, that China's neutrality would be respected in case of war, and that future disputes in the Pacific and the Far East should be settled by peaceful methods.

The Chinese program was rejected as a basis for discussion, in favor of the Root resolution on general principles. This resolution attempted a precise definition of the traditional understandings of the Open Door and eventuated in the legally binding Nine-Power Treaty. By this treaty, the powers agreed to respect the sovereignty, independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China; to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain an effective and stable government; to use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China; and to refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights and privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly states and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such states. They promised not to enter into any treaty, agreement, arrangement, or understanding with any power or powers which would infringe or impair the foregoing principles.

The contracting powers other than China agreed that they would not seek, nor support their nationals in seeking, (a) any arrangement which might purport to establish in favour of their interests any general superiority of rights with respect to commercial or economic development in any designated region of China; (b) any such monopoly or preference as would deprive the nationals of any other power of the right of undertaking any legitimate trade or industry in China, or of participating with the Chinese Government, or with any local authority, in any category of public enterprise, or which by reason of its scope, duration or geographical extent is calculated to frustrate the practical application of the principle of equal opportunity.¹

As if to plug any further legal loopholes, the powers agreed not to support any agreements by their nationals designed to create spheres of influence or to provide for the enjoyment of mutually exclusive opportunities in designated parts of Chinese territory. In regard to railroads, discrimination was forbidden in charges or facilities on the basis of nationality of passengers, origin, ownership, or route of goods. China's position as a

¹ Text of the Nine-Power Treaty is in U. S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1922, vol. I, pp. 276-282.

neutral in future wars was to be respected. It was finally agreed that "whenever a situation arises which in the opinion of any one of them involves the application of the stipulations of the present treaty, and renders desirable discussion of such application, there shall be full and frank communication between the Powers concerned."

In addition to the Nine-Power Treaty, the Chinese achieved substantial progress in attacking individual items in the treaty system. Foreign postal services were abandoned and foreign jurisdiction over all electrical means of communication, including radio stations, was surrendered. With regard to foreign troops in China, the powers would go no further than to give their assent to "a collective inquiry into the facts and opinions concerning their own intentions and the capacity of the Chinese to assure the protection of the lives and property of foreigners in China." For a long time to come the Chinese were doomed to watch in sullen silence the drills and parades of the well-equipped armies of the foreigners in their irritating, ostentatious displays on Chinese soil.

The Chinese gained marked if only partial success in their efforts to terminate the treaty-tariff, extraterritoriality leases, and spheres of interest. The powers promised immediate revision of tariff rates without conceding autonomy, and insisted upon the retention of the customs administration. With regard to extraterritoriality, the powers agreed to the appointment of a commission "to inquire into the present practice of extraterritorial jurisdiction in China and into the laws and the judicial system and the methods of judicial administration of China and make recommendations to assist the Chinese in introducing reforms which would warrant the powers in relinquishing extraterritoriality."

China asked for the immediate demilitarization and eventual retrocession of the leaseholds, since leaseholds were no longer needed to preserve the balance of power. Viviani of France agreed to collective restitution. Lord Balfour of England foresaw no objection to the return of Weihaiwei, but pointed out that Kowloon was necessary for the security of Hongkong. Baron Shidehara of Japan declared Japan had no intention at present of relinquishing the important rights she had lawfully acquired at no small sacrifice. China made no progress at Washington toward the recovery of the residential concessions in the port cities. On February 4, 1922, China and Japan signed a bilateral agreement which provided for the return to China of the Japanese-held former German lease and sphere of interest in Shantung.

The powers agreed to publish all their treaties, conventions, exchanges of notes, and other international agreements which they considered in force and to list all contracts between their nationals and Chinese involving "any concession, franchise, option or preference concerning railways, mines,

forests, navigation rights, river conservancy, harbor works or public services, or for sales of arms or ammunition, or which involve a lien on public revenues or properties." They worded the Nine-Power Treaty with all the legal skill at their command to put an end to the system of spheres of interest, general superiority of rights, or exclusive monopolies.

By the time of the Washington Conference it had become quite clear that international rivalries in China actually hindered China's economic and political development and produced friction among the powers themselves. Therefore the delegates were disposed to handle the Chinese complaints with sympathy and a large measure of understanding. Individual nations adopted the attitude that they would surrender their privileges just as fast as China could put its own house in order. A Japanese delegate remarked that the powers were disposed to look forward to the future with hope and confidence, but like genteel, retired burglars they were not willing to relinquish their hold on accumulated swag.

After the conference, the suave diplomats of the Peking regime returned to China and continued to peck away at the unequal treaties. The most-favored-nation clause proved a serious obstacle to spectacular or even substantial progress. To the foreigner, the clause meant that a privilege for one was a privilege for all; to the Chinese the obstinacy of a single nation thwarted an entire program of restoration. For example, after Great Britain, the United States, and others had agreed to restore tariff autonomy in 1928, they were held up by the dilatory tactics of Japan. No action could be taken until the last single nation agreed to a proposed procedure. Recovery of rights had to be paced by the tempo of the most reactionary and least considerate of China's neighbors, rather than by the speed and good intentions of China's friends.

It was impossible to accomplish many diplomatic victories while the country itself was writhing in civil war. A conference on tariff autonomy and another on the abolition of extraterritoriality met in China after the Washington Conference in order to consider ways and means, or methods, to accord with China's demands. It was no longer a matter of whether China's sovereign prerogatives should be restored, it was rather a problem of how to effect the restoration. But there was not even a single Chinese government with which conversations could be conducted. The British negotiated the return of the Hankow concession with the leftist Kuomintang regime at Hankow; the British and the Americans discussed the Nanking incident with the Kuomintang faction at Nanking; the Belgians and others had to carry out their negotiations with regard to the expiration of their treaties with the government at Peking.

In 1923 on the date of the expiration of the original period of the leasehold in Kwantung, the Chinese sent a sly, but vain, note to Japan asking

Japan to designate a time for discussing questions incidental to the retrocession of Dairen and Port Arthur. Then, as successive treaties with Belgium, France, Japan, and Spain came up for revision or renewal, the Chinese followed the technique of dealing with each power separately, without reference to the dean of the diplomatic corps. The Chinese hoped that each power would try to outdo the others in currying the favor of China. The Chinese announced the termination of the old treaties and the assumption of jurisdiction over the foreigners involved, pending the conclusion of new treaties.

Peking was content to follow the amenities of polite negotiations, but the fiery Nationalists were inclined to resort to more positive measures to win their diplomatic objectives. Acting in accordance with their Russian advisers, the Nationalists demanded immediate and unconditional cancellation of the treaties, not mere revision. On May 30, 1925, when a British police captain fired into a Chinese mob at Shanghai and when Chinese were killed in the course of riots at Shameen in Canton, students, laborers, and merchants took up the cry, "Foreigners Have Shot Down Chinese Citizens on Chinese Soil." This was the fuel which propelled Chiang Kai-shek's march to Hankow. After the antiforeign riots at Chin-kiang, Hankow, Kiukiang, and Chungking, the radicals shouted for the return of all concessions, the expulsion of foreign troops, and the immediate abolition of extraterritoriality. Boycotts paralyzed British shipping and demonstrations jeopardized foreign lives and property throughout China.

In 1926 the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang announced its policy to combat any country which acted in a spirit of imperialism and to exhibit the most cordial friendship for any country which treated China on a footing of equality. Among the powers having relations with China there was to be no exclusiveness of friendship. The measure of friendship was to be equality of treatment, and the test, the conclusion of new treaties on a basis of reciprocal respect for each other's sovereignty. The powers were alarmed at the bitter hatred of foreigners, especially British, and the admiration for and confidence in Russian bolshevism, with its "garbled history, distorted economics and idealistic naïveté" which grew among China's susceptible and long-suffering people. To wean the Chinese government away from the Communists, the powers met Chiang Kai-shek more than halfway in his new orientation of the Kuomintang.

Nationalism under Chiang Kai-shek

Two underlying themes characterized Chiang's thinking: the achievement of national unity was the supreme purpose of the revolution and the unequal treaties were responsible for China's ills. He blamed the unequal

treaties for the loss of self-confidence and a tendency toward servile imitation, the fear of and admiration for things foreign, the growth of insincerity and self-deception, and the disintegration of China's traditional cultural heritage. The unequal treaties were considered as the root cause of the obstacle to reconstruction and the deteriorating factor in the moral fiber of the Chinese nation. However, Chiang disavowed those who borrowed the slogan of democracy as a screen to cover their own position or those who disguised reaction and violence with the false label of liberty. By his own perspicacity and by the responsibilities of his leadership, he refused to share the attitudes of the agitators who merely set the disorganized masses in motion against the foreigners. Chiang was aware of the grievous internal suffering of the Chinese patient, as well as the surface sores of the unequal treaties. In the general pattern of Chinese thought the unequal treaties were accepted as the symbol of imperialism, and anti-imperialism became completely and uncritically identified with nationalism.

In 1927 Chiang turned for support to the Shanghai *bourgeoisie* and their British, Japanese, French, and American financial backers. He could not stamp out antiforeignism but he could marshal it as an instrument of diplomatic pressure. He reminded the powers that the fundamental danger to themselves and their property was due to "insistence on conditions which are at once a humiliation and a menace to a nation that has known greatness and is today conscious of renewed strength." He ordered the evacuation of all foreign property occupied by Chinese soldiers, specifically commanded his men not to fire on foreign ships as they plied up and down the Yangtze, and not to molest foreign lives nor interfere with missionaries. He promised that he would take steps to terminate unequal treaties and to conclude new treaties in accordance with proper procedure—not violence.

Within three years China regained its tariff autonomy. A whole succession of international agreements before 1931 returned to China increased portions of the Boxer indemnities, surrendered the administration of residential concessions of Hankow, Kiukiang, Chinkiang, and Amoy, and restored sovereignty over the former British leasehold at Weihaiwei. New treaties with Poland, Greece, Turkey, and Egypt conceded to China a status of equality. Old treaties with Belgium, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, and Italy were terminated unilaterally.

The Chinese concentrated on the abolition of extraterritoriality. In treaties with many of the powers, China had obtained conditional consent for the abolition of extraterritoriality. The Extraterritorial Commission provided for at the Washington Conference made an extended survey of Chinese judicial conditions and laid down a set of utopian criteria for the abandonment of the consular courts. In 1929 the Nanking government

notified all the powers that "since extraterritoriality is antiquated and detrimental, it should be abandoned, particularly since China now has courts, modern prisons and codes of law." The Americans answered with a warning that sudden abolition would be harmful, but with the assurance that "the United States is ready to participate in negotiations looking to the relinquishment of extraterritorial rights either as to areas or to particular kinds of jurisdiction or both." Other powers were more cautious, but equally sympathetic. The Chinese Foreign Minister, Dr. C. T. Wang, blandly ignored the response of the powers and declared

for the purpose of restoring her inherent jurisdictional sovereignty, on and after January 1, 1930, all foreign nationals in the territory of China who are now enjoying extraterritorial privileges shall abide by the laws, ordinances and regulations duly promulgated by the central and local governments of China.

The powers were not disposed to contest the assumption that January 1, 1930, could be considered as a date upon which gradual abolition should commence in principle, but they were skeptical of Chinese attempts to implement the principle. Because of civil wars, China was not able to promulgate satisfactory regulations throughout the next two years. In the fall of 1931, with the Manchurian incident and the subsequent passing of many Chinese courts into the control of the Japanese military authorities, China recognized the practical advantages of retaining the extraterritorial system as a counterbalance to the might of Japan. Throughout the period of the Sino-Japanese controversy, extraterritoriality was nothing more than an academic issue marked by tacit understandings to the effect that extraterritoriality would be reconsidered with the return of peace.

In the fall of 1931 the outlook was far from gloomy for the solution of the problems of inland navigation, foreign troops, the remaining concessions in the hands of the foreign powers, and the Legation Quarter. The British had indicated by word and deed their willingness to go as far as possible toward meeting the legitimate aspirations of the Chinese nation. The United States had endorsed the same general position, and the Shidehara policy in Japan had given impetus to new hopes for Chinese-Japanese co-operation.

At that time, China's foreign policies were directed to securing for China a status of equality and unqualified independence in the family of nations—no more, no less. Wang Ching-wei, the prime minister under Chiang Kai-shek, declared that treaties would be revised by friendly discussion and negotiation conducted on our part "with dignity and respect for the principles of law and equity." He insisted that the desire for na-

tional independence and international equality were certainly not anti-foreign in nature and were essential for any nation in its struggle for existence. He defined the rightful aspiration of China as the attainment of independence and equality and added, "Nothing is further from the truth than the allegation that the foreign policy of the Chinese government has been uncompromisingly antforeign." Chinese resentment was directed against a system and not against individual nationals of any foreign country. Chinese crowds were on occasion aroused to demonstrations which caused inconvenience and suffering, but the Chinese government was limited in its actions to legitimate protests against the treaties which had outlived their original usefulness and which had been abused and generously interpreted in the interest of the foreign powers.

The process of adjustment and compromise was halted abruptly by the aggression of Japan. Slogans of "Down with the Unequal Treaties" became strangely meaningless when the treaties could be looked to as the one forlorn hope of help against invading armies. "Drive Out the Imperialists," which had been so popular in the days of China's flirtation with Russia, now became "Drive Out the Japanese." Just as China's modernization process halted in its tracks and concentrated on the overwhelming tasks of mobilizing all of China's human, economic, political, and spiritual resources to resist Japan, so the antforeign sentiments converged on the immediate single objective of opposing Japan's drive for a New Order in East Asia. China's national salvation and eventual reconstruction depended upon successful resistance to an implacable enemy.

Suggested Reading

- STEPHEN CHEN AND ROBERT PAYNE, *Sun Yat-sen: A Portrait* (New York, 1946).
 GEORGE M. DUTCHER, *The Political Awakening of the East* (New York, 1925).
 STANLEY K. HORNBECK, *China Today: Political* (Boston, World Peace Foundation Pamphlets, No. 5, 1927).
 H. B. MORSE, *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, 3 volumes (Shanghai, 1910, 1918).
 ROBERT POLLARD, *China's Foreign Relations, 1917-1931* (New York, 1933).
 HAROLD QUIGLEY, *Chinese Politics and Foreign Powers* (Worcester, International Conciliation Pamphlet No. 227, 1927).
 J. G. REID, *The Manchu Abdication and the Powers* (Berkeley, 1935).
 LYON SHARMAN, *Sun Yat-sen, His Life and Meaning* (New York, 1934).
 U. S. CONGRESS, *Limitations of Armament Conference*, Senate Document No. 126, 67th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, 1922).
 STANLEY F. WRIGHT, *China's Struggle for Tariff Autonomy* (Shanghai, 1938).
 SSU-YÜ TENG AND JOHN K. FAIRBANK, *China's Response to the West: A Documentary Survey, 1839-1923* (Cambridge, Mass., 1953).

CHAPTER 10

The Rise of the Japanese Nation

Like China, Japan suffered the indignities of unequal treaties but, unlike China, Japan achieved the status of international equality by the turn of the nineteenth century. Japan avoided wars against the Western powers and sought for itself the same assets and attributes which had made the West strong. From an isolated, antiquated empire, helpless before the black ships of Commodore Perry, it grew in prestige by successive shows of strength against Korea and military victories over China and Russia.

Japan became an important factor in international diplomacy and a welcome ally in time of war. In its evolution, Japan came to face the same dilemmas which rent asunder the Western world: totalitarianism or democratic forms of government, tyranny or individual liberalism, state socialism or free enterprise. Consciously, deliberately, Japan discarded its feudal heritage and devoted its youthful energies to modernization along the lines of Great Britain and the United States. Then, in torments of its own frustrations and impatience, it joined forces with the European prototypes of fascism and took the fatal, initial step which spread World War II to East Asia.

Treaty Revision

No sooner were the treaties of 1854 and 1855 signed than Japan began to consider ways and means of revision. Lord Iwakura, with a suite of fifty, went to the United States and Europe to try to persuade all seventeen treaty powers to agree to the relinquishment of extraterritoriality and tariff control. The United States was willing to negotiate because it was interested in the opening of the entire Japanese Empire and the removal of the ban on Christianity. The European powers were not disposed

to discuss any concessions. Iwakura failed to accomplish the specific objectives of his mission, but he traveled widely and he observed carefully. He returned to Japan with a clear view of the reforms which Japan would have to accomplish before it could anticipate treaty revision. On the recommendation of Iwakura, Japan established legations in Washington, London, Paris, St. Petersburg, Berlin, and Vienna.

In its drive for equal treatment Japan found a sympathizer in Judge John A. Bingham, the American minister in Tokyo from 1873 to 1885. He was impressed with Japan's progress and he urged Washington to accede to Japan's overtures for reciprocal treatment. On July 25, 1878, Japan and the United States signed a treaty which conceded to Japan the right to regulate its own tariff schedules and control its coastal trade in exchange for opening new ports and abolishing the export tax. The American treaty was ratified but could not go into effect until all the other powers made similar concessions. The British minister accused the Americans of acting falsely in making this treaty, "as they well knew that the other powers would not agree to it, and therefore that they might make themselves agreeable to the Japanese without incurring any risk."

In 1882 Count Inouye, the Foreign Minister, called a conference of the diplomatic representatives in Tokyo to discuss ways and means for treaty revision. The problems in Japan were less extensive and less complicated than the treaty problems in China. The three main problems in Japan were tariff autonomy, reciprocal application of the most-favored-nation clause, and the elimination of extraterritoriality. The powers were too closely united to permit Japan to make any substantial dent in their solid front. Then a new Foreign Minister tried new tactics. He enforced the letter of the treaties to show how absurd some of the provisions were, particularly with regard to travel in the interior. Instead of negotiating with the powers *en masse* he approached them one by one, using the device later pursued by China. In 1888 he succeeded in getting a treaty with Mexico which omitted the extraterritorial system, recognized Japan's tariff autonomy, and applied reciprocally the most-favored-nation clause. Mexico was unimportant except as a symbol and a psychological stimulus.

While Japan was racing ahead with its internal programs of reform, it became more insistent in its demands for treaty revision. The scene of negotiations shifted from Tokyo to the capitals of the foreign powers, the better to defeat the possibility of united opposition. Japan centered its hopes in England, because England had the greatest volume of trade with Japan and was most influential in international affairs. It was argued that if the British could be convinced that the time had come for revamping relations with Japan, other nations would follow.

The reasoning was sound, and an Anglo-Japanese treaty was signed on July 16, 1894, which took the lead and set the style in Japan's rise to equality with the great powers. This treaty did not provide for tariff autonomy, but it abolished extraterritoriality and consular courts; it contained a mutual most-favored-nation clause and provided for reciprocal rights of travel, residence, navigation, and exercise of religion. It was to become effective in 1899, but only if other powers took similar action. This time there could be little doubt that the others would take similar action because Japan had gained military strength and was about to demonstrate its military superiority in East Asia. A treaty was signed along these same general lines with the United States in November, 1894, and with all the other powers by 1899, when all went into effect at the same time. The few remaining restrictions on Japan's full sovereignty—in matters of tariff control and foreign settlements in Japan's ports—expired in the early years of the twentieth century. After that time no nation had any legal right to interfere in matters of Japan's internal administration or jurisdiction.

The Meiji Revolution

Japan's diplomatic equality was purchased with the specie of internal reform. Concessions were not easily obtained except by the demonstration of Japan's growth and strength. The transformation from the ancient feudal country into a modern state was a thoroughgoing revolution acting upon every phase of Japan's national life. Changes were not only on the surface but they penetrated into the roots of politics, economics, and social traditions.

When the Tokugawa shogunate was embarrassed by its inability to stand up against the West, its enemies adopted a slogan, "Honor the Emperor—Expel the Barbarians." After two and a half centuries of ignominious retirement, the emperor found himself the rallying point for a new Japan. In November, 1867, on the death of the old shogun, his successor and last of the shoguns voluntarily surrendered his position. The whole system of administration transferred its loyalties from the shogun to the emperor. The new emperor—the Meiji emperor—was only fifteen years old when he was crowned, or "restored," on October 31, 1868. He reigned until 1912, thus spanning an entire era of revolution and modernization.

The outer daimyos replaced the Tokugawas as the influences around the throne. By bitter experience they had come to appreciate the strength of the Western powers and they saw the necessity for studying and adapting the institutions and ways of the West. Although they themselves did

not possess the quality or the vision to assume the responsibilities of leadership, their retainers were to become Japan's greatest statesmen—men like Kido, Ito, Yamagata, Katsura, and Terauchi from Choshu; Kuroda, Matsukata, Yamamoto, and Okubo from Satsuma; Okuma from Hizen; and Itagaki from Tosa. These lesser samurai joined with able courtiers like Iwakura and Saionji, with the rising financial oligarchy, and with Shinto scholars to abolish the old feudal structure and to create a centralized state with the emperor as the recognized source of power.

The capital was moved from Kyoto to Yedo, renamed Tokyo, and the emperor was installed in the palace of the Tokugawas. A "Charter Oath" was promulgated containing a vague promise of a deliberative assembly so that the nation might be governed according to public opinion. The people were exhorted to study new political and social theories, and men of ability and wisdom from all over the world were to be employed in the service of the nation. The Charter Oath was a manifestation of Japan's dedication to the policy of deliberate borrowing from the West.

The government was reorganized more in accordance with Western models and a cabinet system was established by 1871. The cabinet members were merely advisers to the throne and they were selected from the most influential clans. As they were intellectual individuals, they argued constantly among themselves as to best methods of procedure. Some advocated an extremist foreign policy; others counseled radical domestic innovations like a Diet and party government.

Most agreed on the necessity for the eradication of feudalism. They concluded that the daimyo and samurai classes should be abolished, that soldiers should be in the service of the state and not some feudal lord, that peasants should be allowed to own land, and that the social stigma attached to business and trade should be erased. In 1869 imperial officials were appointed in every fief, and the land registers of some of the major fiefs were turned over to the central government. The daimyos were promised half their normal revenues and appointments as governors on their own estates if they would give up their semiautonomous status and permit themselves to be absorbed into the new regime. One by one the daimyos surrendered titles to their fiefs and accepted in exchange pensions and titles of nobility. By an imperial rescript of August, 1871, the clans were disbanded, the fiefs were abolished, and the country was reorganized into prefectures, roughly similar to American states. The samurai were relieved of their obligations to their lords and were deprived of the right to carry the traditional two swords. They were promised pensions to compensate for their loss of privilege. Many samurai used their money to enter business or to purchase farms.

These tremendous changes were accomplished with a minimum of friction and objections but not without personal jealousies and a certain amount of righteous indignation. A single rebellion signified the last gasp of feudalism. A Japanese hero, Saigo Takamori, in the service of the Lord of Satsuma, believed that the emperor received wrong advice in abstaining from overseas adventures, and he believed that Satsuma received less than its just share of government recognition. He also felt that the new reforms reduced the samurai to the level of artisans, farmers, and traders. He determined to restore the samurai to their positions of dignity and to advance the lot of Satsuma in the distribution of government power. For nine months, from January to September, 1877, the private army of Satsuma battled against the new conscript army from Tokyo. More than a third of the total number of soldiers engaged were either killed in battle or died by their own hands. The rebel army was defeated and Saigo took his own life. After the defeat of the Satsuma forces, no other champions of the feudal system dared to oppose the new and progressive policies of the central government.

While the peasants produced the rice, the political oligarchy plunged Japan into a national orgy of change and modernization. The mood of the times (like an earlier period when there was the great borrowing from China and a later period when there was the eager copying of the United States) was to study, to experiment, or to go abroad. The military system was transformed. In 1873 a national conscript army was created and every youth was held for seven years of military service—three on active duty, two in the first reserve, and two in the second reserve. European uniforms were adopted and ordnance and materiel were purchased abroad. Advisers were hired from France but replaced by Germans after the Franco-Prussian War. The Japanese Army was Prussian in organization and discipline. The spirit of bushido, the way of a warrior, intensified and glamorized, and the responsibility for army leadership were assumed by the men of Choshu. A Department of the Navy was created in 1872 and the next year a naval academy, arsenal, and naval hospital were established. Ships of war were originally purchased from Europe and subsequently built in the yards in Japan. Advisers were sought in England, and the responsibility for navy leadership was assumed by the men of Satsuma. By the time of the Sino-Japanese War in 1894, the military might of Japan was respectable, even by European standards, and the Chinese had no chance whatever for victory.

In keeping with Japan's campaign for recovery of its sovereignty, Japan modernized its legal system and adopted new codes of civil and criminal law. Japan chose the continental or code system as preferable to the British

common law system and sent its young law students to France for study. On October 12, 1881, the Meiji emperor promised to summon an imperial Diet in 1890. He sent Count Ito abroad to study foreign constitutions. Ito was greatly impressed by Otto von Bismarck and saw in the German model an ideal precedent for Japan to preserve its autocratic institutions in a democratic framework. Upon Ito's return, the Japanese cabinet was made responsible to the emperor, not to any representatives of the people, and a Privy Council was established. A genro or Council of Elder Statesmen was set up to advise the emperor on important national and international affairs.

A constitution was promulgated on February 11, 1889, as the gift of the emperor and not as a hard-won prize of popular agitation. It was a short document, with a preamble, seven chapters, and seventy-six articles. According to it, the emperor was the head of the state, the source of sovereignty. He was deemed sacred and inviolable. He was the supreme commander of the army and the navy, with power to make war and peace. The constitution contained a Bill of Rights which stipulated that all able-bodied men were subject to military service; no subject should be arrested, detained, tried, or punished, unless according to law; no house should be entered or searched without a warrant; freedom of religious belief was granted within limits not prejudicial to peace and order; liberty of speech, writing, publication, public meeting, and association should be enjoyed by all within the limits of the law. The qualifying phrases made the guarantees meaningless.

The constitution provided for a House of Peers and a House of Representatives. They were given powers of legislation, but no control over the cabinet, the budget, or decisions for war or peace. The members of the lower house were elected by a very restricted group of voters. Along with the constitution were promulgated five special bodies of law, equal in authority to the constitution: laws for the conduct of the House of Peers, rules for the Diet, a law of finance, an election law, and the Imperial House Law.

These political strides were accompanied by intense economic activity, largely because the government was as devoted to economic development as to political progress. International trade expanded; silk, tea, chinaware, paper, camphor, lacquer, and coal were exchanged for textiles, machinery, and hardware. The British did more business with Japan than all the other nations combined, but the Japanese steadily increased their share of the profits from the carrying trade and from the distribution and exchange functions.

Through aid and subsidies the government encouraged and paved the

way for a later control of industrial enterprises. In 1872 a railroad was built from Tokyo to Yokohama; in 1874 another line was opened from Osaka to Kobe, and by 1894 there were more than 2,000 miles of track in the empire. The British supplied materials, advice, and rolling stock, but foreigners neither controlled nor operated railways in Japan as they did in China. Telegraph lines were built and public utilities were installed. Small factories, mills, arsenals, and dockyards were constructed, and by 1885 more than a thousand Japanese concerns were active in some kind of economic activity. There was little room for foreign entrepreneurs inside Japan, and there were no other Asians who approached the Japanese in industrialization.

With its affinity for the sea, Japan built, operated, and financed one of the largest merchant marines in the world. The NYK, or the Japan Mail Line, operated regular service to Asia, Europe, and America; other lines carried familiar Japanese flags to the seven seas. The Bank of Japan, the Yokohama Specie Bank, and other financial institutions were organized to provide the capital and credit for economic expansion. Through government support relatively small fortunes skyrocketed into great empires controlled by a single parent company or a small group of financiers. Tightly knit financial cliques, known as *zaibatsu*, reached out in all directions to control banks, textile concerns, mines, chemical industries, dockyards, ship companies, and a multitude of lesser interests. The Mitsuis, largely through astute manipulation of government funds, guided and profited from industrialization; the Mitsubishiis assumed a position of leadership in the merchant marine and shipbuilding; and the Sumitomos branched out from copper mining into heavy industries and the manufacture of armaments.

While a few individuals, families, or combines at the top amassed great wealth, the peasants languished in poverty. Population increased by leaps and bounds—from 30,000,000 in 1850 to 70,000,000 by 1950. Goods were not produced for the home market but for export or the purposes of the state. Japan guided its industrial revolution from the beginning toward the strengthening and greater glory of the state, and not for the benefit of its own individual citizens. In a single generation, Japan achieved its major goals: a strong army and navy, an effective government, and a vigorous industry and commerce.

These changes were not brought about blindly or rashly, because Japan clung steadfastly to its traditional values. The government never permitted the rate of change to menace internal stability. It preferred to graft the new on to the old rather than to replace the old by the new. In a political sense, Japan did not allow the new institutions to displace the clandestine advisers and committees that were the real sources of power around the

throne. From an economic point of view, the zaibatsu were merely the apex of a pyramid whose broad base was the masses who derived their living from the soil and the sea. In a social sense, the dominant goal was not to tear up the old life by its roots, but to give a new fullness and a new meaning to institutions and traditions which were of proved but limited value.

The family institution preserved much of its importance in spite of the attacks of the individual and the state. Buddhism retained its hold on the minds and spirits of most Japanese regardless of the determined efforts of the Christian missionaries. In the realm of the spirit, the most significant achievement of the Meiji revolution was the revitalization of the Shinto religion. State Shinto glorified the emperor institution and identified the state with religious traditions. Constant references to the divinity of the emperor, the land of the gods, and the sacred virtues of the Japanese produced a mystical reverence for Japan's own cultural heritage and a fanatical devotion to the divine mission to spread the blessings of that culture to Japan's less fortunate neighbors.

Japan was decades ahead of the Germans or the Russians in its use of the educational system for the indoctrination of ultranationalism. In 1871 a Ministry of Education was established which created and directed a highly centralized hierarchy of elementary schools, middle schools, colleges, and universities. The broad spirit of Japanese education was contained in the imperial rescript of 1890:

Know Ye, Our Subjects:

Our Imperial Ancestors have founded Our Empire on a basis broad and everlasting, and have deeply and firmly implanted virtue; Our subjects ever united in loyalty and filial piety have from generation to generation illustrated the beauty thereof. This is the glory of the fundamental character of Our Empire, and herein also lies the source of Our education. Ye, Our subjects, be filial to your parents, affectionate to your brothers and sisters; as husbands and wives be harmonious, as friends, true; bear yourselves in modesty and moderation; extend your benevolence to all; pursue learning and cultivate arts, and thereby develop intellectual faculties and perfect moral powers; furthermore, advance public good and promote common interest; always respect the Constitution and observe the laws; should emergency arise, offer yourselves courageously to the State; and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of Our Imperial Throne coeval with heaven and earth. So shall ye be not only Our good and faithful subjects but render illustrious the best traditions of your forefathers.

Education for all boys and girls from six to fourteen years of age was free and compulsory. The poorest districts offered the same opportunities

as the richest; the farms and villages were given the same consideration by the government as the metropolitan areas. It took money and effort to build schools and train teachers, but national enterprise and national vision gave Japan the first literate populace in Asia. Subjects in the elementary school were Japanese language and history, arithmetic, geography, science, singing and sewing for the girls, drawing, gymnastics, and morals. Gymnastics included military drill and discipline; morals meant superpatriotism. Hours were long and vacations few. While it was still dark, the uniformed children trudged off to school in the morning and often, after dusk, returned to their homes in the evening with their books strapped to their backs exactly like children in other lands.

Beyond the elementary schools the opportunities for education for girls were very limited. Some middle schools and private schools for girls existed, but the colleges and universities were practically closed to them. Sufficient technical schools and higher schools for men were established to meet Japan's needs in training leaders for industry, the professions, and government service. The subjects taught in Japan's colleges and universities corresponded to the curricula in Western schools, but the emphasis was on the sciences rather than the humanities because of the possibilities of dangerous thoughts. Difficulties were encountered even in the teaching of sciences because research methods and the spirit of criticism were scarcely compatible with Japanese techniques and objectives of indoctrination. The creative thinking of Japanese professors was supplemented by translations of the best of Western thought. It was perfectly possible to get courses in Japanese universities in English literature, Italian art, French logic, or German economic theory. Graduate students were encouraged to study abroad.

The educational system was at once the strength and the weakness of the Japanese program of modernization. It was the strength in that at the elementary levels it provided an intensely loyal, thoroughly indoctrinated mass of citizenry. It was the weakness in that at the advanced levels it produced a more skeptical class of scholars and educated leaders who rebelled intellectually at the idea of regimentation and totalitarianism.

The Meiji revolution inaugurated deep but gradual changes in the life of the Japanese people. Old class alignments disappeared and new distinctions arose which were based on wealth and achievement. The countryside became concerned primarily with tenants and landlords, the cities with capital and labor. The countrypeople could appreciate the benefits of the importations from the West, but they could not hope to earn the money to buy the simplest gadgets. The introduction of the machine age brought neither the will nor the ability to cope with the serious social dislocations

which the beginnings of industrialization produced. The workers, particularly the women, were increasingly at the mercy of the men who owned and operated the mills. The ideas of democracy and socialism crept into Japanese books, magazines, and newspapers. After 1875 severe press laws meant suppression for any paper and fines or imprisonment for any editor who dared to criticize the government, and it was not until after the creation of political parties that newspapers like the *Asahi* and the *Mai-nichi* were able to become influential organs of public opinion. In Japan the freedom of the press was an early casualty of rigid censorship. The printed word was to serve and promote government policy rather than to encourage original and independent thinking.

During this period the face of Japan began to change. Railway stations became prominent landmarks in the cities; Western-style government buildings, stores, and hotels sprang up as rather grotesque neighbors to shrines, temples, and flimsy Japanese homes and inns.

Internal Developments in Japan to 1931

The governing of Japan during the first generation of the constitutional era was a complicated process of balancing rival political groups. The bureaucrats were challenged by the advocates of modern party and parliamentary government, but with the exception of a brief interlude in 1898, the bureaucrats controlled the government until 1918. Control was maintained primarily because of the influence of the *genro*, or elder statesmen, who made and unmade cabinets in the name of the emperor. Party politicians were seldom liberal or progressive, in spite of their labels, and were overly concerned with the capture of power and the division of spoils. Party loyalty was given to individual leaders and not to programs or ideals. Serious strife divided the advocates of civil supremacy from the militarists. The outstanding antagonists in this conflict were the princes, Ito and Yamagata, both from the Choshu clan. Ito advocated party participation in government, while Yamagata opposed any mollicoddling of the politicians and proposed Japan's expansion by military means.

From 1901 to 1913 Prince Yamagata was the power behind the throne, and he caused the alternation of General Katsura and Prince Saionji as premiers. During this period, the *Seiyukai*, or Association of Friends of Constitutional Government, was able to gain control in the Diet, but it was not able to make any headway with demands that the cabinet should be responsible to the elected representatives of the people. The politicians

were not forceful personalities and the elections were not honestly conducted.

After the death of the Meiji emperor in 1912 and Japan's entry into World War I, the liberal trend in politics was temporarily halted. High prices and wartime shortages led to repressive measures, but with the return of peace the demand increased for the resumption of liberal policies. A commoner, Hara Takashi, the leader of the Seiyukai, was called to organize the first party government to rule Japan in the twentieth century. Corruption, bribery, and the spoils system ruined this brilliant promise of a democratic system. Hara was assassinated on November 21, 1921, ten days after the Washington Conference was convened and successive admirals were put at the helm of Japan's ship of state until 1924. Various party governments ruled from then until after the Manchurian incident in 1931.

Parties in Japan were far from ardent advocates of democracy. The Seiyukai represented large landowners, and was consistently supported by Mitsui and Sumitomo interests. The other major party, the Minseito, championed industrial capitalists and it enjoyed Mitsubishi backing. The alliance between the zaibatsu and the major political parties was mutually beneficial. The zaibatsu served the parties by supplying the funds which were necessary for normal election bribery; the parties served the zaibatsu by choking off leftist movements which might have attracted the votes of the tenant farmers and the workers. In 1925 the right to vote was extended to all males over twenty-five years of age without regard to property qualification, and made possible the organization of labor and radical parties. The Diet became more and more the meeting place for bureaucrats, admirals, and generals who curried the favor of the politicians, zaibatsu, intellectuals, small business men, and rural landowners. This bourgeois-democratic alignment met the needs of the state until it encountered the great depression and the rise of the Kuomintang in China. One party, the Minseito, like the contemporary Hoover regime in the United States, advocated a policy of internal retrenchment. At the same time it displayed a surprisingly mild international attitude. The opposition Seiyukai advocated a more positive policy at home and abroad.

By 1931 both parties were viewed as the puppets of wealth. The old clan and military aristocracy, reinforced by the humble peasant folk who furnished the soldiers and missed the corruptions of luxury, attacked the theory and structure of parliamentary government. They took the initiative in foreign policy, and they forced the party politicians out of office. On May 15, 1932, they assassinated Premier Inukai and attacked strategic power stations, the Metropolitan Police Board in Tokyo, and the Bank

of Japan. These incidents marked the end of a trend—ineffective as it might have been—toward democratic and liberal institutions and the beginnings of Japan's relentless march toward mobilization for total war. Many people from every class of society welcomed the change.

Japan's rapid economic transformation increased the pressure on the agricultural population, a steadily diminishing proportion of the total population, to produce more food for more people. Until World War I Japan's rate of population increase was less than that of Great Britain, but after that date it exploded. The life span lengthened and the death rate decreased, while the birth rate remained constant. If the level of living was to be maintained or improved, Japan had to expand its industries and commerce. The state provided the initiative and the leadership for accelerated economic development. Transportation, communication, mining, and manufacturing enterprises were multiplied. As a result of three foreign wars, new industries were called upon to produce military supplies, and Japanese ships were hired for transporting men and materials. Japanese traders covered China and Southeast Asia; their salesmen swarmed throughout South America and Africa. Increased exports changed Japan from a debtor to a creditor nation.

Economic expansion did not bring prosperity to the majority of the Japanese people. The inflationary spiral brought increased hardship to small landowners and to farm, industrial, and white-collar workers. High taxes and increased debts forced farmers into bankruptcy or tenancy, and drove many country boys into the army or the city for jobs. As the labor supply swelled, wages remained low and working conditions medieval. Labor unions were organized but they were without legal status. They were intimidated by the Peace Preservation Law of 1925, which stipulated fines or imprisonment for membership in societies dedicated to overturning the political and economic order. Labor did not have the right to strike and was obliged to submit its disputes to compulsory arbitration in enterprises directly affecting the public welfare.

Bank failures in 1927 signaled the coming depression. They foreshadowed the rationalization of economic activities, which was in effect the doom of free enterprise. Imports were reduced, exports were increased, and the shipment of gold was embargoed. By a generous use of subsidies and bounties, the government starved nonessential industries and encouraged those considered vital for national security and welfare. The home market was neglected in favor of the export boom. The nation initiated the policies of self-sufficiency which were ominous signposts on the road to war.

While the industrial magnates and the merchant princes increased their

wealth and political influence, the poorer classes struggled to improve their sustenance and began to express their protests against the inequities of the social order. The farmers organized co-operatives for credit, seeds, purchases, storage, and sales. They were interested in economic gains rather than social benefits and never associated themselves intimately with labor or radical movements in the cities. Japanese Socialists confined themselves to theories, and labor leaders who organized a General Federation of Labor in 1920 contented themselves with a moderate and conservative program. In 1921 Japanese Communists organized as a branch of the Comintern. Very few Japanese were attracted to the materialism and internationalism of communism, but many were enticed into the ranks of the protest parties in the hope of economic betterment. In 1928 and after, the government intensified its crack-down on subversive activities of the left and looked with more favor on the superpatriotic agitations of the right.

Mobilizing for War

In the depths of the depression, the forces of democratic liberalism gave way to the inexorable pressures of ultranationalistic totalitarianism. In 1932 the Showa Blood Brotherhood assassinations accounted for the lives of Finance Minister Inouye, Baron Dan of the Mitsui zaibatsu, and Premier Inukai. Censorship, uncertainty, and terror drove Japan to a low point in its internal political and economic situation in 1936.

On February 26, 1936, twenty-two officers and 1,400 men of the Third Infantry Regiment took over strategic points in Tokyo, defied their orders to go abroad, and planned the murder of the premier and some of his cabinet officers. They remained in a state of rebellion for three days until they were induced to return to their regular status by imperial orders. They feared for the welfare of Japan—so they said—and their leaders paid with their lives for bringing to the attention of the people in this spectacular manner the nature of the crisis in which they believed Japan was living.

This incident of "two-twenty-six," as much as any single occurrence, signalized the inauguration of Japan's new policies. Hirota Koki became premier and acted as a civilian front man for the armed forces. On August 11, 1936, he convened a conference of five ministers to adopt "the Basic Principles of National Policy." These principles reduced the Diet in power and prestige, gave the militarists their opportunities to control the government, and dedicated Japan to coldly planned expansion in the name of national defense. Hirota was condemned to death by the International

Military Tribunal for the Far East for his role in the five-year period from 1936 to 1941.

In June, 1937, just before the China incident, Hirota relinquished the premiership to Prince Konoye. The conviction grew that political parties based on liberalism, democracy, and socialism were not fit for the nation. Patriotic organizations like the Black Dragon Society, the *Jimmu kai*, the Cherry Blossom Society, and the *Kokuhonsha* began to emphasize the Imperial Way, *Hakko Ichiu* or "the Eight Corners of the World under One Roof," and Japan's Divine Mission. The Ex-Servicemen's Association and the Imperial League of Young Officers became the most animated spokesmen for the doctrine that the military were the purest interpreters of the imperial will.

In 1940 Japan coupled its aggressive foreign policy with an undiluted program of totalitarianism. All political parties, labor unions, and associations of whatever sort were gathered up into a huge Imperial Rule Assistance Association dedicated to the service of the emperor. When General Tojo became premier in October, 1941, the entire country was groomed to move as one cannonball of fiery resolution.

Japan's political policies seemed to be calculated deliberately to prepare for war. Military budgets skyrocketed, while the army and the navy perfected their organization, equipment, materiel, and training. On January 16, 1941, the War Ministry urged the Ministry of Finance to draw up plates for money for the Southern Regions. Pesos, guilders, and dollars were printed in May, and by October some of these currencies had been sent to the Shanghai agency of the Bank of Japan. During the summer of 1941, the Total War Research Institute carried out table-top maneuvers remarkably suggestive of the actual outbreak of hostilities. The plans for Pearl Harbor were almost a year in the making, although they were not approved by an imperial conference until September 6, 1941.

In military strategy and operations, the supreme command of the army and navy were traditionally independent. Even while General Tojo was premier and chief of the army general staff, he testified that he could not put a finger in matters affecting the naval high command. The full responsibility for the decision for war on December 1, 1941, was that of the cabinet ministers and the supreme command, and not the responsibility of the emperor, who never assumed responsibilities beyond expressing his wishes or offering suggestions.

Mobilization for war required long years of tragic economic preparation. The military leaders kept a paternal eye on the rural districts, but they concentrated on the control of industry, trade, and finance. A "hundred-years' war" required the most careful husbanding of Japan's

meager resources, pending the anticipated conquests of Manchuria and the Southern Regions. As early as 1930 Japan increased the tempo of rationalization in keeping with its traditional policies and with world trends. In 1931 it passed a Major Industries Control Law and subsequently enforced cartelization in cotton spinning, silk, rayon, paper, carbide, flour, sulphuric acid, cement, sugar, and copper industries. In 1934 Japan enacted the Petroleum Industry Law which regulated production, importation, and refining, and provided that all foreign companies should keep a six months' supply in storage. Semiofficial policy companies were established for iron and steel, mining, imports and exports, and shipbuilding.

In 1938 the National General Mobilization Law practically put Japan on a wartime economic footing. This was a general enabling act under which some seventy ordinances and 300 regulations were promulgated. Each industry was given absolute control over production, materials, labor, capital, prices and markets, but the industries were either strictly regulated by the state or directly administered by the state. By subsidies, licenses, quotas, protective tariffs, tax concessions, grants-in-aid, and monopoly guarantees, strategic industries were guaranteed profits and expanded; while smaller or nonessential enterprises were either squeezed out or forced to merge. Priorities were given to munitions, aircraft, automobile, engineering, machine tool, iron and steel, liquid fuel, coal, nonferrous metals, shipbuilding, electric power, and railway equipment industries because of their obvious military value. One basic policy company was organized for each industry—as, for example, the Japan Electric Generation and Transmission Company—and that company bore the entire responsibility for meeting the government's requirements in its own field. The government exercised its supervision through the National Planning Board, which became the general economic overseer. The National Planning Board was in turn wholly subject to the military.

In 1941 a Key Industries Control Ordinance set up a control association for each industry. Each control association was given absolute control over mergers, expropriation or transfer of plants, production and distribution schedules, allocations of labor and materials, technical standards, investments and profits. In November a Law Concerning Industrial Equipment contained the ominous provision that key industries should have proper equipment even in the case of an accident, presumably like a fire or an air raid.

The government control of finances was as tight as the control of production. The flow of money from banks to industries was determined by strategic needs, and the money market was kept in bounds by taxes and

forced savings. The control of foreign exchange was absolute and imports were linked to exports, licensed or prohibited. As in any inflationary situation, Japan seemed to be prosperous. Jobs were plentiful and yen were abundant. Beneath the apparent prosperity was the dearth of consumer goods, the prohibitive level of prices, and the pouring of the products of Japan's booming factories into the insatiable maw of the war machine. Not one third of Japan's production was being used in China; more than two thirds was being stock-piled for more distant adventures.

While Japanese should have been enjoying economic prosperity, they were instead subjected to onerous restrictions and fanatic propaganda. In May, 1938, General Araki became Minister of Education and he looked to the revision of textbooks and the improvement of the curriculum. Military training expanded to include drills, marches, handling of weapons, and military lectures. History, civics, geography, and ethics contributed to aggressive militarism, blind devotion to authority, and faith in Japan's mission. Schools were meticulously supervised, universities were subjected to witch hunts, and professors were discharged or punished for trivial deviations. One outstanding legal authority, Professor Minobe, was purged for teaching that the emperor was the organ of the state rather than that the state was an instrumentality of the emperor. What had been a growing confidence in Japan's abilities transformed itself into a contempt for others and a howling demand for Japanese expansion.

All the media of mass communications were enthusiastically dedicated to greater chauvinism. Foreign motion pictures were excluded and Japanese productions became primarily, if not exclusively, propaganda films. Actors were licensed, and newsreel shots and narrations were designed to start Japanese audiences applauding or hating. War was interpreted as something glorious, not sad, and Japan was shown as struggling to preserve its life, not as an aggressor. The Japan Broadcasting Company made the radio extremely effective in whipping up patriotic spirit. Newspapers were censored and editorials were supervised. Foreign language newspapers were squeezed out or reduced to inanity. Any writer who submitted an article with an overtone for peace was sure to receive a visit from the police. The police were hopeless pawns of the military. If public meetings were held, the police had to be there; if public addresses were to be made, copies had to be submitted and approved in advance.

A Bureau of Information was established in 1936. It became the Board of Information in 1940 and its president was given cabinet status. It was responsible for all government handouts—individual agencies were not permitted their own public information officers. The Ministry of the In-

terior had a National Thought and Activities Headquarters which was responsible for repression of subversive ideas and for thought control.

Foreigners in Japan experienced a difficult decade. Businessmen saw their enterprises eclipsed by Japan's economic nationalism. Missionaries were hurt to see a Church of Christ in Japan diverted to political ends and their schools nationalized. Foreigners were blamed for Japan's frivolities and light-heartedness. The militarists proclaimed a return to fundamental purity and the elimination of the evils of the West. Ballroom dancing was condemned and taxi dance halls were abolished. Small cafés, beer joints, and movie houses were closed. Golf and luxury sports were frowned upon; the baseball terms "strike," "slide," and "out" were given Japanese equivalents. The Jewish conductor of the Tokyo Symphony was discharged and a Nazi hired in his place. (During the war the Jewish conductor was rehired at a substantial increase in salary.) The use of English was prohibited in scientific and technical writing, and English was taken off the required list in schools and colleges. English marking was erased from street names and railway stations. The pendulum went completely into reverse. The wild rush to copy the West gave way to an unreasoned frenzy to rid Japan of every association with the West.

The heavy hand of the police state crushed the tender seeds of individual freedom which had just begun to show signs of life in Japan. In the villages the neighborhood associations watched over the activities of every family and forced them into silence and conformity. In the cities, the *mogas* and *mobos*, the modern boys and modern girls, were shifted from their studies of the arts and sciences, their high school frivolities and discussion groups, into the grim business of preparing for war. Tokyo walked with heavy tread and talked with whispering voices. In 1941 the Peace Preservation Law was tightened; and the National Defense Security Law, the Military Secrets Protection Law, and the Defense Resources Secrets Protection Laws were placed on the statute books. Definitions were flexible, and only in silence was there safety—unless the occasion was a patriotic mass meeting, the dedication of a new factory, or the departure of another troop train heading ominously toward the China front.

Suggested Reading

G. C. ALLEN, *Modern Japan and its Problems* (New York, 1938).

HUGH BORTON, *Japan Since 1931* (New York, 1940).

KENNETH W. COLEGROVE, *Militarism in Japan* (Boston, 1936).

M. E. COZENG, *The Complete Journal of Townsend Harris* (New York, 1930).

- YUKICHI FUKUZAWA, *Autobiography*, translated by F. Kiyooka (Tokyo, 1934).
- J. H. GUBBINS, *The Making of Modern Japan* (London, 1922).
- D. G. HARING, ed., *Japan's Prospect* (Cambridge, 1946).
- FRANCIS L. HAWKS, *Narrative of the Expedition of an American Squadron to the China Seas and Japan*, 3 volumes (Washington, 1856). (Account of the Perry Expedition.)
- D. C. HOLTOM, *Modern Japan and Shinto Nationalism* (Chicago, 1943).
- D. C. HOLTOM, *Modern Japan and Shinto Nationalism* (Chicago, 1943).
- NOBUTAKE IKE, *The Beginnings of Political Democracy in Japan* (Baltimore, 1950).
- NOBUTAKE IKE, *The Beginnings of Political Democracy in Japan* (London, 1922).
- W. W. McLAREN, *A Political History of Japan* (London, 1922).
- E. HERBERT NORMAN, *Japan's Emergence as a Modern State* (New York, 1940).
- COUNT SHIGENOBU OKUMA, compiler, *Fifty Years of New Japan* (London, 1910).
- H. S. QUIGLEY, *Japanese Government and Politics* (New York, 1932).
- ROBERT K. REISCHAUER, *Japan: Government-Politics* (New York, 1939).
- O. TANIN AND E. YOHAN, *Militarism and Fascism in Japan* (New York, 1934).
- ARTHUR WALWORTH, *Black Ships off Japan* (New York, 1946).
- A. MORGAN YOUNG, *Japan under Taisho Tenno, 1912-1926* (London, 1928).
- , *Imperial Japan, 1926-1938* (New York, 1938).

CHAPTER 11

The Foreign Policies of Japan

As Japan emerged as a modern nation, it developed vigorous foreign policies. Domestic dilemmas were often side-stepped by diverting the nation's energies and attention across the seas. Conversely, Japan from the very beginning of its national existence derived unusual advantage at the diplomatic bargaining tables because its representatives spoke with the voice of one authority backed by the dynamic force of a united people. Japan's rise to a great power was spectacular and unexpected. The quality of its statesmen surpassed the poverty of its resources and compensated for the recency of Japan's entry into the world community.

In foreign policy, Japan regarded its relations with the Asian continent as fundamental. Its geographic location accounted for its appreciation of its own strategic vulnerability. As of prime importance, Japan was obliged to concentrate upon its position in Northeast Asia, Korea, Manchuria, and Mongolia. It could never afford to be disinterested in China and, it may be argued, became so obsessed with the idea that it had to dominate China that it deliberately engaged in the reckless adventures which paved the way to its own catastrophes in World War II. The idea of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere seemed to Japan a natural and inevitable arrangement with its neighbors.

Japan's basic approach to world affairs was that its own security and welfare were rooted in Asia. Relations with the rest of the world were looked upon as incidental, except as they affected directly the situation in Asia. The principal objective of Japanese diplomacy—whether with China or Russia, or later with Great Britain, the Axis powers, and the United States—was the establishment of its leadership in its own immediate environment.

Consolidating the Empire

The Japanese looked upon the process of territorial acquisition as consolidation rather than expansion. Japanese historians considered the Kuriles, Sakhalin, the Bonins, the Ryukyus, and Formosa as natural and inevitable bastions in the legitimate self-defense of Japan.

Japan's claims to Sakhalin were at least as valid as the claims of Russia. In 1873 one of the ablest of Japan's diplomats, Count Soyejima, would have purchased the entire island of Sakhalin for Japan, but the Japanese cabinet frowned upon the proposition. The island was regarded as worthless in view of the extreme coldness of the climate and the barrenness of the soil. The possession of even a portion of the island was unwanted because it would merely furnish a source of constant trouble between the two countries. In the light of the cabinet attitude, it was easy to reach a settlement with Russia. Russia wanted Sakhalin because of its commanding position at the mouth of the Amur River.

The Japanese-Russian treaty of 1875 recognized Sakhalin as Russian and the Kurile Islands as Japanese. It provided for the payment of an indemnity in exchanging public buildings owned by the Japanese government in Sakhalin and by the Russians in the Kuriles and assured the right of option and protection of the nationals of Japan in Sakhalin and of Russia in the Kuriles. The treaty accorded to Japanese ships entering the port of Kirsakov in Sakhalin a ten-year exemption on the payment of customs and harbor dues, gave the Japanese the right to appoint a consul there, extended most-favored-nation treatment to Japanese vessels and merchants, and granted to Japanese subjects privileges of fishing and navigating in the Okhotsk Sea and along the coast of Kamchatka. In exchange for its claim to Sakhalin, Japan received a treaty from a great power which was entered into on a basis of equality and reciprocity and which gave eminent psychological satisfaction to Japan, sensitive of its national honor.

In October, 1880, the Bonins, or Ogasawara Islands, were incorporated into the internal administration of Tokyo Metropolitan Prefecture. These islands are 480 miles south of Tokyo, on the trade routes to the east and south. They were allegedly discovered and named in the sixteenth century by Ogasawara Sadayori, whose name they bear. In 1827 the British flag was raised there, and in 1853 the American colors were hoisted over the Coffin group by Commodore Kelly of Perry's expedition. The claims of three powers were in conflict when in 1861 the shogunate notified Townsend Harris of its intention to encourage emigration and to appoint an administrative official. Some tens of Americans, British, and French had es-

established themselves in the islands, but their interests were not of sufficient importance to prompt their respective governments to oppose Japan's assumption of full territorial sovereignty.

Japan meanwhile established its position in the Ryukyus. The Ryukyus were tributary both to China and Japan for centuries. Tribute was first sent to China in 1372 and to Japan in 1451. The successive princes of the Ryukyus, although tracing their ancestry to the half brother of the great Yoritomo, received their investiture regularly from the Chinese emperor. On the other hand, the Ryukyus were conquered by the Lord of Satsuma in 1609, and after that date the princes also received their investiture from the sovereign of Japan. The islands maintained a kind of independent status, in spite of the annual tribute to the courts at Peking and Satsuma. As an autonomous entity, the Ryukyus concluded treaties with the United States in 1854 and with the Netherlands four years later.

In November, 1871, a Ryukyuan junk was stranded off the east coast of Formosa and fifty-four of the sixty-six members of the crew were killed and eaten. The Ryukyuan government sought the protection of Japan—to Japan's delight—because Japan claimed the Ryukyus as part of Japan's realm. Japan followed an American precedent and decided to send a punitive expedition to Formosa if negotiations with China were not successful. Japan's claims were received sympathetically by the Tientsin viceroy, Li Hung-chang, who was quite willing to recognize Chinese responsibility for events in Formosa. The Chinese court differed from Li. The court was financially embarrassed by the emperor's wedding and was in no mood to satisfy Japan's demands for indemnities. In 1874 the Japanese sent a punitive expedition against Formosa, another unmistakable step in eliminating the Chinese from the Ryukyus.

In 1872, after the massacre of the sailors but before the punitive expedition, the Japanese authorities invited King Sho Tai to Tokyo, made him a member of the Japanese peerage, and constituted the Ryukyus as vassalage under him. Japan arranged to terminate the tribute to Peking, and in October, 1872, formally incorporated the Ryukyus into the Japanese Empire. In successive steps, Japan recognized the Ryukyans as Japanese subjects, assumed all right to carry on diplomatic negotiations for the Ryukyus, garrisoned imperial troops in the Ryukyus, reorganized the internal administrative structure, and took over the functions of the police and the judiciary. In 1879 the Japanese authorities took over all political rights from the king of the Ryukyus and organized the administration of the islands as the Okinawa prefecture.

The Chinese retracted while the Japanese expanded. In 1874 Li Hung-chang was able to persuade the court of the wisdom of insisting on its

sovereignty over Formosa, even at the cost of a money payment to Japan, on behalf of the Ryukyuan sailors. On October 31, 1874, a Chinese-Japanese treaty recognized the Japanese expedition as a just and rightful proceeding to protect its own subjects. China agreed to pay 500,000 taels (\$750,000) not as an indemnity but as consolation to the aggrieved families and as reimbursement for roads and buildings which Japan had constructed in the course of the expedition. The indemnity was paid within three months and the Japanese forces evacuated Formosa. This transaction really sealed the fate of China by advertising to the world that here was a rich empire which was ready to pay but which was not ready to fight.

The Chinese protested that the clause in the 1874 treaty which acknowledged Ryukyuan as Japan's own subjects was insufficient to constitute formal abandonment of China's claims to the Ryukyus. The Chinese tried to enlist General Grant in support of their position while the former president was on a world tour in the Orient, but they were unsuccessful. They then tried to salvage half a loaf and undertook negotiations looking to the division of the Ryukyus. The Chinese lost the will to oppose Japanese penetration into the Ryukyus in view of the graver complications of Formosa and Korea.

The immediate result of the Japanese expedition to Formosa in 1874 was to establish Japan's claims to the Ryukyus. The indirect result was to emphasize for Japan the importance of Formosa itself. Formosa had been a trading center, a pirates' lair, and an outpost for fugitives from justice. After a period of Dutch control and two generations under notorious pirate rulers, Koxinga and his son, Formosa was incorporated into the Chinese Empire in 1682 and administered as part of Fukien Province. Internal conditions were a mixture of maladministration and extortion, neglect and laxity, banditry and interclan feuds, and chronic wars between Chinese and aborigines. When shipwrecked sailors were cast ashore in the midst of such anarchy, it was fortunate if they escaped with their lives.

The British were interested in Formosa until they got Hongkong, and some Americans were intrigued with the idea of making Formosa an American possession. British and American firms built up a promising trade in oolong tea, opium, and camphor in the decade 1860-1870 when Tamsui, Tainan, Keelung, and Takao were opened for commerce. In 1871 a fortnightly steamer service was inaugurated between Formosa and the mainland of China. These developments were of interest to Japan, which established in 1874 in connection with its expedition an Office of Formosan Affairs with Okuma as its director. For ten years Japan quietly studied the possibilities of Formosa. In 1884 France unsuccessfully tried to take and hold Formosa as a guarantee for China's payment of the indemnity

promised as a result of the war in Indo-China. The French initiative stimulated the Chinese in Formosa to institute belated reform measures, strengthen the military defenses, and look to a program of economic development.

It was another case of too little and too late. When war broke out between China and Japan over Korea, Japan seized the occasion to move into the Pescadores and to demand title to the Pescadores and Formosa as part of the reward of victory. Within a few months after the Treaty of Shimonoseki legally ceded Formosa to Japan in 1895, the troops of Japan occupied Formosa in spite of token Chinese opposition and an embryonic independence demonstration on the part of some Formosans. The Japanese felt that "the island which China had torn from Koxinga's descendants by intrigue, bribery, and brute force passed again into the hands of the Japanese, in whose veins flows the same blood as filled those of Koxinga." This version differed from the Cairo Declaration in 1943 which affirmed that Formosa had been stolen from China by Japan.

On October 10, 1895, General Nogi entered Tainan and set about pacifying guerrillas in the countryside. A civil administration was commissioned the next year and called upon the army for establishment of law and order. Intermittent skirmishes broke out between Japanese and aborigines, and between 1907 and 1928 four armed revolts by Formosans and Chinese were ruthlessly suppressed.

Japan in Korea

Korea, alternately called the "dagger pointing at the heart of Japan" and "the bridge of culture between Japan and the mainland of Asia," was the first objective of Japan's expansion on the continent. Neither Korea's existence as a separate cultural and political entity nor its age-long political relations with China sufficed to thwart Japan's intentions. The disasters which overwhelmed the armies of Hideyoshi prevented further aggressions against Korea during the Tokugawa shogunate.

Immediately after the Restoration, Japan sought both directly and through China to establish communications between the boy emperor of Korea and the newly created emperor of Japan. The king's father, the reactionary regent, Taiwunkun, shied away from the Japanese overtures and sought protection from the Chinese overlord. Anti-Japanese feeling ran high in Korea; prointervention sentiment rose to a fever pitch in Japan. In September, 1875, the Japanese brought about the opening of Korea, repeating the lessons which they had learned from the ships and

the diplomacy of the United States. A Japanese warship, ostensibly on a survey mission along the Korean coast, was fired upon by a Korean shore battery. A battle followed, the Korean batteries were reduced, and Japan claimed for its victory a commercial treaty.

Japan ignored China's claim to suzerainty over Korea and signed the Treaty of Kanghwa direct with Korea on February 27, 1876. The treaty constituted Japanese recognition of the independence of Korea and emphasized Korea's equality with Japan. It provided for Japanese consular jurisdiction in Korea and for the exchange of ministers and consuls. It stipulated that two ports, Jinsen and Gensan, in addition to Pusan, were to be opened in Korea and that detailed trade regulations would subsequently be agreed upon. Thus, at the same time that Japan agitated for the abolition of unequal treaties in Japan, it took the lead in clamping similar treaties upon its weaker continental neighbor. To counter the growing Japanese influence in Korea, China urged Korea to enter into treaty relations with the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Russia, and France.

The Korean countryside was a hotbed of anteforeignism, confusion, and chaos; the Korean court was a tug of war between the regent and the queen, who had been selected from the powerful, noble Min family. The king was a hopeless, feckless individual who vacillated between the demands of his father and the will of his wife. The regent continued to look to conservatism and China, and the queen turned toward modernization reforms and Japan. In a riot in Seoul in 1882, some Japanese officials were killed, the Japanese legation was attacked, and the Japanese minister was driven to refuge aboard a British ship. In retaliation, Japan forced the Treaty of Chemulpo of August 30, 1882, upon Korea which provided for the usual apology and indemnities, and authorized the stationing of Japanese troops to guard the legation at Seoul. China also obtained the right to station troops in the Korean capital.

Japan's problem was to detach Korea from China as a prelude to the implementation of its own leadership. China took measures to oppose Japan's schemes. Yüan Shih-k'ai came to Korea as Resident Minister and obtained from China special rights of residence and travel, a monopoly of telegraph development, and control of the Korean customs. Sino-Japanese rivalry became hopelessly enmeshed in the internal strife, and the two powers tried to improve their respective positions in Korea by direct negotiations. In the spring of 1885 the Minister of the Imperial Household, Ito Hirobumi, negotiated a convention with the Tientsin viceroy, Li Hung-chang (Yüan Shih-k'ai's patron and immediate superior), which provided that troops of both China and Japan should be withdrawn from Korea

within four months and, if troops of either side were to be returned, that advance notice would be given in writing to the other side. Neither Japanese nor Chinese were to be employed as instructors for the Korean Army. At this point, when Japanese influence seemed at its lowest ebb in Korea, approaches were made to Russia for assistance. Russia sought the lease of Port Lazarev and as a countermove British naval forces occupied Port Hamilton on an island off the southern tip of Korea.

Three major forces swirled about the country and the court. The heirs of the old order clustered about the Taiwunkun; the moderns or progressives looked for favors to the Japanese legation; and the queen sought to balance power in her favor by playing up to Great Britain, the United States, and Russia. Yüan Shih-k'ai dominated the king and he tended to favor the queen in his efforts to preserve peace and Chinese hegemony. An American adviser to the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Owen Denny, opposed Yüan because he felt that it was his first duty to advance the movement toward Korean independence. During the five years from 1889 to 1894, American influence waned, Russia played a retiring role, and China and Japan were left face to face at the court of Seoul. The party of content found their support at the Chinese residency; the "Young Korea" party of discontent found their encouragement at the Japanese legation. All the forms of Oriental intrigue were adopted—demonstrations, denunciations, palace cabals, assassinations of ministers, revolts in the provinces—but in none was any proof ever obtainable of the guilty agency. Plotting and counterplotting, charge and countercharge, advice and counter-advice, all were poured into the ears of the distracted puppet king, until nothing was left but the final arbitrament of war.¹

Kim Ok-kiun, a progressive leader who threatened civil war, was lured to Shanghai where he was assassinated on March 29, 1894. His body was returned to Korea and cut into pieces and exhibited throughout Korea as a warning to other progressives who might threaten civil war. In June, 1894, the Tonghaks, or members of a reactionary Society for Eastern Learning, from the opposite extreme of the social order and with the backing of the Taiwunkun, instigated rebellions in southern Korea. In the face of civil war, the Korean court, moved by the fine hand of Yüan Shih-k'ai, asked for Chinese military assistance. The Chinese sent troops and notified the Japanese *afterward*. The Japanese immediately dispatched six times as many soldiers to look after Japanese interests.

In June, 1894, a new Japanese minister arrived in Korea and proposed reforms to the king of Korea. He suggested the eradication of corruption

¹ H. B. Morse, *International Relations of the Chinese Empire* (Kelly and Walsh, Ltd., Shanghai, 1910-1918), Vol. 3, p. 18.

among officials, a civil service based on merit, reforms in political, military, and fiscal administration, and an improvement in the educational system. He intimated that it would be difficult to carry out these reforms as long as the Chinese retained their influence in Seoul. There was nothing subtle about the Japanese approach. The Japanese government reassured itself about the strategic value of Korea in its program of continental expansion and viewed with alarm the potential and smoldering designs of other nations. It feared that the contagion of Korea's internal chaos might spread to Japan with disastrous effects considering the inflammable quality of its own domestic controversies. Farsighted Japanese began to appreciate the economic value of Korea as a potential rice supplier for Japan's sprouting millions and as an adjunct to an embryo industrial and commercial machine.

Japan took the initiative. The Korean government was forced to request Japanese assistance in driving the Chinese out of Korea and to sign a treaty of alliance giving freedom of movement and supplies to Japanese troops. Japan refused to withdraw its troops preliminary to the accomplishment of the proposed reforms and it engaged in hostilities against China on land and sea before it formally declared war. The Japanese Navy defeated the Chinese off the mouth of the Yalu and secured the line of communications between Japan and Korea. Japan poured troops into Korea and mastered the situation immediately. The Japanese forced the king of Korea to issue edicts changing the entire governmental system and modernizing, on paper, the economic and social life of Korea almost overnight. By the Treaty of Shimonoseki, April 17, 1895, China recognized the full and complete independence and autonomy of Korea. Thus was accomplished the second step in Japan's advance in Korea. The first step was the Japanese recognition of Korea's independence by the Treaty of Kanghwa in 1876; the second step was the Chinese recognition of that independence and autonomy by the Treaty of Shimonoseki, nearly two decades later.

Korea became independent in name only and was never thereafter genuinely independent of Japanese domination. Japanese advisers supervised every branch of the Korean government and Japanese economic interests plunged into the development of Korea's resources. When the headstrong queen turned to Russia for the anti-Japanese support which had previously come from China, she was murdered. The Japanese worked through their old enemy, the Taiwunkun, and they made the hapless king their political prisoner. In some mysterious manner the king escaped and took refuge in the Russian legation on February 11, 1896. The pendulum swung against the Japanese, who tried to accomplish reforms too fast and too ruthlessly, with the result that Russia superseded Japan in exercising control over the Korean government.

After the embarrassment of the Triple Intervention, Japan was content to work out a temporary arrangement with Russia for relative position in Korea. On May 14, 1896, the Russian minister, Waeber, in Seoul and the Japanese representative, Marquis Komura, agreed that Japanese civil gendarmes should replace military guards for the protection of the telegraph lines between Fusan and Seoul and that these should be withdrawn as soon as possible. They further agreed that the small number of Japanese and Russian guards maintained for the protection of property should be withdrawn when peace and order were assured. When Prince Yamagata went to St. Petersburg to attend the coronation of the czar, he made a more fundamental agreement with Russian Foreign Minister Lobanov-Rostovsky. Russia and Japan agreed to counsel the Korean government, to establish a sound financial system, and to render assistance in the matter of loans if needed. Both powers pledged themselves to abstain from participation in the organization and maintenance of Korean police and military forces. Both were to receive equal treatment in matters of economic rights and privileges.

With the Korean king in their custody, and with the bravado which accompanied their successful opposition to Japan in China, the Russians ignored their agreements about Korea and undertook new offensive measures. They sent military advisers and instructors to reorganize the Korean army, imposed a Russian director over the Korean arsenal, converted Russian timber concessions along the Yalu River and their mining concessions along the Tumen River into outright instruments of aggression, and sought to obtain control of Korea's customs and financial administration. Japan realized that Russia had overextended itself and proposed an arrangement that if Russia recognized Japan's freedom of action in Korea, Japan in return would regard Manchuria as lying outside Japan's interest.

Meanwhile, in Korea the independence sentiment crystallized against Russia and forced Russia to withdraw its advisers, close the Russo-Korean Bank, and recall its aggressive minister, M. de Speyer. On April 25, 1898, Baron Rosen, the Russian ambassador in Tokyo, and the Japanese Foreign Minister, Nishi, signed a conciliatory protocol which reaffirmed recognition of the independence and the perfect sovereignty of Korea. Japan and Russia agreed to abstain from all direct interference in the internal affairs of that country and not to take any measures regarding the nomination of military instructors and financial advisers without previous mutual understanding. Russia recognized Japan's peculiar commercial interest in Korea and agreed not to obstruct the development of the commercial and industrial relations between Japan and Korea.

For five years (1899-1904) Russia and Japan jockeyed for primacy in Korea. Russia's major interests were in China and Manchuria, while

Japan's immediate objectives and most attainable hopes were in Korea. Russia sought a naval base near Fusan but Japan thwarted its efforts. Russia sought a declaration of neutrality for Korea or an understanding which would limit Japan in Korea. Japan preferred to play the game of world politics with complete and unimpeded control of Korea as the goal. In 1902 and 1903 the Russians made further menacing moves. They occupied a Korean port near the mouth of the Yalu, tried to obtain a concession for a railway from Seoul to the Yalu River, and built telegraph lines and highways from North Korean points to their military posts in Manchuria.

Coupled with Russia's manifest motives in Manchuria, the activities in Korea constituted a serious menace to the existence of Japan. The Russo-Japanese War resulted directly from events in Manchuria, but its roots were equally enmeshed in the frictions of Korea. Japan was willing to make concessions to Russia about Manchuria or China, but not about Korea. In 1904 Japan forced the Korean government to accept advisers in financial affairs, foreign affairs, and police, judicial, and military matters. The Japanese minister to Korea was authorized to supervise the entire Korean administration. When Japan declared war on Russia, the imperial rescript emphasized that "the safety of Korea is in danger; the vital interests of Our Empire are menaced." During the war, Japanese troops overran Korea and Japan took over the Korean postal and telegraph services. The Japanese compelled the Korean king, whose title had been changed to emperor, to sign a treaty of alliance which guaranteed the national independence and territorial integrity of Korea and the safety of the imperial family. Behind this façade, Japan prepared careful plans to convert Korea into a protectorate at an opportune moment.

By the renewed alliance between Japan and Great Britain on August 12, 1905, Japan received British recognition of paramount Japanese interests in Korea. By the Treaty of Portsmouth, the following month, Japan obtained the same recognition from Russia. Both Japan and Russia agreed to abstain from military measures on the Russian-Korean frontier which might menace the security of Russian or Korean territory.

In November, 1905, Japan sent Marquis Ito to Seoul to negotiate a convention converting Korea into a Japanese protectorate. The convention was signed while the imperial palace was under Japanese guard. It granted to Japan the control and direction of Korea's foreign relations and provided for the appointment of a Japanese resident-general in Korea. Japan informed the powers that its previous attitude of guidance proved insufficient and that in the future Japan would take and exercise, for reasons closely connected with its own safety and repose, a paramount interest in the political, military, and diplomatic affairs of Korea.

Marquis Ito resigned the presidency of the Privy Council and became the first Japanese resident-general in Korea in February, 1906. He launched a host of Japanization measures labeled reforms, and complained of Korea's insincerity and non-co-operation. The Korean emperor was singled out for particular blame and he was forced to abdicate in favor of his son. A new Japan-Korea agreement was signed on July 24, 1907, which placed the administration of all important state affairs, official appointments and dismissals, and the enactment of all laws and ordinances in the hands of the Japanese resident-general.

The Korean Army was disbanded in August, 1907, and a treaty of annexation was concluded on August 22, 1910. Korea surrendered its sovereignty and Japan assumed the entire government and administration of Korea. A new administrative system was set up under a governor-general and Korea became an integral part of the national life of Japan. Korea as a name and a state disappeared from the map of Asia. It became the Japanese dependency of Chosen—a long line of official declarations, promises, guaranties, and treaty clauses stipulating Korean independence and territorial integrity to the contrary notwithstanding.

The nobility and the powerful conservative elements of Korea were cajoled into acceptance of Japanese domination. Titles and pensions were distributed liberally. The peasants were ignored or simply mobilized into an all-encompassing program of exploitation. Rice production was steadily increased as a matter of state policy, and the precious Korean grain flowed steadily into Japan. The fish catch in Korean waters was quadrupled, primarily to meet the needs of the Japanese diet. Japan undertook the intensive development of Korea's economic resources and built important industries based on those resources. More than 75 per cent of all industrial production was by Japanese corporations and 93 per cent of all mining capital was Japanese owned. War industries, including iron and steel, light metals, chemicals, aircraft, munitions, machine tools, and transport vehicles, were multiplied. Koreans were forced to buy their consumers' goods from Japan, for which they exchanged their rice. All important jobs in the booming Korean economy were reserved for Japanese subjects.

Militarily, Korea was well developed as an outpost for Japanese protection and as a springboard for further aggression. Regular divisions of the Japanese army were stationed in Korea, fortresses were built, naval bases were established, and airfields were constructed throughout the peninsula. Railway and highway systems were developed primarily with an eye to military necessities. Japan was linked closely with Manchuria and with many posts along the northern border near Soviet territory. The country itself was ruled by leading Japanese militarists under the control of the

powerful Chosen Army. Korea was equipped by the Japanese to play the same role in any northern advance that Formosa was destined to play in the march to the south.

Japan brought law and order to Korea and significant progress but with slight regard for the sensibilities of the Koreans. Use of the Japanese language was compulsory, all religions except Shinto were discouraged, and Korean law codes were copied from Japanese patterns with no regard for Korean customs. Discrimination against Koreans was found in every field. Japanese children were given adequate schooling, but Korean children were restricted even in the primary grades. A double standard of wages was maintained, and government jobs were reserved for Japanese.

Hatred of the Japanese became widespread, but it was kept from expressing itself in open rebellion by the strict political and military administration. There were sporadic uprisings, the most spectacular one on March 1, 1919, a demonstration for independence. In the process of suppression and surveillance, the Japanese put hundreds of Koreans to death and imprisoned thousands of others. Korea became a police state with all the inconsiderateness and brutality of a totalitarian system operated by foreign masters. Hardy Korean anti-Japanese leaders agitated quietly within Korea or migrated to Russia, China, or the United States. Men like Syngman Rhee kept alive the aspirations for a free and independent Korea but were unable to check Japan's relentless absorption of Korea into its own continental imperial system.

Japan in Manchuria

After Korea, Japan concentrated on Manchuria. Manchuria was an integral part of the Chinese Empire, unappreciated and neglected until it was opened to Chinese immigration at the turn of the century. The only Japanese interests in Manchuria were those which flowed from the treaties with China. In 1900 Japan would have been quite content to write off Manchuria to Russia in exchange for unhampered control of Korea. Japan wanted Liaotung, but for a long time was impotent against the might of Russia. Japan would have preferred an understanding or division of interests with Russia, but its overtures were met with insolence and evasion. Japan chose to fight Russia for supremacy in Northeast Asia, and spent 100,000 lives and two billion gold yen in achieving victory.

By the Treaty of Portsmouth, Japan succeeded to Russia's position in South Manchuria, Manchuria south of Changchun. Russia transferred to Japan, subject to the consent of China, its lease upon Port Arthur, Dairen,

and adjacent territory of the Liaotung Peninsula, upon the express engagement that Japan as well as Russia would evacuate and turn over to the administration of China completely and exclusively all of Manchuria except the territory affected by the lease. In addition, Russia transferred to Japan, subject to the consent of China, the railway from Changchun to Port Arthur, together with all its branches and all rights, privileges, and property appertaining thereto, upon the engagement that Japan as well as Russia would exploit her railways exclusively for commercial purposes and in no wise for strategic purposes. Japan and Russia agreed not to obstruct any general measures common to all countries which China might take for the development of commerce and industry in Manchuria.

Japan negotiated in December, 1905, the Treaty of Peking with China, by which China recognized the transfers made to Japan by Russia and agreed to a new basis of understanding with Japan in its new position. Japan accepted the obligations of the Open Door and respect for the territorial integrity of China in Manchuria, and within those limits laid a legal foundation for its economic advances. By the agreement at Peking, new cities and towns were to be opened and the railway between Mukden and the Korean border was to be reconstructed. The Japanese were granted the right to have railway guards in South Manchuria, until Russian guards should be withdrawn from the railways in North Manchuria or until tranquillity should be re-established in Manchuria. A Sino-Japanese joint-stock company was to be organized to develop the Yalu River timber reserves. China agreed not to construct any branch railway line in the neighborhood of and parallel to the South Manchurian Railway or any branch line which would be prejudicial to the business of that railway. Subsequent conferences were to be called to take care of further railway, mining, telegraph, and public property matters.

Japan organized the South Manchurian Railway Company in August, 1906. The government retained 50 per cent ownership in the stock of the company and entrusted to the company all railways, mines, and other appurtenances. Through the years, the South Manchurian Railway Company became the chief agency of Japanese penetration into Manchuria and one of the most diversified enterprises in the world. It operated railways, mines, hotels, schools, hospitals, shipping lines, research institutes, factories, harbor works, and electric generator plants. It dictated economic and commercial policies and exercised a decisive influence on political decisions within Manchuria and Japan itself.

Japan also organized a Government-General for the Kwantung leased area and established garrison headquarters for the Kwantung Army. Port Arthur and its vicinity became the advanced outpost for Japan on the

continent. The rest of Manchuria was restored to Chinese administrative control, but the Chinese officials were always sensitive to the opinions and advice of the Japanese. Dairen was reopened as a free port with a Chinese official in charge of collecting the Chinese customs tariff. Japanese settlers came to Manchuria in small—almost insignificant—numbers; the immigrants were primarily concession hunters, developers, smooth operators, and political functionaries rather than colonists and farmers. It was rather the great influx of Chinese farmers into Manchuria which accounted for the expanding production of soya beans, rice, kaoliang, millet, maize, wheat, and barley.

Japan's economic emphasis on Manchuria centered in railways and industrialization. From the Russo-Japanese War to World War I, Japan determined to maintain an exclusive position within South Manchuria and to do so in legal agreement with China. Japan obtained new railway contracts for feeder lines and concessions for new coal mines, telegraph lines, lumbering operations, and miscellaneous commercial and industrial undertakings. As the Japanese forged ahead, the Chinese resisted feebly. Animosity smoldered and discord replaced friendship. Highhanded and underhanded relationships were more common and more frequent than genuine co-operation. Japan thwarted British and American efforts to support China and neutralize Japan's hegemony. International understandings with Russia and an alliance with England enabled Japan to do practically as it pleased in Manchuria. Japan then began to develop a sentimental attachment to Manchuria and to feel that the expenditure of much blood and treasure endowed it with a sacred right of proprietorship. Japan became increasingly insistent in dealing with Chinese authorities about the suppression of banditry and the maintenance of law and order as Japanese treaty rights accumulated and as Japanese investments expanded.

Japan's most extensive treaty rights in Manchuria were consequences of the Twenty-one Demands when Japan was reaching for supremacy in all of China. The treaty between Japan and China of May 25, 1915, with respect to South Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia, provided that the leases of Port Arthur and Dairen and of the South Manchurian and Antung-Mukden railway lines should be extended to ninety-nine years; that Japanese subjects might reside and travel in South Manchuria, engage in business and manufacturing, and lease land outside of treaty ports for trade, manufacturing, or agricultural purposes; that joint Chinese-Japanese enterprises might be undertaken; that Japanese subjects would be accorded extraterritorial rights; that suitable places in eastern Inner Mongolia should be opened to residence and trade; and that the Kirin-Changchun Railway loan agreement should be revised in favor of Japan. By separate

notes China conceded that Japanese subjects should have the right to prospect for and to work certain coal and iron mines in specified regions in Fengtien and Kirin provinces; that if China sought foreign capital for railway construction in Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia, application would be made first to Japan; and that if China found it necessary to employ foreign financial, military, or police advisers in Manchuria, it would hire Japanese.

American involvement in World War I erased the only effective opposition which Japan had encountered in Manchuria. The American signature on the Lansing-Ishii agreement in 1917, recognizing Japan's special interests in China, encouraged Japan to expand its restless energies to take advantage of the war in Europe and to deepen its roots in the whole of Asia. In North Asia, Japan temporarily stretched beyond Manchuria to seek a foothold in Siberia.

Japan was not averse to any possible expulsion of the power of Russia from North Manchuria and preferably from the entire Far East. The Russian revolution seemed to offer a favorable opportunity. When Russia collapsed, the Allies decided to send an international expedition to intervene in Siberia. The United States and Japan agreed to send a limited number of troops to guard military supplies in Vladivostok, to operate the vital Russian railways in North Manchuria, and to assist the Czechoslovakian prisoners who tried to escape from Russia by way of Siberia. The Allies also wanted to extend any efforts for self-government or self-defense which the Russians would be willing to accept, in order to check the spread of bolshevism.

To Japan the Bolshevik or Communist menace seemed deadly; so Japan assumed a particular responsibility to assist in the reorganization of Russia in Asia and in the preservation of peace in the Far East. Japanese troops occupied strategic points in Siberia as far west as Lake Baikal, the Maritime Provinces, and the northern half of the island of Sakhalin. The Japanese acted as masters in the territory which they occupied although they promised they would not interfere with the internal affairs of Russia nor impinge upon its sovereignty. Japan dabbled in the local civil wars between Reds and Whites and tried to establish puppet regimes favorable to Japan. It tried to prevent the formation of governments favorable to the Soviet, and to the limit of its abilities and resources maneuvered to check the return of Soviet power after the chaos of the revolution disappeared. This excursion beyond Manchuria into Siberia proved to be beyond Japan's capabilities. Japan reached an understanding to pull out of the Siberian mainland at the time of the Washington Conference and out of northern Sakhalin at the time of the restoration of Japanese-Russian relations in 1925.

Japan accelerated its earlier efforts to consolidate its control in Man-

churia, its most promising area of operations, actually completed the construction of many railways, and entered into loan agreements with China for the construction of others. Japan dominated the trade and administration of Manchuria to the point where the United States felt that in effect Japan was violating its promises with regard to the Open Door and the territorial integrity of China.

Japan insisted that it acted in Manchuria exactly as Europeans or Americans acted in their weaker neighbors' territories and that it observed the strict letter of its international commitments. To Japan, the Open Door was not an intangible ideal intended to guarantee equality of commercial opportunity, but it was a precise commitment not to interfere with treaty ports or vested interests, to apply the Chinese treaty tariff, and to collect nondiscriminatory railway and harbor dues.

The United States objected to questionable competitive practices on the part of the Japanese, like discriminating in favor of Dairen as opposed to Newchwang or giving rebates on goods entering Manchuria by way of Korea, but it could not pinpoint any violations against the letter, as contrasted with the spirit, of the Open Door.

Likewise, Japan defended itself against allegations of violating the territorial integrity of China. Japan argued that it was within its obligations as long as territory was not actually detached from China. Japan's critics argued that Japanese encroachments amounted to practical impairment of China's integrity and independence. Whenever China complained that Japan acted unjustly, Japan replied that it merely took advantage of its legal rights and privileges. Biding its time, Japan felt sufficiently solid in Manchuria to consider Manchuria, like Korea, firmly in its grasp. It would await an opportune time—for example, the Mukden incident in 1931—to complete the political separation of Manchuria from China and to incorporate that vital area into its own political system.

Japan in China

Japan's ambitions on the Asian continent outgrew the peripheral areas on the north and came to include the sprawling mainland of China itself. As long as Japan was young as a modernized nation and comparatively weak, it was satisfied to be treated as an equal by China. As Japan grew in prestige and power, it demanded from China the privileges accorded to the West. Japan defeated China in war and took to itself territories which had belonged to China. After inching its way into Korea and Manchuria, Japan directed its policies toward political control, economic monopoly, and

military domination of great portions of the China mainland. By these means Japan believed that it could remove any threat to its own security from the direction of China and utilize the resources and markets of China for the welfare of its own dynamic population. Japan seemed to think that its influence in world diplomacy would be enhanced immeasurably if Japan contained within its grasp the destinies of China or the power to mold the policies of China in harmony with its own objectives.

Some Japanese and some Chinese had always believed that Japan and China together should be firm friends and should speak with the united voice of the Orient. Sun Yat-sen had called China and Japan natural friends, unnatural enemies, and had said that, from whatever point of view, China and Japan should co-operate wholeheartedly. He declared that the relationship between the two countries should be common existence or common extinction; "without Japan there would be no China, without China there would be no Japan." Similarities in language and culture and a complementary economic relationship would have seemed to steer Japan and China into parallel paths—and they may do so in the future—but Japan preferred to act more often toward China as a most disagreeable superior than as an understanding neighbor.

In the last days of the Manchu Empire, the Japanese minister played a modest but effective role in Peking. Japan's tactics were to co-operate with the Western powers and let them take the diplomatic initiative. All the while, Japan kept its record straight by observing the principles of the Open Door and the territorial and administrative integrity of China. Years before the outbreak of the revolution in China, Dr. Sun and many of his colleagues found safety and financial support in Japan. Some Japanese opinion fancied the idea of revolution in China, but the Tokyo government favored the preservation of the monarchy. Japan tried to block international recognition of the republic and advanced loans to Yüan Shih-k'ai to sustain him in his struggle against the parliament. Because of incidents involving Japanese citizens, Japan was tempted to intervene in the course of domestic affairs but was restrained by the Western powers and the ominous war clouds in Europe.

Throughout 1913 and 1914 Japan expressed concern about the forthcoming expiration of its leases in Manchuria and about the diplomatic intrigues of China with foreign powers to thwart the ambitions of Japan. China acquiesced before the advances of Russia in Outer Mongolia and Great Britain in Tibet, negotiated with the United States for a possible naval base in Fukien, and talked with Germany about the lease of the Chusan Islands off the mouth of the Yangtze. When the European war broke out, China proclaimed its neutrality; but on August 23, 1914, Japan

—against the wishes of its ally, Great Britain—declared war on Germany. Japanese troops marched across Chinese territory and seized the German public and private properties, railways, and mines which constituted the sphere of interest in Shantung. Japan said that it harbored no territorial ambitions but would eventually restore the leasehold to China.

Upon the conclusion of this successful military operation, Japan undertook to settle all its long-standing accounts with China by the presentation of its Twenty-one Demands. These demands, it is to be remembered, were intended to regularize the Japanese position in Shantung; to strengthen Japan in Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia; to give Japan economic rights in the central Yangtze; to guarantee to Japan that China would not cede or lease to any other power any harbor along the coast; and to accede to certain Japanese wishes regarding advisers, land ownership, joint Japanese-Chinese police forces, munitions, railways, economic rights in Fukien, and religious freedom for Japanese in China. Minister Hioki told Yüan he had better accept these demands or the Japanese might be interested in supporting someone else for the presidency of China. Yüan published the Japanese demands, whipped up popular sentiment against the Japanese pressure, and appealed to the American representative in China for help. On May 7, 1915, Japan gave China twenty-seven hours to accept the Japanese demands or “the imperial government will take such independent action as they deem necessary to meet the situation.” Four days later when the United States heard of this ultimatum, Secretary Bryan sent identic notes to China and Japan saying that the United States cannot recognize any agreement or undertaking which has been entered into or which may be entered into between the Governments of Japan and China impairing the treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, or the international policy relative to China commonly known as the Open Door policy.²

Japan did not permit the American warning to interfere with the conclusion of its treaties with China on May 30, 1915, nor with the acceleration of its measures to expand its influence in China. Japan persuaded Russia, Great Britain, France, and Italy to sign secret agreements recognizing its gains in China and then turned to a diplomatic tug of war with the United States. Japan assumed the leadership in getting China into the war and promoted whispering campaigns about alleged American lack of interest in the Orient.

Japan made loan after loan to the Chinese war lord governments which succeeded Yüan Shih-k'ai and achieved the high point of its influence in

² U. S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1915, p. 146.

republican China. China created a War Participation Board which lined its pockets with Japanese money and gave Japan military agreements which provided for Sino-Japanese military and naval co-operation in the event that their territories or the general peace and tranquillity in the extreme Orient should be menaced by the enemy. Japan would then furnish advisers to China's army and navy and would get in exchange full information about China's military resources and war orders for China's military equipment and supplies. Japan perfected its military control over China under the guise of military co-operation.

In the summer and early autumn of 1918, Japan secretly obtained fresh Chinese commitments to certain of the Twenty-one Demands. The Chinese government categorically agreed to the transfer to Japan of Kiaochow and the German rights in Shantung, on the understanding that while Japan was to restore the leasehold, it would retain and expand the former German economic privileges in the province. This contract was bound by the Chinese government's acceptance of advance payments on large Japanese railway loans.

After the armistice was signed in Europe on November 11, 1918, Japan and China continued the War Participation Board on the pretext of the necessity for protecting the two countries against the spread of bolshevism from the north. Japan continued to pour money and credit into the Peking government and also into the pockets of Chang Tso-lin in Manchuria and some of the rebels in the south. It seemed as if the prime Japanese interest was not in the persons or principles of any of the factions involved, but rather in the perpetuation of chaos and disorder. Security was seldom demanded for loans and the purposes for which the loans were made never materialized. Silver bullets quieted those Chinese who might have opposed the Japanese; Japanese bribes enriched heartless officials who were completely calloused to the plight and poverty of their own people.

When Japanese delegates went to the conference at Versailles in 1919, they had an imperfect title to the German properties in Shantung. It was as if "one thief had taken stolen property from another," although Sino-Japanese agreements—which the Chinese claimed were signed under duress and were therefore invalid—and inter-Allied agreements recognized in advance any settlements which might be reached between Japan and Germany. Japan said that it would be willing to work out bilaterally with China arrangements for the ultimate disposition of German rights in Shantung but that it would walk out of the conference if the Japanese demands were not met. President Wilson commented, "They are not bluffers, and they will go home unless we give them what they should not have."

Japan got its way with regard to Shantung but it also harvested ill will, protests, and boycotts in China.

Japan's troubles mounted. The end of the war brought economic depression and political readjustment. Energies which had been consumed by war in Europe were released for diplomatic reconstruction in Asia. In 1921 Japan seemed impregnable, but it was weakened by troubles at home, contempt in China, a rising challenge from Russia, and outright opposition from the United States. Japan approached the Washington Conference with hesitation and suspicion. It welcomed the discussions about disarmament but it would have preferred to keep the China questions out of the international discussions. Japan stood to gain more from its superior bargaining power in bilateral discussions. Japan resisted China's efforts to nullify the 1915 treaties and stood firmly against China's request to prove its ability to maintain order in Manchuria. Japan declared: "Japanese interests and Japanese security are matters of such importance that she cannot afford to take obvious risks or pander to a sentimental idea at the risk of creating grave international difficulties in a region which has already seen a life and death struggle on the part of Japan." At the Washington Conference, Japan accepted the Nine-Power Treaty and the general resolutions which favored the restoration of rights to China, and made a separate agreement with China looking to the restoration of Shantung. Japan had seemed secure and victorious as a consequence of the decisions at Versailles but in two short years had been obliged to bow to China's quiet but effective opposition.

At the final plenary session of the Washington Conference on February 4, 1922, Baron Shidehara defined Japan's attitude toward China in the following terms:

No one denies to China her sacred right to govern herself. No one stands in the way of China working out her own great national destiny. No one has come to the Conference with any plan of seeking anything at the expense of China. On the contrary, every participating nation has shown readiness at all times to help China out of her present difficulties.

Japan believes that she has made to China every possible concession, consistent with the sense of reason, fairness and honor. She does not regret it. She rejoices in the thought that the sacrifice which she has offered will not be in vain, in the greater cause of international friendship and good will.

When this same spokesman guided the policies of Japan, from 1924 to 1927 and from 1929 to 1931, he exhibited tolerance and patience toward China in its travail and tried to promote solidarity and economic *rapprochement* between the two countries. When Japanese were targets of antiforeignism or boycotts, Baron Shidehara refused to participate in military demon-

strations against China (such as the bombardment at Nanking on March 24, 1927) or to send Japanese troops to the mainland to protect legitimate rights and interests. His policy became known as the "soft policy" in contrast to the "positive policy" of his political rival, Baron Tanaka. Both leaders were determined to preserve Japan's hegemony in China; they represented alternative methods: Baron Shidehara offered the velvet glove of friendship, Baron Tanaka advocated the iron fist.³

During Baron Tanaka's brief tenure of office in 1928, he tried to keep the Chinese Nationalists out of Manchuria and he sent troops to Shantung to protect Japanese railway interests from damage by the advancing soldiers of Chiang Kai-shek. The Japanese were able to halt the northward advance for a brief time, but their victory cost dearly in retaliation and resentment. The Japanese were obliged to admit the futility of force and to negotiate a settlement on March 28, 1929, which provided for the retirement of the Japanese troops from Shantung and for the establishment of a Sino-Japanese Commission to adjudicate the respective losses.

After Shidehara returned to power, Japan recognized the Chinese National Government in January, 1929, and tried for the next two years to adjust peacefully its remaining diplomatic differences with China. Memories of its unassailable leadership during World War I made it difficult for Japan to compromise, but in the political world atmosphere which produced the Kellogg Pact for the outlawry of war, Japan bargained patiently about its tariff privileges, its extraterritorial rights, its concessions, and its investments in inland navigation. Japan promoted measures of cultural co-operation with China designed to foster sympathy and understanding between their respective peoples. Diplomatic negotiations dragged from crisis to crisis until the war clouds piled up in Manchuria where Japan believed its very existence to be at stake and discarded its patience in favor of aggressive military measures.

Suggested Reading

ROY H. AKAGI, *Japan's Foreign Relations, 1542-1936* (Tokyo, 1936).

G. C. ALLEN, *Japan, The Hungry Guest* (New York, 1938).

K. ASAKAWA, *The Russo-Japanese Conflict* (Boston and New York, 1904).

GEORGE H. BLAKESLEE, *Japan and Japanese-American Relations* (New York, 1912).

³ Baron Tanaka's name was associated with the "Tanaka Memorial," which was a document purporting to contain decisions reached at an Eastern Regions Conference of Japanese officials in Tokyo in the summer of 1927. The "Tanaka Memorial" was often quoted as evidence of Japan's blueprint for world conquest.

- F. H. HARRINGTON, *God, Mammon and the Japanese* (Madison, 1944).
- SEIJI HISHIDA, *Japan Among the Great Powers: A Survey of Her International Relations* (New York, 1940).
- HOMER C. HULBERT, *The Passing of Korea* (London, 1916).
- YAMATO ICHIHASHI, *The Washington Conference and After* (Stanford, 1928).
- KIKUJIRO ISHII, *Diplomatic Commentaries*, translated and edited by William R. Langdon (Baltimore, 1936).
- YOSHI S. KUNO, *Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Continent* (Berkeley, 1937).
- A. D. MINDMARSH, *The Basis of Japanese Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, 1936).
- M. G. MORI, ed., *The First Japanese Mission to America* (New York, 1938).
- M. F. NELSON, *Korea and the Old Orders in Eastern Asia* (Baton Rouge, 1945).
- MASAMICHI ROYAMA, *Foreign Policy of Japan, 1914-1939* (Tokyo, 1939).
- TATSUJI TAKEUCHI, *War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire* (Garden City, 1935).

CHAPTER 12

Manchuria, Prelude to Pearl Harbor

The dynamite hidden by the Japanese Twentieth Engineers Regiment which blasted Chang Tso-lin, the Old Marshal of Manchuria, into eternity on June 4, 1928, was the first overt act to signalize Japan's embarkation on the road to Pearl Harbor.

The history of Japan's tragic journey has been compiled in the records of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) which was established by the victorious nations in Tokyo immediately after World War II. Distinguished jurists from eleven countries not only examined the historical record but they sat in judgment against the twenty-eight leaders of Japan whom they deemed most responsible for crimes against the peace, conventional war crimes, and crimes against humanity. In varying degrees all the accused were adjudged guilty, and for their participation in a gigantic conspiracy to wage wars of aggression looking to the military, naval, political, and economic domination of East Asia and of the Pacific and Indian oceans and their adjoining countries and neighboring islands, they were sentenced to imprisonment or to death by hanging.

The IMTFE was pioneering a new trail in international justice and, whatever its shortcomings, it recognized as a principle that government policies do not unfold automatically but result from the ambitions and volitions of the human beings who guide the destinies of nations. Only the Japanese were committed to trial in the Far East, a circumstance difficult to reconcile with abstract justice, and, for their share of responsibility in causing so much suffering and so much misery, their short paths of glory were doomed to end in unsorrows graves.

Japan in Manchuria, then in China, the Southern Regions, and the Pacific Ocean area is more than a chronological narrative; it is a challenging prologue to history in the making.

Japan's Special Position in Manchuria

Japan enjoyed an important and unusual position in Manchuria. No Japanese questioned that sooner or later Manchuria would be absorbed by Japan; it was only a question of time and opportunity. Japan governed the leased territory with practically full rights of sovereignty, and it administered the railway areas including several towns and large sections of such populous cities as Mukden and Changchun with unhampered control of police, taxation, education, and public utilities. Japan maintained armed forces in many parts of Manchuria: the Kwantung Army in the leased territory, railway guards in the railway zones, and consular police throughout the districts where Japanese consular offices were located. Japanese jurisdiction extended not only to Japanese nationals from Japan, but also to Koreans—Japanese subjects—who crossed the border into Manchuria.

In addition to this tangible basis for Japanese legal rights, Japan presumed an ethical and legal right to develop the resources of Manchuria, in spite of its treaty promise at the Washington Conference not to seek any general superiority of rights in any part of China. Whenever Japan talked of its vital interests, or special interests, or special position in Manchuria, it tempered its pretensions by an acknowledgment of the Open Door. After 1925 it talked less and less about vital interests and implied rights and emphasized more and more its obligation to maintain peace and order. There was probably nowhere else in the world an example of a country enjoying in the territory of a neighboring state such extensive economic and administrative privileges.

In the absence of a mutual desire to collaborate, frictions and complications between Japan and China inevitably followed. China consistently pointed out that Manchuria was not a dependency of China, but was an integral part of China. When the powers agreed to respect the territorial integrity of China, the agreements included Manchuria. By the use of force or the threat of force, Japan had obtained concessions from China in the days of its weakness. The resurgent nationalism of China resented the losses to Japan and protested against the validity of agreements which were signed under duress. Therefore the fundamental Chinese attitude was that justice, not the law, was on its side and that it would live up to its treaty obligations no more than expediency demanded. The Japanese countered with repeated protestations that China ignored or evaded its responsibilities.

The Chinese denied the legality of the railway guards and the consular police, annulled mining rights of Japanese, impeded the negotiation of

leases to Japanese citizens, restricted their rights of residence and travel, evaded tax engagements, restricted the rights of Koreans (who were Japanese subjects) and imposed discriminatory taxes upon them, and launched a program of railway building which challenged the economic viability of the South Manchurian Railway Company.

The Chinese refused to allow the Japanese to complete construction of branch lines—particularly to the Korean border—defaulted on loans which were allegedly negotiated with benefit of threats and bribery, and built under their own auspices nearly a thousand kilometers of railways which competed directly with the South Manchurian Railway. The Chinese made arrangements for through traffic which enabled Manchurian farmers to ship their soya beans from farm to coast without the use of the Japanese line. The Chinese launched, with the help of the Dutch, the building of a railway terminus and deepwater dock at the port of Julutao, which would have undermined the commercial importance of Dairen. The Chinese were about to divert traffic from Dairen, as the Japanese had attracted it from Vladivostok. Japan became uneasy, because it believed that time was working in favor of China. Thousands, then millions, of Chinese immigrants poured into Manchuria from North China, and these, in the long run, would prevail against the designs of Japan unless Japan should adopt positive and immediate measures.

The Crisis

In 1928 Premier Tanaka, the advocate of the "positive policy," interpreted the weakened condition of Japan as the product of liberal tendencies at home and soft dealings overseas. He was not alone in his diagnosis. Secret societies in Japan began to whisper in the dead of night that Japan had a divine mission to liberate the colored peoples of the world from Anglo-Saxon domination and to unify the world. Pamphlets, radio, and an inspired press spread the propaganda and preached "Asia for the Asiatics." The philosophy appealed to military circles which were determined to overrule the elected representatives of the people, the civilian ministers in the cabinet, and the civilian advisers to the emperor. They talked of "the Eight Corners of the World under One Roof" and "the Imperial Way" and they urged territorial expansion in the name of these two ideas.

Premier Tanaka placed great emphasis on the necessity of regarding Manchuria as distinct from the rest of China and of defending Japan's special rights and privileges there by force of arms if necessary. He proposed to establish Japanese hegemony over Manchuria through negotiation

with its separatist leaders, particularly Chang Tso-lin, and he advised Chang to abandon his ambitions to extend his authority outside Manchuria. Chang refused, moved his headquarters to Peking, and became involved in civil war against the armies of Chiang Kai-shek which had advanced to Tientsin and Peking. As Chang retreated into Manchuria, the Japanese premier issued a statement to the effect that the Japanese would prevent Chinese troops from entering Manchuria. The protection of Japanese interests in Manchuria necessitated a firebreak against the spreading flames of the Chinese civil war.

Elements within the Kwantung Army conspired to establish Japan as the master of Manchuria. They determined to murder Chang Tso-lin, and this they did by blowing up the car in which he was returning to Mukden from Peking. They plotted to replace Chang, a strong, independent character, by his son, Chang Hsüeh-liang, a comparative weakling. The Young Marshal disappointed the Kwantung Army by joining the Chinese Kuomintang and casting in his lot with Chiang Kai-shek. He delegated the foreign affairs of Manchuria to the control of the Chinese Nationalists and hoisted the banner of Sun Yat-sen over his mansion in Mukden. His actions spurred anti-Japanese movements and stimulated patriotic demands for the recovery of lost rights in the three northeastern provinces.

On their part, the propaganda leaders in Japan spread the idea that Manchuria was Japan's life line, that Japan must expand into Manchuria, develop it economically and industrially, set it up as a defense against Russia, and protect the treaty rights of Japan and its nationals there. A score or more of younger officers who had recently graduated from the Army Staff College organized a research club which they called the "Cherry Society" to study Manchurian and Mongolian questions and national reformation within Japan. Government circles and the voting public were less chauvinistic than the ultranationalists. Comparative liberals were returned to power in Japan and became the targets for criticism, abuse, and even assassination by the extremists. On November 4, 1930, Premier Hamaguchi was wounded by a "silly young fanatic" who was displeased by the government's naval disarmament policy and efforts to cut the defense budget.

Events became critical in 1931. China's nationalism increased but the Chinese central government lost prestige and power by civil wars, floods, and famines. The world depression deepened, with increasingly disastrous results for Japan and its silk trade. The USSR began to rise from its ashes and demonstrated a renewal of its interest in the Far East, particularly in Manchuria. Incidents involving Japanese occurred in Manchuria which set the schemes of the Japanese military into motion.

In the early summer of 1931 a group of Koreans at Wanpaoshan, a small village eighteen miles north of Changchun, leased a large tract of land for growing rice and prepared to irrigate the land by digging a ditch several miles long. The ditch crossed some Chinese property, so the Chinese farmers took matters into their own hands, drove the Koreans from their lands, and filled up the ditch. Japanese consular police came to take the side of the Koreans, drove off the Chinese by gunfire, and protected the Koreans while they dug a new ditch. Press accounts of this Wanpaoshan incident were highly colored and provoked anti-Chinese riots in Korea and a revival of the boycott in China against the Japanese.

On August 17, 1931, the War Office at Tokyo announced that on June 27 a Japanese staff officer, Captain Nakamura, had been arrested, murdered, and cremated, together with three interpreters and assistants near Taonan, in North Manchuria. It was affirmed that his passports were in order and that his permits to travel in the interior were approved by the local Chinese authorities. The Chinese claimed that Captain Nakamura was put to death as a spy. He had represented himself as an agricultural expert and carried on his person patent medicines which included narcotic drugs for nonmedical purposes. Japanese officials demanded an apology, indemnity, and punishment of the murderers, but Japanese military authorities contemplated more drastic measures. One squadron of military airplanes on practice flights over Japanese cities showered propaganda leaflets calling for militant action in Manchuria.

On the night of September 18-19, 1931, an incident occurred which set the Japanese military machine in motion. The Japanese version of the incident was that a detachment of Chinese soldiers dynamited a section of the South Manchurian Railway north of Mukden and was caught in the act by a patrol of Japanese railway guards that happened to be on night maneuvers in the vicinity. The guards opened fire on the Chinese troops, who behaved in "an insulting and provocative manner." The Chinese version was that the Japanese faked the explosion. In evidence the Chinese offered metal splinters which were of different composition from the rails and they pointed out that the southbound express from Changchun passed right over the damaged section of the track without any delay in its scheduled arrival time in Mukden.

The Japanese, in the name of self-defense, attacked the Chinese barracks near the point of explosion and with swiftness and precision put into operation a carefully prepared plan of procedure. They occupied the city of Mukden before dawn and within two days installed a Japanese mayor, Colonel Doihara. They called their troops to action stations throughout the entire South Manchurian Railway zone and spread from there to occupy

the major cities in South Manchuria. Without offering any resistance, the Chinese troops scattered into the countryside or disappeared south of the Great Wall. The Young Marshal established a government in exile at Chinchow, on the Chinese-Manchurian border.

The Kwantung Army took the initiative and it sent *ex post facto* reports to the War Ministry, which in turn kept the premier informed. Premier *Wakatsuki* wrote:

Day after day expansion continued; and I had various conferences with War Minister Minami. I was shown maps daily on which Minami would show by a line a boundary which the army would not go beyond, and almost daily this boundary was ignored and further expansion reported but always with assurances that this was the final move.¹

The Kwantung Army occupied city after city on the pretext of protecting life and property, while Japanese officials at home and diplomats abroad gave assurances that Japanese troops would return to the railway zone as soon as the safety of Japanese nationals and investments permitted. The commander in chief of the Japanese Army in Korea sent reinforcements into Manchuria and he told Prince Saionji that it might be necessary to send troops to the Yangtze. When Chinchow was occupied on the morning of January 3, 1932, the Japanese were in complete military control north of the Great Wall, with the exception of Jehol.

The Chinese appealed to the League of Nations, which immediately passed a resolution advising both sides to withdraw their troops. The Japanese objected to intervention by the League and declared its preference for negotiations directly with the Chinese. The Chinese refused to engage in bilateral negotiations as long as Japanese soldiers occupied Manchurian territory outside the railway zone. In November, 1931, the League decided to send a Commission of Enquiry under Lord Lytton to investigate the facts of the dispute, but while the commission spent its time in investigation the Japanese undertook the creation of a new state based on the "kingly way."

The State of "Manchukuo"

The Japanese considered their military venture as sound business, shrewd politics, sturdy patriotism, and farseeing statesmanship. Japanese military authorities took under their domination and control the functions of civil government and the operation of all public utilities. The samurai

¹ *Judgment of the IMTFE* (Tokyo, no date), p. 561.

spirit, which had been stifled in Japan, seized this heaven-sent opportunity to run a country as it saw fit. Foreign enterprises were effectively choked, and Chinese enterprises—such as electric light and power plants, coal mines, railways, the post office, the telephone, the telegraph, the radio, and commercial houses—were taken over by Japanese. A “Manchurian independence movement” was fostered by the Japanese General Staff and was carried through because of the presence of Japanese troops.

Provisional governments were established for the northeastern provinces, which were directed and staffed by Japanese and supported by Chinese malcontents. A “Self-Government Guiding Board” was organized by the Japanese Army in Mukden to correlate the activities of municipal, district, or provincial governments and “self-government associations” which might express an interest in independence. The board scattered 50,000 copies of a proclamation urging, “Organizations of the Northeast, Unite!” and prepared the public mind for the army’s plan to return the deposed emperor of China, Henry Pu-yi, and enthrone him as the emperor of Manchuria. This was considered an emergency measure to combat the influence of Marshal Chang Hsüeh-liang which grew progressively with the Japanese advance.

Colonel Doihara, in opposition to the wishes and doubts of the Tokyo government, went to Tientsin to “persuade” Pu-yi to return to the throne of his ancestors. Doihara cajoled and threatened and finally caused a riot in Tientsin on November 8, 1931, with the assistance of secret societies and underworld rogues in order to make an opportunity to spirit Pu-yi away from his residence. Doihara’s gangsters rushed Pu-yi to a pier in an armed motorcar, and put him in a small military launch guarded by plain-clothes men and soldiers. The Japanese Army denied any connection with the plot and gave the newspapers the story that Pu-yi was afraid of bombing incidents, riots, or threats on his life in Tientsin and of his own free will had decided to return to Manchuria. Pu-yi was held in secret, protective custody by the Japanese Army until it was expedient to bring him forward as the new ruler of Manchukuo.

In mid-February, 1932, a “Supreme Administrative Council,” consisting of the puppet governors of the four provinces, the chief of the Special Administrative District of Harbin, and two Mongol princes, met in Mukden to organize the new state. This council decided to adopt the republican form of government, to give the title of “regent” to the new executive, and to issue a declaration of independence. Parades and mass meetings were engineered to impress the Manchurian populace with the power of the Japanese Army, and an All-Manchurian Convention was convened at Mukden on February 29, 1932. Speeches denounced the

Chinese and Chang Hsüeh-liang, extolled the Japanese and Pu-yi. On March 9, 1932, Pu-yi was inaugurated as the regent of Manchukuo in the capital at Changchun, renamed Hsinking, and a constitution or "organic law" was proclaimed. Three days later public announcement was made that the new state was in existence and operation, and circular telegrams were sent to the foreign powers inviting recognition. The state was the creature of the Kwantung Army, not the government at Tokyo. Hsinking officials took their orders from generals, not politicians.

The Japanese cabinet fell in line with the army's plans. It decided to render all aid to the new state short of actual recognition under international law and thought it best to have Manchukuo declare a policy consistent with the Open Door. The Japanese cabinet also decided that Manchukuo should seize the customhouses and the salt-tax collecting agencies but that this should be done in such a way as not to bring about troubles in foreign relations. It was decided to use bribery, for example, rather than force and to keep up payments on international obligations. It was planned to seize military power in Manchukuo under the guise of subjugating banditry. It was the judgment of the IMTFF that

in short, the Cabinet fully realized that the occupation of Manchuria and the establishment of an independent State there by Japan was a direct violation of existing treaty obligations; and it was trying to evolve a plan whereby the reality of the breach could be concealed by an appearance of compliance with the obligations.²

The "organic law" of Manchukuo vested power in the regent, and those who controlled the regent controlled the state. The functions of the executive departments were performed, under the direction of the regent, by the premier and the ministers of state who formed a State Council or Cabinet. The ministers of state were generally Chinese, but each minister had a vice-minister who was Japanese. The premier's office consisted of a General Affairs Board, a Legislative Bureau, and an Advisory Bureau. Actual political control was completely in the hands of the Japanese. Greatest practical power lodged with the "Tuesday meeting" of Japanese vice-ministers, the Japanese director of the General Affairs Board, and a Japanese officer representing the Kwantung Army General Staff. In most bureaus there were Japanese advisers, counselors, and secretaries. Appointments or interviews with Chinese dignitaries were at the mercy of the Japanese behind the scenes. Policy formation was in the hands of the Kwantung Army. As the puppet emperor testified at the IMTFF, Manchukuo was not a sovereign state at all:

² *Ibid.*, p. 595.

. . . the Manchurian people, officials and myself lost freedom completely. When Lord Lytton came to Manchukuo, we were all under the supervision of the Japanese military officers; and wherever Lord Lytton went, he was under the supervision of Japanese gendarmes. When I interviewed Lord Lytton, many of the Kwantung military officers were beside me supervising. If I had told him the truth, I would have been murdered right after the mission left Manchuria.³

The Japanese tightened their grip on the new state with lightning speed. In April, 1932, the cabinet decided that Japanese nationals should be appointed to leading posts in the General Affairs Board, Privy Council, the Central Bank of Manchukuo, and offices in the Revenue, Police, Banking, Transportation, Justice, Customs, and other departments "so that a single self-sufficient economic unit comprising Japan and Manchukuo will be realized." The premier of Japan opposed these highhanded tactics and he paid for his opposition with his life. Japanese naval officers forced their way into his official residence and assassinated him on May 15, 1932.

Chauvinistic elements dominated the new cabinet and pledged Japan to the formal recognition of Manchukuo. The cabinet set up a three-in-one post: one official was at the same time the commander of the Kwantung Army, the governor of the leased territory, and the ambassador to Manchukuo. General Muto was the first to hold the combined position, and he took with him to Manchukuo the protocol of recognition. He said to Pu-yi, "Here it is. This is the agreement that you have to sign." The protocol provided for recognition. It also stated that Manchukuo confirmed all rights and interests possessed by Japan in Manchuria at the time of the formation of Manchukuo and that both parties agreed to co-operate in the maintenance of their national security. Secret notes provided that Japan should, at the expense of Manchukuo, undertake the national defense of the new state and the maintenance of law and order; undertake to control all transportation facilities; appoint Japanese nationals to serve as government officials; establish a Japan Air Transportation Company; and develop mining concessions. Japan realized that these diplomatic gestures would cause for a time no small shock to the world, but believed that they would not bring about an international crisis. The Japanese estimate was correct, because the outside world was in no position to do more than to condemn by paper resolutions the aggressions of Japan against the territory of China.

The Japanese armies in the name of Manchukuo invaded Jehol and added that province to Manchukuo on March 2, 1933. The Japanese then approached China for a truce—which was signed at Tangku on May 31, 1933—because time was needed to consolidate and organize the base in

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 605, 606.

Manchukuo preparatory to the next advances into China. The spirit of Japan at that period was captured by General Araki, who said in a news-reel:

It is the holy mission of Japan, the Yamato race, to establish peace in the Orient with its ideals and power. . . . The day will come when we will make the whole world look up to our national virtues. . . . Manchukuo, which was founded by the revelation from Heaven in the form of the Mukden incident, and Japan will work together and will secure permanent peace in Asia. . . . It is the mission of the Army to defend the Imperial Way, in space, in time, in enlargement and development, in eternity and continuity. Our troops have fought with the everlasting spirit of the song: the greatest honor is to die for the Emperor. Our country is destined to develop in space. . . . Compatriots: Let us look at the situation in Asia. Is it to be left unamended forever? Our supreme mission is to make a Paradise in Asia. I fervently beseech you to strive onwards, united.⁴

Manchukuo in Operation

The power of Japan exerted itself in Manchukuo to establish an orderly and efficient administration and to construct on the continent of Asia a defense bastion of "a base for military operations which would contribute to the strength and glorification of Japan for ages eternal." When the army moved into Manchuria in 1931, it received little more than an empty bag. The industrialists controlled the South Manchurian Railway and the big enterprises and consequently most of the taxable wealth of the country. The railway zone, the railway administration, and the consuls were subject to, or privileged by, an extraterritorial system which looked to the Foreign Office in Tokyo for direction. Dairen and the Kwantung leased area plus the Korean farmers were not subject to the administration of the army.

The army set to work to bring all these elements under its control. For two years the army used the façade of the regency to take over the post offices, telephone and telegraph systems, railways, and airlines. For a time it permitted the South Manchurian Railway Company to manage the railways, to undertake the construction of new strategic lines, and to develop vital industries like coal, steel, and liquid fuel. Then the army engineered the abolition of extraterritoriality, which had the effect of placing Japanese individual and corporate persons and Koreans under Manchukuo instead of Japan. It brought about the incorporation of the administration of the Kwantung leased area into the regular government structure of Manchukuo.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 623.

On March 1, 1934, the army enthroned the puppet Pu-yi as the Kang Teh Emperor of Manchukuo. The change in form of government meant increased centralization of administration, fewer civil rights, and stricter control by the Japanese. The highest authority lodged in the new official position which combined the posts of the Japanese ambassador and the commander in chief of the Kwantung Army. The original four provinces of Manchuria were subdivided into ten new provinces and all local government units were placed under a strict administration by a "trustworthy" civil service or a Japan-dominated police organization. A Manchurian Affairs Bureau, under the War Minister, was set up in Tokyo as an over-all co-ordinator of policy.

Manchukuo first addressed itself to the problems of law and order. Banditry was ubiquitous, but officials labeled as bandits Chinese guerilla forces, disbanded soldiers of Chang Hsüeh-liang, native rebels, Communists, or ordinary peasants who took to the highway as a means of getting enough to eat. Where the woods were thick, or when the corn (kaoliang) was high, influential Japanese, foreigners, or Chinese collaborators were frequently kidnaped, beaten, robbed, or murdered. The government used the army, the police, and a home guard for pacification, undertook modest agricultural relief programs, and offered pardons to those who would surrender or reform. Manchukuo pioneered in coping with problems which paralleled the Hukbalahaps later in the Philippines and the Communist guerillas in the jungles of Malaya. When mild measures failed, the government herded the farmers into protected villages, registered all the inhabitants, and held the households rather than individuals responsible for any person carrying weapons, creating public disturbances, or suspected of bandit activities. In spite of the villages which were deliberately burned, and the hostages who were shot, banditry was controlled but never completely erased.

Manchukuo added to its own instability by constant arguments with its northern and western neighbors. During this period, the USSR carried out a policy of peace at almost any price, so the irritations provoked by Manchukuo did not lead to outright war. The new government built railways ending significantly at strategic border points; it disputed incessantly about indeterminate boundary lines; and it settled Japanese army reservists as colonists in areas where bandit or border problems were most acute. Japanese Foreign Minister Hayashi estimated that by February, 1937, more than 2,300 border disputes had taken place between Manchukuo and Soviet Russia. These disputes led to negotiations or hostilities, depending not upon the nature of the dispute but rather upon the mood and the will of the disputants.

The economic development of Manchukuo was intended to make Manchukuo and Japan a single economic bloc, according to the principle of "fit industry for suitable locality" without any customs barrier between the two countries. Although the Japanese zaibatsu hoped to make quick and unlimited profits from their investments in Manchukuo, the army's program called for "such state control as may be necessary in view of the evils of uncontrolled capitalistic economy." Japanese businessmen, as businessmen generally do, wanted a minimum of government interference in their plans and operations, but the army was determined that in Manchukuo the needs of the state would come first, and the business interests would have to subordinate their quests for profits to the demands of public security and general welfare. Feelings between the army and the businessmen were none too cordial: the army officers were in the main poor and frugal; they regarded the zaibatsu as selfish and profligate. However, the skills and the capital of the business leaders were indispensable.

Military purposes dominated the commercial, agricultural, and industrial development of Manchukuo. Although the economy had traditionally an agricultural base, the Japanese exerted comparatively little effort to favor agriculture. The South Manchuria Railway Company was obliged to spend considerable sums in fostering colonization, so that sometime the Manchukuo Army would be able to recruit enough Japanese soldiers in Manchuria instead of impressing men and supplies from the homeland. Very few Japanese farmers were attracted to Manchukuo, and the assistance which they received was too limited to enable them to compete successfully against the Chinese or even the Koreans. In 1934 a Federation of Rural Credit Associations was organized and a system of public granaries was established. With the outbreak of the China incident in 1937, Manchukuo authorities belatedly increased their attention to agriculture. They fixed prices, abolished the free market for grain, and monopolized the distribution and shipping of food. In spite of favorable legislation, government subsidies, and importation of farm labor from China, Manchukuo failed to meet its own food needs and was forced to depend upon imports from Korea and Formosa.

During the years 1932 to 1941, Japan controlled between 65 and 90 per cent of the foreign trade of Manchuria. The yüan currency of Manchukuo was regulated by a central bank and was maintained at par with the Japanese yen. Manchukuo was treated for commercial purposes exactly as if it were part of the domestic market of Japan. Japan-Manchukuo accounts were settled without the usual red tape and restrictions of international financial transactions. Astronomical Japanese investments in Manchukuo made possible tremendous industrial expansion. In the ten-year

period Japanese investments increased from ¥1,750,000,000 to ¥7,150,000,000; bank deposits from ¥871,000,000 to ¥1,860,000,000; tax revenues from ¥99,000,000 to ¥385,000,000; and the national budget from ¥110,000,000 to ¥2,598,000,000. By the beginning of World War II, Manchukuo had in operation more miles of railway than existed in China south of the Great Wall. More than 40,000 miles of highways had been completed. Government bus lines and air services were operated, and Manchuria was linked with the new naval bases which were built in Korea.

The international relations of Manchukuo presented Japan with a succession of complications. While the League of Nations investigated the Sino-Japanese dispute, Secretary Stimson on January 7, 1932, announced his policy of nonrecognition:

The American government cannot admit the legality of any situation *de facto*, nor does it intend to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into between those governments, or agents thereof, which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence, or the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China, or to the international policy relative to China, commonly known as the Open Door policy; and that it does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty, or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928, to which Treaty both China and Japan, as well as the United States, are parties.⁵

Other nations were less positive in their attitudes, and usually less critical of Japan. However, on February 24, 1933, the Assembly of the League of Nations, while it shied away from any sanctions or punitive measures against Japan, formally and unanimously adopted a report according to which the member states of the League pledged themselves not to recognize the Manchukuo regime either *de jure* or *de facto*. Japan walked out of the League but proceeded with its policies in Manchukuo.

The Open Door was effectively closed. Manchukuo took over the Chinese maritime customs administration in Manchurian ports and expropriated the funds of the Salt Gabelle. For a time, Manchukuo silenced the opposition of the foreign powers by continuing to pay its proportionate share on China's foreign loans. As Manchukuo revised its tariff rates and policies to favor Japan, the powers protested, but Japan took refuge in the pretense that Manchukuo was an independent country.

After 1934 Manchukuo and semiofficial Japanese enterprises formed the Manchuria Petroleum Company, which squeezed the Standard-

⁵ U. S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan (1931-1941)*, I, p. 76.

Vacuum Company, the Texas Oil Company, and the British-Dutch combine known as the Asiatic Petroleum Company out of the lucrative business of importing, processing, and distributing petroleum products. Western interests were forced out of mining, and foreign banks were closed by lack of business. Trade dwindled and even the Russians, who were pursuing a policy of peace at almost any price, recognized the handwriting on the wall by agreeing to dispose of their holdings in the Chinese Eastern Railway Company. Only the countries in political agreement with Tokyo were given commercial encouragement or barter agreements which traded soya beans, groundnuts, and other agricultural products for industrial machinery, motors, and materials and products essential to war. One by one, El Salvador, Germany, Italy, Franco Spain, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Wang Ching-wei's China, and Thailand accorded recognition to Manchukuo.

The British sent a trade mission to Manchukuo, but its recommendations did not eventuate in recognition. The USSR treated Manchukuo with all the formalities short of *de jure* recognition. The United States, Australia, and Canada carried on direct and indirect trade relations without surrendering their firm position against recognition. Chiang Kai-shek's China negotiated postal pacts, through-train arrangements, and telephone and telegraph agreements. These accords testified to a growing reciprocal cordiality between China and Manchukuo, and recognition might have been possible had it not been for the North China crisis and the resultant increase in the hatred of Japan which characterized Chinese informed opinion.

Since Japan's prime interest in Manchukuo was in its raw materials and industrial potential, Japan established in 1937 an Industrial Bank of Manchukuo, passed an Industrial Control Act which nationalized the key industries of Manchukuo, and placed in operation a Five Year Plan for agriculture and industry. This plan gave first priorities to munitions industries for weapons of war, airplanes, automobiles, rolling stock, and basic major industries such as iron, liquid fuel, coal, and electric power. The predominant idea was to develop industries quickly which would complement the industries of Japan. The Japanese Army wanted an independent economic structure which could continue a fight in the event that any disaster should come to the mainland of Japan.

An industrialist, Aikawa Gisuke, who had learned the malleable iron business in the United States and who had parlayed his knowledge into a huge economic empire, was invited to Manchukuo to direct the Five-Year Plan. The army was impressed with the fact that he seemed to be a hard-headed, independent businessman who was not afraid of the Mitsubishis and the Mitsuis, and whose companies were owned by the general public and not by some closed family holding company. As a result of his counsel,

Manchukuo set up a huge holding company, the Manchurian Heavy Industry Development Corporation, financed half by the Manchukuo government and half by Aikawa's Japan Industry Company (Nissan). In order to make investments attractive, the government guaranteed 6 per cent return for ten years, no restrictions on dividends, and made the tax burden as light as possible.

German engineering skill and technical instruments were imported, power dams were built on the Yalu and Sungari Rivers, new mines were opened, and factories and assembly lines were constructed. The Japanese boasted that they obtained everything possible from Manchukuo, but they fell far short of their production goals. Plants with huge capacities were built, but they were shut down too frequently because of lack of machinery or raw materials, labor shortages, and the almost complete stoppage of trade from outside the yen bloc countries. Manchukuo helped Japan in the production of some heavy goods after Pearl Harbor, but it was not able to meet the demands of global war.

Manchukuo itself became the victim of inadequate knowledge and experience and paid the price for trying to erect and operate a superstructure which was divorced from the interests of the masses of the people. Chinese businessmen were not allowed to enter important industries or to make loans, so most of them went into bankruptcy. Their black market manipulations intensified the ordinary hardships and chaos of inflation. Chinese farmers lost their lands to Japanese immigrants and Chinese laborers lost all their hope of a decent living by the program of compulsory savings. A labor and civil service law required all persons between eighteen and forty-five to render labor service to the Japanese army in opening highways, digging mines, and constructing public works. The laborers in concentration camps were the hidden side of the medal which the Japanese military displayed as the blessed paradise of peace and comfort of Asia in Manchukuo.

For the majority of people in Manchukuo the level of living remained almost what it had been under Chinese war lord government. In the urban communities, the Japanese prospered while the White Russian, Chinese, and Manchu laborers continued as hewers of wood and bearers of water. Taxes were high and commodity shortages were serious as the government diverted more and more consumers' goods into the maw of the military machine. Thought control stifled all outlets of criticism, because an Emergency Law for the Preserving of Peace and Order enabled the Japanese to imprison anyone without trial.

Education aimed at the Japanization of the youth. The Japanese language became the medium of education and the Japanese ideal of *wang tao* or

the "kingly way" became the touchstone of educational philosophy. New textbooks were issued which inculcated the Confucian virtues of right conduct, propriety, benevolence, and loyalty. Formal education suffered except for vocational and civic training, and when a National University was opened in 1938 at Hsinking, it had an enrollment of 150 students. Even those were carefully selected. Civic training in Manchukuo was in the hands of the Concordia Society, which acted as the propaganda agency of the army. Patriotic celebrations, national contests, pamphlets, radio programs, and films provided fun and entertainment and tried to influence all the races of Manchuria *for* Japan and *against* China. News from the outside world filtered into Manchukuo through a Japanese news agency and reached the people only through an officially inspired press monopoly.

According to the IMTF, Japan sanctioned and developed the traffic in opium and narcotics in order to finance her operations in Manchuria and to weaken the power of resistance of the Chinese. Wherever the Japanese Army went, Japanese drug peddlers followed or were sent ahead to engage in intrigue, sabotage, and espionage. Even the Japanese soldiers and their officers engaged at times in the lucrative business. Manchukuo, as an alleged independent state, was obliged to take the blame for world-wide traffic in drugs and for sinister debauchery of the Chinese people. After 1937 Manchukuo appeared to make genuine efforts to suppress and control the illegal use of narcotics, but by that time parts of China under Japanese control had become a vast dumping ground for opium and its derivatives.

The Japanese made sporadic efforts to win the sympathy of segments of the population, but they defeated their own purposes by ineptness and lack of consideration. Chinese in Manchuria steeled their hearts against Japan although they lacked the strength—perhaps even the will—to revolt. There was no reason to believe that resentment against a foreign oppressor necessitated ultimate cleavage between the Chinese and Japanese. Many Chinese in Manchukuo felt themselves as foreign as the Japanese, and in some respects the Chinese farmer was better off than before. He received real money for his crops, prices were high, taxes were fixed and regular, and he was free from the levies and extortions with which he had been plagued in the days of the war lords. The trouble was that the Japanese who emigrated with the army were ruthless, buccaneering adventurers who were entirely lacking in ethics and often in human decency. They would hire or conscript labor, force it to work at fever pitch, and then fire the unfortunate victims without pay. The Chinese seethed inwardly, but they exhibited their delightful way of enjoying life in spite of it all. Without an organization or equipment, they were obliged to submit to the police state and to wartime regimentation, until the entire Japanese house of

cards in Manchukuo came tumbling down. Then the long-suffering, silent millions of Manchuria became playthings in the new three-cornered struggle between the Red Army, the Kuomintang, and the Chinese Communists.

Suggested Reading

- PAUL H. CLYDE, *International Rivalries in Manchuria* (Columbus, 1928).
F. C. JONES, *Manchuria Since 1931* (New York, 1949).
Judgment of the IMTFE (Tokyo, no date).
K. K. KAWAKAMI, *Manchukuo: Child of Conflict* (New York, 1933).
OWEN LATTIMORE, *Manchuria, Cradle of Conflict* (New York, 1935).
LEAGUE OF NATIONS, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry and Supplementary Documents* (Geneva, 1932).
F. B. SCHUMPETER, ed., *The Industrialization of Japan and Manchukuo* (New York, 1940).
SARAH R. SMITH, *The Manchurian Crisis, 1931-1932* (New York, 1948).
HENRY L. STIMSON, *The Far Eastern Crisis* (New York, 1936).
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, *Foreign Relations of the United States, the, 1931*, Vol. III (Washington, 1946).
———, 1932, Vol. IV (Washington, 1947).
V. K. WELLINGTON KOO, *Memoranda Presented to the Lytton Commission*, 2 volumes (New York, 1932). (The official Chinese case.)
W. W. WILLOUGHBY, *The Sino-Japanese Controversy and the League of Nations* (Baltimore, 1935).
C. WALTER YOUNG, *The International Relations of Manchuria* (Chicago, 1929).
———, *Japan's Special Position in Manchuria*, 3 volumes (Baltimore, 1931).

CHAPTER 13

Japan in China

The seizure of Manchuria and Jehol was the first step in Japan's apparent plan gradually to control all of China and eventually to establish a New Order or Co-Prosperity Sphere in Greater East Asia. Step by step Japan extended its area of operations into Inner Mongolia and North China, in complete disdain of the opposition of China and in utter defiance of the protests of the Western world. Japanese statements of policy endeavored to keep the diplomatic record clear by constant repetition of its treaty rights and good intentions.

Japan was careful to cloak its warlike activities with the protective mantle of self-defense. Through its armies, its puppet governments, its economic monopolies, its propaganda and worse, Japan tried desperately to dominate China and to make its conquest pay in terms of military strength, good will, and co-operation, as well as dollars and cents. On the eve of World War II, Chiang Kai-shek, as the symbol of Free China, stood firm against the Japanese designs and accepted the Chinese Communists as allies in an anti-Japanese United Front. Only a minority of China's leaders, like Wang Ching-wei, succumbed to Japan's blandishments and threats of force and collaborated with Japan in China.

Chinese Reaction to Manchukuo

China's policy of nonresistance was predicated on an awareness of its own weakness and a fantastic hope of sympathy and assistance from the great powers. China's disillusionment with the empty support of world opinion forced Chiang to look to his own inner strength and to prepare for an eventual showdown against his powerful, invading neighbor. As long as

Japan confined itself to Manchuria, the Chinese people were disappointed but incredibly apathetic. Manchuria was cold and distant and only the officials knew that in Manchuria China had lost 85 per cent of its unsettled wasteland, 80 per cent of its forest wealth, and most of its railways and industrial raw materials.

Chinese resistance stiffened as Japan moved southward. Chiang concentrated the energies of his government on military vitalization, political unification, and economic reconstruction. He hired Germans to train his armies and Americans and Italians to build up an air force. He bought military equipment wherever he could establish credit, and he sought civilian political and economic advisers. He eliminated antiforeignism from his official policies and he denied by silence the venom against the foreign imperialists in earlier days. He became the model exponent of the sanctity of treaties and orderly processes of international conciliation. He turned every phase of China's national development toward the single dominating purpose of resisting Japan. He built roads and factories for military reasons rather than economic benefits. His anti-Japanese propaganda became vitriolic, and his party and government political machines organized boycotts and demonstrations against the Japanese. Madame Chiang Kai-shek, who was more articulate than her husband, warned that China's war was the war of the democracies; that if Japan conquered China, Japan would leave its footprints and bomb craters on the good earth of territories controlled by the West.

With each new advance, Japan applied constant pressure for the acceptance of further demands. Chiang's tactics were, like the bamboo, to bend with the wind. His own internal position was too precarious to allow him to risk uncompromising opposition to Japan. The Canton faction disputed his leadership within the Kuomintang, war lords in a half-dozen provinces flouted his control, and the Communists diverted his military energies. Japan expressed increasing displeasure with the Chinese lack of sincerity and failure to co-operate. Japan could not bring China to accept its views regarding troop movements in North China, domination of Inner Mongolia, and establishment of North China autonomous regimes. The Chinese observed that "the face of the sheep cannot be expected to respond to blandishments in Nanking while its hindquarters are being shorn in Hopei." Japan complained that Chiang continued to help the bandits in Manchukuo and to tolerate the Communists at his council table and urged him to change his ways by suppressing anti-Japanism, dissolving anti-Japanese societies and student movements, enforcing stricter control of the press and public opinion, and giving wider circulation and greater credence to Japanese statements and advertisements. Because of the responsibilities of his

official position, Chiang tempered his sentiments with caution, but his people became increasingly vocal in expressing their preference for national suicide to the galling spectacle of Japanese troops on Chinese soil.

By 1936, the entire Chinese nation seemed to demand war with Japan. Chinese bitterness caused incidents against Japanese individuals throughout China. As Lin Yutang said, "The Japanese are daily putting more fire under the boiler and then calling upon the Chinese Government to prevent the steam's escaping by any safety valve. It is an impossible situation and one day the boiler will burst." Orators and publicists of the Kuomintang, hundreds of newspapers written in simplified style, and the incidents themselves made the policy of Japan with its war potential a brutal reality to millions of Chinese. Opposition to Japan became synonymous with nationalism and patriotism, and the dynamic sentiment reached beyond the treaty ports into the highways and byways of rural China. Furthermore, the Chinese masses felt the adverse economic effects of the Japanese advance. When war actually came, the Chinese were psychologically prepared to undergo the hardships and sacrifices of a war of attrition. Gaudy posters carried slogans like "Boycott Japanese Goods," "Recover the Lost Territories," "Wipe Out the National Disgrace," or "Fight Japan to Save China."

Japanese Penetration into China, 1931-1937

Japanese soldiers were no more conspicuous than the soldiers of other foreign nations south of the Great Wall until the Shanghai incident of January to May, 1932. At the very time the Kwantung Army brought into existence the independent state of Manchukuo, the government of Japan sent its armies and its ships to protect its interests in Shanghai. For months, the headlines of the world told the story of heroic Chinese resistance and the editorial writers wondered whether Japan was merely diverting attention from Manchuria or preparing to invade the Yangtze Valley. Military action destroyed large sections of the International Settlement at Shanghai and spread to the surrounding area. When the Chinese showed their will and ability to fight and when the powers showed their sympathy for China, the Japanese decided to negotiate a truce, to avow publicly that they had no territorial ambitions south of the Great Wall, and to withdraw to their primary operations in Manchuria.

The occupation of Manchuria and Jehol was completed with the signature of the truce at Tangku, in North China, on May 31, 1933. By this arrangement a demilitarized zone was established between the Great Wall

and the Peking-Tientsin Railway. The area was to be policed by Chinese gendarmes but was to be under surveillance by the Japanese from the air. From this border area, Japan prepared to advance to the south into Hopei and to the west into Chahar. Perhaps Manchukuo failed to produce the paradise which the Japanese demanded and the failure drove them deeper into the heart of China. The Japanese did not shrink from the militaristic nature of their aggression because the prevalent philosophy glorified war as the father of all creative work, the mother of culture, the vital energy and the driving force of the state.

On April 17, 1934, Amau Eiji, an official spokesman for the Japanese Foreign Office, announced a doctrine that "to keep peace and order in East Asia, Japan must ever act alone and on its own responsibility. There is no country but China which is in position to share with Japan the responsibility of maintenance of peace in East Asia." When the United States and Great Britain protested against this reassertion of Japan's claim to a special position in China, Japan repeated its bland assurances that it had no intention whatever of seeking special privileges in China, of encroaching upon the territorial and administrative integrity of China, or of creating difficulties for the bona fide trade of other countries with China.

In spite of these assurances, incidents were created or utilized as excuses for further Japanese aggression. In May, 1935, two pro-Japanese Chinese newspapermen were assassinated in the Japanese concession in Tientsin. As a consequence, the Japanese military commandant, General Umedsu, on June 10, 1935, forced the Chinese garrison commander, General Ho Ying-ch'in, to accept certain Japanese suggestions. The Ho-Umedsu agreement provided that the Chinese authorities in Hopei Province would withdraw certain troops and officers, close the Kuomintang offices, ban all party activities, and prohibit all anti-Japanese activities.

At the same time, the arrest of some Japanese soldiers in Chahar Province gave an excuse for another far-reaching agreement. General Ching Teh-chun, representing the Chinese garrison, and Colonel Doihara, of the Kwantung Army, made similar arrangements for the province of Chahar. The Japanese then set up a Hopei-Chahar Political Council under General Sung Che-yüan who, rather surprisingly, did not automatically do everything the Japanese told him to but took rather seriously his allegiance to the Chinese central government.

In 1935 and 1936 Japan established two so-called independent governments: the Inner Mongolian government of Prince Teh and the East Hopei anti-Communist autonomous government of a Chinese collaborator, Yin Ju-keng. Japan had hoped to persuade the five northern provinces of China (Hopei, Chahar, Suiyuan, Shantung, and Shansi) to declare their

independence from Chiang Kai-shek and to make themselves subservient to Japan after the fashion of Manchukuo. Japan drew up its plans for military occupation, political consolidation, and propaganda penetration, but it encountered insurmountable obstacles in the devious diplomacy of the local Chinese officials. Japanese armies invaded Chahar, brought pressure to bear on Prince Teh, and tried to engineer through him an independent *Mengchiang* or *Mengkukuo* (country of the Mongols) consisting of Chahar, Suiyuan, and Ninghsia. In June, 1936, an independent Mongolian government was set up and in July an agreement was concluded with Manchukuo providing for mutual political and economic aid. If it had been able, the army would have extended its sway into Outer Mongolia and Tsinghai. Japan thus took away another part of Chinese territory and strengthened its position against forthcoming objections from the USSR.

Japanese military officials in China began to talk openly of the elimination of Western interests in China and the eradication of the Kuomintang. Although Nanking protested vigorously, the Japanese themselves assumed charge of suppressing anti-Japanese activities in the major cities of North China. They imprisoned Chinese intellectuals and officials on trumped-up charges, dispersed student mass meetings, and intimidated those who would have advocated a boycott. The Hirota government in Japan which came into power after the incident of February 26, 1936, secretly undertook the formation of a new and positive China policy. The fundamental principles of this policy included: (1) a sound development and accomplishment of Manchukuo; (2) intensification of the national defense of Japan and Manchukuo in order to eradicate the Soviet menace in the north and at the same time prepare against Britain and America; and (3) realization of close co-operation among Japan, Manchukuo, and China for economic development.

The Japanese government feigned impatience and exasperation. It felt that it had temporized and exhausted its efforts to induce China to co-operate peacefully. The time had come to redefine its objectives and to implement its own ideas. In August, 1936, its mood seemed to be diplomacy if possible, war if necessary. It announced vague administrative measures to be applied to North China to assist the people in North China to procure perfect independence in administration and to set up an anti-Communist, pro-Japanese, and pro-Manchukuo area. Japan wished to make North China a source for the necessary raw materials for Japan's national defense and a base for resistance against any possible menace of invasion by the Soviet Union. To effect these measures, Japan decided that it would have to guide local powers and restrain Nanking, allay or appease foreign and

Chinese suspicions, and carry out its economic policies as rapidly and completely as possible.

These decisions were made in secret. In public, the prime minister put forward three points as prerequisites for Chinese-Japanese understanding: co-operation between China and Japan in suppressing communism; recognition of Manchukuo by China and the formation of a Japan-China-Manchukuo economic bloc; and the cessation by China of all unfriendly acts in relation to Japan. On the surface, Japan advertised to the world that it was striving for a New Order of peace and stability in China; beneath the surface, it was planning to consolidate an advance base for further military operations, regardless of costs or consequences. It was heady wine which the Japanese drank: the first step on the way to the peace of the world was peace in the Orient; and this could be achieved and guaranteed only by the fine steel of the samurai sword.

In May, 1936, as a result of an incident, Japan obtained permission to station a battalion of troops at Fengtai, an important railway junction west of Peiping. Between Fengtai and Peiping, in a commanding, strategic position, was located a bridge known as *Lukouchiao* or the Marco Polo Bridge. The Japanese wanted the Chinese to evacuate this area completely and sell Japan land in the neighborhood for the construction of barracks and an airfield. The Chinese refused and their refusal prompted the Japanese Foreign Office to enter into negotiations with the Chinese government looking to the adjustment of all outstanding Sino-Japanese disputes.

The Japanese demanded Chinese acquiescence in Hirota's three points and, in addition, tariff revision favorable to the Japanese, establishment of an air service between Japan and China, inauguration of the special area (presumably the five provinces) in North China, replacement of foreign advisers by Japanese, satisfaction for the anti-Japanese incidents, revision of Chinese schoolbooks to remove all trace of anti-Japanism, and extension of rights to station Japanese troops in China. The Chinese attitude was to procrastinate; to hope for the growing sympathy and support of the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain, and France; and to come forth with counterdemands. The Chinese demanded evacuation of Japanese troops from North China, abolition of the Shanghai and North China demilitarized zones, abandonment of the puppet regime of Yin Ju-keng in East Hopei, cessation of troop maneuvers and illegal flying in North China, elimination of the Japanese-sponsored smuggling and narcotic evils, and termination of undercover Japanese movements to destroy the political unity and the financial stability of the Chinese government.

The Japanese government was not able to impose its demands and gave way to a short-lived cabinet under Prime Minister Hayashi in Jan-

uary, 1937. He was less adamant than the Japanese militarists desired, so he was replaced in June, 1937, by a cabinet under Prince Konoye which was completely responsive to the militarists' aggressive will. General Tojo, on duty in North China at that time, wired the General Staff in Tokyo that from the point of view of military preparations against the Soviet Union, the time had come first to deliver a decisive blow against the central government of China.

Military Aggression at the Marco Polo Bridge

By the Boxer Protocol, the powers having legations at Peiping had the right to station railway guards at specified points on the railway between Peiping and the sea; and by a subsequent agreement, these troops were given the right to carry on field exercises and rifle practice without informing the Chinese authorities. From June, 1937, the Japanese troops carried out intensive night maneuvers in the vicinity of the Marco Polo Bridge. On the night of July 7, 1937, during maneuvers, the Japanese reported a soldier missing, and during the search fire broke out between Chinese and Japanese troops. Each side blamed the other for opening hostilities and for aggravating the situation by rushing in reinforcements. An American military attaché to the United States Embassy on the spot reported: "I believed that the incident could easily be settled if the Japanese really so desired, as I had observed absolutely no signs of any aggressive attitude on the part of the Chinese."

War clouds hung low because tensions were so great. The Chinese were jumpy and in a mood to shoot any Japanese soldier on sight; the Japanese were tactless but convinced they were embarked upon a mission of justice and righteousness. A Japanese university student expressed the typical conviction when he wrote, "At the end of this century people will cry out loudly that the foundation stone of real peace was laid in 1937." All the lingering Japanese complaints of population pressure, political discrimination, and economic inequity seemed to have a possible satisfaction in successful action in North China. The time seemed ripe "to beat China to its knees so that it may no longer have the spirit to fight." For self-preservation and defense of treaty rights, Japan argued that it must take up arms against China's leaders, not against the Chinese people. The Japanese made much of their anti-Communist obligations. They recalled the Anti-Comintern Pact made with Germany in November, 1936, and they objected to the United Front which grew in China after the Sian incident. The Japanese said that communism was a raging fire which must be put out before it

crossed the Yellow Sea. After the Lukouchiao incident, Japan proposed a local truce, but it rushed reinforcements by land, sea, and air from Manchukuo, Korea, and Japan into North China.

While the Japanese listed a hundred instances of outrages committed by the Chinese, the Chinese retorted that the Japanese should list a thousand instances of smuggling, distributing narcotics, troop maneuvers, unlawful airplane flights, and protecting houses of vice. The Nanking government wished to avoid a military test of strength against Japan. Nanking had been purchasing equipment from many foreign sources, and it had discovered all too many instances where the equipment did not match. German gun carriages would not work for Italian guns, and French bullets were impossible in British rifles. Italian-trained aviators were strangers to American planes. Chinese military officers who learned their profession in Japan, Russia, or elsewhere were not familiar with the strategy and tactics needed in their own country. Personal jealousies between Chinese commanders made difficult a co-ordinated campaign, and only a few members of the Chinese high command were expert enough to think in terms of armies rather than divisions. Moreover, the Chinese industrial machine was by no means equal to a full-scale war.

Nonetheless, Chiang Kai-shek responded to the adamant demands of his colleagues and followers and publicly called for the last ounce of strength in the struggle for national existence. He warned that a surrender to Japan in North China would be an "unpardonable sin against our race." "If Peiping could become a second Mukden, what is there to prevent Nanking from becoming a second Peiping?" He realized that hostilities would demand sacrifices and he declared, "We will have to trade space for time." "Once the fighting begins, we will never surrender." Through his Foreign Office, Chiang notified the world that "actual hostilities will be on a major scale and will encompass the whole of China. It will not be just a case of some soldiers in the north fighting against certain Japanese troops, but it will be a case of the Chinese nation against the Japanese nation. Trouble will certainly arise in Kwangtung, Fukien and the Yangtze Valley, but everywhere it will receive the attention of the Chinese forces."

China proposed mutual withdrawal of troops from the danger zone, simultaneous cessation of movements of reinforcements, and peaceful negotiations by any means known to treaties or international law. China insisted that settlement should be accomplished by diplomatic negotiations at the national level—not between the local military commanders—and that no changes in troop disposition or political administration could be tolerated because of Japanese military pressure. Arguments bristled and incidents in the Peiping area multiplied. Large-scale fighting occurred in Tientsin and

Peiping itself, and on August 8 the Japanese military commander took over Peiping and set up a military government there.

Hostilities spread to the Shanghai area. Inconsequential incidents inflamed tempers while both Chinese and Japanese moved large numbers of troops. On August 13 a Japanese landing party was fired upon and a war ensued—in fact, if not in name. The Japanese assured the powers that Japan had no hostile intentions and no other purpose than to make China co-operative. The Chinese appealed to the League of Nations and the League reported on October 6, 1937, that the events constituted a breach by Japan of her obligations toward China and toward other states. The League declared that military operations by Japan were out of all proportion to the incident that occasioned the conflict; that such action could not possibly facilitate friendly co-operation between China and Japan and could not be justified on grounds of legal instruments nor on the right of self-defense; and that the action taken by Japan was an unjustified breach of Japan's treaty obligations. At an international conference at Brussels under the auspices of the League, in November, 1937, the member nations pronounced Japan the aggressor in the conflict and promised to refrain from any action which would weaken China's power to resist. At every step Japan opposed third-power interference in East Asia and refused repeated British and American offers of good offices.

By the end of 1937 Japanese armies spread throughout North and Central China. The capitals of Chahar, Hopei, Suiyüan, Shansi, Chekiang, and the capital of China itself fell to invading forces. Japan established an Imperial General Headquarters in Tokyo to co-ordinate its military drives, although it continued to treat the China affair as an incident and not a war. The Japanese prime minister said that Japan desired not so much the occupation of Chinese territories as the annihilation, smashing, and killing of Chinese national armies. General Matsui, Commander of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force, issued a statement to his troops on October 8, 1937, in which he said that

the devil-defying sharp bayonets were just on the point of being unsheathed so as to develop their divine influence, and [that] the mission of the army was to fulfill all its duties of protecting Japanese residents and interests, and to chastise the Nanking government and the outrageous Chinese.¹

General Matsui ordered that, since the capture of China's capital was an international event, careful studies should be made so as to dazzle China with Japan's military glory. The city surrendered on December 13, 1937, and General Matsui made his triumphal entry four days later. For six weeks

¹ *Judgment of the IMTFE*, p. 707.

the Japanese Army dazed the world with one of history's brutal orgies of robbing, looting, burning, and shooting. A missionary testified that to his certain knowledge thousands of civilian men, women, and children were killed inside the city walls, quite apart from the tens of thousands of soldiers machine-gunned in cold blood after their surrender. The American vice-consul reported, "It would seem that the soldiers were let loose like a barbarian horde to desecrate the city." For his responsibility for these atrocities, General Matsui was hanged by the IMTFF. Elsewhere in China similar stories of the water treatment, electric shocks, cigarette-burning, hanging by thumbs, pulling out finger nails, and worse associated a terrible reputation with Japanese aggression and cast grave doubts upon Japan's advertised struggle for a New Order.

In December, 1937, Japan coupled a peace drive with its military victories. Through the German ambassador, Dr. Oscar Trautman, Japan offered China peace on four conditions: that it recognize Manchukuo and collaborate with Japan and Manchukuo in anti-Communist activity; set up demilitarized areas, and specify independent administrative organs in designated areas; co-operate closely with Japan and Manchukuo in economic matters; and pay necessary reparations. Japanese terms became increasingly severe and the Chinese government became correspondingly defiant. Chiang gained moral support from abroad and moved his capital to Chungking, deep in the heart of China's interior. When it became clear in January, 1938, that Japan would not be able to bend Chiang to its will, the prime minister, Prince Konoye, announced a new tactic. Japan would no longer care for the national government of China but would expect the establishment and development of a new government of China. "Of course," said the prime minister, "there will be not even a slight change in our policy that respects the sovereignty and territoriality of China and the rights and interests of other powers in China."²

In 1938, the year of Munich, Japan mobilized for total war and began to talk of preparing for ten years of fighting. The Japanese Navy blockaded the coast of China while the expeditionary forces by land crashed or crawled through the hills and swamps of Central China. By October the Japanese had reached as far as Hankow and Canton. It was not a dress parade penetration and it cost the Japanese heavily in casualties. At one city the Chinese broke the dikes and flooded the countryside rather than surrender to the Japanese. Chinese guerillas harassed the Japanese regulars and taught the Japanese that they could conquer the country on horseback but could not rule it on horseback. As in a swimming pool, the Japanese moved about as they pleased but the waters always closed in where the

² *Ibid.*, p. 713.

swimmers had been. In spite of the millions of Chinese who lost their lives and the tens of millions who lost their homes, the Chinese Nationalists grew grimmer in their determination to fight to the end. Chiang became more and more the symbol of resistance and he issued blast after blast against Japan. He defied his enemies to come into Free China to dislodge him.

On November 3, 1938, the Japanese government issued a statement advising the world that with the fall of Canton, Wuchang, Hankow, and Hanyang, the National Government had been reduced to a local regime and that the ultimate aim of Japan was to establish, in collaboration with China and Manchukuo, a New Order which would secure eternal peace in the Far East. Chiang stigmatized the New Order as verbal sorcery and disguised enslavement: "It means nothing but shackles and manacles for us." On December 22, 1938, the Japanese government issued a more detailed definition of its objectives. Japan resolved to carry on military operations for the extermination of the anti-Japanese Kuomintang regime and to proceed with the work of establishing a New Order in East Asia, together with those Chinese who shared Japanese ideals and aspirations. These objectives included recognition of Manchukuo, Chinese adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact, Chinese consent to the garrisoning of Japanese troops at specified points in China, designation of Inner Mongolia as a special anti-Communist area, Chinese recognition of freedom of residence and trade on the part of Japanese subjects in the interior of China, and extension to Japan of facilities to develop natural resources, particularly in North China and Inner Mongolia.

Japan said that it did not desire economic monopoly nor limitation of interests of other powers who grasped the meaning of the new East Asia. Japan disclaimed any demands for Chinese territory (except Manchukuo) or war indemnities and promised to respect China's sovereignty. Japan announced that it was ready to consider abolition of extraterritoriality and rendition of foreign concessions and settlements. In secret, Japan decided not to make peace with Chiang, to foster a new Chinese central government which would be responsive to the Japanese will, to establish in North China and Mengchiang a zone of a high degree of unity in defense and economic development, to establish similar zones in the lower Yangtze and in South China, and to re-examine the principle of the Open Door from the standpoint of the Japan-China-Manchukuo economic bloc and the defense of the Japanese Empire.

Chiang rejected these terms, which would have made China a completely helpless satellite of Japan. Therefore the Japanese military forces drove on. They occupied Hainan Island off South China on February 10, 1939,

and Nanchang, the capital of Kiangsi, on March 26, 1939. They gave the usual assurances that Japan had no territorial designs on China and would not permit its occupation to go beyond military necessities. On December 23, 1939, the Japanese landed in Lungchow in southernmost China and the next day they captured Nanning, the capital of Kwangsi. Japanese bombers attacked cities and railways and in 1940 the Japanese armies moved cautiously in all directions out of their main base in Hankow. They had apparently reached the limit of their military effectiveness against Chiang Kai-shek and were not able to break his will or overcome his resistance. Japanese military campaigns were practically ended in China until they were resumed against the United Nations in the later stages of World War II. As military victory faded away from Japan, political and economic measures were devised as substitutes.

Political Domination

Just as political manipulations accompanied the military adventure in Manchukuo, the special service sections of the Japanese expeditionary forces in China tried to create the spirit and the institutions which would convert a defeated China into a friendly China. Neither the Inner Mongolian government nor the East Hopei autonomous regime proved auspicious. On August 8, 1937, the Japanese commander set up a military government in Peiping and threatened with death anyone who would defy his edicts. Japanese forces created peace maintenance organizations in various localities in North China, and the Japanese high command brought an elderly Chinese ex-official, Wang K'eh-min, from Hongkong to Peiping by way of Japan to head a provisional government. This government was inaugurated on December 14, 1937, the day after the fall of Nanking and was a carbon copy of the puppet creation in Manchukuo. It absorbed the peace maintenance committees of Peiping and Tientsin and on June 30, 1938, it took over the East Hopei autonomous regime. This provisional government, together with the renovation government in Central China, later accepted the invitation of Wang Ching-wei to participate in the organization of the so-called new central government.

The renovation government in Central China, which was also referred to as the restoration government or the reformed government, was formally established on March 28, 1938. The inevitable peace maintenance committees followed in the wake of the Japanese victories in Shanghai, Nanking, and Hangchow, but the influence of Chiang in these areas was so strong that it was impossible for the Japanese to approach the pro-Japanese

Chinese openly. Thus the matter of building up a substantial regime was difficult, unlike the case in North China. Complications also arose because of the existence of the sizable foreign interests, especially in the International Settlement at Shanghai. The Japanese Army and its special service sections were obliged to maintain a great degree of control and accept overt responsibility for the renovation government.

In November, 1938, the Japanese created in northwest China an autonomous federation of Mengchiang (Mongolia and Sinkiang) with Prince Teh at the head. Chahar, Suiyuan and Shansi were organized as separate local governments under the federation, but neither these organizations nor other projected organizations became effective realities because of military necessities. Energies of the Japanese were forcibly concentrated on the opposition of the guerillas, to the damage and neglect of their political intrigues.

The Japanese endeavored to co-ordinate and unify their assorted puppets and on December 16, 1938, they established in Tokyo a *Ko-A In*, or Asia Development Board, more frequently called the China Affairs Board. This board was directly under the prime minister and was put in charge of all politics, economics, cultural activities, and administrative affairs in China conducted by any Japanese government agency. The board had branch offices throughout China and worked closely with the Japanese Army and Chinese collaborators.

The movement for the establishment of the new central government in China promised success when Wang Ching-wei, vice-chairman of the Kuo-mintang and vice-chairman of the National Defense Council—second only to Chiang Kai-shek—left Chungking and cast in his lot with the Japanese. After secret meetings between Wang's friends and Japanese army officers, Wang was spirited to Indo-China and to Shanghai, where he announced that he would accept the Japanese terms of December 22, 1938, which had been rejected by Chiang Kai-shek. In the spring of 1939 Wang visited Japan and haggled over the terms upon which he would enter into relations with Japan.

The Japanese, even at this late date, hesitated to accept Wang except as a last resort, and they would have preferred a China federation including Chungking, provided that Chungking would give up its anti-Japanese and pro-Communist policy and would accomplish the required personnel changes. Japan was obliged to hesitate and to vacillate because of the mercurial changes in the diplomatic situation of its enemies and allies in Europe during 1939. Within a period of four and a half months, between the end of August, 1939 (when Hitler and Stalin signed a nonaggression pact) and the middle of January, 1940, there were two cabinet changes in Japan which made it difficult to chart a definitive course in China.

Wang was sent back to China, given ample funds, and told to reorganize the Kuomintang and to form a new Chinese central government. He re-wrote the party platform, agreeable to Japanese concepts, and inaugurated on March 30, 1940, a new Chinese government. General Abe Nobuyuki, a soldier and not a professional diplomat, was named as Japanese ambassador to Wang's government and negotiated a basic treaty and associated documents which were signed at Nanking on November 30, 1940.

The treaty pledged amity and economic co-operation between China and Japan and joint defense against communism, and granted Japan the right to station troops, naval units, and vessels in China. One additional secret agreement pledged China and Japan to concerted action in diplomacy and obligated China to comply with Japan's demands for military needs in railways, airways, communications, and waterways in areas where Japanese troops were stationed. A second secret agreement gave Japan wide latitude in naval operations in Chinese waters and laid down nominally favorable conditions for Chinese co-operation in development of strategic resources for Japan's military needs. In a separate letter Wang promised that as long as Japan carried on military operations in China the latter would co-operate toward the full attainment of Japan's war purposes. On the same day that these agreements were concluded, the governments of Japan, Manchukuo, and China issued a joint declaration which provided that the three countries would mutually respect their sovereignty and territory and would promote general co-operation as good neighbors, common defense against Communist activities, and economic co-operation.

Japan created the fiction that Wang's government was the successor to the regime of Chiang Kai-shek, and insisted that because of Wang's rights as a succession government the question of international recognition could not arise. Japan rejected the protests of foreign powers, particularly the United States, against its actions in China and drove on to hasten the surrender of Chiang's regime. Japanese planes bombed Kunming and Chungking. But just before the Japanese decided to expand their war to Pearl Harbor, they admitted that their political domination over China was incomplete. Chiang Kai-shek eluded them, and it might require, by their own estimates, ten or fifteen years and the application of the whole of Japan's military might to conclude the China incident.

Economic Domination

Japan expected that its conquests would bring jobs and profits, and looked to China for greater economic returns than had been gained from Manchukuo. Japanese businessmen worked out trade agreements with

Chinese and pushed the ordinary channels of commerce to the limits of their potentialities. When these proved too little and too slow, the Japanese resorted to official political methods to speed up their economic activities. The East Hopei autonomous regime authorized a special customhouse at Tangku, its seaport, for the convenience of Japanese who wished to evade the rising Chinese tariffs. The harbor became crowded with junks and Japanese craft dumping cargoes of cigarettes, matches, beer, flour, sugar, toys, flashlights, cotton goods, and novelty items. The small revenue collected per item provided a luxurious income for the puppet government and deprived the Chinese maritime customs of an estimated \$50,000,000 in legitimate income. These goods were smuggled into China proper and with their cheap prices defeated the possibility of a successful boycott.

Economically, the war shattered the basis of China's prosperity. In Shanghai alone, Chinese losses included five sevenths of their cotton mills, five sixths of their rubber factories, three fourths of their silk filatures, one half of their establishments for flour, tobacco, lumber, soap, paper, cement, vegetable oils, and sundries. Looms, spindles, machines, and equipment were destroyed or looted. Thousands upon thousands of laborers were thrown out of work. International trade was stopped except that which contributed to the needs of the Japanese Army in China. Other coast cities, railways, highways, and industries were crippled because of the ravages of war. Millions of Chinese became entirely without the means of subsistence. Banking and industrial and commercial life were stifled, and agriculture was limited to a hand-to-mouth existence. Nepotism, corruption, rack rent, usury, and bribery bedeviled the lives of the miserable masses.

These conditions plagued the ambitious Japanese militarists. Furthermore, the old, established Japanese companies which had profited from the traditional commercial relations between Japan and China resented the growing interference of public officials in their private affairs. Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and the Yokohama Specie Bank warned against the reckless overinvestment of Japanese resources in China which dissipated Japan's material wealth and brought nothing but paper profits. They warned that soldiers were not workers and that the costs of military campaigns and protracted policing, coupled with the loss of China's good will, would lead to disaster.

Their advice was wasted on policy makers who looked to a Japan-China-Manchukuo co-prosperity bloc as the essential basis of the New Order. Their program was to make the Japanese Empire a self-sufficient unit in coal, iron, cotton, timber, tin, tungsten, and vegetable oils with exportable surpluses to exchange for petroleum, wool, rubber, bauxite, potash, and

steel alloys. According to the proposed co-operation between Japan and its satellites, Japan would make all decisions with regard to industrial activity, labor, finance, banking, exchange, communications, and transport. Japan's function would be to promote science and techniques to develop heavy industry, the chemical industry, and mining, and Manchukuo would develop important basic industries. In Northeast Asia fullest use would be made of a combination of the know-how of Japan, the water power of Korea, the resources of Manchukuo, and the man power of China. China would concentrate upon the development of its material resources and transportation facilities.

The Asia Development Board or the China Affairs Board in Tokyo fixed the policies for finance, trade, and over-all economic development of China. It was agreed that economic exploitation should be regulated so that China could not become a competitor of Japan but rather a contributor to Japan in its quest for armaments and war materials. In April, 1938, the Japanese government created two national policy companies: the North China Development Company and the Central China Promotion Company. These were giant holding companies to supervise the financing, formation, and operation of a multitude of subsidiaries in their respective areas. The Japanese economic plans in China were scarcely under way when the China incident expanded into World War II.

In North China, as operating subsidiaries under the North China Development Company, Japan established a North China Communications Company which undertook the construction of some new strategic railway lines and which operated 3,750 miles of railways, 6,250 miles of bus lines, and 625 miles of inland waterways. The Japanese also organized a North China Telephone and Telegraph Company, a North China Aviation Corporation, the Lungyen Iron Mine Company for Chahar, the Tatung Coal Mining Company in northern Shansi, and the North China Salt Company. All these companies were given monopolistic rights but they never ironed out their difficulties with local Chinese interests or with the Japanese Army.

Similar handicaps plagued the operating subsidiaries in Central China under the Central China Promotion Company. The Japanese set up a Central China Iron Mining Company and a Central China Salt Company. Immediately after the occupation of Shanghai, the Japanese authorities incorporated a Central China Water and Electricity Company to take over the Chinese portion of the Shanghai municipal utilities.

The operation of the Central China Sericulture Company illustrated the Japanese process of economic domination. The company, established in June, 1938, took over five damaged Chinese mills in Wusih and one in

...The company's capital of 1,000,000 yen was obtained by the capitalization of the Chinese property at 2,000,000 yen by an actual investment of 3,000,000 yen by private Japanese firms and by a real or fictitious credit of 3,000,000 yen by others interested in the industry (probably the Japanese military).

The company would produce whatever silk products were judged most useful according to the needs of Japan and its products would be sold and distributed through the Mitsui organization. It was expected that the company would eventually serve as the monopolistic agency through which the Nanking government of Wang Ching-wei would control the supply of cocoons for the mills of Shanghai. The Japanese exerted every ruse and pressure to entice or force the Chinese into "joint companies" for taking over some small enterprises which some struggling Chinese had mortgaged his family fortune to establish.

The Japanese encountered stiff Chinese resistance. It was too clear that Japan intended to monopolize the key positions for their own nationals and to drain off for themselves whatever profits accrued from shipping, warehousing insurance, and sales commissions. As China's wealth moved toward Japan, Japan tried desperately to prevent further deterioration in China. It put into effect strict currency regulation, but it failed to cope with inflation, black marketing, and general insecurity.

Japan's social policies were equally unsuccessful in China. With all its propaganda activities, Japan convinced few Chinese of its sincerity or good intentions. Japan censored all news in and out of China to the limit of its ability, and it carried on extensive positive propaganda campaigns by radio and moving pictures. The Japanese created a *Hsin Min Hui*, or New People's Society, as the only recognized party. It organized popular demonstrations, conducted mass meetings and victory parades, but never won the loyalties of significant numbers of Chinese. The Japanese were accused of undermining the Chinese social foundations by reprehensible policies of drug peddling, smuggling, acquiring property by false pretenses, sabotaging the currency, stripping the customs and the salt taxes, changing the schools and the textbooks to conform to Japanese standards, and protecting their own despicable carpetbaggers. "They created a desert and call it peace."

Japan faced three Chinas on the eve of World War II. Wang Ching-wei at Nanking had a nominal rule over 70,000,000 Chinese. His supporters called him a patriot who would help China most by arguing with Japan for China's rights. His opponents called him a thoroughly selfish and incompetent traitor. Chiang Kai-shek labeled Wang's government a government of slaves of utter moral depravity and an insult to the will of the Chinese people. The Japanese hailed Wang as "a harbinger of spring, like daffodils which come before the swallow dares."

Chiang Kai-shek dominated Free China in Chungking and asserted authority over perhaps 150,000,000 Chinese. He symbolized resistance. He was the rallying point for outside help to China but he was the victim of the relentless, destructive, political and economic forces which were unleashed by the Japanese invasion.

The third China was the area which was without definite boundaries but which contained half of China's population. It gave allegiance neither to Chiang Kai-shek nor to Wang Ching-wei but depended for survival upon its own wits and the goodness of nature. Local war lords or self-appointed authorities recognized no obligations to anyone but themselves; whether they abused the people or afforded some measure of protection depended completely on their own power and their conscience. In 1941 the Communist regime in Yenan was such a group. It exercised dominion over a half million souls but it had its own government, its own army, and its traditions of looking to the Soviet Union and keeping up the United Front with Chiang Kai-shek. Its policies were triple-barreled; they aimed at strengthening Communist power over the local governments, improving the relative bargaining power of the Communists with the Kuomintang in the event of ultimate civil war, and carrying out guerilla operations against the Japanese.

On its part, Japan staked its prosperity if not its very life on the China affair. Japan demanded exclusive domination of its own geographic area and chose to exert all its economic and military power to that end. It began in Manchuria, it continued into China, and then expanded into the Southern Regions. While Japanese boots trampled over helpless Chinese victims, Japanese statesmen announced their lofty aim of a New Order, of Asia for the Asiatics, "where there shall be no conquest, no oppression, and no exploitation." Their words were lost in the din of battle.

Suggested Reading

- T. A. BISSE, *Japan in China* (New York, 1938).
 WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN, *Japan Over Asia* (Boston, 1941).
 T. ITO, *Problems in the Occupied Areas in China* (Tokyo, 1939).
 Y. KOIZUMI, *Recent Political and Economic Developments in Manchukuo* (Tokyo, 1939).
 K. MIKI AND K. HOSOKAWA, *Introductory Studies on the Sino-Japanese Conflict* (Tokyo, 1939).
 H. OZAKI, *Sino-Japanese Relations in the Twentieth Century* (Tokyo, 1939).
 SIR JOHN PRATT, *War and Politics in China* (London, 1943).
 H. S. QUIGLEY, *Far Eastern War, 1937-1941* (Boston, 1942).

H. S. QUIGLEY AND G. BLAKESLEE, *The Far East, an International Survey* (Boston, 1938).

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER, *China's Wartime Politics, 1937-1944* (Princeton, 1944).

ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, *China and Japan* (London, 1938).

E. A. SELLE, *Donald of China* (New York, 1948).

GEORGE TAYLOR, *The Struggle for North China* (New York, 1940).

CHAPTER 14

British Policies in East Asia

British civilization placed its mark on the life of peoples everywhere east of Suez. British merchants and British seamen visited the ports from Gibraltar to Yokohama, trading British goods for the spices, tea, and silks of East Asia. The profits of commerce filtered beyond the banks and the trading companies into the pockets of humble shareholders throughout the length and breadth of the United Kingdom. Liverpool shippers, Plymouth sailors, Lancashire weavers, Birmingham steelmakers, and London commission men accumulated a personal stake in India, Singapore, and the China trade. They developed definite, if conflicting, ideas of how the British government should get on with the job of protecting and promoting British interests on the eastern rim of the world.

In the nineteenth century, the name of Great Britain was synonymous with power. British power influenced the course of events in Asia and contributed substantially to the maintenance of peace or the outbreak of war. Great Britain symbolized the West. The adjustment of diplomatic conflicts in the East necessitated prominent consideration for the will and fiat of the British government. Where the British led, others followed. British diplomacy was realistic and devoid of sentimentality. Whatever success it enjoyed stemmed from the clear appreciation of its premises, the flexibility of its tactics, and the devotion of its servants. Diplomacy was the handmaiden of commerce, content with the Open Door (or equality of commercial opportunity abroad) and "splendid isolation" at home.

The challenge of Russia in Asia sent the British government scurrying for friends and allies. As the Russian bear ambled eastward across Siberia and southward toward China, it brought nightmares to complacent British statesmen. These nightmares ended only with the smashing of Russia by Japan. After the Russo-Japanese War, with the assurance of the Anglo-

Japanese Alliance the focus of British diplomacy shifted from Asia to Europe. The German kaiser replaced the Russian czar as the disturber of British peace of mind. Singlehearted concentration on the German menace characterized British international relations until the end of World War I.

The costs of World War I weighed heavily on British backs and destroyed British economic pre-eminence. With their overseas assets depleted and their income diminished, the British were hard pressed to keep pace with the rising new nations of Japan and the United States. Great Britain became the victim of its own past glory. As the burdens of leadership became too onerous, Great Britain looked to the system of collective security as an added guarantee for its own destiny.

Because the British had been foremost among the powers in obtaining a privileged position in the East, particularly in China, the pendulum swung most violently against them. Great Britain became the prime target of anti-imperialism and rising nationalism. Its cup of woe was filled to overflowing on the eve of World War II by the combined attacks of Japan in Asia and Germany in Europe. The British genius for compromise proved unequal to the mad challenge of the dictators. World War II cost the British the major part of their accumulated wealth and, at least temporarily, their accustomed role of leadership in world affairs.

Premises of British Policy

British policy, like American policy, in East Asia resulted from a conflict of internal forces and pressure groups. The ruling classes were educated to a practical understanding of foreign affairs, and the best minds were attracted to the diplomatic service abroad or to the Foreign Office in London. The professionals or career men enjoyed public confidence and exercised the greatest influence in shaping foreign policies, even in defiance of public opinion. The British system of cabinet responsibility to the Houses of Parliament meant that the government in power was subject to constant criticism; yet it was remarkable how partisan cleavages of opinion were not permitted to embarrass the Foreign Minister. At a later date, Ernest Bevin, the tough old Foreign Minister in a Labor cabinet, lacked the polish of phrase and the delicacy of maneuver of Sir Winston Churchill; yet he acted in an unmistakably Churchillian manner when he conducted British foreign affairs. The British cabinet spoke through and in the name of the Crown and the sentiments expressed were those of the people as made known through their representatives in the House of Commons and the House of Lords.

Some of the most bitter but most enlightened debates on policies in Asia were staged in the House of Lords. Some distinguished members had served as ambassadors, or colonial governors, or viceroys of India, and were most concerned with the broad bases and longer perspectives of foreign policy. They had lifelong experiences in the affairs of empire and were primarily interested in preserving intact the general British traditions of primacy.

The House of Commons concentrated more on the short run and reflected the diversity of British personal opinion. Party lines spiced the debates and the British democratic machine necessitated the presence of the "loyal opposition." British officialdom was accustomed to consult a large number of British experts in Far Eastern affairs—and no odium attached to the word "expert"—men who had been advisers to the governments of China or Japan, maritime customs administrators, businessmen on leave, or journalists, writers, scholars, and commentators. Trade unions, missionary societies, and various private organizations of assorted shades of political conviction were always ready to voice their recommendations or otherwise exert their influence for their own preferred line of international conduct.

The dominions often cast a deciding vote in the determination of a given British course of action in the affairs of China and Japan. As the British Empire evolved toward the Commonwealth of Nations, the dominions developed foreign policies of their own. Neither Canada, Australia, nor New Zealand was willing to trust its destinies to the dicta of Downing Street or to permit its individual national interests to be subordinated to the needs and demands of the United Kingdom. They freely chose the benefits of Commonwealth solidarity, but they insisted on their right of advice and consultation. Sometimes with regard to British policy in East Asia the dominions counseled caution where London preferred firmness; sometimes, the situations were reversed. But as time marched on, no British decision could be made effective without the agreement and support of the overseas dominions.

A last cohesive pressure group in the formation of British policy was the British community in Asia, the Old China Hands and their kind. They looked upon themselves as the heirs of Sir Stamford Raffles and Rudyard Kipling, the noblest of the breed, who had spread the name and glory of the British among less favored peoples. By mail across Siberia or by way of the Suez they clamored for positive British government action in support of their welfare and security. They realized that humble or consequential as they might have been, they were exposed to insults and indignities. They bore the brunt of scurrilous attacks and they expected gunboats and royal fusiliers to be on hand for their protection. Their privileges died

hard and they could not bring themselves to admit that the old day of the white man in East Asia gradually approached its last horizon.

From the vantage point of London, national interests in the Far East were less vital than similar interests in Europe, the Middle East, or the New World. However, the British regarded their preponderant intangible interest in world peace as indivisible. A condition of peace was always preferable for British security and prosperity. Wars were overcostly, haphazard, and stupid. The web of British commerce covered the globe and it required a secure fastening for every strand. The British disregarded the government structure and the ideological affinity of the nations with whom they dealt. They believed that the only sound principle for international dealings was that each country was responsible for its own system of internal government and that none would submit to interference by its neighbor. They saw the challenge to British interests as resulting from the behavior of the other party to the conflict rather than from the nature of its political organization. Decisions about recognition, resistance or compromise, principle or practice, were always taken in accordance with cold-blooded comparison of benefit and detriment to British tangible and intangible interests.

The British identified their security interest in the Far East with the maintenance of their territorial possessions and the protection of their routes of communication and supply. British territories included Australia, New Zealand, and numerous island groups in the Pacific Ocean; India, Ceylon, and Burma; the Malay Peninsula, with precious Singapore at the tip, and the outlying areas of North Borneo, Brunei, and Sarawak; and the island of Hongkong with its protective area at Kowloon. The British life line, or route to the East, passed around Portugal and Gibraltar, through Malta and the Mediterranean to the Suez; thence through the Red Sea, past Aden and eastward to Bombay, Colombo, Calcutta, or Rangoon. An alternate route rounded the Cape of Good Hope.

The British life line then led to Singapore and either down under to Australia and New Zealand or uphill past Java Head to Hongkong, Shanghai, and Kobe or Yokohama. The Indian Ocean was practically a British lake and one quarter of British shipping was always in its waters or in ports along its shores. British commerce, British communities in the Orient, the British-Indian Army, the British garrisons in Asia, and the scattered naval bases between Southampton and Singapore depended upon the control of these vital supply lanes. If those lanes were to be severed permanently, the entire British position in East Asia would become an attractive hostage to fortune.

The British guarded their trade and investments in the Orient with

tenderness and tenacity. Their level of living depended upon the profits of Britain's undertakings as universal trader, carrier, banker, and entrepreneur. By British standards, the trade with China was never very large, representing, as it did, only 1 per cent of British exports and 0.5 per cent of British imports. British subjects in China made additional profits by working for the Chinese government or performing services ancillary to trade. Wharves, docks, and godowns belonged to British owners. British banks and insurance companies underwrote financial transactions and extended commercial credits.

The British flag covered about one third of all China's foreign commerce and about two fifths of its coastal and inland commerce. The trade with Hongkong was much more extensive and lucrative. It brought tremendous profits in commissions, hauling, lighterage, insurance, finance, and shipping. Munitions, raw materials, and goods of every description passed back and forth between Hongkong and the mainland. The Hongkong banks were favored depositories of the overseas Chinese and the war lords who had fallen from grace. Trade and finance were the lifeblood of Hongkong. British trade with Japan was about the same as the trade with China, but the prospect became more pessimistic as the Japanese developed industries which competed with the British. The Japanese also performed for themselves services like banking, shipping, and insurance, with the result that, until the Japanese aggression in China, Great Britain regarded Japan as a partner in security rather than as a source of profit.

British investments in East Asia were so extensive as to demand vigorous policies from the British government. In China, there were more than 1,000 British firms and 13,000 British residents at the outbreak of the war in Europe. Some of these firms were old and respected institutions like Jardine, Matheson and Company; Butterfield and Swire; the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation; the Asiatic Petroleum Company; the Union Assurance Company; the Peking Syndicate; the Imperial Chemical Industries; the British-American Tobacco Company; the Kailan Mining Administration; and the British and Chinese Corporation.

British initiative and British finances penetrated deeply into the sinews of the Chinese economic structure. Thirty per cent of all foreign investment in China was British; 6 per cent of all British foreign investments were in China; and eight out of ten British dollars in China were connected with Shanghai, the treaty ports, or concessions. The British had placed about a billion and a quarter dollars, American equivalent, in China and they stood to lose the entire investment to the Nationalists, the Japanese, and, ultimately, the Communists. In addition, the British invested between \$100,000,000 and \$150,000,000 in Hongkong, or nearly as much as the

Americans had in the whole of China. British investments in Japan amounted to \$300,000,000 or a ratio of one to four as compared with investments in China. This figure was about the same as American investments in Japan. In 1936 there were only 2,000 British residents in Japan, where the ordinary business of living was much less attractive for the Westerner than life in China. British investments in Southeast Asia exceeded a half billion dollars, representing primarily investments in petroleum, rubber, tin, copra; forest, agricultural, and mining enterprises; public utilities; shipping facilities; business properties; real estate and residential development. These assets loomed increasingly important as other sources of wealth slipped annoyingly away.

Policies in the Nineteenth Century

England emerged from the Napoleonic wars with unchallenged naval supremacy and with a power base in India. In 1824 it concluded an arrangement with its ancient commercial rival, Holland, which settled the spice rivalry and enabled the British to look beyond the Indies to the alluring markets of China. England was confirmed in its possession of Singapore and left in position where it could watch and check French encroachments in Indo-China and toward Siam. The British and French compromised their differences over Siam in 1896 when, in a joint convention, they affirmed their respect for Siam's independence and agreed to the recognition of non-contiguous spheres of influence within Siam.

The Englishmen who went to Canton from India belonged to a race which had just emerged triumphantly from a series of great wars in Europe, and they were prone to domineer over the Asians. The British merchants surrounded themselves with an air of aloof complacency and an irritating assumption of racial superiority. They entertained no ambition to assume political control of the Celestial Empire because "the wave of British colonial expansion which had washed over India and Africa had died down to a ripple on the edge of the Far East." The residual urge to imperialism expressed itself only in Burma, where the Chinese emperor made no effort to protect his vassal, although he accepted tribute as late as 1900.

The British Foreign Office disclaimed any desire to ride roughshod over Chinese authority and instructed its representative to conform to Chinese regulations and to consider Chinese prejudices. The British supplied the power which opened the floodgates of intrigue for others and obtained the unequal privileges for all the trading nations. The British stood for the

Open Door and the most-favored-nation treatment. Any favors which they extracted from the Chinese were automatically extended to their friends and competitors. They sought no exclusive political consideration, because they were convinced that their merchants could hold their own in straight commercial rivalry. In the face of this liberal trade policy, the British controlled two thirds of all China's foreign trade until the time of the "Battle of the Concessions."

The British received the credit and the blame for fastening upon China the system of extraterritoriality, special residential areas, special tariff consideration, and all the trappings of the regime of privilege. British merchants, whether writing home in 1839, 1859, or 1899, exerted constant pressure for more open ports, with occasional wars if necessary. They wanted to trade within all of China and they wanted the king's peace to guarantee the safety of their lives and the sanctity of their contracts. They saw the opportunities for steam navigation on inland waterways, for railways and factories, and they strove to provide the know-how, the capital, and the raw materials for an unprecedented Chinese industrial development. They expected and demanded full backing from the government at home in redressing their grievances and enforcing their treaty rights. They had no confidence that the Chinese would be able to progress without the guiding hand of the white man and they believed that the ordinary Chinese would welcome British assistance were it not for the duplicity, evasion, cunning, and cruelty of Chinese officialdom from the humblest magistrate to the most lordly mandarin. The British on the spot were not averse to the use of troops or naval demonstrations, and they even argued that China would become modern and prosperous only if it accepted the status, like Egypt, of a British protectorate.

The Foreign Office was less bellicose. It adhered to the Open Door for its merchants, sought to establish closer contacts with the court at Peking, argued for better personal relationships between Chinese and British citizens, and stood firm in support of China's territorial integrity. When British rights were violated, compensations were demanded. No sympathy was extended to rebellious movements within China, and any possible change of dynasty was regarded as "fraught with most unfortunate consequences for ourselves."

British policies toward Japan in the nineteenth century were based on the same general premises. After Commodore Perry opened Japan, the British admiral, Sir James Stirling, with four warships sailed to Nagasaki and concluded a treaty for England along the lines of the Perry treaty. Lord Elgin, after concluding the Tientsin Treaty in 1858, proceeded to Japan as part of his general mission in the Far East and concluded a commercial

treaty modeled on the treaty negotiated by Townsend Harris. To the British, Japan was still farther away than China. It was a less lucrative attraction than China and could well be left to American initiative. Lord Elgin perceived the internal weaknesses in the Japanese political structure, and he argued for a strong central government under the emperor rather than under the shogun. The British determined to restore the mikado to headship of the nation so that the treaties with the foreign powers might receive a sanction that no one would dispute. In 1861 the British were instrumental in assisting the Japanese in resisting Russian encroachments on Tsushima Island. In 1863 the British showed their firmness in bombarding Kagoshima to obtain satisfaction for the killing of a British subject, and the next year they led the attack against Shimonoseki to open the straits. In 1865 after a British squadron sailed into the Bay of Osaka, uncomfortably close to the emperor's residence, the British took a leading part in obtaining the imperial ratification of the earlier treaties. Three years later the British continued their active role in the affairs of Japan by preventing foreign intervention on the side of the shogunate. No more demonstrations of force were deemed necessary in Japan during the long Meiji reign.

British counsel to the Japanese was always in the direction of reconstruction and peace. They saw from an early date that Japanese ventures on the mainland would pit Asians against Asians and would offer an irresistible temptation to Russia. The British took the initiative in renouncing extra-territorial rights in Japan. Their treaty of July 16, 1894, at once signaled the acceptance of Japan into the ranks of the great powers and heralded the momentous shift in British diplomacy from China to Japan as the bastion of British interests in East Asia.

Anti-Russian Theme, 1895–1905

Until 1895 the British avoided permanent commitments and sought complete freedom of choice and action. Then they awakened to the great danger of Russian power in Asia and sought unsuccessfully to persuade the United States to join in offering mediation between Japan and China. Prevailing British opinion toward Japan at the time of the Triple Intervention was one of complacency and neutrality. Britain's interests were not sufficiently prejudiced by the Japanese peace terms to justify intervention which apparently could be executed only by force. The territorial clauses of the Treaty of Shimonoseki were of little concern to the British, but the clauses which opened the interior of China for Japanese (and because of the most-favored-nation clause, for British) warehouses was decidedly wel-

come. Reluctantly, the British advised the Japanese to give in to the demands of the *Dreibund*, but British complacency vanished when the Russians tipped their hand in Manchuria.

Great Britain still regarded China "as a sick man worth many Turkeys, of more value to us as a people than all the Armenians that ever walked the earth; as a commercial inheritance priceless, beyond all the ivory and peacocks that ever came out of Africa." Russia, Germany, and France, acting together for the spoliation of China, were too powerful for the singlehanded opposition of the British; so the wise course of action seemed to be to participate in the scramble. The British preferred to see the integrity of China infringed, to a certain extent, by other powers rather than discarded entirely. The British demanded cartographic consolation in the leases of Weihaiwei and the extended territories of Kowloon and in the establishment of a sphere of interest in the entire Yangtze Valley. The British continued to cling to the philosophy of the Open Door and wished devoutly for its enforcement and preservation, but for insurance they recognized the German sphere in Shantung in September, 1898, and the Russian sphere north of the Great Wall in April, 1899, in exchange for German and Russian recognition of their own sphere in the Yangtze Valley. The British were immensely encouraged by the American circulation at this juncture of the first batch of Open Door notes.

The British Foreign Minister, Joseph Chamberlain, feared that Russia's ambitions extended beyond Manchuria to China proper and he sought alliances to counteract the Russian aggression. The French were out of the question because they were already Russia's allies. The Germans were doubtful, because the kaiser felt the more the Russians got involved in Asia the quieter they would be in Europe. The kaiser told some of his ministers that the German Army was not going to fight against Russia for the sake of British interests. Nonetheless, while the international relief expedition marched on to Peking, the Germans responded to the British overtures. On October 16, 1900, England obtained from Germany an agreement to co-operate in maintaining the integrity of China and the Open Door wherever both powers could exert influence. This agreement proved useless because when the British tried to get an interpretation applying the agreement to the only area which was really vital—Manchuria—the Germans replied, "Nothing could be more indifferent to us than what happens in Manchuria. We only watch over German interests in China and we leave it to England to look after her own."

The Germans suggested extending the British-German *pourparler* to include Japan. As the Germans became more adamant, the Japanese became more receptive to British overtures. On January 30, 1902, Great

Britain abandoned its splendid isolation and entered into an alliance with Japan. The signatories, actuated solely by a desire to maintain the *status quo* and general peace in the extreme East, pledged themselves to uphold the independence and territorial integrity of China and Korea and to secure equal opportunities in those countries for the commerce and industry of all nations. Japan recognized the special interests of England in China and England recognized those of Japan in China and Korea. If either nation should become involved in war with one other power, the other signatory would remain neutral; but if either should become involved in war with two or more powers, its ally was to join in the war.

Both nations welcomed the alliance. Japan needed the prestige and England relied upon its new-found ally to stop Russia in the Far East. After Russia was smashed, Japan had less need of Great Britain, but Great Britain had more need of Japan. Great Britain prized the Japanese commitment as against Russia—if Russia should threaten Great Britain in Central Asia and India—or against Germany and Russia in the event these two should turn against France in Europe and involve England. The Japanese would constitute a threat against Vladivostok and would offset German naval power in the Pacific and permit the British fleet to concentrate in its home waters. The alliance was therefore renewed in 1905 and its scope was extended to India. Each power promised to go to the aid of its ally if the latter were attacked by one power—not two or more, as in the earlier edition—and in exchange Japan was granted a free hand in Korea. The renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance ushered in a new period in British diplomacy no longer directed against Russia but primarily against the rising star of Germany.

Anti-German Theme, 1905–1919

In the preceding period, diplomatic rivalries in Asia threatened to plunge the world into war. After Russia's defeat in Asia, Russia turned its expansive energies toward Constantinople and transformed the Balkans into the powder keg of Europe. Political crises riveted the attention of the world on Europe, while diplomacy in Asia degenerated into conflicts for railway building and financial concessions. As European chancelleries negotiated grandiose ententes and alliances, they paid little heed to boiling volcanoes which were to erupt and topple the Manchu Dynasty and engulf the traditional East-West treaty structure in the flames of anti-imperialism.

The British, Japanese, French, and Russians created a world system designed to overbalance the power and influence of the Triple Alliance of

Germany, Austria, and Italy. International relations in the Far East had no meaning apart from their bearing on the world-wide balance of power. The Anglo-Japanese alliance (renewed again in 1911) and the French-Russian alliance were the cornerstones of the four-power combination, and they were bolstered by successive understandings between England and France, England and Russia, Japan and France, Japan and Russia. In 1907 the British and the Russians settled their differences in Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet. They agreed that neither would interfere with the other in Tibet and would negotiate with Tibet only through China. British influence became supreme in Tibet as Russian influence expanded in Mongolia, but the Chinese never reconciled themselves to the intrigues of either. In the same year the British and French compromised their controversies all over the world: Egypt and Morocco, Newfoundland, Abyssinia, Madagascar, the New Hebrides, and Siam. They showed the will to co-operate and quickly solved their long-standing quarrels. The intransigence of the kaiser was an effective catalyst. French-Japanese agreements were easy: mutual recognition of their respective spheres in Korea and Indo-China. Japanese-Russian understandings covered the old fields of rivalry in Manchuria and converted the former enemies into ostensible friends.

The British never seemed to permit inconsequential differences of opinion to divert their attention from their prime objective, which was containment of the menace of Germany. Altercations with the United States were settled with a minimum of friction, and resentment against Japan arising from the Twenty-one Demands was clothed in the mildest of protests. The extreme reactionary character of the Russian ally was either overlooked or excused. The British policy paid off because when World War I threatened British destiny, the British were not alone. They needed all the help which they bargained for to defeat their enemies. With the end of the war, they looked again beyond Europe to Asia and accorded their interests there the diplomatic importance attached to them at the turn of the century.

Policies in China, 1919–1931

The defeat of Germany and the crasure of Russia by the revolution left a new equilibrium of power in the Far East. The four-power bloc of England, France, Russia, and Japan dissolved without the cementing influence of the German enemy. Japan achieved predominance in Asia while China approached a new low in national helplessness. Great Britain stood by Japan at the peace table at Versailles but was loath to see Britain's vast resources in China at the mercy of its aggressive ally. Japan's comparative friendless-

ness abroad drove it to new heights of vigor and ambition on the Asian mainland.

Great Britain nurtured no further dreams of expansion or aggression. It sought nothing more than stability and welcomed the promise of collective security as embodied in the League of Nations. British energies were harnessed to economic rehabilitation and they relied upon the markets of the Far East to start the wheels of British industry humming again. The British faced a difficult dilemma in their Japanese alliance. For all the Japanese insistence that they were indifferent to the alliance, they were more than willing to continue it. As the Siberian venture proved, existence of the alliance tended to dull the edge of American criticism. Great Britain was sensitive to the newly displayed power of the United States and shied away from antagonizing its creditor, either in the matter of a naval race or of policy in the Far East. Great Britain had to decide whether to terminate its alliance with Japan and line up squarely with the United States or to renew its alliance and depend upon its own good sense and powers of persuasion to keep out of trouble with the United States and curb the aggressions of Japan. At the Imperial Conference in London in 1921, the British government was disposed to choose the latter alternative. The Japanese alliance still promised a quasi guarantee for the British position in China, help in the protection of India, and a bulwark against communism in Asia. Only the Canadian prime minister stood out bitterly in opposition. He pointed out that Canada's experience with Japanese immigrants was none too happy and that Canada's geographic relationship with the United States made it absurd to risk any possible war with the United States stemming from an outmoded alliance. He carried his point.

With regard to British foreign policy, the most significant decisions of the Washington Conference in 1922 were the naval holiday and the formal internment of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. The Nine-Power Treaty was of lesser consequence. The British were in a hapless state in China, and the Nine-Power Treaty was a kind of operation salvage against the attacks of the Chinese Nationalists.

The British were no less enlightened than other powers in China, but they bore the brunt of Chinese antipforeignism. As early as the Mackay Treaty of 1903 the British were on record in favor of gradual relinquishment of some of their rights. At the time of the revolution in 1911, they made it clear that they did not oppose the more radical southern factions because of any objection in principle—they were constitutionally sympathetic to any movement which augured well for liberty and reform—but they threw their weight on the side of the conservative North because they were dedicated to the greatest possible preservation of law and order. This stand angered the Southerners and laid the foundation for anti-British

demonstrations a decade later. The antifoignism which followed Versailles and Washington focused upon the British. Every precautionary measure against the excesses of the revolutionaries was interpreted as an insult to China's sovereignty. When Sun Yat-sen tried to take over the customhouse at Canton, he was foiled by an international naval demonstration, but the British attracted all the blame. When the Russians flocked into China to aid the Kuomintang, they unleashed the propaganda barrage against the archimperialist, Great Britain.

On Saturday, May 30, 1925, three Chinese students were arrested in Shanghai and a mob gathered outside the police station. They howled, "Kill the Foreigner," "Down with the Unequal Treaties," "Drive out the British," and similar passion rousers. Sikhs and Chinese constables fired on the mob. Four Chinese dropped in their tracks and five died later of their wounds. Troubles spread throughout the Yangtze Valley and to Canton. At Canton, Russian-directed cadets fought with French and British naval contingents, thirty Chinese deaths resulting. Riots spread against the British in angry retaliation. Strikes and a general boycott paralyzed British trade and reduced Hongkong to the verge of ruin. "May 30" became a slogan throughout China and British reinforcements were called to Shanghai. It was abundantly clear that old methods of military demonstrations had to be buttressed by new concessions to enlightenment, if British interests were to be preserved in the boiling caldron of revolutionary China.

In December, 1926, the British chargé at Peking distributed to the representatives of the treaty powers a Christmas memorandum which sketched a new orientation in British policy. It recognized the justice of the Chinese claim for treaty revision and abandoned the old attitude of rigid insistence on the strict letter of treaty rights. It suggested a liquidation of the unequal treaties without waiting for the prior establishment of a strong central government. It exhorted the powers not to force foreign control upon an unwilling China and to abandon the idea that the economic and political rehabilitation of China could be secured under foreign tutelage. It constituted a significant retreat but it represented a triumph of common sense. It required a maximum of restraint justified only by its possible good effects on relations for the next hundred years.

The British were quick to implement the new policy—not quick enough, however, to beat the Americans in extending recognition to the government of Chiang Kai-shek. The British hoped by their attitude of kindness to win the support of the moderates in the Kuomintang and to loosen the party ties between the Kuomintang and the Communists. They handed back the concessions at Hankow and Kiukiang, conceded tariff autonomy, and offered to negotiate for the early abolition of extraterritoriality.

Before the year was over, it was more dangerous to be a Russian or a Red

in China than it had ever been to be the most die-hard of imperialists. The Japanese liked neither the British truckling to China nor the speeding up of construction work on the Singapore naval base. They warned Mr. Chamberlain that he would discover in China that "bees sting a crying face." In 1929 the British dropped the arms embargo on shipments to China and guns began to move through Hongkong to Chiang Kai-shek. In quick succession, the British surrendered further their concession at Chinkiang and their rights at Amoy, gave up the leased area at Weihaiwei, and agreed to use their accumulated Boxer funds for railways, public works, and cultural, educational, and philanthropic purposes. And the British sent a mission to assist the Chinese Navy, particularly in the use of ships which were under construction for China in the yards of Japan.

Great Britain, China, and Japan, 1931-1941

The pendulum swung full course by the time of the Mukden incident. Antiforeignism in China lingered to plague the British, but evaporated as the issues narrowed down to the struggle between China and Japan. The British were as prone as the Americans to assist China and gradually substituted a policy of resistance to Japan for an unappreciated and unsuccessful effort at toleration.

In the early years of the Sino-Japanese controversy, the British faced fundamental difficulties in their relations with Japan. They did not like the Japanese challenge to the system of collective security. The dominions had offended Japanese sensibilities by their immigration policies. New Zealand permitted immigration by permit only, Canada excluded the Japanese by special legislation, and Australia enforced a white Australia policy by a dictation test. The dominions united with the United Kingdom and the colonies in placing quota restrictions or prohibitory duties against the import of Japanese goods. The Commonwealth had been panicked into hasty retaliatory action by the specter of the rapidly growing commercial and industrial competitive peril from Japan. With the breakdown of the naval treaties, Great Britain felt obliged to rebuild its fleet with consideration for its security in the Orient.

The chief bone of contention was the China policy. Great Britain refused to stand by idly while Japan asserted its bold challenge to China's integrity and to British interests. British statesmen guided the League of Nations along the path defined by Secretary Stimson's doctrine of nonrecognition, but they stopped short of any program of coercion or sanctions. The British recognized the cold, hard facts of the military situation in Manchuria and

they exerted determined efforts to placate Japan and to reach an agreement which would at least set a limit upon Japanese ambitions. They were impressed by the success of the Japanese military and economic measures; they were embarrassed by complications in Europe; and they were cautious because of the fundamental isolation sentiment and the vicissitudes of partisan politics in the United States. The Federation of British Industries sent an economic mission under Lord Barnby to Manchukuo to study the possibilities for British participation in the development of the new country, at the same time that the British government registered its protest against the Amau statement.

The feverish activities of the British in China throughout 1935 and 1936 did not prevent further attempts to come to an understanding on fundamentals with Japan. A distinguished financial expert, Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, vainly endeavored to bolster China's shaky economic structure and subsequently visited Japan in search of a basic Anglo-Japanese agreement with regard to China. The Japanese question became more urgent with the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936 which joined the British rivals in Asia and Europe in a conspiracy of devilry. The business elements in Japan and Great Britain might well have worked out a reconciliation of their conflicting claims in China, because the record was far from a succession of unmitigated losses. Some British suffered, others gained. Business was good for British firms which supplied goods or services useful for the Japanese, like the Kailan mines, the British-American Tobacco Company, and assorted banks, utilities, and small factories. Hong-kong enjoyed a flourishing commerce, and a Japanese economic mission returned Lord Barnby's visit with an eye to expanded trade and credits. A tacit recognition of old-time spheres of interest in China might not have been entirely out of the question had it not been for the impatience of Japan's militaristic leaders.

After the outbreak of hostilities at Lukouchiao, Great Britain still preferred mediation and extended the hand of friendship to Japan as well as to China. It continued moral support for the League of Nations and timid endorsement of the equally timid overtures of the United States. A strong stand such as would have been the pride of the British lion a generation earlier was obviously impossible. Small credits were offered to China and embarrassing accommodations were made to arrogant soldiers of Japan. Outrages against British citizens and attacks on British commercial interests were glossed over until the Japanese became sufficiently brazen to attack British ships and machine-gun the automobile in which the British ambassador was traveling. British, like Americans, suffered because of smuggling, semiofficial monopolies, manipulation of tariff and currencies, interference

with movement of goods, closing inland waters to shipping, and interference in the remaining settlements and concessions. The British were more vulnerable than Americans, being less able to retaliate and less useful to Japan as a source of petroleum.

The British skirted perilously close to appeasement until the Japanese shifted their attack to South China at the time of the Munich Conference (October, 1938). When the Americans stiffened their attitude and protested against the Japanese New Order, the British followed the American lead. On January 14, 1939, Great Britain sent a note to Japan, which joined in the earlier American warnings, and placed itself in flat opposition to the Japanese pretensions. More British financial aid was extended to Chiang Kai-shek and British activities speeded up on the Burma border. The Japanese struck back with a vengeance and unleashed a propaganda campaign of hate and vilification against the British who were considered the real snakes in China's bosom. The Japanese blockaded the South China coast, organized anti-British demonstrations by their puppets in China, and spread the dogma that "unless Japan peel off the thick skin of the British for all Orientals to see, eternal peace will not dawn in Eastern Asia."

In the wave of bitterness which followed, a British businessman was kidnaped, a British foreman in a Shanghai mill was fatally stabbed, British missionaries were wounded by bombs which "went astray," and a British journalist in Tokyo was taken in an espionage drive. He jumped to his death before he could be cross-questioned by the *kempai-tai* or constitutional police. The "Tuckwo," the pride of the Yangtze River steamers, was sunk, business houses and installations were burned, and mission properties were stripped of their contents by Japanese soldiers.

The whole tenor of life became a nervous dread of what the Japanese military might do because even Tokyo was unable to control the whims of the generals on the spot. At Tientsin, in the summer of 1939, the Japanese troops cut off the food supply, electrified the barriers, and censored all communications with the outside world. On the pretense of searching for bombs, the Japanese sentries stripped British subjects, publicly ridiculed them with unprintable obscenities, and slapped their mouths or parted their hair with confiscated passports.

Hitler enjoyed the Japanese sport, but President Roosevelt shared British indignation. On July 24, 1939, the British ambassador in Tokyo drew up, with the Japanese Foreign Minister, the "Craigie-Arita" formula, according to which the British recognized the actual situation in China, admitted the special needs of the Japanese forces, and undertook not to countenance acts prejudicial to those needs. British military impotence was

a hard and inescapable fact. Two days later the United States announced its intention of terminating the trade treaty with Japan.

The British strengthened their bargaining power with Japan after Hitler's *rapprochement* with Stalin and during the stalemate in the early months of World War II. The Japanese relented in their worst excesses in China and the British government advised its subjects to evacuate Japan and Japan-occupied China. The British backed American policies resisting Japanese maneuvers looking to the establishment of the Wang Ching-wei regime in Nanking and the control of the Netherlands East Indies. After the fall of France, the British assented to the Japanese demand to close the Burma Road for three months (July 17, 1940, to October 17, 1940) to the shipment of munitions, petrol, lorries, and railway materials. The British needed time and they consoled themselves with the thought that little traffic would have moved anyway because of the rainy season. By the time the road was reopened, the Battle of Britain had been won and the Japanese were playing their diplomatic game in a much larger area.

After the Japanese move into northern Indo-China and the conclusion of the Axis pact, the British die was cast. There would be no more surrendering to Japanese blackmail or further compromise of the principles "which give our cause its real inspiration and the sympathy of the world." It was no longer a matter of direction of British policy; it was rather a correlation of tempo with the United States. The British followed the American lead in denouncing their trade treaty with Japan and imposing the regulations freezing Japanese credits and assets. The British hoped that the Japanese would come to their senses, and they followed closely the negotiations which dragged through the hot summer months at Washington. Prime Minister Churchill reached complete accord with President Roosevelt on Far Eastern matters at the Atlantic Conference, and he told the British people on his return that if the United States-Japan negotiations fail "we shall of course range ourselves unhesitatingly on the side of the United States." In his Mansion House speech of November 10, 1941, less than a month before Pearl Harbor, the prime minister declared, "Should the United States become involved in war with Japan, the British declaration will follow within the hour."

World War II in the Far East was a different matter for Great Britain than it was for the United States. The traditional sympathy for Japan died unbelievably hard, and compensating enthusiasm for China never entered the British spirit. They simply could not understand the American devotion to China which tended to detract from the main event in Europe. The British adopted an unambiguous attitude toward India and Burma and in response to attempts to extend the applications of the Atlantic Charter to

the Pacific took the stand that policies designed for nations in Europe were quite different from the progressive evolution of self-governing institutions in dependent territories. Mr. Churchill insisted that British colonialism was not obsolescent, still less in liquidation. After the disastrous blows to British men, power, and prestige in the campaigns in Southeast Asia, the prime minister defiantly declared:

We mean to hold our own. I have not become the King's first minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire. . . . I am proud to be a member of that vast commonwealth and society of nations and communities gathered in and around the ancient British monarchy. . . . Here we are, and here we stand, a veritable rock of salvation in this drifting world.

The British placed major emphasis upon their position in India and Southeast Asia and tuned their relations with China to harmonize with the United States. Differences in military strategy never reached an open rupture because of the successes in Europe and the short interlude between the surrender of Germany and the collapse of Japan. Great Britain joined in tossing diplomatic crumbs for the neglected government in China, and signed a treaty based on reciprocity and equality with China on January 11, 1943. As in the parallel American treaty of the same date, Great Britain surrendered its rights of extraterritoriality; its rights derived from the Boxer Protocol, including the stationing of troops in certain areas and participation in the control of the diplomatic quarter in Peking; its last concessions at Tientsin and Canton and its administrative rights at Shanghai and Amoy; and the special rights enjoyed by British naval vessels in China waters, particularly by British flag merchant shipping in China's inland navigation and coastal trades. In exchange, British nationals received the right to reside and trade anywhere in China.

The British were not prepared to discuss Kowloon or Hongkong and the suspicion could not be avoided that Great Britain intended to preserve as much as possible of its rather illustrious past—and that it would enter the future with as few changes in the *status quo* as a changing Asia would graciously permit.

Suggested Reading

- R. BASSET, *Democracy and Foreign Policy, A Case History of the Sino-Japanese Dispute, 1931–1933* (London, 1952).
W. G. BEESLEY, *Great Britain and the Opening of Japan* (London, 1951).
W. C. COSTIN, *Great Britain and China, 1833–1860* (Oxford, 1937).

- A. L. P. DENNIS, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance* (Berkeley, 1933).
LORD ELTON, *Imperial Commonwealth* (New York, 1946).
IRVING S. FRIEDMAN, *British Relations with China, 1931-1939* (New York, 1940).
O. M. GREEN, "Great Britain and Japan's War on China," *Pacific Affairs* (June, 1938, 224-232).
VISCOUNT GREY OF FALLODON, *Twenty-Five Years, 1892-1916* (London, 1925).
E. M. GULL, *British Economic Interests in the Far East* (London, 1943).
G. F. HUBBARD, *British Far Eastern Policy* (New York, 1943).
G. F. HUDSON, *The Far East in World Politics* (Oxford, 1937).
LENNOX A. MILLS, *British Rule in Eastern Asia* (Minneapolis, 1942).
C. MUTO, *A Short History of Anglo-Japanese Relations* (Tokyo, 1936).
DAVID E. OWEN, *British Opium Policy in China and India* (New Haven, 1934).
NATHAN A. PELCOVITS, *Old China Hands and the Foreign Office* (New York, 1948).
EARL H. PRITCHARD, *Anglo-Chinese Relations during the 17th and 18th Centuries* (Urbana, 1929).
ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, *Political and Strategic Interests of the United Kingdom* (London, 1939).
SIR ERNEST SATOW, *A Diplomat in Japan* (London, 1921).
W. E. SOOTHILL, *China and England* (London, 1928).
SIR ERIC TEICHMAN, *Affairs of China* (London, 1938).
SIR A. W. WARD AND G. P. GOOCH, eds., *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, 1783-1919* (Cambridge, 1923).
E. L. WOODWARD AND ROHAN BUTLER, eds., *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939* (London, 1948).

CHAPTER 15

France, Germany, and the Netherlands

The nineteenth century was the age of Europe in world affairs. France, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Portugal, Belgium, and Spain played essential roles in the diplomatic history of the Far East. Their influence cannot be overlooked or disregarded. The cyclical rise and fall of nations vitiates any prediction that the strong in the contemporary world will remain so forever. The pawns in the game are often as vital as the major pieces. Quarrels between lesser powers can become affairs of honor and lead to life-and-death struggles between their greater allies. The world does not belong exclusively to the mighty, nor is its destiny shaped solely by the will of the dominant. Smaller nations, mostly remembered for their ancient glories, have placed an indelible imprint upon the course of the past; perhaps others will give an unsuspected surge to the wave of the future.

Empire-Building

The ancient Portuguese Empire dwindled to Goa, Timor, and Macao in East Asia; and the Spanish Empire in the nineteenth century consisted only of the Philippines and scattered island groups in the Pacific.

The Dutch fared better. Threatened with extinction by the Napoleonic wars, the Dutch regained their possessions in the Indies, primarily as a guarantee against the possibility of a renascent France. In 1816, after five years of British occupation, Java once more came under the sway of Holland. During the ensuing decades, the Dutch determined to re-establish

their injured prestige by clamping their grip on the whole of Java and extending their administration to the Outer Islands. This was a long and bloody process. The Dutch had to face a five-year rebellion on Java, started by a native hero, Dipa Negara, in 1825, and they suffered heavily in men and money.

A thirty-years' war for Sumatra, 1873-1903, is estimated to have cost 250,000 lives and £50,000,000. The Achinese folk tales told of rivers that ran red with blood. The Dutch had to fight for their tenure in Palembang, Jambi, and Menangkabau and were able to establish their authority only as the result of quarrels among native rulers. Little Jambi, "where the civility of the good-natured Malay was mistakenly interpreted as instinctive servility," stood up against the armed assaults of the Dutch after 1858 and was not successfully invaded and subjugated until 1904 when all its larger neighbors were already overpowered.

In West Borneo, Chinese colonists and gold miners stubbornly fought against the Dutch for half a century. The Dutch as late as 1911 were obliged to dispatch troops from Java to Celebes to quell disorders or punish rebellious local tribes. The Dutch asserted their sovereignty over a portion of the distant, unhealthful island of New Guinea, but they were unable to utilize it for anything more than exploration, missionary efforts, a modicum of trade, and a tropical Siberia for political exiles.

The Dutch looked to the Indies as a source of profit. Their wars ate into the profits and left a heritage of hate in too many parts of the archipelago. In 1830 when Holland was engaged with the revolt of Belgium at home, the wealth of the Indies became more vital than ever. The governor-general resumed the old policy of forced cultures and extracted unconscionable levies from the meager, impoverished population. Dutch opinion at home became progressively aroused and forced the government to pass laws intended to put the whole economic and political administration on a humane and progressive basis.

New reforms were introduced, paving the way for the introduction of private enterprise and for the special protection of the indigenous population, particularly in its ownership of the land. A humble native farmer could not lose his land because of a default on his mortgage or sell his land to foreigners, including the thrifty, sharp Chinese. The government reduced the *corvée*, or forced labor in payment of taxes, abandoned the farming-out of fisheries, and introduced primary education and a liberal penal code.

In 1901 the speech from the throne announced an "ethical policy," which recognized the primary moral obligations of the Netherlands for the people

of the Indies. While the Dutch made profits from the lucrative trade and investments, they made concessions to local demands for more representation in government. The effects of education, the example of Japan, the Chinese revolution, the Indian *swaraj* or self-rule movement and the racial and national unrest throughout the world as a result of World War I stimulated among the Javanese moderates a demand for home rule and among the extremists a movement for nationalism. A Volksrad or Peoples' Council was granted in 1918. Further concessions resulted from the continuing pressures of the Indonesians on the Dutch until the economic disasters of the depression shifted the emphasis from political unrest to economic recovery. The Netherlands and the Indies pulled out of the depression only to face the specter of the menacing approach of the Japanese enemy from the north.

During the nineteenth century, the government of France deliberately constructed its imperial balcony on the Pacific, the colony of Indo-China. French imperialism was a matter for the court and the aristocracy, immune to the democratic processes which enriched and limited the exercise of political power within France itself. The French Revolution shaped the political institutions and created the political philosophy of the mother country, but it failed to reach the French possessions in Asia.

The ambitious, imaginative Louis Napoleon Bonaparte took action against the king of Annam who, in spite of local rebellions, civil wars, and rampant piracy, ordered the missionaries out of his country. The king assumed responsibility for the murder of a Spanish Dominican bishop and refused to receive a French ambassador who was suggested to conduct negotiations. In 1862 the French forces, fresh from the Anglo-French victory over China and supported by a Spanish squadron from Manila, occupied the city of Saigon and imposed on the king of Annam a treaty similar in content and effect to the unequal treaties in China. By this French-Annamese treaty, the king undertook never to cede to any other power than France any part of his dominions, granted religious freedom, agreed to pay an indemnity, opened three ports for commerce and trade, and ceded to France three provinces of Cochin China. The next year France replaced Annam and Siam as the protector of Cambodia, and in 1867 France annexed the remainder of Cochin China.

These measures assured control of the delta area of the Mekong River, but did not guarantee a route from Indo-China to Southwest China. Treacherous rapids in the Mekong made this route impossible. French gentlemen-merchants and explorers shifted their attention to the north and south control of the Red River which led from Hanoi into Yünnan. In 1874 a French buccaneering expedition led to disaster—the French flag

torn to pieces, villages burned, and Christians martyred—but to new treaties between France and Annam. The king recognized French sovereignty over Cochin China and accepted a French protectorate for his own territories in Annam and Tongking. Secretly he sent a mission to the emperor of China, bearing gifts and promising obedience to China, although he had been obliged to conform his policies to those of France.

Royal duplicity and guerilla activities against the French led to a new war between France and Annam in 1883, and in this war China came to the support of its vassal. The principal show of force was against China at Foochow and in Formosa and the Pescadores and led to new treaties with Annam on June 6, 1884, and with China on April 4, 1885. The French protectorate over Annam was reaffirmed, with the Chinese surrendering all claim to the title over Annam which they had exercised intermittently for more than a thousand years. The French area of Cochin China was enlarged.

The administration of Tongking was placed under French residents, the Red River was opened to trade from the sea to Yünnan, and the entire portion of the valley in Indo-China was subjected to the control of the French military. Full toleration and many privileges were accorded the Catholic religion, extraterritorial rights were granted, and the city of Hanoi and additional ports were opened to trade. The Chinese agreed to withdraw their troops from Tongking, to redefine the border favorable to France, to open South China to trade from Indo-China, and to accept French help in building railways in their southern provinces.

The colony of Cochin China and the protectorates of Cambodia, Annam, and Tongking were grouped together under a French governor-general. The group was rounded out by the subsequent addition of Laos (which had become a French protectorate in 1893) and the leased area of Kwang-chowan. The central administrative system which was designed to preserve law and order and to protect Indo-China from external aggression stumbled through a variety of stages until it reached a definitive form in 1911. Policy was laid down in France by the parliament or by ministerial decree, but its implementation was at the mercy of the imperial bureaucracy. Native princes, kings, and even the sovereign of Annam enjoyed the pomp and circumstance of courts and ceremonies, but they were only the façades behind which French administrators ran the country. Only the slightest concessions were made to the forms of democracy and incidental measures adopted for the welfare of native peoples.

Indo-China was subordinated in every way to metropolitan France. The French monopolized the privileged position in trade and investment and virtually excluded others from land ownership and mining. The

economy was dominated by French banks, investment houses, insurance companies, and trading firms. The French made substantial contributions to the national economy in the form of roads, railways, dikes, bridges, and irrigation projects, and provided opportunities for the intellectual and cultural advancement of the local elite. But most Frenchmen at home seldom thought of Indo-China, and when they did it was with the comfortable assumption that Indo-China was a rich and exotic land with a population friendly and grateful for the blessings of French civilization.

Only a handful of Indo-Chinese acquired French culture or met the qualifications for French citizenship. The masses lived generally in poverty, subject to heavy burdens of taxation and labor conscription. Their standards of health and education were wretched. They had no representation in the governments of either France or Indo-China. Long before the advent of communism, the Annamese, later called the Viet-Nameese, learned of reform and revolution. The Communists provided the final militant opposition to imperialism, and in 1931 the Indo-Chinese Communist party, established by Ho Chi Minh, was welcomed officially into the Comintern.

World War I enlightened the French as to the value of Indo-Chinese loans, gifts, and soldiers, and the great depression revealed the potential value of Indo-China as an economic asset. The French awakened to their responsibilities as a colonial power and inaugurated a national policy of strengthening the sentimental bonds between the "mother and child." The Popular Front government examined into charges that "we have in haste imported into that country institutions that the people were not able to understand or appreciate, and which are contrary to their manners and customs as well as to their social state; also our institutions, indeed, far from regenerating these people, have enslaved them and have, with the same blow, paralyzed their spirit and action." The French initiated well-meaning political and economic reforms, but their good intentions were buried with the ashes of collective security.

As the Japanese loomed beyond the horizon of Indo-China, the French, rather on the frantic side, concentrated on defense plans for land frontiers and naval bases. Some 40,000 Frenchmen found themselves sandwiched in between a hostile indigenous population and the troops of aggressive Japan. The French put into jail all the orthodox Communists and Trotskyites upon whom they could lay their hands and forced the remaining revolutionaries and reformists underground. The French realized too late that any successful defense of the colony would necessitate arming the colonials but they hesitated to put guns in the hands of the Annamites lest they be turned against the French. With the collapse of French resistance against

Germany in 1940, Indo-China lay helplessly exposed to Japan and progressively submitted to its ruthless demands.

Other European Interests in East Asia

From the beginning the French in Asia took under their protection the interests of the Catholic church. The murder of a French priest in Kwangsi afforded the French the reason to participate with the British in the second Anglo-Chinese war. After the French established themselves in Indo-China and joined in the Triple Intervention, the French obtained the lease of Kwangchowan, a nonalienation agreement covering Hainan Island, and a guarantee of economic primacy in the three southern provinces of China. They built and controlled the vital railway from Indo-China into Yunnan.

The French as a most favored nation received the benefits of the unequal treaties and established themselves in the open ports. They set aside for themselves valuable concessions in Shanghai, Tientsin, Hankow, and Canton. The French administered their concessions "with common-sense efficiency, prepared to close their eyes to eccentricities which do not prejudice internal order and good government: greyhound racing, *hai alai*, opium traffic, Russian prostitutes." In time of trouble, they mobilized their colonial infantry and the Annamites and showed a determination to defend their interests without undue concern about consequences or unfavorable publicity.

The French were inclined to deal harshly with the Chinese, but they seemed to get on well together even if they had no particular respect for each other. The French wielded significant influence on the maritime customs, the Salt Gabelle, and the Chinese Post Office. Economic interests in China, Japan, and Manchukuo were substantial—less so in trade than in investments. The French did not like the cutthroat competition of the China market and they rebelled at the long hours and liberal credit terms extended by their British and German competitors. French investments in Japan and Manchukuo were minuscule, but in China they were as valuable as the investments of the United States. French investments in Indo-China amounted to ten billion francs and in China to another six billion, exclusive of the leased area and the municipal concessions. These interests accounted for at least a certain part of the firmness and callousness in French policy.

The Germans were late in becoming a nation and in gaining their foothold in the Far East. Bismarck was slow in developing a faith in colonies and gave way to the Kaiser, Wilhelm II, before German policy became explosive. Germany received its China prizes in Shantung and in conces-

sions in Hankow and Tientsin. Germany obtained islands in the Pacific by purchase from Spain and by diplomatic bargaining with Great Britain. World War I and the Treaty of Versailles dealt a disastrous blow to German interests. The Germans lost Shantung to Japan, their concessions to China, and their Pacific islands to Japan and the British dominions.

When Germany re-emerged on the Asian scene, it came as a trader and not as an imperialist. Germans, driven by hardships at home, penetrated deep into the interior of China seeking out contracts for machinery and electrical appliances or collecting for export, peanuts, soya beans, wood oil, bristles, hides, and wool. Germans relied on conciliation and fair dealing instead of the domineering Prussianism of earlier days. They had little accumulated capital for investments of their own and they relied for profits on the handling of any merchandise regardless of its source or nationality. The Germans built a spectacularly successful triangular trade based on the soya beans of Manchuria, but after the depression they were obliged to resort to barter agreements to keep the channels of commerce open.

In 1936 a \$100,000,000 deal between Germany and China envisaged an exchange of wolfram and other raw materials for manufactured products, a foundry, and an arsenal. The Germans displaced the British as third in importance in the China trade after Japan and the United States. German business looked good to China because it afforded a contrast in method and opportunity to the traditional commercial methods in vogue in China. The Germans provided machinery, patents, and technical know-how, while the Chinese contributed labor, raw materials, and land for mutual profit in joint ventures. The Germans were also popular with the Kuomintang because they supplied military advisers, arms, and ammunition. In those days "the Americans talked about love for China and sold petroleum products to the Japanese; the Germans talked about love for Japan and sold munitions to the Chinese."

The Anti-Comintern Pact, the revival of the bean trade, the controversy between China and Japan, and the rise of Hitler doomed the lucrative trade between China and Germany and gave a new impetus to the trade between Japan and Germany. In spite of their natural position as commercial competitors for the price markets of the world, the Japanese and the Germans determined to subordinate their economics to politics. Both nations needed the same products. While Japanese buyers combed the United States for scrap iron, the Germans removed fences from graveyards and conducted house-to-house campaigns for old razor blades, water buckets, and kitchen pots and pans. Nonetheless, Germany and Japan entered into barter agreements; they pooled their technical knowledge to a limited extent, provided for joint use of patents; and German experts came to

Japan to install factories for dyes, chemicals, and the manufacture of synthetic petroleum. The profit motive was completely absent in these relationships; the only objective was girding for war.

Belgian, Italian, and Dutch interests in the Far East were less important than those of the other European nations. The Belgians had a concession in Tientsin and a compound in the Legation Quarter in Peking. The Italians tried without success to lease a naval base near Hangchow but they possessed a concession at Tientsin, a legation compound in Peking, and property in Shanghai which they expected to use for an embassy, a commercial headquarters, a hospital, and a club. Italy shared with France the interest in the Catholic missionaries. Belgians and Italians controlled substantial economic interests in banks, insurance companies, railways, shipping, and mines. On occasion, the Belgians acted as a front for French and Russians who used the Belgians as a means to penetrate into economic spheres reserved for the British. The Dutch were active in banking, shipping, railways, and harbor construction in China. In matters of trade the Dutch, because of the Indies, were the most important of the minor European powers in the Far East. Japan did more business with the Indies than it did with the whole of Latin America. Belgium, Italy, and the Scandinavian countries had sufficient economic interests to justify diplomatic representation. In a multipower world or in a bipolar world, the smaller nations tolerated no underestimation of their interests and insisted on full and respectful consideration of their points of view in matters of policy.

Policies of European Nations before 1937

The interests and policies of France paralleled those of Great Britain in opening China to the Western world and at the turn of the century France in the Far East worked hand in glove with its Russian ally. French money built the Trans-Siberian Railway and French diplomatic support strengthened the agents of the czars in their push through Manchuria toward Peking. The French confined themselves to the south while the Russians concentrated on the north. The defeat of Russia by Japan was inferentially a defeat for France and forced France to reappraise its worldwide diplomatic position. France clung to its privileges in China but sought to placate the United States by a warmer dedication to the Open Door. France solidified its opposition to Germany before World War I by its agreements with England and its treaty of friendship with Japan.

It was generally agreed that sentiment and high ideals played little part in guiding the actions of the French government in affairs of China. The

French never displayed any sympathy for the Chinese Republic or for the national achievements of Chiang Kai-shek. Chinese success was potent and the French feared the spread of the nationalistic infection to Indo-China. The French wanted law and order in China with none of the revolutionary tactics which prepared the way for communism.

France was one of the slower nations to accede to the Chinese program for the recovery of its lost sovereignty. The French subscribed to the theory that the Oriental respects most those who stand firmly for their own rights *and holds those in contempt who make unnecessary surrenders*. The French held back as long as possible in implementing the enlightened program of the Washington Conference. After the Nationalist government established itself at Nanking without a doubt of its own solidity, France bowed to the logic of the situation. French consuls and France-retained students organized Sino-French friendship clubs and the government of France negotiated new treaties with China. During the days of technical collaboration between China and the League of Nations, some very capable French experts in the service of the League contributed immeasurably to the rebirth of Chinese confidence in the purposes of France in East Asia.

France accepted the hypothesis of a strong Japan as the stabilizer in East Asia during and after World War I. The French acquiesced in the Japanese designs in China, and approved the Japanese determination to crush the forces of bolshevism in Siberia. France assumed at the Washington Conference the dual role of Japan's chief assuager and the most recalcitrant of the powers contemplating the restoration of China's complete sovereignty. When Japan moved into Manchuria, France was sympathetic. Admittedly, France discharged dutifully its obligations to the system of collective security. But France seemed content that a stronger power should intervene to protect its legal rights and privileges in spite of the moral rights of the weaker neighbor. France wanted to deal with Indo-China in its own way without external meddlers and was prepared to recognize as legitimate the same desire on the part of Japan in Manchuria. However, when Japan leveled its attack against French rights and interests in China, then France with characteristic resolution re-estimated its policies and became one of the stiffest opponents of the Japanese advance.

In World War I, the Germans paid the penalty in the Far East for the excesses and stupidity of the imperialism of Wilhelm II. On December 16, 1897, the kaiser said to his younger brother, Prince Henry, on the eve of his departure for the Far East:

Make it clear to every European there, to the German merchant, and, above all things, to the foreigner in whose country we are or with whom we have to deal, that the German Michael has set his shield, decorated with

the imperial eagle, firmly upon the ground. Whoever asks him for protection will always receive it. . . . But if any one should undertake to insult us in our rights or wish to harm us, then drive in with the mailed fist and, as God wills, bind about your young brow the laurels which no one in the German empire will begrudge you.¹

The kaiser expected that "hundreds of thousands of Chinese will quiver when they feel the iron fist of Germany heavy on their necks," and he told his troops on embarking on the expedition against the Boxers, "Just as the Huns a thousand years ago, under the leadership of Attila, gained a reputation by virtue of which they still live in historical tradition, so may the name of Germany become known in such a manner in China."

German policy in the Far East had been to excite Russia's lust for empire and to distract its energies from its European frontiers. The more Russia was embroiled in Asia, the stronger was Germany's position against France. Caught between Russia and England, Germany's prime preoccupation was to use one to neutralize the other and never to be involved in controversy or war against both at the same time. Germany toyed with the overtures of England for an alliance against Russia and relied upon its military strength and determination to offset the coalition of England and France.

World War I witnessed the temporary eviction of Germany from the Far East. In addition to German losses to the Japanese and the British, the Germans in China lost their property to the Chinese. The Chinese interned the majority of German residents, took over the German concessions and legation property, cancelled the German share of the Boxer indemnity, sequestered the German ships in port, and removed the humiliating von Ketteler arch from its show place on the main street of Peking.

After the war, the Germans re-established peaceful relations by new treaties with China and built up with the Chiang Kai-shek government a position of political trust and commercial confidence. Chiang hired German military advisers and hoped for their assistance against Japan as well as against the Communists. The German Chamber of Commerce in China was enthusiastic in its endorsement of China's future, but the rainbows disappeared with the rise of Hitler.

German policy in Japan was as checkered as German policy in China. When the Prussian armies defeated the French in 1871, the Japanese militarists terminated their contracts with the French and invited representatives of the victorious Germans to modernize their forces. German encouragement of the Russians in Korea and Manchuria and German intrigue in the Triple Intervention antagonized the Japanese. When Japan

¹ W. L. Langer, *The Diplomacy of Imperialism*, (Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1951), p. 459.

allied itself with England, every commercial and naval issue between Germany and the United Kingdom became an issue inferentially between Germany and Japan. The kaiser was among the first to see in the industrialization of Japan the real "Yellow Peril." Diplomatic hostilities paved the way to World War I and the German eclipse at the hands of the Japanese. In 1919 and after, the Germans and the Japanese seemed destined to political misunderstanding and commercial rivalry.

With the inception of the Hitler movement, the Germans sensed the value of a German-Japanese combination directed against Russia and possibly against England. The Germans speculated upon the common elements in the situation of the greatest have-nots in Europe and Asia. Both were overpopulated, poor in raw materials, and dependent upon overseas markets for continued prosperity. Both were confirmed revisionists, dedicated to expansion at the expense of Russia, the British Empire, the League of Nations, or any other potential obstacle. Both were superpatriotic, given to ultramilitarism and totalitarianism. Both felt unbounded confidence in their destiny or mission as a superior race. They discovered close bonds of sympathy in true Prussianism and the Japanese knightly spirit.

Cautious contacts between German and Japanese leaders preceded the negotiation of an actual understanding. Commercial and military missions exchanged visits, staff officers discussed mutual problems, and sympathetic diplomatic representatives overcame the opposition of dissident elements in both countries. Japanese businessmen wanted no part of a German alliance and no one in Germany outside of the Nazi party officials seemed enthusiastic about Japan in preference to China. Nonetheless, in November, 1936, von Ribbentrop and Ambassador Oshima signed the Anti-Comintern Pact which was followed by a cultural agreement signed at Tokyo on November 25, 1938. Italy and the German satellites joined Germany in its pro-Japanese orientation, and in relentless accord the dictators marched together through the successive crises which culminated in World War II.

The minor powers in Asia were pawns in the game of international politics. They basked in the glory of the dominant and turned for their own advantage the battles between the strong. They were champions of collective security as long as the international system promised to protect their integrity or enhance their welfare. But with the breakdown of collective security, they were the first to detect the drift and to seek shelter in *ad hoc* commitments. Belgium and the Netherlands looked to the Anglo-Saxon coalition for protection, Italy swung into the camp of the Axis. Who would gain, who would lose, was beyond their power to determine—they had little but the freedom of choice.

Policies after 1937

Until the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese hostilities, Germany enjoyed the status of one of China's best friends. The German government, in spite of the Anti-Comintern Pact, announced its desire to trade with both parties. It coveted a position of strict neutrality. Germany wanted Japan to conserve its strength for possible use against Russia; it also wanted China to maintain its stability and impregnability against the Communist menace. Germany therefore sought to act as a mediator in the impossible task of reaching an understanding between China and Japan.

While the Nazis extended help in modernizing the Japanese armaments and in renovating vital war industries in Japan, the Germans in China tried to bring pressure to bear to preserve the business which they had developed under the Nationalist regime. They warned that Japanese expansion would also mean the end of German enterprise and doom German or any other third-party participation in China's reconstruction. They sent frantic telegrams to Berlin stating: "We have in this country, in contrast somewhat to Italy, a good will to lose; the product of twenty years of persevering, constructive work built from scratch by German merchants after the war." They argued that a free, independent China would offer boundless commercial possibilities in contrast to limited benefits to be expected under the tolerance of Japan.

The Berlin hierarchy rejected these appeals from China. The German-inspired press supported Japan enthusiastically and relied upon Japan to implement its New Order in East Asia. The Germans appreciated the weaknesses in their Japanese ally and they deferred war in Europe until the Tri-Partite (Germany-Italy-Japan) understandings were bolstered by the German-Russian nonaggression pact. Time and again the Germans importuned the Japanese to extend their agreement to make it effective against all possible German enemies and not just against Russia, but the Japanese were chary of any indirect cause for embroilment against England.

Before the German-Russian pact of 1939 Germany emphasized the differences in their ideologies and the poisonous effects of the activities of the "Bolshevist Jews." After the pact, Germany talked about the complementary relationship of their economic structures, the unimportance of ideological differences in the interest of political national co-operation. Germany executed its 180-degree turn toward Russia with cynical disregard of the interests or sensibilities of Japan and thought only of its own posture toward England. Hitler blew hot and cold toward the United Kingdom, alternately praising it for its contributions to mankind and swearing his

dedication to its demise. His understanding with Russia was even more important than his pact with Japan in permitting him to strike against England when he judged the moment to be opportune.

The Japanese attacks on the entrenched British position in China compounded England's embarrassments, exposed the fundamental British helplessness in the Far East, and encouraged the Germans in their declaration of war in Europe in September, 1939. German successes on the Western front and later in the initial stages of the attack against Russia had the effect of soothing the injured feelings of the Japanese and reviving unrestrained partnership in their programs of conquest.

As the Germans switched their policies from pro-China to pro-Japan, the French rather automatically changed their orientation from pro-Japan to pro-China. The first clashes between France and Japan took place in the French concession in Tientsin. France refused to permit Japanese soldiers to pass through the concession on their way to the destruction of Nankai University in July, 1937. The next month the French joined the British in endeavoring to preserve the neutrality of the foreign areas in Shanghai. The French consul-general ordered the Annamite troops to man the concession barricades and to shoot to kill if the Japanese tried to penetrate the defenses. The French were equally adamant in the protection of their concession in Hankow.

The most bitter disputes between France and Japan pertained to the Yünnan Railway, the occupation of Hainan, the Paracel and Spratly Islands in the French preserves in the South China Sea, and the Japanese drive into Indo-China. According to the agreement of 1903 concerning the Yünnan Railway, the French retained control of all traffic until the expiration of the lease in 1990. A subsequent treaty in 1930 provided that the French would permit all goods to cross from Indo-China into China on payment of a transit tax and would permit military supplies for the Chinese government to pass free and without interference. As early as February, 1938, Japan threatened to bomb the railway unless the traffic in arms was stopped. The French government agreed to embargo military cargoes, and badly needed supplies piled up at Hongkong, Haiphong, and Hanoi. Guns, munitions, and airplane parts deteriorated as they lay idle on the wharves or in the warehouses, while trucks, medical supplies, and petroleum products rusted or rotted into uselessness. The Japanese reported continuance of fantastic quantities of vital materials and the French replied that their embargo was rigidly enforced. The Chinese protested against French pusillanimity and encouraged the French to open an alternative route into China by way of Langson, in Tongking; thence to Lungchow and Nanning in Kwangsi. From Nanning, they would build east to the Canton-Hankow

Railway and west to Yünnan. From Yünnan the French undertook to construct a railway northward to Suifu and Chengtu in Szechwan. Arguments about the Yünnan Railway were indecisive until the Japanese resumed a determined initiative in 1940.

In 1939 the Japanese occupied Hainan and small, neighboring islands. Hainan is fifteen miles south of the China coast, fifty miles from the French leased territory of Kwangchow, and one hundred miles east of Indo-China. It is 320 miles south of Hongkong, 800 miles northwest of Manila, and approximately midway between Japan and the Netherlands East Indies. France considered its hold on Hainan secure by virtue of the Chinese declaration of nonalienation of March 15, 1897, and the Japanese agreement of June 10, 1907, to respect the rights of France. France experienced a deep shock when the Japanese Foreign Minister told the Diet in his speech of January, 1939:

We can not deal properly with France unless France stops arms assistance to China. . . . In diplomacy France only maintains her position by clinging to the coat-tail of Britain and America. France is nothing but an independent state which depends on the great powers of Britain and America. She has nothing of her own and is bound to take a most sneaking, foxy attitude towards this country.

On February 9, sixteen Japanese vessels disgorged their complements on the island and took it over for military purposes. The Japanese Foreign Minister explained that the operation was "for the purpose of exterminating the Chinese military forces in the island and is therefore an affair which has nothing to do with the question of assuring peace and security as envisaged by the Japanese-French agreement." Southwest China was the chief base for supplies for Chiang Kai-shek and must therefore be destroyed. The duration of the occupation would depend upon strategic necessities and the Japanese would make no statement as to the future status of Hainan after the collapse of the Chiang Kai-shek regime. The Japanese thus advanced to the very doors of the French possessions and prompted the fruitless French efforts to strengthen the defenses of Indo-China. When the war broke out in Europe, France was at the mercy of Japan in East Asia.

The French accepted the Craigie-Arita formula in China; namely, that they would countenance no acts or measures prejudicial to the special requirements of the Japanese forces. The French concessions were practically surrendered to the Japanese, French troops were withdrawn from China, and the Japanese captured Nanning to close the alternative route from Indo-China. The Japanese bombarded the Yünnan Railway intermittently

after December, 1939, and sent a military mission to Hanoi to arrange for air bases, artillery stations, and the passage of Japanese troops into Southwest China. They stopped all military traffic on the Yünnan Railway and took over the accumulated goods on the docks and in the warehouses. The Japanese military mission signed the Hanoi Convention with the French on September 22, 1940, by which Japan agreed to respect French sovereignty in Indo-China, to respect the territorial integrity of Indo-China, and to respect the rights and interests of France in the Far East. On its part, France consented to the placing of its military facilities in northern Indo-China at the disposal of the Japanese.

The Japanese landed troops at Haiphong, took over three air bases, and garrisoned the bases with more than 6,000 soldiers. Their inspectors took over traffic management on the railway, and their engineers put up Japanese railway signals and highway markers. The Japanese acted as if they had come to stay. The Japanese extracted new economic agreements from the French in Indo-China and set about the extension of their military predominance into southern Indo-China. During 1941, Japanese troops arrived in force to occupy strategic areas in the region of Saigon. The French were completely helpless and could only look to an eventual Anglo-American victory over the Axis to restore French fortunes. A Vichy appointee, Admiral Decoux, replaced the De Gaullist, General Catroux, as governor-general. Under painful duress, he agreed that the French administration would do nothing to hinder the Japanese war effort against the Allies. The entire period of World War II was a constant battle of wits between the French and the Japanese, with the French resisting repeated Japanese military and economic demands as much as possible yet never daring to goad the Japanese into outright absorption of the colony.

Thailand, encouraged by Japan, also took advantage of French weakness. Rising Thai nationalism pretended that all countries populated by Thai peoples should be united under Bangkok. Laos and the Thai countries of Upper Tongking were included in the area claimed by the Thai irredentists as well as the provinces of Sisophon, Siemreap, and Battambang. Thailand demanded the rectification of the frontier and undeclared war broke out between Thailand and Indo-China in January, 1941. An armistice was negotiated on board a Japanese cruiser in Saigon harbor, and a treaty signed at Tokyo on May 9, 1941, turned over to Thailand all the territories which it had demanded.

After French humiliations, the Dutch were next to feel the sting of the Japanese lash. The Dutch wanted to confine the Chinese-Japanese war to the Asian mainland because they feared the consequences of either a decisive Chinese victory or a decisive Japanese victory. If the Chinese should win, it might raise grandiose ideas in the minds of the million and a quarter

Chinese residents of Indonesia. If the Japanese should win, they might step beyond China toward the South Seas.

The Japanese had the legal status of Europeans in the Netherlands East Indies and they tended to settle in self-contained communities of their own, immune to the general social life of the islands. This was ideal for espionage purposes. They enjoyed most-favored-nation status in commerce, and after the depression sold many more goods to Indonesia than they bought. The rising flood of imports was carried in Japanese ships, financed by Japanese banks, stored in Japanese warehouses in the coastal towns of Java, and sold to Javanese consumers through Japanese middlemen and tiny Japanese bazaars. Japanese buyers of native products for export to Japan penetrated into the deepest interior of all the islands. Japanese fisheries operated in strategically important seas, and Japanese businessmen bought mining, lumber, and agricultural rights of doubtful economic value in localities of military importance. The Dutch government took steps to protect themselves against the Japanese, thus angering the Japanese because it reduced their trade. Then the sympathies of the Chinese in Indonesia cut still deeper into Japanese profits and set the stage for the Japanese to pursue vengeful tactics against the Dutch at their earliest opportunity.

After the outbreak of the war in Europe, the Netherlands intensified its efforts to give the East Indies military and naval protection against a possible attack. After the occupation of the mother country, Netherlanders in the Indies were driven to depend completely upon themselves. Their trade increased but their defense costs multiplied and they expected political concessions to recompense them for their actual economic sacrifices. The Dutch government in exile responded grudgingly and alienated what might have been an enthusiastic sympathy for their plight. Instead, the Dutch officials in Batavia felt alone and deserted as they were left to cope with the Japanese. The United States and Great Britain were in position to give the Dutch nothing more tangible than moral support and the benefit of any economic pressures which they exerted against Japan in their own behalf.

After denouncing their Treaty of Judicial Settlement, Arbitration, and Conciliation with the Dutch, the Japanese presented demands for tremendous increases in shipments of raw materials from the Indies to Japan and for better treatment of Japanese nationals in Indonesia. The Japanese acted with speed after they received official assurance of Germany's lack of interest in the Dutch territories. The Japanese refused to commit themselves to the preservation of the *status quo* in the Indies and they wished to forestall any Dutch diplomatic move which would place their interests in the Indies in trust with Great Britain or the United States until the end of the war.

German parachute troops were still landing in the streets of The Hague

when the Japanese minister called at the Foreign Office and in the same breath offered condolences and made suggestions about Japan's requirements. In August, 1940, Japan sent to Batavia a distinguished diplomatic mission to obtain peaceful assurance of co-operation under Kobayashi Ichizo, "a typically Japanese business man who had been very successful in combining the exploitation of an electric railway and a popular burlesque theater, but who had little knowledge of the world at large and no familiarity at all with the Netherlands East Indies." The Japanese were most insistent upon huge quantities of petroleum products, economic concessions within the Indies, and control of finance and shipping. The Dutch persevered and procrastinated as best they could but they detected behind Mr. Kobayashi's honeyed words a grim determination to get by force if necessary what he might fail to win by diplomacy. The wealth of the Indies was indispensable for Japan's conquest of the Southern Regions.

Kobayashi failed; a second mission under urbane, tenacious Minister Yoshizawa scaled down its demands but resumed the attack. The Dutch argued that they must consider as a prime objective of policy the welfare and emancipation of the people of the Indies, that they must not concede a preponderance of economic power to any foreign country, and that they must give no advantages to enemies of the Netherlands. While negotiations caught the public eye, Japan secretly planned its conquest by military force. It drew up details of military government and printed occupation currency. In June negotiations broke down, and with the German attack on Russia, Japan decided to postpone its dealings with the Dutch in the Indies while it solidified its military position in Indo-China.

From this time on, Japan realized that direct action against the Netherlands East Indies, or against Great Britain, or against the Dutch was not possible without involving the United States; so the development of Japanese aggression against the Indies followed the course of Japanese-American relations. On July 28, 1941, the Netherlands East Indies followed the lead of the United States in freezing Japanese assets.

The once-buzzing Japanese merchant houses became silent and empty; their managers and employees were probably training for their jobs as economic experts with the invasion armies. Even the Consulate-General had quieted down; its main business now was the booking of passage and the storage of personal effects and of increasing amounts of local currency."²

On January 12, 1942, Japanese troops landed in the Netherlands East Indies. From the first day of the Japanese invasion, Dutch defeat was in-

² H. J. Van Mook, *The Stakes of Democracy in Southeast Asia* (Norton, New York, 1950), p. 124.

evitable. Oil wells, refineries, mining equipment were demolished; harbors, dockyards, workshops, tools, and stocks of war materials were destroyed. Food stocks were distributed to the native inhabitants and the civil servants were ordered to stay at their posts. Indonesia passed under the sway of Japan and entered the Co-Prosperity Sphere. The land was exploited, the life of the people was subjected to the war needs of Japan. The political control of the Netherlands was smashed, as the citizens of the Netherlands were stripped of their power and their prestige and herded into camps for nearly four cruel years of internment.

Suggested Reading

- A. D. A. DE KAT ANGLIANO, *Colonial Policy* (Chicago, 1931).
 KURT BLOCH, *German Interests and Policies in the Far East* (New York, 1940).
 G. H. BOUSQUET, *A French View of the Netherlands Indies* (London, 1940).
 M. COVARRUBIAS, *The Island of Bali* (New York, 1938).
 E. D. DEKKER, *Max Havelaar*, translated from the Dutch by W. Siebenhaar (New York, 1927).
 F. D. DJANG, *The Diplomatic Relations between China and Germany Since 1898* (Shanghai, 1936).
 R. EMERSON, L. A. MILLS, AND V. THOMPSON, *Government and Nationalism in Southeast Asia* (New York, 1942).
 T. E. FENNIS, *French Policy and Developments in Indo-China* (Chicago, 1936).
 J. S. FURNIVALL, *Netherlands India* (Cambridge, 1944).
 W. L. GODSHALL, *Tsingtao under Three Flags* (Shanghai, 1929).
 BRIAN HARRISON, *Southeast Asia, a Short History* (London, 1954).
 ALBERT HYMA, *The Dutch in the Far East* (Ann Arbor, 1942).
 WILLIAM L. LANGER, *The Diplomacy of Imperialism* (New York, 1951).
 R. LEVY, G. LACAM, AND A. ROTH, *French Interests and Policies in the Far East* (New York, 1941).
 R. A. NOREM, *Kiachow Leased Territory* (Berkeley, 1942).
 C. ROBEQUAIN, *The Economic Development of French Indo-China* (Oxford, 1944).
 S. H. ROBERTS, *History of French Colonial Policy (1870-1925)*, 2 volumes (London, 1929).
 VIRGINIA THOMPSON, *French Indo-China* (New York, 1937).
 A. VANDENBOSCH, *The Dutch East Indies* (Berkeley, 1942).
 H. J. VAN MOOK, *The Stakes of Democracy in Southeast Asia* (New York, 1950).
 BERNHARD VIEKKE AND H. M. NUSANTARA, *A History of the East Indian Archipelago* (Cambridge, 1943).

CHAPTER 16

The Far East in Soviet Politics

Czarist Russia experienced the heights of power and the depths of helplessness in its long and checkered history. At one time, it loomed as a giant in the Far East, feared and hated by Great Britain, only to be exposed by Japan as a giant with feet of clay. Czarist Russia slowly regained its prestige among the nations with whom power was the measure of respectability and became a principal enemy of the Triple Alliance in World War I. As long as Russia held the German armies at bay on the eastern front, Paris was safe. Then the Russian armies collapsed and defeat degenerated into mass murder. The political and social system of the czars fed the flames of the Russian revolution. From the ashes of the old regime a new state and a new system came gradually into being.

New Russia—the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, or the USSR—inherited the geographical spaces and the historical traditions of czarist Russia. A land of diverse peoples and great distances, with three quarters of its home base in Asia, it formed its global policies with as much concern for the East as for the West. It inherited an isolationist philosophy of security which placed its reliance upon a *cordon sanitaire* (or a ring of weak or partially controlled states on its frontiers) and a steady expansionist drive directed, at various times, toward the straits, cities on the Baltic, the Persian Gulf, or a warm-water port on the Pacific. But the new Russia added a new element to its synthesis of geographic and historical factors in foreign policy. It stirred into its brew the flavor of Marxian philosophy. It dedicated itself not only to the vital interests of the Russian state but to the accomplishment of the world revolution. In the eyes of the Communists who ruled the USSR, these ends justified every means—military, diplomatic, economic, or propaganda.

After World War I, the peoples of western Europe looked upon the

Soviet regime as a pariah in the society of nations, the source of revolutionary infection, to be quarantined and resisted. In the life span of one generation, the fledgling, a fragile state organism with a life expectancy measured in months, became one of the two superpowers of the world. Multinational Russia passed through years of civil chaos before it achieved internal solidarity. The fortuitous circumstance of "intercapitalist" wars was utilized to expand the border areas and to absorb more millions of inhabitants into its Socialist orbit.

The revolutions of 1917 laid the foundation for the new Russia and the entire period before World War II served as a testing time for its ideology. The requirements of the state and the world revolution were continuously synchronized and dovetailed without obliterating either one in the interest of the other. The masters of the Kremlin manipulated their charges—whether Russian government officials or party functionaries—in whatever country, with eyes steadily fixed on unwavering goals. They balanced East against West and harmonized their relations with China and Japan with the central theme of their global policies. Their only limitations were the fallibility of human judgment and the perspicacity and determination of those with whom they were obliged to deal.

Revolutions in 1917

The splendor of the court, the wealth of the larger landlords, the prosperity of the comparatively few industrial entrepreneurs, the glamour of the military officers, and the brilliance of world-renowned intellectuals constituted a glittering façade for a shabby social edifice overripe for revolution. On March 8, 1917, more than 130,000 workers were on strike in Petrograd and paraded the streets in a mild, comparatively well-ordered demonstration. Neither the government, the leaders of the *Duma* or Russian parliament, nor the police were particularly alarmed. The cry was for bread; few voices were heard protesting against the war or the autocracy of the czar. Demonstrations grew more ominous and crowds attacked the police. The Cossacks who had been patrolling the streets showed friendliness to the strikers. Within a week, regiments of soldiers joined the crowds and the revolution—not only for bread but against the czars and all they stood for—was under way. The *Duma* assumed responsibility for restoration of order, but it vacillated between taking a stand for the czars and supporting the mobs. A *soviet*, or committee of workers, in Petrograd took over the direction of the revolution behind the scenes but did not presume to come forward as a new government. The

majority of the soviet was content with the abdication of the czar and the establishment of a provisional regime under Prince Lvov, with Alexander Kerensky as the Minister of Justice.

Old-time revolutionaries filtered back into Petrograd. The patriarch of the Russian Marxists, Plekhanov, was among the first. He was followed by Trotsky, who came from an eighteen-dollar-a-month apartment in the Bronx; Kamenev, Molotov, and Stalin, who came from exile in Siberia; and Gorky, Lenin, and others, who came from western Europe. As soon as Lenin arrived, on April 16, 1917, he took issue with the restrained elements of the Petrograd soviet. He addressed the crowd as "dear Comrades, soldiers, sailors, and workers," as the "advance guard of the international proletarian army." He wanted no part of a parliamentary republic or of a bourgeois democracy; he was fired by the illusion that "not today, but tomorrow, any day, may see the general collapse of European capitalism." His blazing slogan was "Long Live the International Social Revolution." He wanted a Soviet republic which would nationalize the land, assume control of production and distribution of goods, adopt the party name of "Communist," create a Third International, and sign a treaty of peace. He said the people cried for peace, land, and bread; the provisional government gave them war, hunger, and no land. His militant program called for all power to the soviet, all resistance to Kerensky who succeeded Prince Lvov. Kerensky tried to renew the military offensive against the Germans, but in less than two weeks the Russian front collapsed and Russia, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist as a great power.

In mid-July, 1917, Kerensky charged Lenin with being a spy and an agent of the German General Staff. He cracked down on the Bolsheviks, drove Lenin and Zinoviev into hiding, and threw Trotsky and others into prison. He attempted to set up a military dictatorship, but the Cossacks marching into Petrograd chose fraternization to fratricide. Prison doors were opened, revolutionists came out of hiding, and soviets in Petrograd and Moscow seized power in the cities. By October various nationalities in Russia began to secede and the whole countryside seethed in feverish unrest. Bread riots broke out in the cities and shouts for land rang through the villages. Peasants expropriated lands, drove off or killed cattle, burned down the landlords' barns and dwellings, tortured or murdered landlords, and wantonly destroyed trees, agricultural implements, and machinery. Bands of defeated, desperate, deserting soldiers plundered the countryside as the German Army marched relentlessly through the Baltic countries on the wide-open approach to Petrograd.

Trotsky organized a Military Revolutionary Committee which displaced the General Staff as the highest military authority. He organized

the Red Guards who took over all the key military points in Petrograd, drove out Kerensky and his followers, and set the stage for the second revolution. In an all-night session, November 7 and 8, the Congress of Soviets declared the power of government vested in a Council of People's Commissars, organized primarily from the ranks of the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks. Lenin was named Premier; Trotsky, the Commissar for Foreign Affairs; and Stalin, Commissar for National Minorities.

The cardinal principles of the new government were to take the country out of war, to build up its military strength, and to prepare for a Socialist economy based on the dictatorship of the proletariat. Land was declared to be the property of those who tilled it and the factories were placed in control of the workers. Food was commandeered for the cities, banks and factories were nationalized, transport was taken over by the state—as much to save the country from chaos as to carry out Socialist theories of expropriation. Within a year, all of the larger commercial and industrial enterprises were declared to be the property of the state.

The rest of the world was either preoccupied with its own internal problems, like China, or too deeply involved with its attitudes toward the war, like Japan and the United States, to pay too much attention to developments within Russia. From 1917 to 1921 the country was subjected to civil war, armed intervention, and militant communism. The new Russia found itself isolated from friends and enemies alike and inextricably enmeshed in its own struggle for existence. The new Communist government lost no time in declaring its intention to abolish secret diplomacy, and it made public the secret archives of the czarist government. It issued appeals to all belligerent nations and governments to start negotiations toward what it called a just and democratic peace.

On January 8, 1918, President Wilson, in the sixth of his famous fourteen points, called for the evacuation of all Russian territory and a settlement which would provide Russia with an opportunity for a free and independent national development and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing. In Russia, separatist movements convulsed Finland, the Baltic countries, Poland, and the Ukraine. Siberia writhed in the conflicts between Reds and Whites. In March, 1918, Lenin pressured his colleagues to accept the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Germany, by which Russia was compelled to pull its troops out of the Ukraine, Livonia, Estonia, Finland, and the Åland Islands, and to give up its claims to Poland, Courland, and Lithuania. Russia was obliged to surrender to Turkey the territories of Ardahan, Kars, and Batum and to discontinue its propaganda in the territory of the Central Powers.

Lenin argued that "we must maneuver and retreat until reinforcements

come to our aid." He believed in going one step backward in order to go two steps forward. Tomorrow the revolution would engulf Germany, and Germany would be obliged to disgorge its ill-gotten gains. Austro-Hungarian troops moved into Odessa; the Germans advanced into Kiev, Rostov, and the Crimea. Then the Allied Supreme War Council decided to intervene in Russia and sent troops into Archangel, Murmansk, and Vladivostok. Allied governments, throughout Russia's civil wars, supported the Whites with munitions and technical aid and enforced a strict blockade against Russia. Intervention outweighed Wilsonian idealism.

A host of military commanders arose to challenge the new government: Denikin, Wrangel, Yudenitch, Kolchak, and Semenov. Civil war raged from Chita in eastern Siberia to the Polish frontier, from the Crimea to the Baltic. An anti-Soviet Cossack Army moved up from the basin of the Don toward Moscow and tried to join the British forces in the north. General Semenov established himself at Chita, and Admiral Kolchak in Omsk proclaimed himself the supreme ruler of Russia. At times the Soviet state, fighting for its life, was reduced to territory not much greater than the insignificant size of medieval Muscovite Russia. Gradually the Red Army put down the civil war and overcame the interventionists. Red Army units entered the Baltic states as the Germans withdrew and engaged in war against Rumania and Poland. When the peace conference met in Paris, it did not issue an invitation to Russia. While the conference was in session, Moscow convened on March 2, 1919, the first Congress of the newly formed Communist (Third) International dedicated to world revolution. By the end of 1919 the Allied forces completed the evacuation of Archangel, and the Russians initiated peace negotiations with the Baltic states. Admiral Kolchak's forces were routed—as much by the opposition of the masses as by military defeat. Semenov was defeated by "pale pink" partisans at Chita and gave way to an independent "democratic" state, the Far East Republic, which endured for a brief period with Moscow's tolerance and

In 1920 the Allies lifted the blockade against Russia and granted permits for trade between their own nationals and Soviet co-operatives. The Soviets concluded peace with Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Finland and signed a military alliance with the Ukraine. General Wrangel breathed the last internal opposition when he and the remnants of his anti-Bolshevik forces in the Crimea took refuge on French warships as the government troops entered Sevastopol.

The Poles, backed by French and Americans, remained in occupation as far east as Kiev. The Reds then drove the Poles back to the gates of Warsaw, where they were rallied by General Weygand. The Poles mounted a

counteroffensive, but mutual war-weariness dictated peace negotiations. The Poles pushed their frontiers so far to the east that their territory included some 4,000,000 Russian inhabitants. This gratified Polish national pride, but it invited disaster when Stalin was in position to retaliate. After peace with Poland, Russia quickly resumed peaceful relations with Persia (Iran), Afghanistan, and Turkey. Secretary Hughes rebuffed the Russian offer for the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States and excluded Russia from the Washington Armaments Conference.

The period of isolation and intervention was also for Russia a period of militant communism. Lenin, at the helm of party and state, improvised new lines to cope with internal and international crises. Marx had given guidance on revolution and the road to power; but he was inadequate in his directions on what to do with power and its concomitant, responsibility. A dictatorship of the proletariat was an anomaly in a country that was 85 per cent agricultural, with the role of the peasant in the class struggle defined only vaguely. The circumstances of war drove Lenin, the realist, to a program of social centralization, which many of his followers rationalized as the correct and natural policy of a Socialist state. He created the *Cheka*, or Extraordinary Commission, to deal with sabotage, speculation, and smuggling; and he gave it prerogatives which grew to include arbitrary arrest, judgment, and execution. Lenin himself was wounded by a would-be assassin and in retribution hundreds of figures of the old regime were put to death. Terror, from the beginning, was the handmaiden of war and revolution. The Cheka chose to "strike quick, strike hard and strike secretly."

For three years, the revolutionary leaders relied upon militant communism in their pursuit of peace, land, and bread. Private buying and selling were prohibited by law, and wages were paid in coupons or certificates or ration slips instead of money. Nonworkers were disenfranchised. The Communists tried to extend class warfare to the villages and to derive financial support from the peasants by taking away from them their excess grain. The peasants resisted grain requisitions and preferred to reduce their plantings rather than surrender their surpluses to their own officials. Crop failures aggravated famine conditions and prompted an appeal by Maxim Gorky to Herbert Hoover and the American Relief Administration to extend their operations from western and central Europe into Russia.

The first four years of the revolution constituted a difficult period for Russia: ostracism abroad and famine at home. This period spawned two beliefs: outsiders believed that Russia had lapsed into Mongol savagery and Russians believed that the non-Bolshevik world would, if it could,

destroy the Soviet. The Communists were dedicated to the destruction of capitalist society and were convinced that the capitalists were dedicated to the destruction of their own. Without relaxing their beliefs or intentions, they entered upon a period of new policies or new tactics. This period was marked by adjustments or compromises in their internal activities and by *rapprochement* in their relations with the outside world.

Adjustment and *Rapprochement*

In Russia, as elsewhere, domestic policies modified foreign affairs and vice versa. Internal needs such as rehabilitation and recovery controlled external attitudes like energetic trade promotion and propaganda truce. In a negative way, the atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust blanketed Soviet diplomacy; the fear of capitalist encirclement served as a welcome apology for the drabness of everyday life. The Soviet needed guns and butter, and the overpowering need for guns in a hostile world was called upon to excuse the inability to provide even a small amount of butter.

On February 17, 1920, the Soviet government issued the first "New Economic Policy" (NEP) decree, replacing commandeering of farm products with an agricultural tax. Subsequent decrees had the effect of veering Russian economy toward the more orthodox practices of capitalist states. Russia permitted limited freedom of trade and set up state retail stores. It admitted private capitalism in factories employing less than twenty workers and reinstituted graduated wage scales. The whole internal economy—industry, commerce, transport, housing, and employment—was put back on a straight money basis. Rents were charged for houses and fares were demanded for travel. A state banking system was introduced and an ordinary, stabilized, Western-style unit of money was put into circulation. Securities, notes and checks, and savings accounts were re-created. State trusts were given control of production and distribution in large industries, and trade unions were relegated to an innocuous role in the economic structure. Overtime pay and piecework were again sanctioned. Limited rights to private property—not as an inalienable right of the individual but as a gracious grant from the state—were implied. Concessionaires from abroad were encouraged and protected and special inducements were offered for the promotion of foreign trade. The tax system was revised to ease the burden on the peasants and to shift an appropriate responsibility for the state revenue to the improving urban sector of the economy. With incentive (a camouflaged and disguised profit motive) thus restored, *kulaks*, or prosperous peasants, and *Nepmen*, or propertied *bourgeoisie*, reappeared. They

restored production to the 1913 level. "Instead of grass-grown streets, dilapidated houses and closed shops, there was movement of traffic, fresh paint and plaster, and the hum of business." They also caused rifts in party leadership between Stalin and Trotsky, who also differed in their ideas about the orientation of the world revolution.

Lenin died on January 21, 1924. He had originated the Third International because he believed the Second International had betrayed the world revolution. According to his theory, the USSR was to be only the leading state among equals; the Comintern and the Russian state alike were to be vassals of one lord, the Russian Communist party. Leninism invited the wrath of the capitalist powers who resented its propaganda in their bosoms and in their colonies. Lenin displayed his tact in clinging to his theory but in restraining his actions. He appeased countries in the Near East and Far East and entered into trade relations with the advanced productive countries of the West. He was rewarded by *de jure* recognition from every major power except the United States. Russia entered into a network of nonaggression, nonintervention, and neutrality pacts with Europeans and with China and Japan.

After Lenin's death, Stalin propounded the thesis of socialism in a single country and after a fierce internal struggle elevated it into Communist doctrine. The possibility of continued existence of a proletarian state in a capitalistic environment had previously been rejected by Soviet theorists as un-Marxian and utterly utopian. Lenin had written in 1920, "As long as capitalism and socialism exist, we cannot live in peace; in the end one or the other will triumph—a funeral dirge will be sung over the Soviet Republic or over world capitalism." Stalin would continue to foment unrest and to plant the revolutionary banner in the scattered and remote parts of the world, but he would emphasize the achievement of a Socialist utopia in a single country—his own Russia.

Trotsky opposed Stalin, both on the NEP and on the socialism in a single country dogma. Trotsky saw the NEP as the abandonment or the denial of the equalitarian aspect of communism. He interpreted the emphasis on the Russian state as a new dereliction of duty in the interest of the world revolution. Trotsky was an internationalist, a linguist, who appreciated that the Western democracies were far ahead of the USSR in industrial development. He believed that they were ready for revolution. He reasoned that the best way to socialism—for the world and even for Russia—was to energize revolutionary fervor throughout the world. This would weaken the capitalistic countries and stop them from making war on the Soviet Union. Under the banner, "Workers of All Lands Unite," the Soviet Union would lead the permanent revolution.

Stalin prevailed over Trotsky; he became the high priest of the Communists. Trotskyites were ousted as deviationists and Trotsky himself, who contributed so much to Soviet victories, was expelled from his party and his country. Every likeness of him was removed from the shrine, the Museum of the Revolution, in Moscow. In the victorious clique within the Communist hierarchy the name of Trotsky became anathema. Communist parties throughout the world needed a long time to adapt themselves to the shift in philosophy and tactics which followed the Stalinist succession.

In foreign affairs Stalin improved the standing of the USSR, but Comintern activities jeopardized Russian *rapprochement* with the West. Suspicion lingered that an obliging bear was more dangerous than an enemy. As an aftermath of a general strike in England, Anglo-Soviet relations were broken off. Nevertheless, the USSR was the first to ratify the Briand-Kellogg Pact, and Russia's representative, Maxim Litvinov, was most radical in his advocacy of disarmament measures. In 1928 the General Electric Company extended a five-year credit to the Soviet Trading Corporation in New York.

Within a month after Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev were driven from the party, the Stalinist majority adopted Trotsky's attitude toward the Nepmen and the kulaks. The Communist conference which expelled the opposition decided to end the NEP and reorganize the economy of the USSR by intensive industrialization of the whole country and amalgamation of individual peasant farms into state farms and collectives. On October 1, 1928, the Soviet government announced the first Five-Year Plan aimed at regimenting every detail of economic existence. The Planning Commission decreed how many factories should be built and where, how much coal should be mined, how much food made available, how many kilowatt-hours of electricity produced, and how much currency circulated. The social reforms of the Communist party were underscored, but a life of present toil and sacrifice was offered frankly, almost brutally, as the cost of a utopian future. Stalin emphasized tractors and guns—tractors for an improved standard of living and guns to defend it. He traded grain, oil, timber, and furs for machines and advice. With the help of foreign experts, Russian leaders began to construct a self-sufficient heavy industry. Dams, factories, and combines brought new significance to such scattered spots as Dneprostroy, Kharkov, Chelyabinsk, Stalingrad, Gorki, Sverdlovsk, Magnitogorsk, Khabarovsk, and Komsomolsk. Industry was decentralized because of defense requirements. State production increased but without commensurate benefits for the workers. Living conditions remained miserably de-

pressed but unemployment disappeared. A feeling of progress and propaganda ignited new flames of patriotism.

Collectivization was the counterpart of industrialization. A garden-patch economy was unable to feed Russia's growing millions and to provide an exportable surplus of wheat. The shiny new tractors necessitated large farms and the political regimentation program spurred on collectivization. The gigantic undertaking made many mistakes and gave rise to criticism, resistance, and sabotage. The government resorted to force. Kulaks were driven from their homes and their property confiscated. At the cost of famine, the wealthy peasant class was liquidated. By 1933, collectivization was 75 per cent completed, although concessions were permitted such as individual proprietary rights in gardens, orchards, and domestic animals. The collectives militated against the independent spirit of an individual small holder and fostered a peasant psychology akin to that of the industrial workers.

The Five-Year Plans were more than economic blueprints; they were the general plan for the war regarded as inevitable from the day the Soviet first seized power. The pace and the tempo were geared to war and they were thrown into high gear as the aggressive threats from Germany and Japan seemed to concentrate on the Soviet Union.

Co-operation with the Democracies

With the accession of Hitler, the Russian watchword in international affairs became "peace" but not "pacifism." "We do not covet a single foot of foreign soil; but not a foot of our land shall be yielded to a foreign invader." The Russians boasted that there was no sign of an attempt on the part of the Soviet government to grab the Dardanelles; to penetrate into Manchuria; to conquer Finland, Poland, or the Baltic states; or to establish spheres of influence in Persia, Afghanistan, or other places, while they were building a new social order within their own country. They contrasted the optimistic outlook of their own country with the gloomy effects of the depression abroad.

In the interest of "the indivisibility of peace" and collective security, the USSR proposed an eastern Locarno or multilateral pact of mutual assistance. Failing that, in 1933 it concluded pacts of nonaggression with its neighbors in which aggression was defined as the declaration of war; armed invasion; attacks on territory, vessels, or aircraft; blockade or aid to armed bands invading another state. The USSR offered a similar pact to Japan, which according to Molotov had not yet buried its ambitions or discarded

its weapons. The USSR and the United States re-established normal diplomatic relations after the election of President Roosevelt. The USSR agreed not to disseminate propaganda in the United States, to permit complete freedom of worship for Americans residing in Russia, to conclude a consular convention, and to negotiate a final settlement of claims and debts. On September 18, 1934, the USSR entered the League of Nations which had been formerly castigated in Russia as an "international organization of capitalists for the systematic exploitation of the working peoples of the earth." At one time the Communist line had been to boycott the League, but after the departure of Germany and the walkout of Japan, the line changed to participation. Russia's peace offensive culminated in mutual assistance pacts with France and Czechoslovakia.

The Comintern met in 1935 for its first Congress in eight years. It adopted the policy of nationalism and the United Front. It agreed to form a popular front with any anti-Fascist parties within a state and to co-operate in a united front with any bourgeois democracy until it could be replaced by a proletarian democracy. Delegate Earl Browder from the United States told the Congress that the American Communists "have appropriated the traditions of 1776 and 1861, and we have come forward as the bearers and pioneers of that revolutionary tradition out of which the United States was born." Delegate Maurice Thorez added in support of the nationalist zig-zag, "We do not intend to let Fascism usurp the flag of the Great Revolution nor the Marseillaise." In the name of anti-Fascism, Communists went as far as to approve support of the rearmament program in France.

As its prestige grew, the USSR expanded the scope of its international activities. It sent help to the Spanish Loyalists; it signed the Montreux Convention permitting Turkey to remilitarize the straits; it signed a mutual assistance pact with Outer Mongolia; and it dropped public hints to the effect that it had no plans for bringing about the world revolution. It entered into a naval agreement with the British and, after the Sian incident in China, signed with China a nonaggression pact. Litvinov attacked bitterly the weakness of the West at the Brussels Conference in 1937, and warned that the USSR would have to adopt unilateral defensive measures to cope with the aggressive methods of totalitarian Japan. After Germany moved into Austria in March, 1938, he called for a special conference to consider collective means for checking aggression, for eliminating an aggravated danger of a new world massacre; but he was labeled "premature" by the British. The Comintern urged workers—especially those of France, Great Britain, and the United States—to join the Soviet Union in destroying the existing regimes in the Fascist Triplice. At the very time (August, 1938) the Russians and Japanese were engaged in border hostilities in Chang-

kufeng, the Germans prepared to move into Czechoslovakia. Litvinov declared the readiness of the USSR to defend Czechoslovakia, if France would do the same, and warned Poland that the Soviet-Polish nonaggression pact would be denounced if Poland invaded Czechoslovakia. Again, Litvinov was disregarded and the Russians were not even invited to the Munich Conference. Stalin became convinced that the game of the capitalist powers was to appease Hitler in the West in order to turn him deeper into the quagmire of the East.

Meanwhile, Russia experienced internal difficulties which tended to weaken its hand in diplomacy. Russia could not expect sympathetic collaboration with the West so long as its totalitarian regime flouted its contempt for human rights. Perhaps partially as a sop to the West it adopted a new constitution on December 5, 1936. This provided for direct election to the Soviet Congress, stipulated a bicameral legislature, granted freedom of service for religious cults, and continued some assurance of civil liberties. For a year and a half Russia was rocked and the outside world was shocked by the purges. After one of Stalin's closest intimates was assassinated, the police, the courts, and the firing squads swung into action. Fifty of Russia's great revolutionary names were sentenced to death for treason and sabotage; lesser victims were numbered in the thousands. First, Zinoviev and Kamenev were put to death; then, Karl Radek; then, the Commissar of Defense, Tukhachevsky; and finally, Rykov, Bukharin, Yagoda, and Rosengoltz. The logic of the charges was that these men opposed Stalin and therefore favored Russia's enemies. Internal opposition was tantamount to treason, and treason demanded the sentence of death. No matter a man's intentions or motivation; the fact of opposition was evidence of his guilt.

The intoxication of militarism, nationalism, and economic power blurred the appreciation of the extent to which the political leaders were divided. Loud speakers blared a continuous din of the dangers to the Socialist Fatherland and ordered the people to consider themselves in a state of permanent mobilization. The pledge of loyalty for Soviet soldiers was changed to the Socialist Fatherland and not as before to the workers of the whole world. Men swore as citizens of the Soviet Union instead of as sons of the working class. Education, literature, and cultural activities glorified the state; the Russians were taught to look upon their own past with pride instead of scorn.

The second and third Five-Year Plans enlarged upon the premises of the first one. There was no reversion to private capital since every branch of the economy was state owned and state dominated. Rising production curves flattened out and the general level of living remained at the mercy

of preparations for war. Noticeable inequalities in income separated the higher brackets of the bureaucracy, the army, the OGPU, industrial executives, popular authors, composers, and engineers from the ordinary workers and peasants. "Categories" replaced "classes" in a distinction more ostensible than real. (For example, one could buy first, second, or third *category* tickets for the railroad.)

Foreign trade improved, gold production skyrocketed, debts decreased, almost every line of industrial production zoomed upward, and the international income account balanced in Russia's favor. The defenses of the nation acquired a new look. Forts dotted the vulnerable frontiers; submarines, artillery, tanks, airplanes, and mechanical equipment including automobiles and trucks rolled off the assembly lines in ever-mounting quantities.

Industrialization shifted to the east of the Urals. Between the Volga and the Yenisei a rich area as large as the United States was convulsed into prosperity. By the outbreak of World War II, scores of cities in this Soviet Middle East had a population above 100,000. Alma Ata, Krasnoyarsk, Magnitogorsk, and Stalinsk were twice that big, and Sverdlovsk, Novosibirsk, and Tashkent each had about a half million. The Soviet sent on to the Far East everything from people and transportation facilities to agricultural implements, factories, and armies. A new railway linked Siberia to Turkestan, the Trans-Siberian Railroad was double-tracked, and a new trunk line joined the northern shores of Lake Baikal with the Pacific littoral at Komsomolsk. Most activity was shrouded in military secrecy. Inhospitable areas were converted into fortress Asia, in many respects self-sustaining and in no mood to retreat before aggressive gestures from Japan. When Russian armies fought against Japan in 1904 and 1905, they were dispirited professional armies distant from home and with limited supplies. A half century later, Russian armies were popular armies with professional quality, operating from a home base capable of producing a significant part of its own requirements.

Soviet-German Interlude

The failure of the Munich Conference to bring peace in our time culminated in Stalin's distrust of the policies of appeasement. He was certain, then, that the West had no objections to understandings with the aggressors which would hasten the embroilment of Germany and Japan in wars with the Soviet Union. On March 10, 1939, he announced to the Congress of the Russian Communist party his measures for self-preservation in the

light of the critical situation. He said that he wanted continuing peace and improved business relations with all countries, as well as stronger bonds with the working classes everywhere. He warned that the USSR must be cautious not to be drawn into conflicts by warmongers who were accustomed to have others pull chestnuts out of the fire for them. He stated that the Red Army and the Red Navy must be strengthened to the utmost to defend the Soviet borders, including the mighty outpost of Soviet power in the Far East. He replaced the internationalist Litvinov by the calloused Molotov as Foreign Minister, as a signal of his zigzag in tactics.

Russia continued to discuss with German and British delegations in Moscow the terms of a mutual assistance pact or military alliance. The discussions broke down, ostensibly over problems of guarantees for the Baltic countries and Russian assistance to Poland but fundamentally over the mutual distrust which divided the negotiants. Before the staff conversations were broken off, Russia gave up its hopes of coming to terms and switched to a nonaggression pact with Germany. Molotov announced that any ideology, even the ideology of Hitlerism, in his view could not be destroyed by force and therefore it was not only senseless but criminal to wage a war of ideology camouflaged as a fight for democracy. In August, 1939, Russia and Germany, in complete reversal of tactics, signed the nonaggression pact which set the stage for World War II.

The newspaper *Izvestia* wrote:

The Pact brings an end to enmity in relations between Germany and the Soviet Union. . . . Ideological differences as well as differences in the political systems of both nations cannot and must not stand in the way of the establishment and maintenance of good neighborly relations.

This pact marked the peak of nationalist primacy in the policies of the USSR and stood as a monument to the cynicism of the totalitarian dictators. Hitler's "Bolshevistic Jewish" enemies became overnight his friends; Stalin's "Fascist butchers" became his *compadres*. Churchill was attacked as the greatest enemy of the Soviet Union. The pact sealed the fate of Poland and precipitated the war in Europe. Russia and Germany divided Poland, and Russia closed in on the Baltic states. Russia signed with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania mutual assistance pacts which turned out to be gargantuan satires. Russia promised to respect the sovereign rights, economic and social structures, and government systems of the small states and to defend them against attack.

In time with martial music, Russian troops occupied key bases in the Baltic countries. A journalist from Riga reported that Stalin said to the Latvians, "Have no fear; I'll protect you from those big bad Russians—

what you do with the Communists is your own business; they are Trotskyites anyhow." Russia then invaded Finland, in the echo of a vicious propaganda barrage. The Russians among other things called the Finnish government "hangmen and exploiters, beasts of prey, clowns, crowing roosters, buffoons, lackeys, squirming grass snakes, sharks, mad dogs, bestial murderers," and accused them of "foul attacks, crazy expansionism, maniacal insolence, saber-rattling, and insatiable imperialist ambition." By mid-1940 Russia defeated Finland and absorbed the Baltic states. For its undisguised aggression, it was expelled from the League of Nations but its punishment neither stopped its feast nor curbed its appetite.

It turned to the Balkans, annexed Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, and assumed a strong defensive posture against a threatened invasion from Germany. Stalin's apprehension about Hitler's designs increased after the fall of France. Stalin's *marriage de covenance* with Hitler was of brief duration, but it constituted a distinct period in the evolution of Soviet foreign policy. If any proof were needed, it demonstrated Russia's utter devotion to the doctrine that the end justifies the means and to its belief in the expendability of principles in the struggle for existence. On April 6, 1941, Germany invaded Yugoslavia—one day after Yugoslavia had signed a treaty of nonaggression with Russia. Russia accepted the challenge, secured its eastern flank by a neutrality pact with Japan, and prepared to meet the German invasion which came on June 22, 1941. The subsequent zigzag in policy reconverted Stalin into the enemy of aggressive fascism and the friend and ally of all who were devoted to the destruction of Hitler.

Soviet Policy and World Communism

The Soviet Union added a new vital interest, the world revolution, to the traditional great power interests of strategic security and popular welfare. The Communist party within Russia set up a dictatorship which directed the nationalist policies of Russia and the international machinations of Communists everywhere.

The All-Union Communist party organized itself into a centralized hierarchy in the form of a pyramid based on "cells" formed wherever three party members could be found. The supreme organ, the All-Union Party Congress, was supposed to meet every three years, its powers being exercised in the intervals by the Central Executive Committee (CEC). The real brain trust and General Staff was the nucleus of the Politburo or Political Bureau of the CEC. About fourteen men designed the strategy and called the plays. Like a holding company, they operated through two agencies,

the government of the Soviet Union and the Communist International. They were devoted to Marx, Lenin, Stalin, Russia, and the world revolution. They found it impossible to conceive of any conflict between preserving themselves in power within the party, the interests of the Soviet state, and the enhancement of the revolution. It was not a case of more concern for Russian nationalism than for abstract theory but rather a devotion to the preservation and the strengthening of the state in order to make it a more formidable base for revolution. In spite of disappointments (for example, the failure of World Wars I and II to precipitate the universal uprising of the workers) the masters of the Kremlin did not discard their basic ideology or abandon their ambitions.

The nationalist policies of the Soviet paralleled strikingly the policies of czarist Russia: the pursuit of a protective façade of European satellites; the mystical devotion to Pan-Slavism; and the expansive urge toward outlets by sea, whether toward the straits, the Persian Gulf, or the distant Pacific. The dictatorial organization of the Russian government was an easy transition from the czars. The people were accustomed to having leaders think for them and they acquiesced in a totalitarianism which was not carefully conceived and nurtured but which, more or less, just grew. They were mass-hypnotized into believing that theirs was the most advanced "democracy" and that capitalist "democracies" were backward and corrupt. The people shared the same human preference of people everywhere for peace, liberty, and comfort; but those treasures were far down on the Soviet list of priorities. The populace was regimented by revolutionaries turned reactionary and was sealed in an atmosphere of fear and purge.

All talk of withering away of the state was silenced. It was officially explained that the state would wither away only when the capitalist environment was replaced by a Socialist utopia, when the danger of intervention and restoration of capitalism was finally overcome. Thus the Soviet quest for security became identical with a *pax Sovietica* throughout the entire world. The triumph of the world revolution became identical with the unlimited expansion of the area of Soviet control. The retention of dictatorship was justified by the bogey of the menace from abroad.

Soviet ideology was based on the teachings of Karl Marx as expounded and interpreted by Lenin and Stalin. Marxian philosophy was a doctrine of contest and struggle in every sphere of activity; Lenin applied it to the science of international politics; and Stalin pinpointed its applications for the Russian state. The central determinant in man's life was economic, the system of the production and exchange of goods. The social inequalities resulting from the exploitation of the workers would be ended only when

the victorious world revolution led to the dictatorship of the proletariat. In Lenin's theory, imperialism was the last phase of capitalism. According to him, surplus profits from the exploitation of the colonies and the backward areas had enabled the European capitalists to maintain the wage slaves above the starvation level and to postpone the inevitable uprising. Take away those profits, he argued, free the colonies, and then the workers at home would rise in revolt. Therefore, conflict with the capitalist powers was inevitable, and the duty of the Russian state was to take advantage of divisions between imperialist powers. Lenin once admitted, "If the capitalists had an ounce of solidarity, we could not survive for twenty-four hours." Again, he wrote, "If the imperialists go to war against one another, so much the better for us. Since we are obliged to put up with such rascals as capitalist thieves, each of whom is sharpening his knife for use against us, our direct duty is to make them turn their knives against each other. When thieves fight, an honest man wins." On another occasion, he predicted that Japan and the United States would fight for the supremacy of the world, for the right to loot, particularly Korea, and he insisted that although it would be a heinous crime against communism to support one country against another, nevertheless "[we are] obliged to take advantage of every hour granted by the circumstances in order to gain strength as rapidly as possible."

Stalin, in a bow to expediency, modified Lenin's doctrine of inevitability of conflict. He allowed that differences of ideology and social systems did not prevent the possibility of prolonged and friendly co-operation between the Soviet Union and other powers. He told Roy Howard on March 1, 1936, "American democracy and the Soviet system may peacefully exist side by side and compete with each other. But one cannot evolve from the other. The Soviet system will not become American democracy, or vice versa. We can exist peacefully side by side if we do not find fault with each other over every trifling matter." His was no real faith in permanent, peaceful coexistence, and no abstract longing for peace in a capitalistic environment. His co-operation was that of a rival, not an intimate or a partner. There was no smirching of his ideological slate nor surrender of a long-run objective to a short-term advantage. Peaceful coexistence with the Soviet state implied coexistence on terms compatible with current Communist dogma.

The inner circle, subject to the iron hand of the dictator, hammered out lines of policy. The members of this inner circle had to reconcile the logic of facts with abstractions of theory. They recognized no need for haste nor compulsion of morality. All tactics were permissible in the interest of the class struggle; nothing was justifiable for their enemies who were con-

sidered the enemies of the people. Their lines, once announced, were correct and necessary but always subject to modification, variation, or even reversal. The inner circle were expected to maneuver, to temporize, and to compromise. As in making the ascent of a difficult and unexplored mountain, they resorted to zigzags, sometimes retracing their steps, sometimes abandoning the course once selected and trying various others.

The representatives of the Russian government or the Comintern abroad were permitted no such luxury of vacillation. No appeal to reason, no amount of talk, no mask of toughness could induce the agent abroad to make shifts or adjustments except on instructions from Moscow. Only Moscow could modify the temptation to bully a weak or vacillating opponent or order a graceful retreat in the face of superior force.

The Russification of communism did not destroy, but in some instances strengthened, the power of the Russian Communist party over the various branches of the party in the other nation-states. For many Communist parties, the strongest weapon in their arsenal was the link to Moscow. But it was often difficult to reconcile the nationalism of a Communist or his party with the demands of Russia and international communism. No insurmountable problems arose if the country involved happened to be a friend or ally of the Soviet Union, but conflicting loyalties arose when there was no active united front. Dimitrov told the Seventh Congress of the Comintern that a Communist must sink his roots deep in his native land and that he could defend the interests of the international proletariat best by promoting the national forms of the class struggle. This compelled the hard-core Communist to contribute to chaos even in his own country by agitation, opposition, sabotage, or violence, depending upon the political and economic atmosphere. It also called for the promotion of unrest in the colonial and backward areas.

The Communists often said the road to Paris passes through Peking and Calcutta. They never underemphasized the importance of the Far East. A special department of the Comintern looked after the affairs of the Orient. A Russian delegate headed a Far Eastern section of the Comintern at Shanghai (the *Dalburo*) and a member of the embassy staff at Tokyo looked after the party interests in Japan. The Russian consulate-general in Seoul occasionally distributed money for party purposes. In the Far East as elsewhere the party aimed its appeals at labor unions, students, intelligentsia, writers, soldiers, and sailors. It adapted its propaganda to the predilections of the receiver. It stressed nationalism in Korea, antiwar policy in Japan. It circulated slogans such as "War . . . War . . . Who Profits by It?"; "Death to the Capitalists and the Landlords"; "Liberation of Korea and Formosa"; and "Independence for China." Sometimes the party

workers were furtive and secret, hunted by local government officials or by the police in the International Settlement. Sometimes they worked in the open and in an arrogantly provocative manner. Some agitators were skilled intellectuals; others were paid hooligans and rabble-rousers; still others were merely disgruntled misfits in a capitalistic world.

Unrest and revolution existed in Asia long before the advent of communism. Revolutions owed their logic to the West, but they looked to Russia for their tactics. Communists were able to use the revolutionist atmosphere and environment for their own purposes, for personal accession to power, and for the promotion of the interests of the USSR. The newly furbished team in world politics—state and party—looked to their own border areas, to China and to Japan and even beyond into Southeast Asia, for a new power base for the strengthening of their national position and for the furtherance of what they called their revolutionary objectives.

Suggested Reading

- MAX BOLOFF, *Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia*, 2 volumes (London, 1947, 1949).
- E. H. CARR, *A History of Soviet Russia: The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917–1923* (New York, 1951, 1952, 1953).
- WILLIAM H. CHAMBERLIN, *The Russian Revolution*, 2 volumes (New York, 1935).
- GEORGE CRIEL, *Russia's Race for Asia* (New York, 1949).
- GEORGE B. CRESSEY, *The Basis of Soviet Strength* (New York, 1945).
- DAVID J. DALLIN, *Soviet Far Eastern Policy, 1931–1945* (Princeton, 1945).
- JANE DIGRAS, ed., *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, Vol. 1, 1917–1924; Vol. 2, 1925–1932; Vol. 3, 1933–1941 (New York, 1951, 1952, 1953).
- ISAAC DEUTSCHER, *Stalin, A Political Biography* (London and New York, 1949).
- LOUIS FISCHER, *The Soviets in World Affairs*, 2 volumes (London, 1930). (2nd edition, Princeton, 1951).
- GEORGE KENNAN (MR. X), "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs* (New York, July, 1947).
- HARRIET L. MOORE, *Soviet Far Eastern Policy, 1931–1945* (Princeton, 1945).
- STEFAN T. POSSONY, *A Century of Conflict: Communist Techniques of World Revolution* (Chicago, 1953).
- FREDERICK SCHUMAN, *Soviet Politics at Home and Abroad* (New York, 1946).
- PAULINE TOMPKINS, *American-Russian Relations in the Far East* (Princeton, 1945).
- JULIAN TOWSTER, *Political Power in the USSR, 1917–1947* (New York, 1948).
- U. S. CONGRESS, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, *Background Information on the Soviet Union in International Relations* (Washington, 1950).
- U. S. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE, *Trends in Russian Foreign Policy Since World War I* (Washington, 1947).

CHAPTER 17

The Soviet Union and China after 1917

Within the framework of the interests of state and party, the Soviet Union steered its relations with China from the depths of the Russian revolution to the heights of World War II. The record revealed alternate periods of accommodation and antagonism, co-operation and resistance, friendship and hostility. In spite of twists and turns, Russian officials and party workers seemed to make more wise decisions than blunders and accumulated a record of uneven but steady progress. They increased the power position of the Russian state in the Far East and left their ideological stamp on the political parties and factions which fought for control within China. Russian influence far exceeded normal expectations. The period from 1917 to 1924 marked the cautious re-entry of the Soviet Union into the affairs of China, and the next three years constituted a heyday of co-operation. From 1927 to 1932 Russia conducted no formal diplomatic relations with China. From then until the outbreak of World War II, it maintained a fundamental attitude of cordiality and understanding toward the Kuomintang government of Chiang Kai-shek and applied in China its world-wide policy of the United Front.

The Border Areas

The national interests of the Soviet Union clashed with those of China in the frontier regions, which extend 4,000 miles from Vladivostok to the base of the Pamir Mountains. Russia insisted that Korea, Manchuria, Mongolia, and Sinkiang were to Russia as Canada and Mexico were to the

United States. For the sake of its security—or for the gratification of its aggressive aspirations—the government of the Soviet Union became no less preoccupied than the czardom in the strengthening of its frontier areas. This meant stronger fortifications, improved means of access, and the remodeling of the political system and social structure of neighboring territories to harmonize with the concepts of the Soviet.

The Russians were effectively stymied in Korea by the strict administrative control exercised by the Japanese. Russian schemes in Manchuria were part and parcel of the over-all quest for dominance in China until the Japanese threw a roadblock across the Russian advance by the Mukden incident and the subsequent establishment of Manchukuo. Russian activities in Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang were more successful.

For three years after the Russian revolution, the Moscow regime was powerless to control events in distant areas. In Urga, the capital of Outer Mongolia, the czarist officials were cut adrift and the city was exposed to Chinese and White Russian marauders. Japanese money paid the bills for adventurers like General Semenov and the "Mad Baron," von Ungern-Sternberg. One reign of terror followed another until Soviet forces, with a token army of Mongol partisans, re-established order. In November, 1921, a Mongol People's party assumed direction of the government and concluded a treaty with the Soviet Union, ostensibly based on principles of equality and reciprocity. The Chinese were squeezed out, although the Russians preserved the fiction of Chinese sovereignty. A council of ministers ruled the country under the presidency of a former typist in the Russian Consulate-General in Urga. In the Sun-Joffe agreement of 1923, Dr. Sun declared that he had no objection to the temporary occupation of Outer Mongolia by Soviet forces, and Joffe stated that it was not the purpose of the Soviet government to pursue any imperialist policy there or to induce Outer Mongolia to secede from China. In 1924 these understandings were formalized. Russia recognized Chinese sovereignty in Outer Mongolia and promised to withdraw its troops.

A Soviet pattern of colonization gradually emerged in Outer Mongolia. Social revolution followed on the heels of political "liberation." Well-to-do notables, "capitalists," and lamas gave up their privileges—often their lives—to poor lamas, shepherds, and peasants. In 1924 the *Hutuktu* or Living Buddha died and thus prepared the stage for the proclamation of the Mongolian People's Republic. The phrase, "people's republic," proved a potent propaganda catchword and appeared later in the Chinese People's Republic and the North Korean People's Republic. According to a new constitution, the government was modeled on the Soviet Union. The Red Army withdrew but advisers remained behind to instruct and train Mon-

golians. Russian economic consultants and traders served also as axes of political influence. Visas for Outer Mongolia could be obtained only in Urga (renamed *Ulan Bator* or "Red Hero") or Moscow.

The Mongols attempted industrialization and collectivization in accordance with the Russian pattern, but they modified their experiment to soothe the angry protests of the hardheaded Mongolian herdsmen. Economic improvements were accomplished: highways were constructed, wells sunk, factories built, herds improved, and production increased. But Outer Mongolia was cut off from the rest of the world except at the pleasure of the Soviet government. Missionaries and foreign economic advisers were expelled; Russian troops were again introduced to counter the advances of Japan from Inner Mongolia and Manchukuo.

The Russians encouraged Mongolian nationalism, education, and cultural reforms, within the limits—in the long run—of political domination and Marxian doctrinaire orthodoxy. They ignored or discounted Chinese protests and on March 12, 1936, concluded a defensive alliance with Outer Mongolia. They announced, particularly for the benefit of the Japanese, that they would fight for Outer Mongolia exactly as if it were an integral part of their own territory. Meanwhile, the Soviet had detached the tiny Tuvian People's Republic from Outer Mongolia and in 1944 they annexed it as an autonomous region of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic. Neither the objections of China nor the blandishments and threats of Japan were able to shake the Soviet position in Outer Mongolia; it appeared to be stronger than ever at the end of World War II.

The tide of revolution was slow in reaching Sinkiang. The Chinese governor of the province, Yang Tseng-hsin, weathered the Chinese revolution, and he showed skill in dealing with refugees who swarmed over the border from Russian territory en route to Outer Mongolia, India, or China. He entered into cautious relations with the Tashkent Soviet across the border and encouraged trade between Soviet Russia and Sinkiang. As a matter of fact, he showed more concern for the Russians than he did for the rising power of the Kuomintang. After seventeen years in office, he was assassinated in 1928.

His successor, Chin Shu-jen, expanded commercial relations with the rapidly growing Soviet power in Central Asia. The next governor, Sheng Shih-tsai, began his administration by catering to the Soviet, inaugurating reforms against the traditional patterns of social life, and recognizing the identity and interests of the nationalities or ethnic groups in Sinkiang. He was plagued by rebellions, but he stayed in office by virtue of Russian arms and Russian assistance. The rebels were incited and financed by

Chinese, including Communist sympathizers and Japanese agents. With Soviet loans Governor Sheng exploited mines; gold and oil concessions; and telegraph, radio, and air services. Soviet advisers were active in government and business, and Sinkiang, an integral part of Kuomintang China, became a Soviet colony in all but name. The Soviet denied any imperialist intention and professed absolute adherence to the policy of independence, integrity, and sovereignty for China over all its parts, including Sinkiang. This fiction served as a convenient façade for the structure of Russian domination over the entire hierarchy of Chinese officials.

The Communist party was obliged to remain comparatively inactive in Sinkiang. Its antireligious propaganda might have offended the fanatical Moslem population. Its agitation for economic and social reforms would have created impossible illusions and would have shaken the foundations of their traditional patterns of life. Its appeal to "national" rights would have jeopardized the power of its own puppets over the divergent ethnic groups. The people of Russian Central Asia were the same as the people of Chinese Sinkiang; they constituted the western division of a single Turkistan nation. They wore the same clothes, observed the same customs, and spoke the same language.

Russian influence penetrated deep into the fiber of Sinkiang before the outbreak of the war in Europe. As Governor Sheng Shih-tsai watched the retreat of the Russian armies, he decided that Russia's was a lost cause and he intrigued to worm himself into the affections and inner councils of Chiang Kai-shek. He tried to turn Sinkiang toward China. He arrested his former advisers, including his own Russian-trained brother and his wife, and he jailed or killed those who had held out most promise under the former regime. He guessed wrong, and for the error in his judgment he plunged the entire province into chaos and revolt. There it remained until Russian Communists and Chinese Communists agreed upon a mutually acceptable status for the border province at the end of World War II.

Cautious *Rapprochement* between the USSR and China

Russia and China were disposed to enter into relations with each other after World War I—Russia because it wanted to break the quarantine on the Bolshevik government, and China because it wanted consolation for its humiliation at the Conference of Versailles. The two nations possessed contiguous territories and they had more to gain by understanding than by conflict. Sun Yat-sen was interested in Lenin and his revolution and he hoped that Russia might provide the material aid which the Western

powers had denied him. From the end of 1917, when Chinese troops were sent to Harbin, the relations between China and Russia became increasingly important. Thousands of White Russians fled into Chinese territory to escape the consequences of the revolutionary terror, and, before long, Soviet emissaries came to China, not seeking protection for their citizens or subjects, but rather seeking recognition and new agreements.

On July 4, 1918, Chicherin, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs in Moscow, told the Fifth Congress of Soviets of a new Russian policy toward China. According to it, Moscow repudiated the encroachments of the czarist government in Manchuria, relinquished extraterritoriality in China and Mongolia, waived czarist levies on the peoples of China, withdrew military guards from its consulates in China, and suggested redemption of the Chinese Eastern Railway. In July, 1919, just after the Versailles decisions, Leo Karakhan, the assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs, drafted a manifesto for the ministers, civil governors, bureaus, and all people of the Chinese republic. This manifesto denounced secret treaties and offered to negotiate with China on the following basis:

- (1) The territory seized by the former imperial Russian government will be returned to China.
- (2) The Russian government will restore to the sovereignty of China the Chinese Eastern Railway and the mines and forest appropriated by the former imperial Russian government, and it will not ask one cent therefor.
- (3) The Russian government will not accept the Boxer indemnity payments.
- (4) The special privileges for Russian subjects established by the former imperial Russian government and China are null and void. All extra-territorial privileges are also canceled.
- (5) In addition to the matters noted above, all agreements made by the former Russian imperial government, acting independently or with Japan or with the Entente Powers, with the envoys of China, in which there are unfair points, will be null and void.¹

Shortly after this, the Comintern dispatched two agents, Gregory Voitinsky and an overseas Chinese named Yang Ming-chai, to help organize the Chinese Communist movement. Voitinsky visited Peking and then set up his headquarters in Shanghai. He assembled leftists of varying shades and began the organizational work of the Chinese Communist party (CCP). The Communist organization work was so successful in maintaining secrecy that even the British Intelligence Service was unaware of the presence of Russian agents in China until nearly two years later.

¹ H. T. M. Bell and H. G. W. Woodhead, eds., *China Year Book* (Tientsin Press, Ltd., London, 1924), pp. 860, 861. A translation of the Russian text appears in *Problems of the Pacific* (1927), pp. 265-268.

It was a long time before the Russian government received any response from the Chinese government at Peking which had so far cast its lot with the Allied powers—co-operating in the blockade of the Bolshevik areas in Manchuria, supporting the intervention in Siberia, and concluding an arrangement with White Russian elements for control of the Chinese Eastern Railway under General Horvath. The Soviet promises created a deep imprint on the intellectuals and students in Peking in contrast to their reaction to the Western powers because of Versailles. Practical problems of the Chinese Eastern Railway, the Russo-Asiatic Bank, the status of Mongolia, the disposition of Russian shares in the Boxer indemnity, and procedure for reopening Sino-Soviet relations still separated China and the USSR.

In August, 1920, a delegation from the Far East Republic, headed by a converted member of the old nobility, Ignatius Yourin, came to Peking and successfully discredited Prince Koudachev, his diplomatic and consular assistants, who were until then recognized as the legitimate representatives of Russia. The legation was closed, the consulates taken over, the Russian post offices padlocked, and the Russian concessions transferred to Chinese administration. Russian subjects in China were subjected to most arbitrary treatment because of the loss of all semblance of treaty protection. China assumed a trusteeship for Russian property and the concessions.

In September, 1920, the Communists in Russia called a Congress of Eastern People in Baku to launch a "Holy War" in the interest of the toiling masses who inhabited Asia and Africa. During the same month, the Russian commissar for foreign affairs in Moscow handed to a Chinese mission then surveying the situation in Russia a second diplomatic declaration which amplified the previous Russian offers. However, instead of renouncing Russia's claims to the Chinese Eastern Railway, this new declaration merely proposed a treaty drawn up with due regard for the needs of Soviet Russia. The improving fortunes of the Soviet hedged the original exhibition of magnanimity with a modicum of caution. The Soviet did not repeat the offer to give up property rights. It offered only to give up political privileges in exchange for trade expansion, an agreement by which the Chinese were to disarm and deport White Russians and not to countenance counterrevolutionaries and their propaganda on Chinese soil. In the discussion of diplomatic recognition for Russia, the Russians wanted prior recognition, but the Chinese insisted upon consideration of recognition and other issues at the same time.

When the Russians signed the treaty with Mongolia secretly in Moscow, November 5, 1921, they sent another agent, A. K. Paikes, to Peking. At first he denied the existence of the Mongolian treaty; then he was obliged

to admit it. Chinese resentment prompted his strategic retreat. While Paikes was in Peking, a representative of the Comintern, Maring (or Sneeveliet), attended the formal organization meeting of the First Congress of the Chinese Communist party in Shanghai.

In January and February, 1922, the Russian Communists organized a Congress of the Toilers of the Far East which was attended by thirty members of the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist party. Zinoviev warned the Asians, "Either you receive your emancipation at the hands of the proletariat, or you are doomed to remain the slaves of an English, American, and Japanese camarilla." He told them that unless they gave up all hope in any kind of bourgeois or imperialist intrigue, like the Washington Conference then in session, their national movements would be doomed to failure. He predicted that some imperialists would always ride on their backs, sow civil war, and crush and carve up their country. The Chinese delegation, in a matter-of-fact mood, were at least as impressed by the famine in Russia as by the Communist oratory.

A clever Russian diplomat and publicity agent, Abram (Adolf) Joffe, reached Peking in August, 1922. Having appealed in vain to Europe and America, the Soviet turned with more determination to Asia. Joffe revived the line that Russians were in reality Asians and had followed too long the European orientation of Peter the Great. Joffe could not establish a productive rapport with any rapidly shifting, capricious war lord in Peking; so he went to Shanghai to discuss Russian-Chinese relations with Sun Yat-sen in the safety of the French concession at Shanghai.

Joffe discussed the objectionable aspects of the Russian troops in Mongolia and the desirability of a change in the status of the Chinese Eastern Railway. He did not repudiate the 1919 and 1920 declarations of the Soviet, but he explained that they were mere announcements of policy, the implementation of which depended upon detailed negotiations. Joffe felt that Chinese character was too liquid to sustain interest in the world revolution, but he issued a joint statement which affirmed the most cordial and friendly relations with Sun Yat-sen. He admitted that Communist order or the Soviet system could not be introduced into China because "the conditions do not exist here." He saw in China not the possibility for an immediate proletarian conquest but a national ally in opposing the hostile pressures of the Western powers, England in particular. To accomplish this, Joffe and the representatives who followed him twisted the terminology of the international Socialist revolution to serve the nationalist ends of the Russian state.

Leo Karakhan, who had drafted the seductive promises to China in 1919 and 1920, went to China to negotiate definitive agreements to imple-

ment Joffe's informal understandings. On May 31, 1924, Karakhan and V. K. Wellington Koo signed, for China, a treaty which consisted of seven general declarations and two agreements covering the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER). This treaty settlement established normal diplomatic relations; extinguished all treaties between China and imperial Russia; and predicated all future intercourse on the basis of equality, reciprocity, and justice. Each party undertook to prohibit subversive activities within its borders and pledged itself not to engage in propaganda against the social and political systems of the other. The Soviet Union recognized Outer Mongolia as an integral part of China and renounced all Russian concessions in China, together with extraterritorial rights and the Russian share of the Boxer indemnity. Provisions were made for new delimitation of frontiers, mutual settlement of financial claims, and for a new convention of commerce and navigation.

On the question of the CER the Soviet was adamant. The railway was deemed as vital to the Soviet as it had been to the czars. A ripple of the Russian revolution reached Harbin in the form of a delegation of soldiers and workmen from Petrograd which threatened the life of the picturesque, white-bearded manager of the CER, General Horvath, and demanded custody of the railway. Thirty-five hundred Chinese soldiers defeated the Reds and for compensation suggested the right to share with the Russian guards the protection of the railway property. As a result of Japan's military alliance with China in 1918, Japan took from the Chinese the guard posts and the control of bridges and culverts. Any designs Japan might have had for the complete control of the railway were checked by the action of the Inter-Allied Commission in appointing an American engineer, Colonel Stevens, and a Technical Board to operate the road in the interest of the Russian people. General Horvath retired to Peking, armed with the authority of the Russo-Asiatic Bank, and used the funds at his disposal for the furtherance of the interests of White Russians in China and Manchuria.

Even after the Soviet made overtures for the return of the CER, the Chinese government entered into a contract with the Russo-Asiatic Bank under which China took measures to maintain open communications and assumed a position of trusteeship for the railway. A new board of directors, five White Russians and five Chinese, was established, with a Chinese president and Russian vice-president. The Technical Board continued to operate the railway while the Chinese-White Russian board of directors assumed nominal authority.

The Washington Conference was unable to iron out the administrative complexities of the CER and passed two resolutions asking for better pro-

tection of the railway and the persons engaged in its operation and use and insisting upon the responsibility of the Chinese government toward foreign stockholders, bondholders, and creditors of the CER. When the last of the interventionists withdrew from Siberia, an International Finance Committee replaced the Technical Board at Harbin. Under its jurisdiction, the Chinese policed the road and the Chinese Eastern Railway Company took over its operation. But the ominous shadows of Chang Tso-lin, the "Old Marshal," or the war lord of Manchuria and of the Red armies in the Far East, crept toward the attractive assets of the railway itself and necessitated a new and basic understanding.

Karakhan at Peking understood that the government of China would have to be a party to that understanding and so made a part of his treaty negotiations in 1924 an agreement on general principles and an arrangement for the provisional management of the CER. Article IX of the former stated that the railway was a purely commercial enterprise, and China's right of sovereignty was recognized, as well as its right to redeem the railway with Chinese capital within eighty years. The future of the railway was to be determined by the two governments to the exclusion of any third party or parties. An agreement for provisional management of the CER called for a joint Russo-Chinese board of directors and a Russian manager. All other posts were to be opened to nationals of both countries, and employees were to be divided equally as to nationality.

Ambassador Karakhan realized the advisability of a supplementary agreement with Chang Tso-lin, who hated the Soviet but who controlled the territory through which the railway passed. Chang had showed his contempt for the Russians by closing the land office of the railway and subjecting the company to Chinese tax regulations. Karakhan went to Mukden and signed an agreement with Chang on September 20, 1924. By this agreement (insurance for the Russians in the event the ephemeral Peking government would not be able, or disposed, to live up to its obligations) the eighty-year redemption period was reduced to sixty years. Chang was in position to drive a harder bargain than the Peking government had been. No substantial changes were made in the plan for joint management of the railway, but provision was made for a conference on outstanding problems.

The conference was delayed for more than a year because of Russo-Chinese quarrels and differences of opinion over dismissal of employees, troop movements, and respective rights of the manager and the board of directors. The Russian manager was arrested in 1926 by Marshal Chang's military authorities and replaced by another Russian of his own choosing. The Russian members of the board boycotted the directors' meetings and

in the absence of a quorum the Russian manager took whatever action he pleased. Tension between Chinese and Russians in Manchuria approached the breaking point while parallel differences of opinion between Russians and Chinese aggravated their relationships south of the Great Wall.

Russian-Chinese Co-operation

In 1924 Russia did not neglect any phase of its China policy. It invited Chinese to Russia—including Chiang Kai-shek; it negotiated agreements with the Peking government and with Manchuria; it maintained a close watch over the Communist movement within China; it sent advisers to Sun Yat-sen's Kuomintang; and it supported the Christian general whose troops were driven out of Peking and into northwest China near Russian territory. Soviet tactics looked to the welfare of the Russian state by widening the breach between China and the powers and to the promotion of *the revolution by co-operating with the Kuomintang*. At the same time that Karakhan posed as the friend of the Peking government, Russians in the south conspired against it. In Peking the Russian embassy outranked the legations of other nations and Russian diplomats became popular hosts in social and pseudo-intellectual circles. In Canton the party workers followed the theses of the Second Congress of the Comintern in 1920 which laid down the procedure for backward areas which lacked a strong, class-conscious proletariat. These theses prescribed co-operation with any nationalist revolution and emphasis on organization of workers and peasants but eventual exposure of and attack on any revolutionary movement when it ceased to be truly revolutionary or began to oppose Communist work with the masses. In his telegram to the second party congress of the KMT, Stalin said:

To our party has fallen the proud and historic role of leading the first victorious proletarian revolution in the world. We are convinced that the Kuomintang will succeed in playing the same role in the East, and thereby destroy the foundation of the rule of the imperialists in Asia.

Russian advisers to the Kuomintang included General Galens, born Vassily Bluecher, who rose to be commander in chief of the Russian Siberian Army and who disappeared during the purge, and a famous propagandist, Michael Borodin, alias Gruzenberg, who participated in revolutions all over the world and once ran a private school in Chicago. The Russians assisted in the foundation of the Whampoa Military Academy, with Chiang Kai-shek as commandant and Chou En-lai as head of the political

department, and in the reorganization of the party trade unions and the Canton government. They gave financial assistance and distributed vitriolic handbills, leaflets, and news articles against the missionaries and the Western capitalists.

Lenin's death affected Russian policies toward China. In the struggle for succession Stalin emphasized the building of the Soviet Union as the citadel for the world revolution, while Trotsky emphasized the overthrow of capitalists everywhere, particularly in China. Trotsky advocated the smashing of the Communist-Kuomintang alliance and the formation of soviets, or councils of soldiers, workers, and peasants. Stalin favored the continuation of the Communist-Kuomintang *rapprochement* as the best means of defeating the war lords, who were regarded as the agents of the imperialists, and of driving the capitalistic powers out of China and the entire Pacific area.

Sun Yat-sen's death on March 12, 1925, plunged the factions within the Kuomintang into open rivalry for power. Common resentment against the foreigners in Shanghai and Canton prevented outright civil war. Russian propagandists utilized Chinese anger to fan the flames of anti-imperialism and to point the finger of blame direct at the British. Early in 1926 Chiang Kai-shek emerged as the most powerful figure in the Kuomintang, and he asserted his personal independence vis-à-vis the Russian advisers. In accordance with Stalin's directions, these advisers pretended not to notice Chiang's dominant position and intensified political work among the troops and propaganda activities among the peasants. *Stalin believed that he could use Chiang and toss him aside like a squeezed-out lemon at an appropriate time. Stalin supported the northern expedition but urged caution lest the Communist revolutionists too far outdistance their Kuomintang allies in attitude.*

In Hankow, Kuomintang and Communists organized labor unions and made conditions so difficult for foreign shippers and factory owners that business enterprises were closed. Men were thrown out of work and made excellent grist for the Communist mill. At this point, the Kuomintang right wing under Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang left wing under Wang Ching-wei came to the parting of the ways. The Communists looked to Moscow for instructions. The Comintern on November 22, 1926, decreed the dual tactic of emphasizing the peasant revolt but of supporting the Kuomintang, many of whose influential members were prosperous landlords.

The Indian Communist, M. N. Roy, was sent to China to implement these contradictory instructions. Then the Nanking incident occurred; Chiang took over Shanghai. The Communists still needed guidance with

regard to their relations with the left-wing Kuomintang in Hankow. Stalin explained that the revolution of the entire United Front had completed its first stage and should convert itself into a revolution of the masses—of farmers and peasants against the gentry, the feudal landowners, the militarists, and the counterrevolutionary group of Chiang Kai-shek. But when the Chinese peasants rose in revolt, largely because of Communist propaganda, Stalin hedged. Trotsky wanted the Chinese Communists to break from the rump of the Kuomintang, to support the peasants against the landlords, and to organize self-sustaining Chinese soviets.

Stalin ruled otherwise; anything Trotsky proposed at that juncture met with Stalin's opposition. Stalin said that if the peasants fought against the Kuomintang Army, the peasants would lose. He directed the Communist party to support the Wuhan government in putting down the peasant revolt. He believed that it was better to maneuver than to fight. In due course, the Communists would gain strength and would then take control of the army and spread the revolution. In one breath Stalin extolled the peasant unions, hailed the agrarian revolution, and supported the confiscation of land. In another, he curbed the peasant revolt, directed the Communists to co-operate with the Kuomintang, and excepted the Kuomintang officials from the regulations for land confiscation.

In June, 1927, Stalin issued new instructions to restrain the peasants, to continue co-operation with the Kuomintang left wing, to bring new worker and peasant blood into the Central Committee of the Kuomintang, to liquidate unreliable generals, to organize a new army with students as commanders, and to punish officers who maintained contacts with Chiang Kai-shek or other counterrevolutionaries who set the soldiers against the people. The Communist line was to co-operate with the Kuomintang left but to insist upon terms which made that co-operation impossible.

Roy favored Stalin's policy; he believed that the Kuomintang left needed the Communists in a possible war against Chiang Kai-shek and the right. Borodin and a majority of the Chinese Communist leaders obeyed reluctantly because they believed that Stalin's orders would lead to an open breach between the Kuomintang left and the Communists. The Kuomintang did to the Communists and the Russians what these would have done to the Kuomintang had the tables been reversed. At the end of July the Wuhan government split with the Communists and ordered Borodin and the other Russian advisers out of the country.

Stalin was no more successful in his diplomatic offensive than he had been in his direction of the party policies. He had never allayed the suspicions of Chang Tso-lin. When the war lord of Manchuria moved into Peking in 1926, he displaced the friendly-disposed Feng Yu-hsiang. On


April 6, 1927, Chang authorized a raid on the premises of the headquarters of the Chinese Eastern Railway and the Dalbank, located in the Russian embassy compound. He seized documents which showed how the Russian state was using its funds and its diplomatic status to engineer the machinations of the Communists. He ordered the buildings closed and diplomatic relations broken off. When, in December, 1927, the Russian consulate in Canton became involved in the abortive Communist uprising, the Nanking authorities followed Peking's lead. By the end of 1927, the Russian influence which had loomed so important three years earlier had dwindled to insignificance in Peking, Canton, Hankow, and Manchuria.

From 1927 to 1937

The Russian state broadened its perspective and perhaps its ambitions with the inauguration of its Five-Year Plans.

The China scene, which had looked so attractive as long as China was the only country which promised the possibility of being linked to the Soviet Union by virtue of a common Communist system, lost its glamour for an actor that moved into a prominent role on the stage of the entire world. Questions of statecraft focusing on Manchuria temporarily overshadowed problems of the revolution in China. The Russians objected to the continual efforts of Chang Tso-lin to increase China's participation in the administration of the Chinese Eastern Railway. In 1926 Chang, retaliating against the Soviet for refusing to transport the Chinese railway guards free, arrested the Russian manager of the railway and seized a fleet of railway vessels on the Sungari River. The Russians temporized but they adopted a more serious attitude toward Manchurian issues after the assassination of Chang Tso-lin. His son and successor, Chang Hsueh-liang (the Young Marshal), adhered to the new constitution of the Kuomintang state, and as an agent of the Chinese Nationalist government endeavored to extend Chinese control over the railway.

On May 27, 1929, local Chinese police raided the Russian consulates at Harbin, Tsitsihar, Manchuli, and Suifenhö. They seized incriminating documents and arrested Russian personnel for plotting against the Chinese government. Then the Chinese arrested two Soviet consular officials and a director of the CER as they left Manchuli to cross into Russian territory. On July 10 the Chinese at Harbin seized the entire telegraph and telephone system of the CER and interned or deported some 200 Russian officials and employees of the railway company. The Chinese also closed down some Russian commercial agencies. The Chinese justified their actions on the





claims that the Russians had failed to give Chinese equal treatment in railway management and had utilized all their officials and employees for illegal propaganda mongering.

Russia's response was prompt and energetic. Russia gave the Nationalists three days to rescind its orders, release its prisoners, and convene a conference to settle the disputes. When the Chinese sent an unsatisfactory counterproposal, Moscow announced its determination to recall from China its diplomatic, consular, commercial, and railway representatives and employees; to suspend railway communications with China; and to order all Chinese diplomatic and consular representatives to leave the territories of the Soviet government. Both sides broke off relations and massed troops on the borders. From August until December a state of undeclared war existed. White Russians raided Soviet territory and after repeated protests, Soviet troops under the same General Galens who had been at Canton poured across the border into Chinese territory and disarmed some 10,000 of Chang Hsueh-liang's troops at Hailar. The war was farcical because the Russians unveiled a modern military machine against the impotent comic-opera setup of the Chinese.

On the initiative of the American Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson, he and the French Foreign Minister, Aristide Briand, reminded Russia and China of their obligations under the Kellogg Pact renouncing war as an instrument of national policy. Russia stood firm in its position that the future of the CFR should be determined by the Republic of China and the USSR to the exclusion of any third party or parties and China took the same general attitude at first. After the successful Russian military advance, Secretary Stimson spearheaded a second diplomatic *démarche*. The reply of Russia declared that Russia's actions were countermeasures in the interest of defense and protection of the frontier and the peaceful population, and in no wise violations of the Paris pact. The Soviet government considered American pressure as unjustifiable and unfriendly and could not "forbear expressing amazement that the Government of the United States, which by its own will has no official relations with the Soviet, deems it possible to apply to it with advice and counsel."

The Russians and the Chinese achieved a settlement of their differences in the Khabarovsk protocol on December 22, 1929. This protocol provided for the reopening of consulates and commercial houses, the release of prisoners and internees, the disarming of White Russians in Chinese employ, restoration of Soviet executives and employees of the railway, and convocation of a conference in Moscow for final agreements and resumption of diplomatic relations. The conference in Moscow was still in

session when the Japanese in 1931 inaugurated a new phase of the Manchurian triangle.

The reassertion of Russian influence in the councils of the Chinese Communist party accompanied the recovery of Russia's imperialistic posture in Manchuria. After the break between the Kuomintang left and the Chinese Communists, some Communists went underground in the urban centers and others escaped into the rugged hills of South Central China. Stalin blamed the Chinese leaders for failure to carry out his policies and ordered two agents, Besso Lominadse, aged twenty-nine, and Heinz Neumann, aged twenty-six, to proceed to China to carry out armed insurrections in selected areas. The insurrections failed and Stalin shifted his tactics. He persistently overestimated the chances for imminent victory in China. He ordered the formation of soviets (which Trotsky had been disciplined for suggesting), the integration of small guerilla units into a Red Army, and the linking of peasant revolutionary waves and urban proletarian movements. It was the end of putschism and the beginning of the long conquest for power. The Chinese Communist, Li Li-san, was directed to implement these policies. The policies were shaped in Moscow but the directives for accomplishing them were so enigmatic and contradictory that the Kremlin could disavow responsibility for failures and claim credit for successes.

Li Li-san acted on the premise that China was ripe for revolution, that the "proletariat was the leader of the revolution, the peasantry its ally," and that a victory in one province would lead to eventual victory in the whole of China. In spite of military weakness, he would attack Changsha first, then the Wuhan cities, and rely upon anticipated uprisings of the proletariat to turn the tide in his favor. His first attack on the city of Changsha was an unmitigated disaster. In keeping with the philosophy that the "policy is always correct, the execution is faulty," Li Li-san was ousted from his party leadership in China as a "blind Trotsky actionist."

He was summoned to Moscow for confession of his errors and rectification of his faults. In his own defense before the Comintern committee, he dared to contrast loyalty to the Comintern with loyalty to the Chinese revolution and to affirm that "Russian Communists take care of their own racial interests to the neglect of the Chinese situation which they do not understand." He asserted that his principles would have received a different reception had his tactics resulted in victory instead of defeat. Manuisky retorted that such talk was the language of power "like you hear at the League of Nations." Manuisky accused Li of being a good revolutionist but not a good Communist. Li was held prisoner in Moscow for fifteen years.

* In 1930 the Communists sent Pavel Mif, director of the Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow, to China with a group of returned students to assume direction of the Chinese Communists. The hardened Chinese Communist veterans received them with contempt—"while we were carrying out the revolution, they were taking milk at their mothers' breasts." After four years of intrigue and maneuver, Mao Tse-tung proved himself more adept than the youthful returned students in mobilizing a peasant army and in directing its guerilla tactics. Mao's rise to pre-eminence was in spite of Stalin's hesitation rather than because of any active support.

During this stage, the Russian directorate in the Kremlin devoted more energy to the problems of Russia than to the complications over the struggle for leadership in China. It could not fail to notice the demonstration of strength in the capitalist world in the recovery from the great depression, and the marked growth in the stature of Chiang Kai-shek in China. Consequently, it adopted cautious and flexible policies. It re-established diplomatic relations with the Chinese government in 1932 and offered a nonaggression pact to Japan. The Russian delegate at Geneva reflected sensitivity to Great Britain and France by joining in the general condemnation of aggression, but Russia seemed less concerned than the Chinese Communists about the Japanese operations in the northeast provinces.

When the Chinese Communists seized the opportunity to declare war on Japan in February, 1932, the Russians reacted with caution. In September the Executive Committee of the Comintern in Moscow decided that the Chinese Communist party should do no more than to continue every effort to guarantee the hegemony of the proletariat in the mass anti-imperialist movement in Kuomintang China. While developing the soviets and strengthening the Red Army, the CCP must use the tactic of the United Front from below. Under the slogan of a revolutionary war for national independence against all imperialists, it should work for the overthrow of the agent of imperialism, the Kuomintang. As the forces of Chiang Kai-shek closed in on the Communist capital at Juichin, Moscow advised the CCP to pull out and seek safety somewhere, as far away as Outer Mongolia if necessary. Moscow lost direct contact with the Chinese Communists during the first critical months of the Long March when Mao consolidated his undisputed control over the party. The hierarchy in Moscow which had not hesitated to subject him to discipline earlier lost no time in bestowing upon him its approval.

In 1935 the Communists in China and Russia felt the need for drastic steps in the Asian phase of the world struggle against the aggressors. Russia bowed to the inevitable and, in spite of China's official protests, sold the Chinese Eastern Railway to Manchukuo. Russia built up its border

defenses and in 1936 announced its alliance with Outer Mongolia. With Russian approval, the Communists in China broadened their concept of a United Front from below and promised the Kuomintang co-operation in a national policy of resistance to Japan. Dimitrov, in Moscow, extolled the initiative taken by "our courageous brother party" in China and demanded a broad front in all colonial and semicolonial countries, including China, "under the slogan of a national revolutionary struggle of the armed people against the imperialist enslavers, in the first place against Japanese imperialism and its Chinese servitors."

While extending this underhanded encouragement to the Chinese Communists, Russia conducted negotiations with the Nanking government about the status of Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang, trade, new railways and air routes, consulates, relations with the Communists, and a general nonaggression pact. After the conclusion of the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact, Russia estimated that its prime interest in China was the need for a strong coalition even if it cost the temporary sacrifice of the overt support to the "courageous brother party" in China.

Therefore, the Russians advised the Chinese Communists to exercise their influence for the release of Chiang Kai-shek when he was kidnaped in Sian in December, 1936. After the Japanese attack in North China, Russia quickly concluded a nonaggression pact with Chiang Kai-shek's government in August, 1937. By this document, the two nations repeated the obligations of the Kellogg Pact, agreed to refrain from aggression against each other, and promised that should either nation be subjected to aggression the other nation would refrain from extending aid to the aggressor and would refuse to enter into any agreement which might be used by the aggressor to the disadvantage of the nation under attack.

From 1937 to 1941

After the treaty was concluded, Russia proceeded to strengthen the position of Nationalist China against Japan. From 1937 to 1941, Russia granted China three loans totaling \$250,000,000. The Russians sent trucks, tanks, planes, arms, and ammunition to China in exchange for partial payments of tungsten, tin, antimony, and tea. They tightened their economic control in Sinkiang and built new highways into China. One highway led from Sinkiang to Central China; another, from Ulan Ude to Ulan Bator; and a third, from Lanchow to Ninghsia. They sent pilots, instructors, and volunteers with their planes; established aviation schools at Urumchi and Chengtu; and built a sizable air base at Lanchow. They attached Russian

officers to Chinese armies for strategical and tactical purposes. In the temporary capital at Hankow, a Soviet military mission under General Cherepanov took up headquarters in the Japanese concession next to the German military mission under General Falkenhausen.

As Germans stepped out of their advisory role to Chiang Kai-shek, the Russians stepped in. Chiang Kai-shek, who had been maligned in the Russian press as a hangman and a butcher, became the gallant ally. Mao Tse-tung experienced the same change in sentiment. He referred to "our dear comrades of the Kuomintang" and boasted that the cry, "Suppress the Communists," belonged to history. Russia also became the champion of Chiang Kai-shek within the League of Nations. Litvinov condemned the weak-kneed collective policies against Japan and assailed the Brussels Conference as empty chatter. In its enthusiasm for Chiang Kai-shek the Russians played down and neglected the Chinese Communists. The Comintern's policies concentrated on the United Front and the postponement of major internal social changes in the direction of the revolution.

The Russian overtures toward the Germans in 1939 had their counterparts in Asia. Stalin assessed correctly Japan's embarrassments in China and scaled down correspondingly his estimate of the value of Chiang Kai-shek. He continued his support for Chiang as the leader of a united China and displayed no open concern for the plight of the Chinese Communists. Beneath the surface, the Russians suggested that the Kuomintang was not doing all it might for the eradication of traitorous elements and for the effective prosecution of the war against Japan. Russia pressed for "reforms" which would strengthen the position of the Chinese Communists. Mao Tse-tung dutifully rationalized the twists and turns in Russian policy. He hailed the Nazi-Soviet pact, not as a cynical deal with the aggressor but as evidence of Soviet Russia's growing power as a champion of peace. Neither he nor his Russian backers minimized the major threat from Japan and they recognized Chiang Kai-shek as the most effective instrumentality of Chinese unity. For his part, Chiang stated publicly as late as December 2, 1940, "With Soviet Russia there has been no change in her consistent policy of support for Chinese resistance."

The Soviet-Japanese neutrality agreement of April 13, 1941, disclosed the ultimate selfishness in Stalin's regard for either Nationalist China or Communist China. The agreement included Russia's recognition of the territorial integrity and inviolability of Manchukuo in return for Japanese recognition of the inviolability of the People's Republic of Outer Mongolia. Russia disregarded its obligation to respect the territorial integrity of China, assumed by the treaty of 1924, and to refrain from an understanding with an aggressor, assumed by the pact of 1937. Soviet apologists, including

Mao Tse-tung, pattered that the Russian-Japanese pact was another victory for Soviet diplomacy and its policy of world peace and freedom and independence for China. After the German attack in Europe and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Kremlin shifted its attention from the Far East and the complicated internal affairs of China.

Suggested Reading

- HAROLD ISAACS, *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution* (London, 1938; rev. ed., Stanford, 1951).
- ROBERT C. NORTH, *Moscow and the Chinese Communists* (Stanford, 1953).
- MICHEL N. PAVLOVSKY, *Chinese-Russian Relations* (New York, 1949).
- PETER SHENG-HAO TANG, *Russian and Soviet Policies in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia, 1911-1931* (New York, Columbia Ph. D. dissertation, 1952).
- TANG LEANG-I, *The Foundations of Modern China* (London, 1928).
- , *The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution* (London, 1930).
- KEN SHEN WEIGH, *Russo-Chinese Diplomacy* (Shanghai, 1928).
- T. C. WOO, *The Kuomintang and the Future of the Chinese Revolution* (London, 1928).
- AITCHEN WU, *China and the Soviet Union* (New York, 1950).

CHAPTER 18

The Soviet Union and Japan

Russia and Japan observed their armed truce until the Bolshevik revolution, when Japan unmasked the depth of its fear and the intensity of its apprehension. Japan saw in Russian nationalism an enemy strong enough to confine Japan to the stifling boundaries of its island territories; in Russian militarism, a challenge to its own military traditions; and in the new force of Russian-nurtured international communism, a menace to its unbalanced, top-heavy, social structure.

Japan feared bombing attacks which might originate in Vladivostok, and refused to entrust its national destiny to the good will or apparent benignity of its rival in Northeast Asia. Its territorial interests were in continuous conflict with those of Russia in the islands and waters of the northwest Pacific and along the 4,000-mile stretch from Vladivostok to the base of the Pamirs. Its feudal institutions were under constant attack by Communists who preached an unrelenting crusade for the masses against the wealthy cliques and the militarists. Japanese militarists, in their devotion to an unreasoned ultranationalistic concept of a divine mission, were no less fanatical than the Russian militarists who professed their allegiance to the defense of the Socialist fatherland and the compulsions of the world revolution.

In this electric atmosphere political arguments generated a continuous shower of sparks. Periods of tension alternated with interludes of compromise. First Japan seized the initiative and plunged into Siberia; then it recoiled because of the magnitude of its embarrassments. After the resumption of normal relations, quiet prevailed until Japan unleashed its new program of aggression. Russia countered with policies of peace but resistance until the local conflicts in East Asia became facets of World War II.

From Revolution to Recognition, 1917-1925

The Bolshevik revolution gave Japan an excuse to expand into Siberia. The Russians charged that the Japanese in 1918 conceived "a crazy plan to cut off the whole Soviet Far East from Russia and establish a government there which would be completely dependent upon Japan." The Russians emphasized the Japanese desire for territorial control of rich, strategic regions of Siberia while the Japanese explained their motives as self-defense and containment of communism. When the Japanese military methods proved haphazard and overcostly, both Japan and Russia sought the end of the occupation.

In April, 1919, the Far Eastern representative of the Soviet government approached the chief of the political affairs department (Tsuneo Matsu-daira) of the Japanese expeditionary force at Vladivostok with peace overtures, but he was rebuffed. In December, 1920, the diplomatic representative of the newly established Far Eastern Republic made another unsuccessful attempt to end the intervention. In June, 1921, as both sides conjured up hopes of understanding, the Chita government and the Japanese government secretly agreed to conversations. In late summer the Foreign Minister of the Far Eastern Republic, Ignatius Yourin, who had recently returned from his mission to Peking, went to Dairen to discuss outstanding issues with a Japanese representative. After eight months of wrangling, the Dairen Conference broke up without any substantial attainments. It was in session during the entire period of the Washington Conference and it served the diplomatic purposes of both Russia and Japan. Russia, which was excluded from Washington, had an unofficial observer at Dairen while Japan, under fire from China and the Western powers at Washington, relied upon the existence of the Dairen Conference as a counterpressure to the hostile atmosphere at Washington.

On September 4, 1922, negotiations between the Far Eastern Republic and Japan were resumed in Changchun, and on this occasion were dominated by the presence of the Soviet representative, Joffe, then on his way to China. In view of the pending incorporation of the Far Eastern Republic into the Soviet Union (accomplished on November 15, 1922), Joffe insisted that the scope of the conference be extended to include all Japanese-Russian issues, primarily the issue of the recognition of the new and controversial Soviet government. This matter was too important to be left to the decision of the conferees in the relatively obscure Manchurian town of Changchun.

Viscount Goto, the mayor of Tokyo and a professed advocate of Japanese-Russian understanding, with the concurrence of Premier Admiral Kato,

invited Joffe to come to Japan for a rest cure after his arduous negotiations with Sun Yat-sen. Joffe wanted "to take a cure" in Hongkong but the British authorities were not hospitable. He arrived in Tokyo on February 1, 1923. By that time Japan had withdrawn its troops from Nikolaevsk and the Maritime Provinces, and the Soviet had established its control over the whole of Siberia. Japan hoped for agreements with Russia which would ease mounting economic difficulties at home. Joffe remained in Tokyo to conduct official discussions until he was recalled to Moscow on July 31, 1923.

Joffe's successor in Peking, Leo Karakhan, renewed discussions with Yoshizawa Kenkichi, the Japanese minister. Karakhan, as the only ambassador, enjoyed an enviable diplomatic status in Peking, and his prestige was enhanced by British and Italian recognition of the Soviet regime. Karakhan found Yoshizawa increasingly eager for an understanding. Japanese spirits were low because of the great earthquake in Tokyo and Yokohama, the perennial economic crisis, and the American quota immigration act. Consequently, Karakhan and Yoshizawa reached agreement and signed the Treaty of Peking on January 20, 1925.

The treaty provided for the resumption of diplomatic relations and the exchange of diplomatic and consular representatives. The Soviet Union recognized the continuing validity of the Portsmouth Treaty, but assented to the revision or abandonment of all other treaties, agreements, and conventions made during 1905-1917 between Japan and czarist Russia. Japanese would continue to fish in Siberian coastal waters pending revision of the fisheries convention of 1907. Until the conclusion of a new commercial treaty the nationals of either country were to enjoy in the territory of the other most-favored-nation treatment in matters of entry, travel, residence, private ownership of property, and peaceful pursuits of commerce and industry. Both countries pledged themselves to restrain all their officials and all organizations officially subsidized from engaging in propaganda or any act, overt or covert, liable in any way to endanger the order and security of any part of their respective territories. To satisfy Japan's need for natural resources and Russia's for technical assistance, Russia agreed to grant concessions to the Japanese for exploitation of mineral, forest, and other natural resources of Eastern Siberia.

In protocols and annexes to the basic document Russia agreed to adjust its debts to Japan, and Japan agreed to complete the withdrawal of its troops from northern Sakhalin by May 15, 1925. Soviet authorities expressed their sincere regrets for the Nikolaievsk incident of 1920. Russia granted Japan oil, lumber, and coal concessions in northern Sakhalin for a period of forty to fifty years, subject to the stipulations that Soviet labor

laws were to be observed and that half the technical staff and three quarters of the unskilled labor were to be Soviet citizens.

Within a year after the regularization of Russian-Chinese relations, Russia and Japan resumed normal diplomatic intercourse. Ambassadors were exchanged, consulates were opened, and concession agreements were signed. The Japanese obtained an additional concession of 2,500,000 acres of timberland in the Maritime Provinces. The Shidehara policy of co-operation applied to Russia as well as to China. On January 23, 1928, the governments of Russia and Japan signed a new fisheries convention which reaffirmed Japan's rights to capture, gather, and manufacture maritime products along the Russian coast facing the Japan Sea, the Sea of Okhotsk, and the Bering Sea; but Russia indicated, ominously, its plans to expand greatly its own activities in the vital fishing industry.

From 1925 to 1932

Between Japanese recognition of the Soviet Union and establishment of Manchukuo, Russian-Japanese relations seemed calm and uninteresting. Beneath the surface, however, mutual suspicion and distrust smoldered. Each side—publicly but not officially—accused the other of espionage and preparation for sabotage. Japan counted but little in Russia's preoccupation with the contest for internal leadership and preparations for the Five-Year Plans. Nor was Russia too important to Japan while it was fighting for economic preservation, but as both nations grew stronger they became increasingly touchy about their respective rights and obligations. Japan recovered from the depression promptly and spent its national substance on an impressive military machine. Russia created an independent army of the Far East, with its own command, its own equipment, its own scheme of defense, and its own plans for agricultural and industrial self-sufficiency.

Japan maintained a neutral attitude in the Sino-Soviet crisis of 1929 in Manchuria and refused to support Secretary Stimson's *démarche* under the Kellogg Pact. Baron Shidehara explained to the Japanese Diet that he believed direct negotiation between the disputants was the only avenue to a satisfactory settlement. In a sense, the Soviets reciprocated with an attitude of detachment at the time of the Mukden incident. "*Pravda* termed the incident a very serious international event which carried with it the threat of new attempts at anti-Soviet provocations to which the imperialists would resort in order to conceal their aggressive policies." *Pravda* criticized the Japanese for their aggressive designs; the "reactionary, feudal, bourgeois" Kuomintang regime for its failure to resist;

and the League and the Western powers for playing up the Red menace and trying to turn the Japanese advance against the Soviet Union. The Russian news outlet indicated its disapproval of Japan's actions, but the Russian officials refrained from any condemnation of Japan. With the assurance of hindsight, the Russian associate prosecution counsel before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East at the end of World War II labeled the Japanese move a pretext to enslave and exploit Manchuria—not as a means for defense but as a springboard to *domination of East Asia, including Siberia and Outer Mongolia. He accused Japan of triggering world fascism, enshrining brutal nationalism, and utilizing the entire machinery of the state as a weapon of crime.*

Less than a month after the Mukden incident, the Soviet was deeply involved in trying to keep Japan out of the Soviet sphere in North Manchuria. In spite of rumors intimating that Russians were advising Chinese troops, Russia assured Japan that it was pursuing a policy of neutrality and noninterference. Russia expressed its desire for continued amicable relations with Japan but protested against the spread of hostilities and the apparent Japanese intention of replacing existing authorities in Manchuria. By the end of 1931, Molotov characterized the Far Eastern conflict as the most important part of Russia's foreign policy. He refused to co-operate with the League of Nations and blamed its halfhearted resolutions for the further development of military operations.

Because of the failure of collective security, Russia looked to a non-aggression pact with Japan to guarantee its defense. In December, 1931, Ambassador Yoshizawa, formerly at Peking and most recently Japanese delegate at the League of Nations, passed through Moscow on his way from Geneva to Tokyo and called on his Peking friend, Leo Karakhan, the Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs under Molotov. Karakhan knew that Yoshizawa was slated to become Foreign Minister in the new cabinet of his father-in-law, Inukai, and proposed a nonaggression pact. Yoshizawa, on his arrival in Tokyo, found the Japanese in no mood for nonaggression. They were exultant in their successes and saw no necessity for assuming imprecise obligations.

Ambassador Hirota from Moscow suggested that the time was ripe for a strong stand vis-à-vis the USSR, with a firm resolve to fight at any time necessary. Hirota felt that Japan's real objective was not defense against communism but rather occupation of Russian territories. The Japanese military attaché in Moscow urged the importance of preparations for the inevitable war against the Soviet Union and declared there was no alternative to a war of annihilation which would advance Japan at least as far as Lake Baikal. At the same time, illustrious Japanese generals talked about

converting the Sea of Japan into a Japanese lake and annexing by military methods the territories of the Maritime Provinces, Zabaikalye, and Siberia.

In February, 1932, after the Japanese occupation of Harbin, the heart of former Russian enterprise in North Manchuria, the Soviet adopted a stiffer attitude. The Russians asked the Japanese for information as to the character of the newly organized Manchurian state, saying they found it difficult to determine how official were the demands of Japanese authorities in Manchuria—for instance, to use the Chinese Eastern Railway. They protested against the use of White Russian guards by the Japanese and referred to the historic prohibitions in the Portsmouth Treaty against the maintenance of Japanese troops in Manchuria. The protests lacked teeth because the Russians were in no position to risk a war. They contented themselves with verbal barbs, usually in *Izvestia* or *Pravda*, repeating their expressed sympathy with the Chinese people, charging the Japanese with anti-Red plots, and warning the Japanese that the Soviet Union would have to strengthen its own defenses.

The USSR refused to co-operate with the Lytton Commission because, in Litvinov's words, "We did not believe in the honesty and consistency of the governments participating in these actions and primarily because we did not seek armed conflict with Japan." The Soviet was not in position either politically or economically to take on new risks on the distant Far Eastern frontier. It was ready to negotiate both with China and Japan. In gestures of appeasement, Russia negotiated trade agreements with Japan, settled minor disputes over fisheries and the Chinese Eastern Railway, and continued to dangle before Japan the opportunity for a nonaggression pact.

The Soviet Union was not able to utilize communism in Japan as a tactical weapon as it had done so successfully in China. The Russian revolution exerted its impact upon Japan at a time when advocates of democracy and opponents of militarism were gathering strength. The success of the Bolsheviks in overthrowing the Romanovs inflamed the imagination of Japanese youth and intellectuals. Thought waves from Russia inspired left-wing student and labor organizations. In the shops and on the streets, Japanese translations of Russian literature and Japanese books on social problems sold by the thousands. Government surveillance kept pace with the spread of dangerous thoughts and led to the Peace Preservation Law in 1925. The police cracked down on academic freedom and took students into custody for spreading the ideas of Marx and Lenin. Students were accused of attempting to overthrow the government and seize power, set up a dictatorship, socialize production, abolish private property, and establish communism. Their organizations were regarded as suspicious or sub-

versive, and as potential leaders of workers, peasants, and soldiers, the students were effectively neutralized by the police.

The first Communists in Japan were heirs of syndicalism and anarchism. *They were not represented at the Baku Congress of the Peoples of the Orient in 1921 and they did not form a political party until the following year. Their leaders were quickly rounded up and arrested and party activities came to an abrupt halt. During the next two years, the Far Eastern Bureau of the Third International in Shanghai tried to reactivate the Japanese Communist party in anticipation of the enfranchisement of the entire Japanese male population. Spurred on by occasional agents from Moscow, the Japanese Communists reorganized in 1926. They established their own propaganda organ, *Akahata* or the *Red Flag*, and they wormed their way into virtual control of the Farmer-Labor party. Their handbills ranged from mild slogans advocating an eight-hour day and the right to strike to extreme proposals for parliament without the emperor, confiscation of the property of the emperor and the capitalists, and dictatorship of the workers and farmers.*

In a predawn raid on March 15, 1928, police officers of the Metropolitan Police Board in Tokyo swooped down on Communist headquarters and arrested more than 100 party members. A nationwide dragnet rounded up 65,000 suspects. Police informers infiltrated the ranks of the Communists and supplied information for repeated raids. The party was unable to function, and by the early thirties the best-known and most ardent leaders were either under arrest, in jail, or in exile. Japanese authorities in Korea were equally vigilant in suppressing even the slightest manifestation of communism.

Local Conflicts, 1932–1939

The Japanese development of Manchukuo seemed to point to a direct attack against the Soviet Union. Japan increased its troops in Manchukuo, extended the term of service of enlisted men, and speeded up its training program. From 1931 to 1936 troops in Manchukuo were increased from 50,000 to 270,000; planes were increased threefold; pieces of ordnance, fourfold; and tanks, more than tenfold. Japan sent settlers of military age to Manchukuo in suspiciously large numbers, perhaps as many as 150,000; reconstructed fishing ports for landing of troops or for naval bases; built plants for manufacture of automobiles, trucks, tanks, and aircraft; built highways, railways, and airfields for military purposes; enlarged the river flotilla on the Sungari; and established a strategic communications network.

In addition, Japanese civilian advisers to the government of Manchukuo worked out plans for the national and local administration, maintenance of peace and order, organization of industries, and control of currencies.

According to Russian intelligence sources, Japan promoted sabotage activities in factories and on the railroads and stirred up all manner of ideological strife, including pacifism and anti-Semitism. Japan used White Russians as scouts, saboteurs, and propagandists and organized three detachments of White Russian emigrants for the army of Manchukuo. Japan was blamed for all the arrests, wrecks, and controversies which stemmed from the Chinese Eastern Railway.

Russian weakness in the Far East dictated a policy of peace or strategic retreat. With the inauguration of the second Five-Year Plan, Russia concentrated on adding to its military and economic strength in the area east of Lake Baikal. Russia wanted a backing of respectable force before shifting its policy from peace to resistance. Elimination of weak spots in Russia's armor was as essential as the adoption of new defense measures. In consequence, Russia sold the CER, purged its internal administration, negotiated an alliance with Outer Mongolia, and repaired its diplomatic fences in Europe, the United States, and China. Within five years—at the time of the Anti-Comintern Pact—Russia was in position to discard its attitude of softness and to take a firmer stand in its disputes with Japan.

In the spring of 1933 the Russian Foreign Office made a detailed statement of its grievances centering in the CER: bandit depredations, costs of troop movements, military priorities, disappearance of rolling stock, and Japanese pressure on the Russian management. Russia suggested the sale of the line as one of the most radical means of settling the conflicts which complicated the relations of the Soviet with both Japan and Manchuria. Foreign Minister Litvinov took cognizance of the 1924 agreement with China which stipulated that the future of the CER should be settled by the two countries to the exclusion of third parties, but he explained that Russia felt free to go on with the sale because the Nanking government and its subordinate authorities had ceased to be actual partners of the Soviet Union a year and a half earlier. Inspired Soviet sources commented that China would lose nothing by the sale of the CER to Manchukuo: "If and when China reconquers Manchuria, China will get back the Chinese Eastern Railway with everything else." Russia needed peace, breathing space, and credits. It reasonably calculated that in any future war against Japan, Manchuria would be the battleground and the CER would be one of the prizes of victory. It seemed wiser to contest for someone else's property and in the meantime to utilize the income from the sale of the railway.

On June 26, 1933, Soviet and Manchukuo representatives began negotiations in Tokyo with Japanese officials acting as intermediaries. A year and nine months later, on March 23, 1935, documents were signed which effected the sale of the CER; an agreement between Russia and Manchukuo on transfer of ownership; a tripartite protocol regarding arrangements for payments in goods; a final protocol dealing with details of the schools and co-operatives formerly operated by the employees of the CER; and an exchange of notes between Japan and the USSR in which Japan guaranteed the payments. The contracts called for a price of 140,000,000 yen plus about 30,000,000 yen in pensions to Soviet employees, one-sixth to be paid in cash and the balance in cash and goods within three years. *The sale of the CER meant the temporary withdrawal of Russian influence from North Manchuria and fixing of the boundary between Japanese and Russian spheres at the long, long line between Manchuria (or Manchukuo as it was then known) on the one side and Siberia and Outer Mongolia on the other. Manchukuo (in reality, Japan) had made a good bargain; it obtained a valuable asset cheap and a free hand in the development of its transportation system for military and strategic purposes.*

Year after year—almost day after day—frontier disputes, fisheries arguments, or some minor irritant kept Japan and Russia at a fever pitch of animosity. First one side and then the other assumed the initiative. Either had ample opportunity and excuse to start a war had it dared to take the risk.

After Japan became the power behind Manchukuo, it discarded the lackadaisical attitude which China had taken toward frontier problems. Japan sought more exact location of ill-defined border markers and adjustment of disputed areas in its favor. The Siberia-Manchukuo border compares in length with the border between the United States and Canada. At the western extremity, Manchukuo, Siberia, and Outer Mongolia meet without a natural demarcation; in the midsection, the meandering Amur River constantly shifts its course; and at the eastern end of the border, the ranges of hills make indistinct boundaries among Korea, Manchukuo, and Siberia. Three-quarters of a million armed men glared at one another across these borders, and their respective patrols exchanged angry shots to create an unending series of incidents. The Japanese wanted demilitarization of the frontier zones, but the Russians refused because their strategic railway was too near the border to permit any demolition of their fortifications or relaxation of their guards.

Two border incidents created unusually bitter headlines. On June 30, 1937, the Japanese sank two Russian gunboats in the Amur River and occupied two small islands which the Russians had claimed. The Japanese

accused the Russians of provoking the incident to divert attention from the execution of Tukhachevsky and the other purged army officers in Siberia; the Russians replied that the Japanese plotted the incident as a feint while they moved into North China. The Soviet evacuated the islands without the formality of any kind of diplomatic agreement. During the months of July and August, 1938, Japan demanded the cession of an important hill, Changkufeng, west of Lake Khasan, which overlooks the rail and highway approaches to Vladivostok. Russia refused and asserted its legal right to ownership. The Japanese brought up an entire division of their army in Korea and attacked in force. On that occasion the Russians did not retreat but beat off their enemies. They alleged that hostilities at Changkufeng were more than a border incident and constituted an unsuccessful Japanese attempt at aggressive war. Their superior strength obliged Japan to accept a truce and mediation of the border dispute by a bilateral commission.

Four nations—Manchukuo supported by Japan, and Outer Mongolia supported by Russia—clashed in the shapeless, barren wastes where Manchukuo and Outer Mongolia met. Japan considered the area as a strategic base from which to threaten Irkutsk and the Trans-Siberian Railway and as an attractive headquarters for propaganda among the Mongols. Japan wanted to break Russia's diplomatic hold on Outer Mongolia by obtaining rights for diplomatic and consular representation, construction of a telegraph line, and initiation of commerce and trade.

A serious border incident occurred in January, 1935, and led to the establishment of a border commission. On June 23, 1935, the Mongols arrested a group of Japanese military officers who had entered Mongolia as surveyors and real estate developers. The active Soviet policy in negotiating an alliance with Outer Mongolia, coupled with Japanese preoccupations elsewhere, took this border area out of the category of danger spots until the summer of 1939. Then Japan and Russia contested for disputed territory east of the Khalka River in the Nomonhan district east of Lake Buir. Russia again accused Japan of utilizing a frontier dispute as a pretext for an aggressive attempt to secure an advanced military base for further war against the USSR. The Japanese attacked the border guard and for four months carried on large-scale hostilities involving aircraft, artillery, and tanks. According to Russian figures, Japanese-Manchukuan casualties exceeded 50,000; Russian-Mongolian losses were more than 9,000. The operations were on a front of fifty to sixty kilometers and to a depth of twenty to twenty-five kilometers. The Japanese abandoned the attack with the announcement of the German-Soviet nonaggression pact in Europe.

Sakhalin, or Karafuto, was another focal point of Russo-Japanese friction. This chilly island, at the extreme north of the Japanese chain, was, before

1904, a Russian land of forced labor, prison justice, nightmares, and death. After 1925 Japanese concessionaires encountered increasing opposition from the Soviet in the exploitation of the coal and petroleum reserves. The concessionaires were accused of violating their contracts by curtailing production, ignoring safety requirements, smuggling supplies, withholding adequate goods from the workers, hiring too many Japanese and too few Russians, exporting oil on navy tankers, and failing to pay rent on their equipment. Exchanges of diplomatic notes brought no tangible relief for the Japanese who were gradually squeezed out of their promising enterprises.

The Russians also fought stubbornly for an increasing share of the rich fisheries resources off the Siberian coast. The catch of salmon, herring, cod, *and shellfish provided food and livelihood for thousands of Russians and Japanese and supplied the raw material for 5 per cent of all Japan's exports.* The respective rights of Russian and Japanese fishermen were fixed according to the convention of 1928 and renewed annually until 1936. This convention conceded to the Japanese the right to fish anywhere off the Siberian coast except in thirty-seven bays and inlets which were reserved for Soviet state exploitation or closed for strategic reasons. It permitted the Japanese to establish canneries on the Siberian coast and to export marine products from these canneries without a license and without payment of an export duty. It stabilized or reserved fishing lots in the immediate vicinity of these canneries for the exclusive use of the Japanese. Finally, it permitted the Japanese to put ashore, only where their own lots touched the coast, in order to dry the fish, repair their sails, fix their nets, replenish their supplies, or do any other chores within the definition, "purposes of the industry."

Bitter disputes arose in pursuance of this last clause. The Russians declared that military landing parties disguised as fishermen came ashore, that Japanese naval vessels furtively penetrated Russian territorial waters, and that hundreds of Japanese spies filtered into the hinterland. The Japanese countered that Russians fired on innocent Japanese fishermen accused of espionage and that Russians refused to permit Japanese to land in time of distress or serious need. The men of the sea of both nations were rugged individuals who frequently fought it out in hand-to-hand battles or shot it out with rifles and guns.

The fishing lots other than stabilized lots were sea areas which were auctioned off annually in Vladivostok to Russian and Japanese bidders without discrimination as to nationality. The Russians bid in rubles, the Japanese in yen, and the auctioneer awarded the lot to the highest bidder according to an arbitrary exchange rate. In the thirties, the Russians manipulated the exchange rate in their favor and they subsidized private citizens and

co-operatives in their competition against the highly integrated "Nichiru" combine which co-ordinated the activities of the Japanese. The Russian share of the catch climbed steadily from 10 per cent in 1928 to 60 per cent in 1935. The Japanese resented the relative loss and expressed their resentment in the seizure of Russian vessels, in the frequent shooting of alleged poachers, in fishing beyond legal limits, and in agitating for a new and more favorable fishing convention. They sought the end of annoying Russian regulations and of the precarious auction system which put them at the mercy of Russian whims. Each year the Japanese argued for a new basic treaty, but the Russians assented only to makeshift modifications and extensions of the old one. Restrictions on the Japanese multiplied and their rents went up as the Russians exerted all the pressure that the traffic would bear.

In addition to these perennial issues, there were constant pinpricks which inflamed national tempers. The press of Japan and Russia minced no words in their propaganda attacks against each other. The braggadocio of the party officials in Russia matched the chauvinism of the Japanese militarists. Zhdanov said, "The Soviet Foreign Commissar should be more resolute in his attitude toward the arrogant, hooligan, and provocative conduct of the agents of Japan and that puppet state called Manchukuo." General Araki in a public address retorted that it might be necessary to attack Russia to wipe out the Comintern, and Tojo expressed his conviction in a letter to the General Staff, "From the point of view of military preparations against Soviet Russia . . . we should deliver a blow first of all upon the Nanking regime to get rid of the menace at our back." Molotov referred to Japan's "wanton resort to armed force," and Matsuoka boasted to an interviewer, "We will plant our flag in the Urals." Russia blamed officials of the Japanese embassy for espionage and plotting to acquire the Maritime Provinces, while Japan repeatedly accused Russia of building up its armaments to an alarming degree and spreading the poison of communism. Each side in its own mind was convinced of the justice and necessity of its own acts and of the menace to its own existence in the acts of the enemy. Russian radio stations at Khabarovsk and Vladivostok carried on a relentless battle of the air waves with Japanese stations in Mukden, Dairen, and Hsinking.

Japan protested against Russia's aid to Chinese bandit forces in Manchukuo and to Chiang Kai-shek, and Russia replied with protests against Japanese conspiracies with White Russians in Manchukuo. Manchukuo refused to pay an installment on the Chinese Eastern Railway contract on the grounds that Russia had failed to satisfy outstanding debts and claims. Russia denied the legality of Manchukuo's position and called upon Japan to make good the default. In its correspondence with Japan, Russia offered

to release Japanese fishing boats and their crews in its custody, grant further concessions in Sakhalin, resume parcel post traffic between Manchukuo and Siberia, and permit the opening of a Japanese consulate in Sakhalin. Russia demanded in return that Japan should release a detained Soviet mail plane, surrender river boats that Japan had taken, liberate four Soviet citizens in Japanese custody, pay the installment due on the Chinese Eastern Railway, and pay damages for nonfulfillment of a contract of the Matsuo shipyards for the construction of three steamships for Russia.

The Soviet Union and Japan in World Affairs, 1935–1941

The local conflicts between Russia and Japan did not in themselves contain the germs of war. The world conflict between the peace-loving states and the Fascist Triplice determined primarily whether border conferences in Asia would succeed or fail and whether fishing agreements would expire or continue. Neither nation objected to the existence of tension: Japan used it to obtain larger military appropriations from the Diet and to erase the growing resentment against the long and harsh terms of military service; Russia used it to divert attention from the purges, to arouse patriotic fervor, and to add complications to Japan's woes in China.

But neither nation wanted to expand the local conflicts into a full-scale war. Russia believed that Japan was conspiring to wage aggressive war but preferred to postpone a showdown. Russia reasoned that time was on its side and it would gain in strength while Japan exhausted itself in China. Furthermore, political isolation and economic poverty doomed Japan to a gradual but steady decline in the balance of power. It seemed to Russia that if it were to fight Japan, both nations would weaken themselves to the comparative advantage of the Western powers. Why save China from Japan only to expose China to the mercies of the Western imperialists? Nor was Japan willing to precipitate a fighting war. Japan interpreted all its moves as counters as well as attacks in its international chess game with Russia.

Japan shared the world dislike of communism and could not accept Russia as a thoroughly safe neighbor because of its dangerous ideology. Prudence demanded that Japan should take precautionary measures against policies which included the Sovietizing of other nations through propaganda and revolution. Japan had to keep pace with the expanding power of Russia which grew from a harmlessly weak neighbor to a mighty military rival. Japan feared retaliatory air raids from Siberia on its flimsy wood and paper homeland and mistrusted the effects of war on the untested bonds between Japan and its advance bases on the Asian mainland. The Japanese Army and

Navy had their hands full in China, and the merchant marine was taxed to capacity with its logistics job. Japan was unwilling to enmesh itself so inextricably in Siberia that it would be estopped from a dash to the Southern Regions should the opportunity arise.

General Tojo admitted that Russia was Japan's implacable enemy but he confessed that Japan never intended to invade the USSR—"rather she has been bent on defense against Russian aggression in a very timorous manner." He insisted that such measures as seemed warlike against the USSR were only elementary precautions. He believed that, given the nature of the modern world as it is, the statesmen of Japan would have been derelict in the discharge of their responsibilities had they done less than they did. He denied that at any time Japan intended to make a surprise attack on Vladivostok, Blagoveshensk, or any other Russian point. He minimized the significance of such recorded incidents as German-Japanese toasts "to your Urals and to our Lake Baikal" and General Oshima's indiscreet remark, "I am drinking Russian vodka and think that I am drinking Russia."

Time and again it seemed that war was imminent, particularly in the conflicts over the islands in the Amur River, Changkufeng Hill, and the Nomonhan border region. The issues were not solved on any of these occasions but were sidetracked because of the greater compulsions of general international relationships outside the immediate points of contact. Localized incidents between the two nations did not occur in a power vacuum but were rather a part of the world-wide avalanche which became World War II. As early as May Day, 1932, the Russian general, Bluecher (ex-Galens, the Russian adviser in Canton), told his troops in Siberia, "The flames of real war are beginning to flicker on our frontier."

Four days after consummation of the sale of the CER, Hitler denounced the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. The Russians countered with the adoption of the United Front, the speeding up of their military preparations, and the alliance with Outer Mongolia. The next turn of the vicious circle took Hitler's armies into the Rhineland. While Stalin was dealing with Germany and the West, he wanted no risk of a stab in the back from Japan. He wanted a nonaggression pact with Japan, not "as an act of love" but as a sensible means of bolstering his own security. But Japan had no intention of relaxing its own vigilance against either the open challenge of Russian arms or the subtle menace of Communist propaganda. Japan rejected Russia's overtures and concluded the Anti-Comintern Pact, with a secret annex which made of it a veiled military alliance against the territory of all peace-loving states. The pact achieved

its purpose of compounding the nuisance value of Axis maneuvers when conducted alternately in Europe and Asia.

Russia could not concentrate on either Germany or Japan and consistently capitulated because of its inherent weakness. When Russia believed that it had an opportunity to drive a wedge between Germany and Japan, or when it hoped that Japan would be amenable to Russia because of embarrassments elsewhere, Russia exhibited an attitude of sweet reasonableness. When China or the Western powers seemed disposed to compromise with Japan, Russia increased the flow of goods to China and talked more feverently about the indivisibility of peace. When the British and French prime ministers seemed on the verge of an understanding with Hitler, Litvinov asserted that the Soviet Union was the only nation ready to fight for its principles.

At the beginning of 1939 Russia faced diplomatic isolation when it decided to make its own arrangements with the dictators. Russia had no basic confidence in Great Britain, "which grinds in the dust Hindus, Arabs, blacks in Africa, and workers at home," nor in France, which "deserted Czechoslovakia in its hour of need and stood in awe of Hitler," nor in the United States which "hates Communism as much as Fascism." The suddenness of the Russian pact with Germany in August, 1939, caused the overthrow of a Japanese cabinet while a new stopgap government took time out to reassess the new situation. Japan feared that Germany had sold out Japan, had bought salvation for itself at the cost of releasing Russia's energies for an instantaneous, mighty blow against Japan. It became quickly apparent to Japan, however, that Russia had no intention of counting upon German assurances and even strengthened its military position against Germany while fixing with Germany the fate of Poland. Russia and Japan easily and quickly ended their arguments over the payments on the CER, claims and fisheries, and initiated negotiations in Moscow for a new trade agreement. As Russia became more deeply involved in Finland, Japan took a more active interest in the White Russians in Harbin who plotted for the autonomy of Siberia. Japan offered to buy the Maritime Provinces, perhaps the whole of Siberia east of Lake Baikal, but Molotov dryly responded that he believed buyers could be found in the Soviet Union for southern Sakhalin.

On January 31, 1940, the Japanese Foreign Minister, Arita, told the Diet that Russia should cease interfering in the industrial concessions of northern Sakhalin, modify its policy of support to the anti-Japanese regime in China, and collaborate for the realization of general peace in eastern Asia. Japan's fear of Russia subsided and the two nations resumed their posture of picayunish antagonism.

Then came the spectacular German drive through the Low Countries. This aroused Russia's concern. Russia was happy with the stalemate on the western front but was worried lest the easy victories of Germany would induce Great Britain to surrender and prompt Germany to strike like lightning to the east. The German victories also opened new vistas for Japan. Japan cashiered the fence-sitting Yonai cabinet and returned Prince Konoye to the premiership. Japan decided to forget the earlier German treachery and to make a new agreement with Germany and Italy. This enabled Japan to postpone a showdown with Russia and to prepare immediately for an attack against the helpless, attractive remnants of empire in the southern seas. Japan signed the Axis pact with Germany and Italy on September 27, 1940, and allayed the Russian misgivings by insertion of a special clause which provided that "the existing political relations between each of the three treaty powers and the Soviet Union should not be affected by the treaty."

Germany approached the Soviet Union with a proposition to join the Axis pact and Ribbentrop invited Molotov to come to Berlin to explore the possibilities of a four-power world. Molotov was suspicious and fearful of the power of Germany; he hoped that Germany would spend its strength on Great Britain but he was desperately afraid that Germany would mobilize against Russia. Japan was intoxicated with its prospects for the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The time seemed right for a four-power understanding, an understanding on paper without the least community of spirit. Molotov was shocked at the idea of joining the Axis but was incapable of reaching an agreement with Germany on the limits of respective German and Russian spheres, particularly in the traditional areas of rivalry in the Balkans and the neighborhood of the Black Sea. Russia also watched with interest the growing antagonism between Japan and the United States in the Pacific. At that precise time Japan, in its Total War Research Institute, worked out plans for eliminating Red influence in the Asian territories of the USSR.

Whatever might have been in the hearts of the two nations, the Japanese Foreign Minister, Matsuoka, took off for Europe in March, 1941, seeking a truce with Russia. In Germany he learned of Germany's military preparations against Russia: "Should Russia one day take up an attitude which could be interpreted as a threat against Germany, the Führer would dash Russia to pieces." Matsuoka had visions that Germany would whip Russia in Europe, that Japan would make a lightning move to the south, and then return to take Siberia. He thought that if Germany should attack Russia and if Russia had a neutrality pact with Japan, Russia might withdraw its troops from the east and expose itself to Japan. On April 13, 1941,

Russia and Japan in Moscow signed a neutrality pact which contained the engagement that should either become involved in hostilities the other would remain neutral. The pact was to remain valid for five years. At the time, Russia canceled the Japanese concessions in northern Sakhalin to reduce the danger of spies. At the same time, Russia and Japan signed a supplementary declaration of mutual respect for the territorial integrity and inviolability of the Mongol People's Republic and Manchukuo in order to eliminate a grave source of friction between Japan and the Soviet Union. Stalin was pleased with his diplomatic coup; if Germany should attack Russia, he would appreciate Japanese neutrality. He personally escorted Matsuoka to the railway train to see him off on the long journey across Siberia. Matsuoka, too, was pleased; if Japan should fight the *United States or Great Britain, Japan would appreciate Russian neutrality.*

In June, 1941, Japan and Russia worked out a commercial convention and a one-year barter agreement. Then Germany attacked Russia. Japan wondered whether to honor its neutrality pact or to close the pincers on the eastern front. The USSR seemed ready to fall to the ground like a ripe persimmon. As Germany bogged down, it pressed for Japanese intervention. But Japan had its eyes on the south and the most ardent chauvinist could not believe that Japan could attack north and south at the same time. Japan speeded up its aid to Germany and transmitted valuable economic, political, and military intelligence.

Through Russian spies on the staff of the German embassy in Tokyo, Russia knew exactly the extent and nature of Japan's help and often learned of Japan's intentions. Japan interfered with Russian shipping in the Far East, particularly with the lend-lease supplies which were destined to go from the west coast of Vladivostok. Japan closed the Sangar Straits and obliged Russia to use the La Perouse Straits or the Korean Straits. When the former froze over and the latter became too dangerous and annoying because of submarines, the Russian ships had to take the long, foggy route past the Aleutians and through the Kuriles. Japan was treaty bound to observe neutrality toward Russia, but that neutrality was far from benevolent.

Germany was Russia's enemy and in that war Japan was neutral; then Japan became the enemy of the United States and in that war Russia was neutral. It was not one world and one war when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor. The Russians were in an anomalous position in the Far East: exposed and ineffective in their own Siberian homeland, actively allied with Outer Mongolia, bound to do nothing directly or indirectly to hurt China, and committed to Japan with a paper pact of formal neutrality. They developed an air supply route from the United States and Canada through

Alaska to Siberia, and through the grudging tolerance of neutral Japan they maintained a trickle of supplies by sea from their ally, the United States. Every ton of aid over the distant Pacific contributed to Russian victory over Germany and the return of Russia to the Asian scene after its temporary eclipse during World War II.

Suggested Reading

WILLIAM S. GRAVES, *America's Siberian Venture, 1918-1920* (New York, 1931).

MAURICE HINDUS, *Russia and Japan* (New York, 1942).

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST, *Judgment of the IMTFE* (Tokyo, no date). (See also the dissenting opinion of Justice Pal.)

H. K. NORTON, *The Far Eastern Republic of Siberia* (London, 1923).

F. B. PRICE, *The Russo-Japanese Treaties of 1907-1916 Concerning Manchuria and Mongolia* (Baltimore, 1933).

USSR, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, *Documents and Materials Relating to the Eve of the Second World War* (New York, 1948).

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, *Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939-1941* (Washington, 1948).

JOHN WHITE, *The Siberian Intervention* (Princeton, 1950).

CHAPTER 19

Japan in World Politics

The quest for security and equality generated in Japan a policy of boldness and initiative on the continent of Asia and an attitude of restraint and patience in its diplomacy with the rest of the world. Japan considered China as lips to the teeth or wheels to the axle and could not remain indifferent while the nations of the West expanded to the East. The Japanese government and people were convulsed with anger at the action of the three powers in the Triple Intervention in 1895, but in the presence of their national danger they wisely curbed their anger and swallowed their humiliation.

Japan welcomed an alliance with Great Britain in 1902 as its initiation into the company of the great powers. After its victory over Russia, Japan's foreign policies became factors of prime importance in world affairs. Japan was no longer exclusively in and of the Orient; its role was a leading one and its stage was the world. At the beginning of World War I Japan was an important, full-fledged member of the combination of powers which opposed Germany and its allies. Between the Treaty of Versailles and the outbreak of the China incident, Japan was a vital cog in the machinery of collective security, and demonstrated to the world that international relations were determined by the needs and the will of Asia as well as Europe and the United States.

Japan's activities in China brought inevitable conflicts with the Western powers. Japan became increasingly careless about orderly processes and joined forces with Germany and Italy to create a new world order of their own conception. Japan subordinated the methods of diplomacy to militarism, and its aggression spawned war and ultimate defeat. In 1941 Japan's choice was not between the normal alternatives of war or peace—it was whether to test its steel against the armies of the USSR on the Asian main-

land or against the mighty navies of Great Britain and the United States in the Pacific and the Southern Regions.

Before World War I

Japan had considered it essential to lower the curtain on "the uncertain and sinister drama of Korea" and to prevent the partition of China by the Western powers. It opposed carving the roast before being assured of a generous portion for itself. Japan was quick to accept the American proposals for the Open Door and the preservation of China's independence and territorial integrity, and repeatedly made these principles the prime objectives in its major diplomatic arrangements before World War I. In contrast to European powers which subordinated their Asian policies to European requirements, Japan assumed obligations in Europe only as they contributed to its concept of security in Asia, particularly in China.

In view of Russia's aggressive moves to the Far East in 1901, Japan sought an end to its diplomatic isolation. Some Japanese statesmen, notably Marquis Ito and Marquis Inouye, advocated an understanding with Russia; others, like Viscount Ishii and Count Hayashi, preferred an alliance with Great Britain with the possible adherence of Germany. On January 30, 1902, Count Hayashi and Lord Lansdowne signed Japan's first alliance with a Western power. This had the twin effect of strengthening Japan's position in Asia and of expanding Japan's diplomatic horizons to the farthest borders of the British Empire. For more than two decades, the alliance with Great Britain was the keystone of Japan's international position.

According to the preamble of the alliance, the High Contracting Parties expressed their desire to maintain the *status quo* and general peace in the extreme East, "being moreover especially interested in maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the Empire of Corea, and in securing equal opportunities in those countries for the commerce and industry of all nations." The High Contracting Parties agreed that, "having special interests, of which those of Great Britain relate principally to China, while Japan in addition to the interests which she possesses in China, is interested in a peculiar degree politically as well as commercially and industrially in Corea," it would be admissible for either of them to take such measures as may be indispensable in order to safeguard those interests. If either Great Britain or Japan were to become involved in a war in defense of those interests, the other would maintain a strict neutrality. If any other power or powers should join the hostilities

against that ally, "the other High Contracting Party will come to its assistance, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it." Both parties agreed to refrain from entering into separate arrangements with another power to the prejudice of the interests above described and agreed to communicate with one another fully and frankly if their interests were placed in jeopardy.

This alliance served Japan well during the Russo-Japanese War. In preventing France from coming to the aid of its ally, Russia, the alliance forestalled a world-wide conflict. After Japan defeated Russia, Japan negotiated and signed on August 12, 1905, a revised alliance with England. On this occasion, Japan was in the better bargaining position. Japan had eliminated its Russian enemy, and Great Britain was in apparent need of friends against the restless rising power of Germany in Europe.

In the 1905 revision Japan and Great Britain defined their objectives as general peace in the regions of eastern Asia and India; the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China; and the maintenance of their respective territorial rights and special interests. They agreed to communicate if their rights and interests were in jeopardy and to consider in common the measures which should be taken to safeguard those menaced rights and interests. If by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action on the part of any other power or powers either High Contracting Party should be involved in war in defense of its territorial rights or special interests, the other party would at once come to the assistance of its ally and would conduct the war in common and make peace in mutual agreement with it. Great Britain recognized the right of Japan to take such measures of guidance, control, and protection in Korea as she might deem proper to safeguard her paramount political, military, and economic interests, provided always that such measures were not contrary to the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations. Japan recognized similar rights on the part of Great Britain in regard to the regions in the proximity of the Indian frontier.

By 1911, Japan was still less dependent upon its understanding with Great Britain because of its own unchallenged diplomatic hegemony in Asia. Japan had reached satisfactory agreements with France, Russia, and the United States, and was quite prepared to deal drastically with China should the occasion arise. Japan looked upon its alliance with Great Britain as a useful but expendable ornament. On the other hand, Great Britain was increasingly menaced by the arrogance of Germany and was decreasingly confident of the strength and assistance of its allies, France and Russia. Great Britain was also perturbed lest its alliance with Japan should

lead it into war against the United States. Therefore the two traditional allies negotiated a second revision which was signed in London on July 13, 1911. This text was substantially the same as the 1905 document with the exception of Article IV:

Should either High Contracting Party conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third Power, it is agreed that nothing in this Agreement shall entail upon such Contracting Party an obligation to go to war with the Power with whom such treaty of arbitration is in force.

This article was intended to exclude the United States from the purview of the alliance, since Great Britain and the United States were contemporaneously negotiating an arbitration treaty. This arbitration treaty was not consummated, but a Bryan Peace Treaty between the United States and Great Britain in 1914 seemed to exclude the United States from the operation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance because of Article IV in the text of 1911.

Japan harbored a lingering resentment against France because of French participation in the Triple Intervention and because of French sympathy and financial support for the activities of Russia in East Asia. Since the French had limited their ambitions in China to the concessions and to South China, Japan had managed to avoid any acrimonious disputes with France. When Japan's ally, Great Britain, signed a cordial understanding with France in Europe, Japan pursued a similar tactic in regard to Asia. On June 10, 1907, Japan and France signed an agreement and a declaration at Paris agreeing to respect the independence and integrity of China and announcing their special interest in the maintenance of peace and order in the regions of the Chinese Empire adjacent to the territories where they had rights of sovereignty, protection, or occupation. Each was to support the other in maintaining peace and security in those regions with a view to maintaining the respective situation and the territorial rights of each on the continent of Asia. By the supplemental declaration, Japanese in Indo-China and Indo-Chinese subjects and protégés in Japan were accorded most-favored-nation treatment.

One by one, Japan obtained recognition and approval of its special interests and territorial rights in Asia: first from Great Britain; then, France; and then, Russia. Japan exhibited its diplomatic acumen in repairing its broken fences with Russia. On July 30, 1907, Japan signed with Russia two conventions, one public and one secret, which erased Russian objections to Japan's onward surge. By the public convention, Japan and Russia agreed to recognize

the independence and the territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the principle of equal opportunity in whatever concerns the commerce and industry of all nations in that empire, and engage to sustain and defend the maintenance of the *status quo* and respect for this principle by all the pacific means within their reach.

By the secret convention, Japan and Russia divided Manchuria into spheres of influence, the south to Japan and the north to Russia. Russia recognized the relations of political solidarity between Japan and Korea, and Japan recognized the special interests of Russia in Outer Mongolia. For three years, the relations between Japan and Russia were remarkably free from friction and they became closer in 1910 because of their mutual opposition to the financial and railway machinations of the United States in Manchuria.

On July 4, 1910, Japan and Russia, in an additional public and an additional secret convention, expanded the scope of their understandings. Japan was not concerned about possible encroachments of Russia in Japan's sphere; its psychology was rather to obtain Russian acquiescence in further aggressive designs which the Japanese might undertake. These conventions contained no reference to the Open Door and declared that in case the *status quo* was menaced the two powers would communicate with each other for the purpose of agreeing upon measures that they might judge it necessary to take for the maintenance of the said *status quo*. Japan and Russia were no longer limited to "pacific means," as they had been three years earlier in 1907. Japanese annexation of Korea by treaty took place on August 22, 1910, exactly seven weeks after the Russian-Japanese agreements.

As long as Japan looked upon Russia as its menace in Asia—that is, before the Russo-Japanese War—Japan regarded its relations with Russia as relations between a civilized power (Japan) and an exponent of autocracy, greed, and militarism (Russia). When the enemies became friends, the Japanese attitude changed completely. Many Japanese believed that the development of Japanese-Russian friendship would lead to predominance in the Far East and all over the world "especially from the moment on when the Pacific Ocean becomes the center of rivalries among various powers." Japan and Russia agreed to collaborate against the financial imperialism of the Anglo-American combine and on July 8, 1912, they signed in St. Petersburg a new treaty which made precise and complete their previous agreements and which drew a clear line of demarcation between the Japanese and Russian spheres. Russia claimed North Manchuria and western Inner Mongolia as its sphere, while Japan claimed South Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia.

Japan experienced no difficulty in coming to terms with Russia because

Russia was preoccupied in Europe and was weakened by internal dissension. Japan could afford to be gracious to Russia, short of strengthening Russia to the point of resisting Japan. As long as Japan had contented itself with the British alliance and the support of the Open Door in China, Japan opposed Russia in the East. But when Japan decided that the Open Door contradicted its own demands for special position, then Japan anticipated opposition from its British ally and looked to Russia for tacit support in its drive for leadership in Asia. In spite of its fear of a strong Russia, Japan co-operated with Russia in its hours of adolescent weakness.

On July 3, 1916, Japan signed its last alliance with pre-Soviet Russia. The Japanese Foreign Minister recalled Russia's separate peace in the Seven Years' War and feared that Russia might drop out of the fight against Germany and its allies. In order to bolster Russia's faltering morale, Japan sent munitions and supplies to the Russians and negotiated diplomatic agreements, as Viscount Ishii explained it, to relieve Russia of anxiety in its Far East possessions. The signatories pledged not to be a party to any arrangement or combination against the other and to confer if their territorial rights or special interests were menaced. A secret convention set up a defensive alliance which was to last for five years and, to assure that China should not fall under the political domination of any third power hostile to Japan or Russia, Japan and Russia pledged to come to the aid of each other should war arise from defense of their respective vital interests in China. To Japan these vital interests in 1916 meant, not the Open Door, but the strengthened position which had resulted in South Manchuria, eastern Inner Mongolia, and Shantung by virtue of the Twenty-one Demands. By patient and astute diplomacy Japan had thus lined up three of the powers, Great Britain, France, and Russia, behind its program in Asia. There remained Germany and the United States.

In allying itself with Great Britain, Japan chose to do no double-dealing with Germany. Japan had old scores to settle with Germany. Germany had kept Japan out of Liaotung and had established itself across the Gulf of Pechihli in the sacred Shantung Peninsula. Japan considered the German position in Shantung a menace to its own security and seized the opportunity to oust the Germans in World War I. After Great Britain declared war on Germany on August 4, 1914, the British asked for nothing more than limited, local co-operation from the Japanese in destroying German ships in Chinese waters. On August 15, the Japanese delivered an ultimatum to the Germans demanding the withdrawal or disarming of their ships and the delivery within thirty days of their leasehold in Kiaochow to Japan with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China. Germany ignored the ultimatum, and on August 26 Japan declared war. The Japanese quickly

took over all the German holdings in China and occupied the German islands in the South Seas. On October 19, 1915, Japan announced its adherence to the Declaration of London, in which the nations fighting against Germany pledged themselves not to make a separate peace and not to offer peace terms without previous consultation among themselves. In a series of secret agreements in February and March, 1917, Japan obtained from its allies unqualified support for its demands for permanent legal title to its conquests over Germany in China and the islands north of the equator.

Japan's diplomatic relations with the United States were cordial as long as Japan followed the objectives of the Open Door. On July 29, 1905, William Howard Taft and Premier Katsura in Tokyo in an informal conversation recorded their agreement that the people of the United States were fully in accord with the policy of Japan and Great Britain for the maintenance of peace in the Far East. On November 30, 1908, Ambassador Takahira in Washington and Secretary of State Elihu Root reaffirmed their wish for free and peaceful development of commerce on the Pacific Ocean, their devotion to the *status quo* in the Pacific and to the Open Door in China. Japan and the United States agreed to communicate with each other should the *status quo* in the Pacific be threatened.

As Japan shifted from the Open Door to a policy of special interests, it aroused American opposition. The Twenty-one Demands precipitated Secretary Bryan's warning that "the government of the United States cannot recognize any agreement or undertaking impairing the treaty rights of the United States, the political or territorial integrity of China or the Open Door." Japan bided its time to neutralize the American objections. Viscount Ishii came to the United States immediately after the United States formally became a cobelligerent against Germany and signed with Secretary Lansing an agreement, November 2, 1917, by which

The Governments of the United States and Japan recognize that territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and consequently the Government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous.

The agreement contained restraining assurances concerning Japan's attitudes toward China and the Open Door, but it completed the diplomatic structure which Japan had erected to guarantee its special interests. At the time of World War I, Japan was the courted partner in the alliance with Great Britain and was more the giver than the receiver in the agreements with France and Russia. Japan's differences with the United States were solved to Japan's advantage by the Lansing-Ishii agreement. Japanese delegates went to the Conference of Versailles confident of obtaining

fruits of victory for which the legal groundwork had been so carefully prepared.

From World War I to the Mukden Incident

After World War I Japan's diplomacy was inconsistent and contradictory as a result of the interaction of its idealistic profession of liberalism and internationalism and its realistic devotion to totalitarianism and aggressive nationalism. It reflected the internal confusion which resulted from the decline in prestige of the political parties and their zaibatsu backers. It suffered from the uncertainties caused by social unrest, rapid industrialization, and economic depression. It became impatient because of the mounting population, the progressive hostility to Japanese emigration, and the growing difficulties of finding and sustaining markets for Japanese goods abroad.

The Japanese delegates at Versailles were doomed to bitter disappointments. They encountered determined hostility from the Chinese, who were in no mood to surrender Shantung to the Japanese. They were not able to obtain a clear-cut international recognition of the principle of racial equality to which they were dedicated. They were not able to get outright title to the German possessions north of the equator in spite of wartime agreements. Mandates, subject to supervision by the League of Nations, seemed poor substitutes for colonies which Japan had expected to receive and to develop strictly for its own benefit. The Japanese signed the Covenant of the League of Nations, but they were none too happy about commitments to respect and preserve against external aggression the independence and integrity of member states, including China. They disliked the obligation to settle disputes by arbitration, conciliation, or adjudication before resort to war. Nor did Japan like Article XIX, which provided for reconsideration of treaties that had become inapplicable and for the consideration of international conditions which, continuing, might endanger the peace of the world.

Japan was equally frustrated in its venture into Siberia. It had not been able to gain a military or diplomatic victory over the Russians and it had stirred up suspicion in the minds of its allies because of the blatant exposure of its expansionist ambitions on the Asian mainland. It had also been thwarted by the unremitting resistance of the Chinese to its attempts to establish itself firmly, smoothly, and profitably in Shantung. The exercise of leadership proved to be more thankless and more burdensome than the attainment of leadership. Japan therefore approached the Washington Conference in a chastened and somewhat contrite frame of mind.

The Washington Conference in 1921-1922 was, in many respects, an unhappy diplomatic denouement for Japan. The world's sympathy for China was strikingly revealed and prompted Japan to surrender to China many unequal privileges and special interests. The Four-Power Pacific Treaty (negotiated by the United States, Great Britain, Japan, and France) relating to insular possessions and insular dominions in the Pacific afforded Japan a certain sense of security, but it dealt Japan a cruel blow in terminating the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Viscount Ishii was chagrined when the British thrust the decree of divorce in the face of Japan, and felt that the British government was utterly lacking in chivalry when it buried the alliance deep in the Pacific Ocean. The Japanese statesman would have preferred to see the alliance disposed of "like a courtly knight or the faithful charger of a great general."

The Five-Power Treaty on the Limitation of Naval Armament brought Japan a welcome respite from a race in building expensive capital ships. The agreement on the *status quo* of fortifications and naval bases in the western Pacific removed potential sources of friction and left Japan safe from any possible naval attack in its own area. The general public in Japan was war-weary, disposed to peace and internationalism, and quite content with the naval holiday, although the naval ratios doomed Japan to numerical inferiority. The Japanese admirals from the beginning agitated for "parity" and advocated policies which were more concerned with national security than with the general proposition of naval disarmament.

Japan looked upon the Nine-Power Treaty as the complete triumph of the United States over Japanese diplomacy and the final blow to its drive for special interests. Japan believed that its special interests did not work the slightest disadvantage to China. Some Japanese argued that China should feel toward Japan as some Central and South American countries felt toward the United States—not resentful, but thankful because of the sense of added national security resulting from the benefactor's policies.

Throughout the decade of the twenties, Japan conducted its diplomacy with uncertainty and caution. Toward China it wavered between the policies of Baron General Tanaka, which relied upon strong diplomatic notes, silver bullets, and armed force, and those of Baron Shidehara, which assumed toward China an attitude of courtesy and equal treatment. Toward the United States, Japan tempered its traditional friendship with a growing consciousness of suspicion and distrust. Japan resented the American diplomatic stand at the Washington Conference, but it accepted with new gratitude American expressions of sympathy and assistance to the victims of the great earthquake in the Tokyo-Yokohama area in September, 1923. The enactment of the immigration law in April, 1924, caused a complete

reversal in Japanese-American relations. The Japanese were offended and insulted. They looked upon American protestations of good will as hypocrisy and felt personal affront as well as national opposition in American attitudes on China policy, immigration, naval competition, and trade rivalry.

Perhaps nothing contributed more than this deterioration in American relations to the determination of Japan's attitudes toward Soviet Russia. The collapse of the czars invited the Siberian intervention and tempted Japan beyond its capacities to resist or fulfill. The murder of Japanese soldiers at Nikolaievsk in 1920 inflamed public opinion in Japan against Russians and seemed to preclude any new understandings between Japan and Russia. As the political situation in Russia stabilized, Japan was faced with the unpleasant alternative of defying or recognizing the Bolshevik regime.

Japan's loss of friends abroad, together with the effects of the immigration act in the United States and the Russian co-operation with the Chinese Nationalists, prompted Japan to sign the Treaty of Peking and the additional protocols with the new Russian power. These agreements were in the nature of an armed truce. Japan regarded Russia as a national and ideological menace and looked askance at its growing military and economic power. Frequent incidents between the two countries created an atmosphere of distrust and exasperation, but did not lead to actual crises until both antagonists became more firmly established at home and more assertive in foreign affairs.

Japan also encountered firmer attitudes from its erstwhile European allies when World War I ended. Once Great Britain dispelled its fear of Germany, it looked upon Japan as a potential rival as well as a valued ally. Japan was a menace to British interests in China; at the same time it was a friend and supporter of the British stand against the Chinese attacks on the unequal treaties. The sharpest conflict of interest between the Japanese and the British arose from trade competition by which Japan threatened to displace British leadership in the international markets of the world.

Great Britain found itself increasingly obliged to consider the wishes of its partners in the British Commonwealth in determination of foreign policy. Australia, New Zealand, and Canada were as important as the United Kingdom itself in the formation of postwar British policies. The commonwealths of Australia and New Zealand were uneasy about the burgeoning power of Japan and were uncertain whether to promote their own security by outright opposition to Japan or by continued alliance with their northern Oriental neighbor. As has been pointed out, Canada enter-

tained no such misgivings. Geographically located next to the United States, Canada insisted upon termination of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. All the dominions appreciated the contributions of Japan to the maintenance of the balance of power in Asia and to the preservation of order and stability in the face of the combined challenge of the Chinese Nationalists and the Soviet. They understood that changes would have to be made in the old imperialistic order, but they wanted those changes to be effected in an orderly manner.

Japan, as a great power and charter member of the League of Nations, participated in every major international conference. Japan had its own selfish purposes in desiring to keep its military budget down without impairing its security or prestige. It wanted the right to equality in naval armaments, but it accepted limitations at less than equality in conferences at Geneva in 1927 and at London in 1930. The United States, Great Britain, and Japan agreed on a prolonged holiday for capital ships, a 10-10-6 ratio in heavy cruisers, an approximate 10-10-7 ratio in light cruisers, and parity in submarines. A bitter rivalry in naval armaments hampered the quest for peace.

Japan nevertheless shared the idealism and optimism which produced such fond hopes for the League of Nations, the Permanent Court of International Justice, the Geneva Protocol, the Locarno Pact, and the Kellogg-Briand Treaty. Japanese diplomats warned against the impossibility of speedy accomplishment of disarmament or compulsory arbitration and opposed hasty and imperfect definitions of aggression. The Japanese argued that the aggressor could not be defined as the party who struck the first blow, even in a war arising from questions recognized as matters exclusively of internal jurisdiction. They emphasized that any valid definition of aggression must give adequate weight to provocation.

Japan signed the Kellogg-Briand Treaty, or the Pact of Paris, of August 27, 1928, which contained the following provisions:

Article I. The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the name of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.

Article II. The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means.

Japanese public opinion considered this pact as welcome as a good rice crop, but they used it as a political football. Critics in Japan pointed out

that "pacific means" were not defined and penalties were not specified for violators. The government was obliged to explain that the phrase, "in the name of their respective peoples," was inapplicable to Japan since the emperor was the fount of sovereignty and that the pact could not be considered a restriction or impairment of the right of self-defense. The sad truth was that by 1928 Japan's explosive internal situation was at the point of minimizing international agreements for the maintenance of peace and demanding its rights as a have-not power even at the cost of abandoning its treaty commitments.

International Relations during the China Affair

After 1931 Japan became increasingly bitter and ultranationalistic in its external relations. As Japan became more totalitarian at home, it exhibited more arrogance abroad. It sabotaged the machinery of collective security rather than enter into compromises for the sake of peace. The establishment of Manchukuo was one of the wedges which split the world into hostile camps. Japan and its Axis partners extended recognition and the United States opposed recognition. Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China itself shied away from formal *de jure* recognition but sought ways and means to accommodate themselves to an inescapable *de facto* situation.

Japan blamed the Western powers for aiding Chiang Kai-shek and thus prolonging the "hellish agonies of war." The Amai statement of April 17, 1934, was more of a warning to the Western powers than to China. Japan declared that it would object as a matter of principle to any joint operations undertaken by foreign powers even in the name of technical or financial assistance which must give rise to political complications. Supplying China with war airplanes, building airdromes in China, detailing military instructors or military advisers to China, and contracting loans to provide funds for political uses would tend to make friendly relations difficult among Japan, China, and other countries and to disturb peace in East Asia. The United States, Great Britain, Germany, and Italy had been doing the things to which the Amai statement objected.

The Japanese looked upon opposition to their program as tantamount to denying their right to live. The West regarded Japan's program as illegal, unjust, and headed for catastrophe. Japan's relations with the Western powers went from bad to worse because of trade rivalries, competition in building and operating the merchant marine, and the arguments for limitation of armaments. On December 28, 1934, Japan denounced the Washington Naval Treaty to become effective at the end of 1936. An

attempt at a new agreement in the London Conference in 1935 proved abortive. The naval race began which entailed ship construction and equipment, dock-building, harbor-dredging, and laying out of airfields from the Aleutians to the mandated islands. Inside China (according to the prosecution lawyers of the IMTFF.) Japan used intimidation, fraud, artifice, chicanery, negotiation, and force to evade, abrogate, alter, redefine, or break treaty provisions.

Japanese militarists conceived their mission in China to be to purge China—as Japan purged itself—of liberalism, democracy, socialism, and communism as the “rotten fruits of the West.” Even Chiang Kai-shek was blamed for being a pro-Communist, a participant in the United Front against Japan. Japan wanted to eliminate all the poison in China, personified by the Kuomintang and the Communists, and to enlist China in an “Asia-for-the-Asiatics” campaign against the West. The Asian ideology should be Neo-Confucian and should be based on the ancient virtues of loyalty, filial piety, benevolence, and propriety. Major General Tada wrote:

‘The two great missions from heaven which are the natural obligations which our empire must bear are (1) to head a movement against the tyranny and highhandedness of the white people and a racial war for emancipating the colored people from the enslaving opposition of the whites and (2) to rectify the material civilization of the West by the moral civilization of the East.

Japan talked of the holy war and considered itself above treaty-breaking. For Japan any means were justified in seeking the ends of righteousness, self-defense, and the realities of the New Order. Japan’s bellicosity toward the powers varied directly with its military success against China. Whenever its military goals seemed within sight, Japan’s pronouncements were adamant and hostile; when its armies were bogged down, its diplomacy became more conciliatory. Japan discovered that its anti-Western or Pan-Asian campaign was impossible because of China’s unwillingness to co-operate. Japan therefore limited itself to anticommunism, which still failed to attract Chiang Kai-shek. This tactic gained the friendship and co-operation of Germany and Italy, pinpointed the hostility of Japan against the USSR, and courted the benevolent neutrality of the United States and Great Britain. The Anti-Comintern Pact, signed by Japan and Germany on November 25, 1936, provided for mutual exchange of information about Communist activities and discussion of co-operative measures to be taken in mutual defense against communism. The pact extended to like-minded nations an invitation to join. A secret article provided that if either party were attacked without provocation or menaced by the Soviet Union the

other would not carry out any measure which would in effect relieve the position of the Soviet Union. In such event both parties would immediately consult on measures to preserve their common interests. Both parties also pledged themselves not to conclude treaties with the Soviet Union which did not conform to the spirit of the pact.

Japan believed that, as a consequence of the Anti-Comintern Pact, Hitler would remove the German military advisers who were helping Chiang Kai-shek, and democratic nations would support the anti-Communist crusade. Germany wanted Japan to make peace with Chiang and to bring him into the antidemocratic Axis; Germany warned Japan that Chiang could be considered pro-Communist only by the most devious and stubborn reasoning. Some Japanese—Prince Saionji, Arita, Yamamoto, Harada, and Ikeda—were inclined to endorse the German reasoning, but other Japanese—Kido, Konoye, Tojo, and Itagaki—advocated relentless and uncompromising war against Chiang and the powers who supported him.

Until 1938, when Japan was emboldened by Hitler's triumphs in Europe and its own capture of Hankow and Canton, Japan was not unmindful of its economic vulnerability. Its official statements contained a generous portion of soft words like "Japan will welcome the cultural and economic co-operation of all powers in China." After 1938, soft words became more infrequent. Instead, Japan insisted that "economic activities of other powers should be subject to certain restrictions" and declared, for the sake of its Chinese puppets, that "it would give positive consideration to the questions of abolition of extraterritoriality and the surrender of the settlements and concessions in China."

The Japanese Army in China perpetrated deliberate incidents against British, Americans, and French which could only have been designed to antagonize the powers or weaken their position as against Japan's. In 1937 the British ambassador was shot under circumstances which could hardly be described as accidental; British river boats were attacked; American tugs were machine-gunned from the air, and the American gunboat, the "Panay," was sent to the bottom of the Yangtze River. Missionary properties were destroyed and foreign nationals were insulted, slapped, beaten, or killed. Foreign property rights were ignored. Japan blockaded the China coast and closed the inland rivers to shipping other than Japanese. The Japanese undermined the integrity of the maritime customs, with consequent losses to foreign bondholders, and with their monopolies put long-established foreign commercial firms out of business.

On February 10, 1939, after Munich, Japan seized Hainan and on March 30, 1939, the Spratly Islands which menaced Indo-China. Japanese

planes frequently bombed the railway from Indo-China to Yünnan, which carried supplies and ammunition to Chiang Kai-shek. The Japanese rode roughshod over foreign rights and interests in the treaty ports. Foreigners were humiliated and squeezed out of their rights at Hankow, Canton, Amoy, and Tientsin. At Shanghai—the pride of the Western imperialists on the China coast—the Japanese used the International Settlement as a military headquarters, took over the policing and administration of law and order, and passed out strong hints that the future of Shanghai would have to be redetermined in view of the changed circumstances. Japan robbed Shanghai of its sparkle and profit and made of it Japan's strongest base in its undeclared war against the powers in China.

Japan singled out Great Britain as its particular target. Great Britain was blackened as the pillar of the Chinese temple and as the fiendish enemy of the New Order. Japan spread anti-British propaganda and incited crowds to demonstrations in the streets of Tokyo. In China, coolies were aroused to the point of violence against any hapless British subjects who happened to be caught out in the streets. The British were too preoccupied in Europe to oppose Japan in China. The British withdrew their garrisons of Seaforth Highlanders and East Surreys from Peking and Tientsin and surrendered to Japanese demands regarding the concessions. Only the Americans were in position to protect the rights of all foreigners in China. The American doctrine of nonrecognition constituted a psychological check to Japan, and a succession of American notes and protests kept the legal record unmistakably clear. The United States co-operated with the League in its condemnation of Japan's practices and proved to be the moving spirit of the Brussels Conference in November, 1937, which met "to examine the situation in the Far East and to study peaceable means to hasten an end to the regrettable conflict which prevails there." Japan respected the power of the United States, but discounted the possibility that the United States would fight to preserve its interests in Asia.

Japan paid closer attention to the growing power of the Soviet Union, which could no longer be ignored. Japan rebuffed Soviet overtures for a nonaggression pact and strengthened its military position on the borders of Manchukuo and in Inner Mongolia. Japanese political leaders spoke openly and often of the inevitable clash against the Soviet Union. Disagreements and incidents brought the two nations to the apparent edge of war, while their armies glared at each other like tigers across the frontiers. Japan had reason and opportunity to undertake war against Russia, but it had neither the strength nor the assurance for certain victory. Japan postponed and procrastinated, never quite convinced whether its prime enemy was in China, Siberia, or the South Seas.

The Japanese looked upon the Anti-Comintern Pact as the keystone of their foreign policy. They concluded cultural and economic pacts with Germany and extended all three agreements to include German and Japanese satellites in the anti-Comintern system. Germany pressed Japan to sign a general treaty of mutual aid against not only the USSR but against whom it might concern. Strong interests in Japan—like the court circles, the navy, and the zaibatsu—opposed anything more than a consultative pact, and they warned against any agreement which might turn Japan against the Anglo-Saxon powers rather than against the USSR. Hitler's arguments were powerful and he might have persuaded the Japanese to his point of view had it not been for his impatience and what the Japanese considered his treachery in concluding behind their backs the German-Russian Nonaggression Pact of August 23, 1939. The overwhelming Japanese inclination had been to move against Russia, but it was checkmated by the Hitler-Stalin agreement. The Germans kept the pressure on Japan to shift its objectives to the Southern Regions and to solidify the base of its security and prosperity at the expense of the wealthy, imperialistic, Anglo-Saxon powers in the Indies rather than at the expense of the Russians in the underdeveloped areas of Siberia. Germany reminded Japan that it was the Western powers rather than Russia which prevented the success of the Japanese program in China.

Japan's Diplomacy between the Outbreak of the War in Europe, September 3, 1939, and Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941

Within two years Japan was obliged to make rapid and basic shifts in its foreign policies, primarily in accord with the fortunes of its German ally in Europe. The major turning points were the German-Russian Nonaggression Pact, the outbreak of war in Europe, the German victories on the Western front, and the German attack on Russia.

During the entire two years, only the Japanese policy toward China remained constant. Japan wanted speedily to settle the China affair and to move on to a broader stage. The Japanese realized that this meant defiance of the Western Powers, but as Colonel Hashimoto wrote:

The moment we establish a policy to drive out all Anglo-Americans from China, China will begin to move toward a new order. . . . Only when we rid ourselves of the idea that we have to depend on Britain and America, and establish the plan to construct a self-supporting economy in the Japan-Manchuria-China bloc can we materialize an expansion plan of our armament and production power independent of Britain and America. . . . We'll lose

Great Britain and the United States, but Manchuria, China, and the South Seas will become ours.¹

On the surface, Japan maintained a conciliatory, passive attitude throughout the winter 1939–1940 which was dubbed the “sitzkrieg” in Europe. Japan proclaimed its neutrality in the war in Europe because it was not sure whether the German-Russian combination could overpower the British and French. Japan could not decide whether to make peace with Russia as Germany wished, or to turn its back on both Russia and Germany and court the good will of England, France, and inferentially the United States. Japan tempered its animosity toward Great Britain, and marked time until April, 1940, when Hitler’s armies crashed through the Allies on the western front.

The Japanese immediately became antidemocratic and not anti-Communist. They notified the Germans that they would like to resume negotiations for an alliance, but the German Foreign Office responded that it needed no helping hands for the harvest. Ribbentrop overruled the Foreign Office and undertook negotiations which culminated in the Tripartite Pact of September 27, 1940. Japan, Germany, and Italy agreed to recognize one another’s leadership in their respective spheres and “to assist one another with all political, economic, and military means when one of the three Contracting Parties is attacked by a Power at present not involved in the European War or in the Sino-Japanese conflict.” This, of course, meant the United States. The pact affirmed that “the aforesaid terms do not in any way affect the political status which exists at present as between each of the Contracting Parties and Soviet Russia.”

In Tojo’s affidavit before the IMTFE, he explained:

It is my sincere belief that the purpose of the treaty was to improve the international position of Japan, and thereby operate as a factor in the solution of the China incident, as well as in preventing the spread of the European war to East Asia. From the very outset of the negotiations on the Alliance to the final stages of its ratification there was no thought whatever of dividing the world among the signatory powers, nor of world conquest. It was considered solely as a means of defending the country against the onslaught of the “have” nations and to find a way to survive under the prevailing international situation.²

It was understood that Germany would not seek the aid of Japan in Europe and Japan would not seek the aid of Germany in China. Both nations wanted to keep the United States out of war. Japan’s role was to

¹ IMTFE, Document 9580, TP 3536, February, 1940.

² Tojo’s affidavit, *IMTFE*, p. 20.

keep pressure on the USSR in the hope of inducing the USSR to align with the Axis and to increase embarrassments to Great Britain and the United States in the hope of dissipating their efforts in Europe. Japan insisted upon making its own decisions about the possibility of making war against Great Britain and the United States. As a consequence of the alliance, it would declare war only if a favorable opportunity presented itself. Matsuoka called the pact a strong spiritual combination based on a common idea and an effective instrument for peace. To the rest of the world "it was the peace that the burglar gives when he binds and gags the watchman before robbing the house."

Meanwhile, Japan took action as a "trail blazer" or a "guide," without "any idea of domination or subjugation" in Southeast Asia. On June 12, 1940, Japan and Thailand concluded a treaty providing for mutual respect of territory, exchange of information, and consultation on questions of mutual interest. Japan catered to Thailand and kept its good will because of the value of military bases in Thailand and the control of the land bridge across the Malay Peninsula on the flanks of Singapore. Japan obliged the French to cede to Thailand from French Indo-China 69,000 square kilometers of territory with a population of 335,000. Thailanders boasted that for the first time in fifty years their own flag flew over their brothers in Cambodia, but the French shrugged off the procedures of Thailand as the "vexatious acts of ill-bred children."

As soon as France fell to Germany, Japan extracted from Germany a disclaimer of interest in French Indo-China and the Netherlands East Indies. On September 22, 1940, a Japanese general signed the Hanoi Convention with the governor-general of French Indo-China, which exchanged an assurance of respect for the rights and interests of France in Indo-China for rights to station Japanese troops in northern French Indo-China, to build air bases, and to control movement of supplies and equipment over the railway from Hanoi to Yunnan. The Japanese planned and prepared for a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere which would give them political, economic, and cultural hegemony in Indo-China, the Netherlands East Indies, the Philippines, Thailand, Burma, and Malaya.

After the surrender of the Netherlands, Japan announced its interest in the political *status quo* of the Indies. Japan sent two commercial missions to Batavia which unsuccessfully demanded preferential treatment in the exploitation of the resources of the Indies and abandonment of the policy of depending upon the United States and Great Britain. In spite of stubborn Dutch diplomacy, the Dutch were obliged to speed up their sales to Japan and to treat the Japanese with extreme care and deference. It became clear that the Japanese would have to use force to make the Netherlands

East Indies assume their "rightful" place in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

Force was out of the question unless an understanding could be reached with Russia. The Japanese Foreign Minister, Matsuoka, visited Europe and in spite of his discovery of tension between Germany and Russia, he signed a neutrality pact with Russia on April 13, 1941. This pact stipulated, "Should one of the Contracting Parties become the object of hostilities on the part of one or several third Powers, the other Contracting Party will observe neutrality throughout the duration of the conflict." The news of this agreement angered Hitler, who had already launched his preparations for an attack on Russia. Hitler would have preferred to have Japan postpone its offensive against the Southern Regions pending the destruction of Russian power. Matsuoka preferred the diplomatic game under the old rules which called for neutrality with Russia and preparation for action to the south. Matsuoka had this to say on leaving Stalin:

Mr. Stalin came to the station to see me off. . . . He appeared to be sincerely reluctant to say good-bye to me, and when I was about to leave he hugged me and kissed me very hard. And he said to me, "The Russian race is not a European race. They are real Asiatics. Since they are both Asiatics, should not Japan and the Soviet Union be good friends?" So I thought of utilizing this opportunity to delay my departure, and carry on further negotiations concerning Soviet-Japanese friendly relations beyond the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact.³

On June 22, 1941, when Germany attacked Russia, Japan was again obliged to take inventory. If Germany were to become mired in Russia, more Allied strength could be diverted to the Pacific. Japan's ambitions for a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere would then be scuttled. But the German campaign seemed to be spectacularly successful and encouraged Japan to a more vigorous push against the democratic powers in the Southern Regions. On July 17, 1941, Japan persuaded Churchill to close the Burma Road for six months, and on July 21, 1941, Japan and France signed a mutual defense pact which enabled Japan to extend its military power from Hanoi 600 miles to the southward in Indo-China to Saigon. Japanese militarists talked more ardently about ABCD (American-British-Chinese-Dutch) "encirclement and the opportunity which comes once in a thousand years to release our Empire from its chain." Cooler heads counseled caution and sought an understanding with the United States. The determination to move to the south proved greater than the patience to wait

³ Herbert Feis, *The Road to Pearl Harbor* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, N. J., 1950), p. 187 and footnotes.

for peaceful opportunities. Under the illusion of a speedy German victory over Russia, the Japanese extended the war to the Pacific by their own coolly calculated gamble at Pearl Harbor.

It would be a mistake to conclude that Germany pushed Japan into the war, quite apart from the fact that the very self-conscious Japan of 1941 would not have permitted itself to be forced in any manner by any foreign power. Germany had to make the best of a situation that Japan had created at Pearl Harbor, just as before that Japan had to make the best of situations created unilaterally by the Germans. Japanese leaders gave the Germans no intimation of Pearl Harbor. They distrusted the German embassy in Tokyo because of the arrest in October, 1941, of Richard Sorge, the German journalist, who was a Soviet spy. They also distrusted their own embassy in Berlin because it was well known that the ambassador there, General Oshima, talked too much when under the influence of a little liquor.

The military successes of the Japanese in the opening days of World War II bolstered the German morale. Exultant Japan and its equally exuberant allies in Europe concluded a military alliance on December 11, 1941, but misunderstandings followed quickly in the wake of stalemate and defeat. "One world" at war was in reality "one world in two wars," one in Europe and the other in Asia and the Pacific. Germany wanted Japan to shift its attack from the Southern Regions to Russia. Japan constantly urged Germany to cut its losses in Europe, to make its peace with Russia, and to come to the aid of Japan in the East. After its original gains, Japan would have been most receptive to almost any peace on compromise terms.

Suggested Reading

HUGH BORTON, *Japan Since 1931* (New York, 1940).

WILFRED FLEISHER, *Volcanic Isle* (New York, 1941).

JAPANESE GOVERNMENT FOREIGN OFFICE, *Collection of Official Documents and Releases, 1922-1940*, 19 volumes (Tokyo, 1940).

MORINOSUKE KASHIMA, *Basic Policies of Japanese Diplomacy* (Tokyo, 1938).

WATARU KIYOSAWA, *Diplomatic History* (Tokyo, 1941).

JOHN M. MAKI, *Japanese Militarism* (New York, 1945).

A. M. POOLEY, ed., *The Secret Memoirs of Count Tadasu Hayashi (1850-1913)* (New York, 1915).

MASAMICHI ROYAMA, *Japanese Policy in a Changing World* (Tokyo, 1938).

NAOKICHI TANAKA, *World Politics and the New Order in East Asia* (Tokyo, 1940).

SADAJI YABE, *Japanese Foreign Policy Since the Restoration* (Tokyo, 1940).

CHAPTER 20

The United States in the Far East, 1900-1931

Until the end of the nineteenth century, American foreign policy in the *Far East* was restrained by and tailored to the lesser role which the United States played in world affairs. As economic power ballooned from 1900 until the great depression of 1931, its policies became more confident and assertive. The expansion in manufacturing and trade rocketed the United States into the ranks of the greatest and strongest nations and the spirit of boom and braggadocio translated itself from the economic into the political realm. The annexation of the Philippines reflected the expansive mood and, together with the acquisition of Hawaii and the Panama Canal Zone, symbolized the growing American influence in the Pacific area. The states on the west coast assumed more interest in the determination of American attitudes, and developed the idea that East Asia was the near neighbor to the West and not a strange, distant region far to the east as conceived by Europe. The outmoded doctrine of isolation which dominated American thinking about Europe seemed singularly inapplicable to the fantastic economic hopes which came to be associated with Asia.

Right down to the rude awakening of Pearl Harbor, the vast distances of the broad Pacific seemed to guarantee the United States against any immediate threat to its own security from East Asia. Power struggles in that region were consequently looked upon with a degree of detachment and a lack of vital concern. The general principles of peace, world order, and collective security emerged as immediate American objectives. The United States clung to its traditional policies of equal commercial opportunity and territorial integrity. As its awareness of international economic interdependence increased, the United States displayed a deeper determina-

tion to preserve and promote its own legitimate interests in East Asia. It became more resolved to protect the China market against the seekers after special privilege and the monopolists, and it sought to curb the ambitions of European powers by developing the strength of the Asians themselves. The colonial world of Southeast Asia assumed an entirely new importance. Its resources of rubber and tin were swallowed by American industrialization. Profits on sales from the Indies to the United States accrued to the benefit of the imperial powers, primarily the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. These profits enabled the Europeans to keep their own channels of triangular trade open and to balance their accounts with the United States.

Republican administrations under Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft governed the United States from 1901 until 1913; the Democrats were in office for two terms under Woodrow Wilson, 1913-1921; and the Republicans returned to power under Warren G. Harding, Calvin Coolidge, and Herbert Hoover from 1921 to 1933. Partisan politics were seldom if ever of major importance in making American policies in East Asia. Strategic economic and cultural factors also determined the checkered course of relations with the Philippines. The breakup of China, World War I, and the emergence of China's nationalism were at least as influential in the formation of American policies toward China as the will of an American president, the legislation of Congress, or the interplay of forces in American domestic politics.

When the twentieth century opened, the great powers of Europe tended to regard Asia as the backyard of power politics. Only Russia and Japan regarded their confrontation in Asia as of prime importance. After the defeat of Russia by Japan, the Europeans were obliged to focus their attention on problems at home and to leave the Asian field primarily to Japan and the United States. During four decades, their rivalry was the dominant feature of East Asian international affairs. When their policies clashed or their tempers blazed, the whole world edged nearer the brink of war; when their statesmen compromised their differences or met around the conference table, they avoided or postponed disaster and provided at least a little longer period of peace and comparative calm.

The Philippines

While the American Army set about the business of administering the Philippines, the American government acted to prepare for a civilian administration. Instructions from President McKinley to a commission under

William Howard Taft provided that the sovereignty of the United States should be supreme and that no promise of independence should be given. With the exception of trial by jury and the right to bear arms, the Filipino was to enjoy all the guarantees of the American Bill of Rights. The system of government for the Philippines was to be

designed not for our satisfaction or for the expression of our theoretical views, but for the happiness, peace and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands, and the measures adopted should be made to conform to their customs, their habits, and even to their prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent with the accomplishment of the indispensable requirements of just and effective government.¹

On July 2, 1902, President Roosevelt signed the Cooper Bill which provided for civil government in the Philippines. The government thus created consisted of a governor-general appointed by the president of the United States, an appointed commission acting both as an administrative body for the civil governor and as the upper house of the legislature, and an elected representative assembly. This act applied as many of the principles of democratic government as were deemed advisable in the light of existing conditions in the Philippines and remained in effect until it was superseded by the Jones Act in 1916.

From 1901 to 1913 the ideas of Taft dominated American policy. Taft, as civil governor, as secretary of war, and as president of the United States, followed the slogan, "The Philippines for the Filipinos," but he interpreted it with conservative Republican caution. Early American government in the Philippines was a benevolent paternalism, concerned with law and order, trade, public health and welfare, and education. Independence and political rights for the Filipinos became the rallying cries for the Nacionalista party under Manuel Quezon and Sergio Osmena.

The fact that the Philippines were administered by the War Department was in itself a revelation of American attitudes and ideas. Filipino aspirations were politely, perhaps subconsciously, subordinated to considerations of security and world politics in the policies of the American government. The American public showed indifference to its opportunities and responsibilities in the Philippines. The islands constituted a point of issue between the United States and Japan even after the Japanese disclaimed their interest by the Taft-Katsura agreement of 1905. In the heat of the immigration controversy in 1907, President Roosevelt telegraphed a code message to the commander of the Pacific fleet to prepare to defend the islands from a momentarily expected attack from the Japanese. The president was ap-

¹ Dean Worcester, *The Philippines* (Macmillan, New York, 1914), p. 792.

prehensive about the Philippines and felt that they should be strongly fortified or given up. On August 21, 1907, he wrote to Taft:

The Philippines form our heel of Achilles. They are all that makes the present situation with Japan dangerous. I think that in some way . . . you should state to them that if they handle themselves wisely in their legislative assembly, we shall at the earliest possible moment give them a nearly complete independence. . . . I think that to have some pretty clear avowal of our intention not to permanently keep them and to give them independence would remove a temptation from Japan's way and would render our task easier.²

For ten years after the signing of the treaty of peace with Spain, the United States was estopped from any discriminatory tariff legislation with regard to the Philippines. In 1909 the Americans rejected the Open Door for the Philippines and adopted a policy of free trade with the Philippines, together with substantial duties against competing foreign goods. The United States acquired almost a monopoly of both the import and export trade of the islands. Primarily as a result of tying the Philippines to the American market, a number of agricultural industries boomed and acquired an overwhelming importance in the export trade and financial structure of the islands. The sugar barons prospered; the tobacco growers, lumber kings, coconut plantation owners, and coconut processors made fortunes. Profits came easily and money flowed freely. American investments reached a quarter billion dollars and the Philippines became one of the most important customers in American foreign trade.

When the Democrat, Woodrow Wilson, was elected to the presidency, the Filipinos expected more political favors. A new governor-general, Francis Burton Harrison, Filipinized the civil service and dedicated himself to active preparation for independence. In 1916 President Wilson approved the Jones Bill, the successor to the Cooper Bill, which pledged the United States to recognize the independence of the Philippines as soon as a stable government could be established therein. During World War I, the Philippines question was pushed into the background, to re-emerge only with the return to Republican normalcy under President Harding. An investigative commission under General Wood and Cameron Forbes sent to the Philippines in 1920 reported that the policies of the Democrats had led to confusion and maladministration. The Wood-Forbes report stated that the Filipino people lacked adequate education in political matters; that there was irreconcilable diversity of opinion on conditions of independence; and that the islands were not ready economically or militarily for independence.

General Wood remained in the Philippines as governor-general to re-

² Henry F. Pringle, *Theodore Roosevelt* (Harcourt, Brace, New York, 1931), p. 408.

impose the executive authority of the United States. The Nacionalistas were furious and their leader, Manuel Quezon, girded for a battle which he later said sent General Wood to his grave and himself to the sanatorium. President Coolidge opposed immediate independence, as did his successor, President Hoover. Americans endeavored to persuade the Filipinos to take their minds off independence and settle down to the serious work of self-improvement. Filipino tempers seethed while the Americans lectured. The American government carried on its obligations as an imperial republic, but the American masses lost their interest in the Philippines.

After the economic crisis of 1931, Americans changed their views about the nature of the problem of the Philippines. Farm groups, patriotic societies, and labor organizations looked upon the Philippines as a menace to American economic interests and advocated independence. Less influential pressure groups, such as traders, shippers, investors, and clergymen, argued for the retention of the Philippines. In December, 1932, after the election but before the inauguration of Franklin D. Roosevelt, the American Congress passed the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Bill which provided for independence after a transition period of ten years. This bill also provided for a quota limitation on Philippine imports into the United States, a gradual application of the American tariff, and an annual immigration quota of fifty Filipinos.

President Hoover vetoed the bill. He challenged every major feature of its provisions, denounced it as a repudiation of America's moral responsibilities, and expressed his doubts that the Filipinos could maintain their independence. The lameduck Congress overrode the veto, but the Filipinos refused the American offer of independence. They feared that inadequate safeguards had been offered against economic chaos and military helplessness. The American Congress passed a new bill which became law as the Tydings-McDuffie Act when approved by President Roosevelt on March 24, 1934. It provided for a ten-year transitional commonwealth period, at the end of which time the Philippines were to be given outright independence. During the commonwealth period, Filipinos were to recognize the supreme authority of the United States and maintain true faith and allegiance to it. (This clause was later the basis of American complaints against Philippine collaborators with the Japanese.) Acts of the Philippine legislature affecting currency coinage, imports and exports, and immigration could not become law until approved by the president of the United States. Foreign affairs were under direct supervision and control of the United States, which was responsible for the defense of the islands. The United States reserved the right to review court decisions, limit the public debt and foreign loans, maintain military reservations, keep armed forces

in the Philippines, and intervene for the preservation of the government of the commonwealth or for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty. Looking toward economic independence, the act established a system of quotas and graduated tariffs to cushion the shocks of adjustment. Specified quotas on sugar, coconut oil, and abaca, for example, were to continue on the free list for five years; but after that time the products of the Philippines would have to accommodate themselves to the necessities of unfavored and unsubsidized competition.

With the passage of this act, the Americans felt that they were closing the books on an old era and introducing to the world something new in the way of pledges honored and promises redeemed. But the act was conceived in time of peace and was designed to meet the purposes of two nations only. The commonwealth ushered in a new era, indeed, but it was not the easy entrance of a seasoned actor on a familiar stage. After 1935 the Philippines were called upon to meet a new and terrible situation where their own desires were completely overshadowed by the ugly horrors of war and invasion.

Interests and Policies Relating to China

In spite of China's anomalous position in international affairs, the United States was careful to treat China as a sovereign equal. President Theodore Roosevelt was not a great admirer of the China of his day, but during the height of his controversies with Japan in 1908 he considered the possibilities of an understanding for joint action with Germany and China in case of need. The American government importuned the Chinese government to break off diplomatic relations with Germany in 1917, although it was perfectly clear that China could not be of substantial aid to the Allies. At Versailles, and later at the Washington Conference, the Chinese representatives were accorded the fullest measure of diplomatic courtesies in spite of the restrictions on China's sovereignty.

The issue of racial prejudice and discrimination polluted the relations between the United States and China. From 1882 to 1895 a succession of state and federal laws, judicial decisions, and treaties closed the door more firmly on Chinese immigration. Chinese were attacked by Western labor unions; Chinese were harassed in the courts and occasionally murdered in the streets. It could be claimed that Americans in China were accorded a greater measure of justice and protection than Chinese received in the United States. In 1904 Congress excluded Chinese laborers permanently from the United States and its possessions. The definition of laborers made

exceptions only for teachers, students, merchants, travelers, and government officials. No Chinese could become a citizen of the United States by naturalization. The Chinese lodged diplomatic protests and organized the first large-scale boycott in their history. It was directed against the importation of American goods, and although ineffective it served as relief for outraged sentiments. The good will gained by American policy in China was offset to a large degree by the callous treatment accorded to Chinese in the United States.

The United States could, and did, ignore China's wishes with impunity. It violated existing treaties and dictated others in an overbearing manner. When China balked at the harsh terms demanded by the State Department, Congress dispensed with treaty sanctions altogether, and enacted laws that were even harsher. Scant allowance was made, either in California or in Washington, for the sensibilities of a proud and friendly people. The persecution of Chinese subjects in the United States was winked at by the courts and, in effect, condoned by the federal government. It was a less excusable counterpart of the anti-foreign riots that sometimes took American lives in China.³

The United States treated China with an ambiguity which vacillated between pretended noninterference in Chinese internal affairs and vigorous assertion of the Open Door. American commercial and missionary interests in China expanded and placed increasing responsibilities upon the American government to protect the treaty rights of its citizens. As the United States watched the progressive deterioration of the Manchu Dynasty and the chaos which accompanied the birth pains of nationalism, it rejected any temptations for unilateral or international intervention. When the Peking government was challenged by the Republican revolution in October, 1911, the United States helped neither the established regime nor the revolutionists. Although the Chinese Republic was inaugurated on February 12, 1912, the United States did not extend formal *de jure* recognition until May 2, 1913.

During the struggles of the war lords, the United States refrained from taking sides. On January 27, 1927, when the Nationalists were on the march through the Yangtze Valley, Secretary Kellogg announced American policy to be "in every way to maintain an attitude of the most careful and strict neutrality as among the several factions that have disputed with one another for control in China." After the Kuomintang achieved a degree of unity in China, the United States recognized its government on July 25,

³ A. W. Griswold, *The Far Eastern Policy of the United States* (Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1938), pp. 338-339.

1928, by concluding a treaty restoring tariff autonomy to China. On that occasion, Secretary Kellogg stated:

We do not believe in interference in their internal affairs. We ask of them only that which we look for from every nation with which we maintain friendly intercourse, specifically, proper and adequate protection of American citizens, their property and their lawful rights, and, in general, treatment in no way discriminatory as compared with the treatment accorded to the interests or nationals of any other country.⁴

The United States discovered that the implementation of the Open Door policy was infinitely more difficult than its enunciation. The replies to the notes of Secretary Hay by the powers were evasive and noncommittal, reflecting no intention to subscribe to the guarantee of equality of commercial opportunity or the preservation of China's territorial integrity. When one of the cabinet members asked Hay how he expected to enforce the Open Door if it were challenged, he replied, "Armies and navies; international moral force is mere flapdoodle." Hay himself was disillusioned and, under pressure from the War and Navy Departments, in November, 1900, sought unsuccessfully to obtain for the United States a naval base and territorial concession in Fukien. Americans co-operated in the military expedition to relieve the foreigners besieged by the Boxers in Peking, but once the siege was raised and the diplomats restored to power, every semblance of co-operation or self-restraint vanished.

The indemnities assessed against China by the Boxer Protocol in 1901 were so heavy that it seemed from the beginning as if the powers anticipated default and would demand new or enlarged territorial concessions to satisfy their claims. The Russians were particularly highhanded in their dealings with the Chinese and acted as if Manchuria were their own protectorate. In a memorandum to China on February 1, 1902, which was, in effect, a warning to Russia, Secretary Hay pointed out that the United States viewed with grave concern the cession to any power or any company the exclusive right or privilege of opening mines, building railways, or in any other way developing the industries of Manchuria. The secretary explained to President Roosevelt:

We are not in any attitude of hostility toward Russia in Manchuria. . . . What we have been working for two years to accomplish, if assurances are to count for anything, is that, no matter what happens eventually in Northern China and Manchuria, the United States shall not be placed in any worse

⁴ U. S. Department of State, *United States Relations with China* (Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1949), p. 12.

position than while the country was under the unquestioned dominion of China.⁵

Hay declared that "tsarist diplomacy was now marked by an uncertainty, a contradiction, an evasion and an unfriendliness unique in the history of diplomatic relations." As the Russians poured troops into Manchuria, they denied any intention to force any political convention or understanding upon China. Secretary Hay again wrote the president:

Dealing with a government with whom mendacity is a science is an extremely difficult and delicate matter. . . . We are not charged with the cure of the Russian soul and we may let them go to the devil at their own sweet will. If they have simply lied to gain time, a situation of a certain seriousness will soon be developed.⁶

Partly as a defiant gesture to Russia, the United States concluded a treaty with China on October 8, 1903, which reaffirmed the Open Door, opened Mukden and Antung to trade, and gave the United States the right to station consuls in Manchuria. By this treaty the United States obtained precisely the same rights and privileges in Manchuria that Russia nominally possessed. In the opinion of an American journalist, A. Maurice Low:

Without the expenditure of one dollar, without moving a single ship or a single soldier, without an alliance, without buying in one place by surrendering in another, simply by straightforward honest diplomacy, he [Hay] has placed such insurmountable obstacles in the path of Russia that it will be impossible for Russia to make Manchuria Russian without fighting the United States, or without paying the United States the price she may demand.⁷

Mr. Low foresaw an American-Russian clash over Manchuria as "not inevitable, but not improbable," because he believed that Russian diplomacy in Manchuria placed a red-hot poker on top of a barrel of gunpowder. He did not foresee how the position of the United States would be altered by the Japanese victory over Russia.

The United States not only took a firm stand against blatant pretensions to special interests but it also adopted as a cardinal principle of policy the strengthening of China, with the idea of bolstering China's power to resist foreign encroachments. Dollar diplomacy—the substitution of dollars for bullets and the promotion of American investment and trade—was accepted as a legitimate American weapon. After Russia's defeat, an American capi-

⁵ Tyler, Dennett, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War* (Doubleday Page, Garden City, 1925), pp. 135–136.

⁶ E. H. Zabriskie, *American-Russian Rivalry in the Far East* (University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1946), pp. 88–89.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 99.

talist and railroad magnate, E. H. Harriman, reasoned that he might be able to buy into the railways of Manchuria and make them a link in an American-owned, round-the-world system. In August, 1905, he sailed to Japan with the hope of acquiring half the South Manchurian Railway and some of its ancillary mining rights. His schemes were thwarted in Asia, but he found a vigorous ally and fellow dreamer in a young American official, Willard Straight. From 1906 until 1908, as consul-general in Mukden, Straight came to the conclusion that the United States owed its lack of power in the Far East to the small amount of American capital invested there. His ideas were none too popular with President Roosevelt, who favored Japan more than China, but they appeared most attractive to President-elect Taft and his newly appointed Secretary of State, Philander C. Knox. Straight became the Peking representative of an American financial group composed of J. P. Morgan and Company; the National City Bank; the First National Bank of New York; E. H. Harriman and Company; and Kuhn, Loeb and Company.

In May, 1909, Straight expanded his ambitions from Manchuria to China proper. He learned that the Chinese government had signed a contract with a "Consortium" or international combination of British, French, and German bankers for the construction of a railway system from Hankow, in Hupeh Province, south and west into Canton in Kwangtung and Chungking in Szechwan. The proposed system was known as the "Hukuang Railways." In 1898 the American-China Development Company had obtained a contract for a railroad from Hankow to Canton, but American interest in the enterprise had gone by default to a Belgian syndicate. It was repurchased by J. P. Morgan in 1905, who promptly sold out to the Chinese government. Then in 1909 it seemed logical to Straight to revive American interest in the Consortium's Hukuang project.

The American president and his secretary of state were sympathetic. They favored the admission of the American banking group on terms of equal participation into every foreign loan floated by China and they were not averse to inspiring a demand for funds when the Chinese seemed unimaginative. Washington told Peking that unless Americans were invited to share in the Consortium loan, Washington might reconsider the remission of the Boxer indemnity funds. Some \$12,000,000 had been earmarked for return to China as in excess of amounts claimed for actual American losses. The Chinese gave in to American pressure and on November 10, 1910, signed a quadruple agreement with the enlarged Consortium for the Hukuang Railways loan. The loan was not actually floated until June, 1911, and railway construction did not begin until 1913 because of the revolution.

Meanwhile, Harriman and Straight pursued their Manchurian schemes. Following tactics learned in the United States, Harriman conceived the idea of building a railway from Chinchow to Aigun, parallel to the South Manchurian Railway. He would smash a competitor who refused to sell out. China fell in line with Harriman's projects, but these lost their driving force when Harriman died on September 10, 1909. Then Secretary Knox suggested that the Manchurian railways be taken out of international politics. He proposed bringing the Manchurian railroads under an economic, scientific, and impartial administration, by some plan vesting in China the ownership of the railroads through funds furnished for that purpose by interested powers willing to co-operate. Failing that proposal, Great Britain and the United States might give diplomatic support to China in construction of a line from Chinchow to Aigun. No one other than the United States, not even Great Britain, welcomed the Knox proposals; and Knox's blunt manner of presenting his scheme played into the hands of Russia. The Russian government considered the Chinchow-Aigun line as politically dangerous, economically unprofitable, and strategically threatening and signed with Japan the understanding of July 4, 1910, regarding their respective interests in Manchuria and Mongolia.

On September 22, 1910, the Chinese government requested a loan from exclusively American sources for the double purpose of currency reform in China proper and the industrial development of Manchuria. The Americans were bound by the Consortium agreement to open any loan to the other three powers, England, France, and Germany, for equal participation. Preliminary agreements were signed, but the loans were never floated. Because of the threatening war clouds in Europe, England and France were not willing to undertake any diplomatic actions—even in Asia—without consulting their respective allies, Japan and Russia. These two powers expressed an emphatic veto and insisted upon their right to be included in the Consortium. In the hectic diplomatic maneuvers which followed, Great Britain and Japan renewed their alliance; Great Britain and Russia reached a new understanding over Tibet and Mongolia; Russia assured its own primacy over Mongolia by its pact with that country and with China; and Japan agreed to support the tottering Manchu regime in exchange for a free hand in Manchuria.

The Chinese revolution provided more business for the financiers. Yüan Shih-k'ai needed money to pay his troops, maintain order, and meet the operating deficits of his new government. On February 27, 1912, two weeks after his inauguration, he approached the Consortium for a reorganization loan secured upon the Salt Gabelle. China agreed that Japan and Russia should be included in the Consortium. Small emergency sums were ad-

vanced, but endless arguments prevented the consummation of any substantial loans until April 26, 1913. Before that time, the new American president, Woodrow Wilson, had been inaugurated and he had eased the withdrawal of the American bankers from the Consortium group because the reorganization loan seemed to touch very nearly the administrative independence of China itself. The bankers had lost their enthusiasm because of the tedium of the negotiations and the lack of profits.

It was hopeless to try to help China to help itself during the interim between the collapse of the Manchus and the establishment of the government of Chiang Kai-shek. The struggle to protect China against foreign rapacity after the eclipse of Russia was primarily the diplomatic duel between the United States and Japan.

Interests and Policies Relating to Japan

As long as the United States and Japan were of lesser importance in the Far East, they pursued similar policies. Both favored the Open Door in China and both opposed the surge of Russia. President Theodore Roosevelt admired and believed in Japan. He felt that Japan's trade policies were better than Russia's and that Japan was a country with free institutions and ideals formed according to an American pattern. When war broke out between Japan and Russia, Roosevelt called on the belligerents to respect the neutrality of China and assured Japan of the benevolence of the United States. When Japan attacked the Russian fleet in Port Arthur without warning, he did not blame Japan for its treachery or infamy but said that Russia's supine carelessness was well-nigh incredible. He was well pleased with Japan's victory, because "Japan was playing our game." He would have been better pleased had Japan and Russia drained themselves in a longer stalemate war. Under the secret prodding of near-exhausted Japan, he took the initiative in offering his good offices when his favored belligerent, Japan, enjoyed a temporary flush of victory. However, he believed that the complete destruction of Russia as an Asiatic power would be unfortunate. He regarded the Russians as treacherous, shifty, and incompetent, but he wanted to preserve some Russian strength to moderate the actions of Japan.

Before the Portsmouth Conference opened on August 10, 1905, Roosevelt sent his Secretary of War, Taft, to Tokyo as his personal representative for an exchange of views with Japan's Premier and Foreign Minister, Count Katsura. They affixed their signatures to a memorandum which was so secret that even the American ambassador in Tokyo was not informed of

its existence. Count Katsura stated positively that Japan "does not harbor any aggressive designs on the Philippines" and explained his country's plan to assume control of Korea's foreign affairs. Secretary Taft expressed his approval of Japan's plans and his belief that President Roosevelt would concur in his views. This agreement—like the Yalta agreement later—lacked the formality of a ratified treaty and bound only the administration which made it. It looked like selling Korea down the river, but Roosevelt's opinion was, "We cannot possibly interfere for the Koreans against Japan—they could not strike one blow in their own defense." He, and many others in the administration, rationalized that the Koreans would be better off with Korea as a part of the Japanese Empire.

As Japan went from triumph to triumph, American public opinion shifted. At first, Japan was hailed as the brave little nation fighting single-handed against a reactionary giant for the independence of Korea and the return of Manchuria to China. Then the realization dawned that Japan was an Oriental power and Russia was one of the West. The suspicion grew that Japan lumped Americans with all the other white devils inferior to themselves. Furthermore, Japan became as rapacious in its demands and as imperialistic as Russia. A compromise peace seemed preferable for American interests to an overwhelming Japanese victory. At Portsmouth, the Russian delegate, Count Witte, showed himself to be "a simple, accessible, and amiable man, treating the most humble citizen as his equal," but in the eyes of Roosevelt he was "shockingly vulgar, very selfish, and totally without high ideals." Roosevelt, throughout the conference, liked the Japanese, whom he regarded as "entirely selfish, though with a veneer of courtesy" and "gentlemanly, self-respecting and self-restrained." The president won the Nobel prize for his contribution to peace, but when he turned his gaze to the Orient he found nothing but ill will toward the United States in spite of his best intentions. In China the United States was the butt of the boycott and in Japan the president was the villain who had prevented Japan from collecting its rightful spoils from Russia.

As Japan emerged as the new colossus of the Orient, Roosevelt was haunted by fears of invasion of the Philippines, the "Yellow Peril," and excessive Japanese immigration. Accordingly, he revised his earlier views toward Japan and abandoned the traditional American attitude of friendship in favor of a new relationship of hostility and conflict. From 1905 to 1908 Japanese-American crises were continuous and war scares were recurrent. Along with his diplomatic maneuvers, the president sent the American fleet around the world on a cruise which lasted from March 16, 1907, to February 22, 1909. He called this demonstration of American naval power the most important service he rendered to peace. The appearance of the

fleet in Japanese waters put an end to nonsensical war talk, and the cruise itself alerted Great Britain and the dominions to the coming of age of the United States as a naval and Pacific power. The British were shown an alternative to the Anglo-Japanese alliance as a possible bulwark for their own policies in the Far East.

The immigration issue between Japan and the United States was regarded by the president as "the most critical problem of our foreign policy." His task was to meet the demands of the people of the Pacific coast and at the same time to treat Japan courteously and without any more offense than absolutely necessary. Japanese laborers were first imported into Hawaii by American sugar planters in 1886; 80,000 were brought in by 1900. The fear of Japanese infiltration expedited American annexation, but Japan's official concern for the claims of its citizens showed that Japan could not be treated in the same cavalier manner as China. By 1900 Japanese immigration became a serious problem also on the American mainland. In that year Japanese in the United States numbered 24,000 as compared with 90,000 Chinese. Thereafter, the Japanese increased; the Chinese decreased. By 1930 the Japanese figure had mounted to 138,000; the Chinese had shrunk to 75,000. In Hawaii from 1900 to 1930 the Japanese population grew from 60,000 to 140,000; the Chinese showed only a slight gain from 25,000 to 27,000.

By the treaty of 1894, Japan gave the United States practically a free hand in dealing with labor immigration, but the Japanese were determined not to be handled as Chinese. Japan endeavored to regulate emigration in accordance with American immigration requirements. When anti-Japanese agitation erupted in California in 1900, Japan discontinued issuance of passports for laborers bound direct for the American mainland. But passports were granted to Japanese going to Hawaii, whence they streamed into the United States, either direct from Hawaii or through Canada or Mexico. State legislatures in the West memorialized Congress to exclude Japanese, an action which prompted President Roosevelt to comment that "Japan cannot behave worse than the State of California, through its Legislature, is now behaving towards the Japanese." In April, 1906, during the San Francisco earthquake and fire,

while the Japanese Red Cross contributed to the victims of the disaster more generously than all of the other nations of the world combined, visiting Japanese scientists were stoned in the streets, Japanese restaurants were boycotted and the Exclusion League, boasting a membership of 78,500, remorselessly pursued its goal.⁸

⁸ T. A. Bailey, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Japanese-American Crises* (Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1934), pp. 16-27.

On October 11, 1906, the San Francisco Board of Education passed a resolution requiring all Chinese, Japanese, and Korean children to be segregated in an Oriental public school. Parents were to be protected from having the youthful impressions of their children affected by association with pupils of the Mongolian race. Japanese public opinion was inflamed, and the ambassador in Washington lodged a formal protest. President Roosevelt wrote his son, "The infernal fools in California, especially in San Francisco, insult the Japanese recklessly and in the event of war it will be the Nation as a whole which will pay the consequences."

The president called segregation a "wicked absurdity" and invited the entire Board of Education to the White House to persuade them to rescind segregation in return for a promise to stop the immigration of Japanese labor. In 1907 immigration from Hawaii, Canada, and Mexico was stopped by law, and in 1908 the details of a "Gentleman's Agreement" were worked out. Japan agreed to continue to limit passports for skilled or unskilled labor other than to former residents of the United States and to parents, wives, or children of residents and settled agriculturists. In exchange, the United States agreed not to pass exclusion legislation. Japanese immigration was not effectively stopped and protests continued to rumble in California. When President Roosevelt left the White House in 1909, he felt that the immigration issue had been compromised but not conclusively settled.

The matter of curbing Japan in the Pacific and in the Orient was scarcely less critical than immigration. The United States signed a five-year arbitration convention with Japan on May 5, 1908, and reached a new overall understanding in an exchange of notes between Secretary Root and Ambassador Takahira on November 30, 1908. This came as an aftermath of the immigration crisis. According to the Root-Takahira agreement, both countries expressed the wish to encourage the free and peaceful development of their commerce on the Pacific Ocean; declared their policies directed to the maintenance of the *status quo* in the region above mentioned and to the defense of the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China; resolved reciprocally to respect the territorial possessions belonging to each other in the said region; determined to support by all pacific means at their disposal the independence and integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry of all nations in that empire; and agreed to communicate with each other should any event occur to threaten the *status quo*.

By this agreement, the United States obtained from Japan a new pledge to support the Open Door and the integrity of China (the notes omitted the prefix "territorial" before integrity) and a fresh disavowal of aggressive tendencies toward the Philippines. In return, Japan obtained a free

hand in Manchuria. The existing *status quo* (in 1908) included the concessions of the Portsmouth Treaty and the Japanese-Chinese Treaty of Peking and thereby covered important Japanese railway and mining rights, leaseholds, and privileges of the Japanese in Manchuria. Willard Straight called the Root-Takahira agreement, "like the Korean withdrawal, a terrible diplomatic blunder." On the other hand, President Roosevelt felt that the maintenance of peace, the stability of the Far East, and the continued opportunity to expand American commercial interests were worth the compromises which he felt obliged to make. After his retirement from the Presidency, he wrote to his successor:

Our vital interest is to keep the Japanese out of our country and at the same time to preserve the good will of Japan. The vital interest of the Japanese, on the other hand, is in Manchuria and Korea. It is therefore peculiarly our interest not to take any steps as regards Manchuria which will give the Japanese cause to feel, with or without reason, that we are hostile to them, or a menace—in however slight a degree—to their interests. Alliance with China, in view of China's absolute military helplessness, means of course not an additional strength to us, but an additional obligation which we assume; and as I utterly disbelieve in the policy of bluff, in national and international no less than in private affairs, or in any violation of the old frontier maxim, "Never draw unless you mean to shoot!" I do not believe in our taking any position anywhere unless we can make good; and as regards Manchuria, if the Japanese choose to follow a course of conduct to which we are adverse, we cannot stop it unless we are prepared to go to war, and a successful war about Manchuria would require a fleet as good as that of England, plus an army as good as that of Germany. The Open Door policy in China was an excellent thing, and I hope it will be a good thing in the future, so far as it can be maintained by general diplomatic agreement; but, as has been proved by the whole history of Manchuria, alike under Russia and under Japan, the "Open Door" policy, as a matter of fact, completely disappears as soon as a powerful nation determines to disregard it, and is willing to run the risk of war rather than forego its intention.

How vital Manchuria is to Japan, and how impossible that she should submit to much outside interference therein, may be gathered from the fact—which I learned from Lord Kitchener in England last year—that she is laying down triple lines of track from her coast bases to Mukden, as an answer to the double tracking of the Siberian Railway by the Russians. However friendly the superficial relations of Russia and Japan may at any given time become, both nations are accustomed to measure their foreign policy in sections of centuries; and Japan knows perfectly well that sometime in the near future, if a good occasion offers, Russia will wish to play a return game of bowls for the prize she lost in their last contest.⁹

⁹ A. W. Griswold, *The Far Eastern Policy of the United States* (Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1938), pp. 131-132.

Although William Howard Taft had been instrumental in working out some of President Roosevelt's understandings with Japan, he adopted new tactics when he succeeded to the responsibilities of the White House. He chose to contest Japan rather than to compromise. His dollar diplomacy was designed to checkmate Japan, as well as to aid China, but it was, if anything, less effective than President Roosevelt's *Realpolitik*. When President Wilson took over the direction of American policy, he faced an aggressive and growing Japan. During his administration, American opposition to Japan's expansionism took on a new character. The premise shifted to idealism and moral suasion as Japan's methods shifted from diplomatic pressure to political and military intervention. President Wilson, like his predecessors and successors, discovered that too often principles were the sacrifices demanded by expediency for the sake of peace.

Because of its preoccupations with World War I in Europe, the United States temporized in the Far East. In answer to China's plea for a guarantee of neutrality or American intervention to thwart the Japanese in Shantung in 1914, the American government wrote that "it would be quixotic in the extreme to allow the question of China's territorial integrity to entangle the United States in international difficulties." In dealing with the Twenty-one Demands, Secretary Bryan conceded that territorial contiguity created special relations between Japan and South Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, and Shantung Province. On May 11, 1915, he notified both Peking and Tokyo that the United States

cannot recognize any agreement or understanding which has been entered into between the governments of Japan and China, impairing the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy relative to China commonly known as the Open Door policy.

The United States was less anxious than the Allies or the militaristic faction in control in China to have China enter the war in Europe. The United States was most concerned to have China resume and continue her political entity and to proceed along the road of national development. After its own declaration of war against Germany, the United States was obliged to seek a new understanding with Japan. Secretary Lansing refused to recognize Japan's paramount interests in China, but on November 2, 1917, he and Viscount Ishii, the Japanese delegate, affixed their signatures to an agreement which stated

the Governments of the United States and Japan recognize that territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and, consequently the

Government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China and particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous.

In a secret protocol both governments pledged not to take advantage of existing conditions to seek special rights or privileges in China which would abridge the rights of the citizens or subjects of friendly states. This agreement was a stopgap measure which did not signalize a permanent American retreat before Japan. It indicated a moratorium pending the solution of the more immediate business with Germany.

Within a week after the signature of the Lansing-Ishii agreement, President Wilson showed that he had no intention of forsaking China in favor of the special interests of Japan. The president reversed his earlier stand on the Consortium which had never passed officially out of existence and authorized the renewed participation of American bankers. He reasoned that he could restrain Japan from making further independent loans to China if Americans were privy to all financial negotiations. American bankers were unenthusiastic except for possible investments in Manchuria, the area which Japan insisted should be excluded from the Consortium operations. Arguments over respective shares of capital and spheres of activity delayed the signature of the new Consortium agreement until October 15, 1920. British, American, French, and Japanese banking groups agreed to supply capital for economic reconstruction and improved communications in China. No actual loans were concluded because of the war-lord rivalries, but the American participation in the second Consortium proved an effective device to curb the unbridled financial imperialism of Japan in China.

President Wilson's fundamental reason for participation in the Siberian intervention was also to prevent Japanese penetration into North Manchuria and Siberia. On January 17, 1918, Japan intimated its intention to occupy Vladivostok and to take over the operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway and the Amur Railway. The idea of intervention was repugnant to the president and it took him six months before he could make up his mind to send American troops to join in the intervention. He insisted that American purposes were to assist the Czech prisoners of war, safeguard the military supplies, and help steady Russian efforts at self-government. He denied any intention to interfere in the internal affairs of Russia or to infringe Russia's territorial sovereignty. He disliked the aggression and intrigues of Japan and the other Allies and he ordered the American troops out as soon as he considered it safe to do so. When the last contingent of Americans embarked on April 1, 1920, the Japanese band struck up the tune, "Hard Times, Come Again No More." The United States was

powerless to prevent or stop Japanese intrigues, but on July 16, 1920, it informed Japan in friendly candor that it could not recognize the occupation of Sakhalin by a non-Russian power. On May 31, 1921, it repeated that "it could neither now nor hereafter recognize as valid any claims or titles arising out of the present occupation and control, nor acquiesce in any action taken by the government of Japan which might impair existing treaty rights, or the political or territorial integrity of Russia."

President Wilson's third challenge to Japan—in addition to his participation in the Consortium and in the intervention in Siberia—unfolded at the Paris Peace Conference. The United States fought a losing battle to defend China against Japan, as China tried to "convert the gospel of the Fourteen Points into a charter of liberty for China." The Japanese legal position with regard to Shantung was impregnable against the combined Chinese and American assault and was accepted as part of the Versailles settlement. The law prevailed over counterclaims of morality and justice. The American delegation opposed the Japanese demand for the German colonies north of the equator and led the fight to force Japan to accept the mandate system. The Americans did not want the Japanese to have the island of Yap even as a mandate because of the important cable connections there. With all his idealism, Wilson was unwilling to support the Japanese appeal for the incorporation of a clause recognizing racial equality into the Covenant of the League of Nations. When the debris of World War I and the Conference of Versailles were cleared away, the stark reality of bitter American-Japanese rivalry continued to cast its shadow over the frail form of collective security and world peace.

The Republicans were no less antagonistic to Japan than the Democrats. Secretary of State Hughes, in the Harding administration, took firm steps to incorporate American Far Eastern policy into international treaties. In 1921 the Anglo-Japanese alliance was about to expire and the United States opposed its renewal. It was not so much that the United States feared that the alliance might be a back door to war against England; it was rather that the alliance proved a useful cover for Japan's program in China. The time seemed ripe to go beyond negotiations for revision of the alliance and to call an international conference on limitation of armaments and Pacific and Far Eastern affairs. At Washington in 1921 and 1922 the powers in conference concluded seven treaties and passed twelve resolutions in addition to a special bilateral treaty between China and Japan about Shantung and another between the United States and Japan about Yap. These settlements determined the political and diplomatic status of the Far East for a decade and regulated the fundamental controversy between the United States and Japan until the Mukden incident.

A four-power treaty involving the United States, Great Britain, Japan, and France pronounced the formal death of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. A four-power agreement to talk replaced a two-power agreement to fight. The four powers agreed to respect their rights in insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific, and in case of dispute to refer the matter to a joint conference for consideration and adjustment. They bound themselves to full and frank communication in order to arrive at an understanding as to the most efficient measures to be taken if the said rights were threatened by aggressive action of any other power.

Japan was none too pleased with the termination of the alliance which had been the cornerstone of its policy for twenty years, but was pacified by the accompanying Five-Power Treaty on naval armament. This treaty, signed February 5, 1922, applied only to capital ships. It called for a ten-year construction holiday and for the scrapping of some ships already planned or being built. It limited capital ships to 35,000 tons and 16-inch guns, and aircraft carriers to 27,000 tons and 8-inch guns. The United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy were to maintain a ratio in capital ships of 5-5-3-1.75-1.75. The treaty was to remain in force for ten years until December 31, 1936, and thereafter subject to termination on two-years' notice by any of the signatory powers. The article in the treaty which particularly satisfied Japan was Article XIX which provided for the maintenance of the *status quo* in fortifications and naval bases in the respective insular possessions of the powers. This article applied to (1) the insular possessions of the United States except (a) those adjacent to the coast of the United States, Alaska, and the Panama Canal Zone, not including the Aleutian Islands, and (b) the Hawaiian Islands; (2) Hongkong and the insular possessions of the British Empire east of 110 degrees east longitude, except (a) those adjacent to the coast of Canada, (b) the Commonwealth of Australia and its territories, and (c) New Zealand; and (3) the following territories of Japan: Kuriles, Bonins, Amami-Oshima, Loochoos [Ryukyus], Formosa, the Pescadores, and any insular territories or possessions in the Pacific Ocean which Japan might hereafter acquire.

Although every gun in the United States Navy was pointed at Japan because of the heated controversies between the two countries, this agreement, promising not to fortify Guam, Pago-Pago, the Philippines, and the Aleutians, ruled out the possibility of offensive American naval action in the western Pacific. Great Britain was equally limited by its agreement not to fortify Hongkong, although it was still free to fortify Singapore at its pleasure. This assurance of security made the Japanese government willing to accept the inferior naval ratio. By removing the fear of attack on the Japanese mainland, it gave Japan more freedom of action on the Asian

continent. The American surrender of its blueprint navy clearly implied that it did not intend to fight for its traditional Far East policies but would rely instead on a new international treaty.

The Nine-Power Treaty, signed by the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, Italy, China, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Portugal, committed all the powers to precisely the formulae which the United States sought to implement after 1899. Article I bound the powers

- (1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China;
- (2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government;
- (3) To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China;
- (4) To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly states, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such states.

Article III stated:

With a view to applying more effectually the principles of the Open Door or equality of opportunity in China for the trade and industry of all nations, the Contracting Powers, other than China, agree that they will not seek nor support their respective nationals in seeking:

(a) any arrangement which might purport to establish in favor of their interests any general superiority of rights with respect to commercial or economic development in any designated region of China;

(b) any such monopoly or preference as would deprive the nationals of any other Power of the right of undertaking any legitimate trade or industry in China, or of participating with the Chinese Government, or with any local authority, in any category of public enterprise, or which by reason of its scope, duration or geographical extent is calculated to frustrate the practical application of the principle of equal opportunity.¹⁰

The additional articles bound the signatories not to support their nationals in seeking spheres of influence or "mutually exclusive opportunities in designated parts of Chinese territory"; to respect China's neutrality in case of war; and to communicate fully and frankly among themselves whenever circumstances seemed to require the application of the treaty. This treaty contained no sanctions; it was a self-denying pronouncement rather than a pact for collective security. It did not bind anyone to action; it relied

¹⁰ From the text of the Nine-Power Treaty, U. S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1922, I, pp. 276-282.

completely on good faith. "The treaties went as far as pen and ink could go to preserve a peace founded on such antithetical elements as those inherent in the *status quo* in the Far East."¹¹

The United States thrust other barbs into Japan throughout the course of the conference. It brought constant pressure to bear for the passage of resolutions which returned to China its prerogatives of sovereignty and it paved the way for the Japanese-Chinese understanding on Shantung. Secretary Hughes repeated the American nonrecognition policy with respect to North Manchuria and extracted from Baron Shidehara a fresh disclaimer of Japanese designs on Siberia and northern Sakhalin. The United States and Japan reached a mutually satisfactory understanding covering their respective rights on Yap. Neither the United States nor Japan could point to a complete diplomatic victory at Washington, yet both felt that their gains compensated for their sacrifices.

Within a year and a half after the conclusion of the Washington Conference, American-Japanese sentiments reached the heights of good will and alternately descended to the depths of indignation and resentment. The terrible earthquake and fire at Tokyo and Yokohama in September, 1923, occasioned an outpouring of American sympathy, only to have its good effects nullified by the bitterness and rancor of the American immigration policy. Since the enforcement of the Gentleman's Agreement in 1908, the United States faced two continuing problems: Should the immigration of Japanese laborers be limited more drastically and should any discrimination be permitted legally against Orientals legally resident in the United States? Japanese immigration decreased, but because of the influx of Japanese women as picture brides, the American-born children of Japanese parents showed an uncomfortable increase—uncomfortable, that is, to the Caucasian citizens in those areas where Japanese were domiciled in considerable numbers.

In 1913 the California legislature passed a law stipulating that aliens ineligible to citizenship could no longer own land nor lease it for longer than three years. In 1920 the state took away the privileges of Japanese to lease lands, to act as guardians for their American-born children who might own lands, and to own shares in American-controlled landowning companies. In a series of decisions between 1922 and 1925 (which were reversed in 1952 and 1953) the Supreme Court held that Japanese and other Orientals were ineligible for citizenship and that the land laws passed by California and many other states were constitutional.

¹¹ A. W. Griswold, *The Far Eastern Policy of the United States* (Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1938), p. 331.

In 1924 a new immigration bill came before the Congress which made special provisions for Orientals. The Congress considered a measure to deny the right of entry into the United States of persons not eligible for citizenship. Secretary Hughes opposed this measure on the ground that a quota for Japanese on the same basis as a quota for other nations would permit the entry of only about 250 Japanese annually. The secretary transmitted to the Congress a communication from the Japanese ambassador which stated:

I realize as I believe you do the grave consequences which the enactment of this measure containing that particular provision would inevitably bring upon the otherwise happy and mutually advantageous relations between the two countries.

This sentence was interpreted by some Congressmen as a veiled threat and was cited as a reason to pass the immigration law with the Oriental exclusion clause by an overwhelming majority, 308 to 62 in the House and 68 to 9 in the Senate. The Congress was determined to do as it pleased even at the cost of jeopardizing the good results of the Washington Conference. President Coolidge accepted the measure because of his approval of the rest of the bill.

The climax of American opposition to the policies of Japan during the Republican administrations (1921–1933) followed Japan's militant re-assertion of its rights in Manchuria. In April, 1923, Secretary Hughes brought about the abrogation of the Lansing-Ishii agreement. The coauthor of the agreement, Viscount Ishii, expressed the view that Japan's special interests in China were inextinguishable because they were realities deriving from nature and geography, not benefits conferred on Japan by the United States. He wrote:

... Mr. Lansing and the author merely performed the rôle of photographers, as it were, of a condition. Even though Americans may destroy the print because it is not to their liking, the negative will remain. And even if the negative also be destroyed, does not the substance of the picture remain?

... The Ishii-Lansing agreement may have been canceled, but Japan's special interests in China continue to live in all their vigor.¹²

Despite Japan's adherence to the Washington treaties, the Kellogg Pact, and the London Naval Treaty of 1930 and the influence of Shidehara liberalism in the internal politics of Japan, the Japanese never abandoned their life line in Manchuria. When they launched their attack on Mukden on September 18, 1931, they encountered the vigorous opposition of Secre-

¹² Viscount Ishii, *Diplomatic Commentaries*, Transl. and Ed. by W. R. Langdon (The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1936), pp. 134–135.

tary Stimson. He co-operated with the League of Nations and he urged Great Britain and other European nations to support him for the sake of peace. He appealed both to China and Japan for moderation and he framed his protests to Japan in terms of mildness in the hope that he would not embarrass the Japanese liberals and play into the hands of the militarists. When his efforts for discussion and conciliation failed, he addressed identic notes to Japan and China which constituted a forceful reiteration of the traditional American policies of territorial integrity and the Open Door. On January 7, 1932, he resorted to his announcement of nonrecognition.

In 1932 the United States was in no position to back the nonrecognition doctrine with force. It enjoyed the moral support of the League of Nations, but it won a rather hollow victory when Japan turned its back on the collective security system and walked out of the League. Few who listened to the ominous tread of Matsuoka's footsteps realized that his path led from a sanctuary dedicated to co-operation and peace directly to a bloody field of battle.

Suggested Reading

- T. A. BISSON, *America's Far Eastern Policy* (New York, 1945).
 DOROTHY BORG, *American Policy and the Chinese Revolution, 1925-1928* (New York, 1947).
 TYLER DENNETT, *Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War* (Garden City, 1925).
 FOSTER R. DULLES, *America in the Pacific* (Boston and New York, 1938).
 F. V. FIELD, *American Participation in the China Consortiums* (Chicago, 1931).
 A. WHITNEY GRISWOLD, *The Far Eastern Policy of the United States* (New York, 1938).
 STANLEY HORNBECK, *The United States and the Far East* (Boston, 1942).
 G. KENNAN, *E. H. Harriman, A Biography*, 2 volumes (Boston and New York, 1922).
 GEORGE KENNAN, *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950* (Chicago, 1951).
 ALLAN NEVINS AND LOUIS M. HACKER, eds., *The United States and Its Place in World Affairs, 1918-1943* (Boston, 1943).
 T. W. OVERLACH, *Foreign Financial Control in China* (New York, 1919).
 HENRY PRINGLE, *Theodore Roosevelt* (New York, 1931).
 PAYSON J. TREAT, *Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Japan, 1895-1935*, 2 volumes (Stanford, 1938).
 E. H. ZABRISKIE, *American-Russian Rivalry in the Far East, 1895-1914* (Philadelphia, 1946).

CHAPTER 21

The Fateful Decade, 1931-1941

The fateful decade began and ended with acts of violence by Japan and it was marked by a gradual, relentless descent to war. Every play the Japanese made was in a poker game with fate. Japan placed its bets in its gamble for life or death with a somber appreciation of the odds and risks. There was no bluff or sense of guilt—just a haunting awareness of the weakness of its hand. When war came, Japan felt, “We are right and they are wrong; it is the inimitable will of heaven that the right shall prevail.” On the other hand, the United States believed that the strongest power in Asia, together with all its allies in Europe, surrendered to a policy of aggression and abandoned all pretense to understanding, friendship, and peace. The United States was confident that “we have constantly proclaimed and sought to apply principles of law, justice, fair-dealing and morality” and that it had no recourse but to resort to a righteous war.

In 1931 Japan seized Manchuria; in 1935 Italy invaded Ethiopia; and in 1936 Fascists and Loyalists made a mockery of civil war in Spain. The next year the rape of Nanking crowded the headlines with the anti-Jewish pogroms in Berlin. In 1938 Hitler occupied Austria and dismembered Czechoslovakia. Collective security shriveled away as aggression fed upon appeasement. The agreements at Munich echoed in the tramp of the Japanese hobnailed boots marching into Canton and Hankow. The war in Europe cast its shadows upon Asia and triggered the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

During this fateful decade, the United States launched the New Deal to overcome the strains and confusion of the depression. Economic recovery lagged until defense preparations and war orders quickened the pace. President Roosevelt’s first inaugural address pledged the United States to the policy of the good neighbor as a contributing factor to the peace of

the world. The recognition of Soviet Russia seemed like a slight amelioration of the prevailing mood of isolation. The sentiment of peace at any price disappeared with the growing appreciation of danger to the national security. President Roosevelt insisted upon respect for the rights of Americans abroad and accompanied his diplomatic protests with an internal drive for a "respectable defensive posture." He led the slow march of the United States from an attitude of illusory aloofness to the point where it became the arsenal of democracy and eventually the foremost among the nations united in common cause against an "attempt at world conquest unparalleled alike in boldness of conception and in brutality of operation."

Before the China Incident

The Roosevelt administration at the outset was obliged to relegate possible positive action in the Far East further into the background because of the domestic problems of the depression and the rising challenge in Europe. An uneasy truce obtained between the United States and Japan, although it was on record in Washington that the Japanese military machine had been built for war, felt prepared for war, and would welcome war. On February 21, 1934, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs delivered a message to Secretary Hull which stated that no question existed between the United States and Japan which was fundamentally incapable of amicable solution. Secretary Hull replied that if any controversy should arise, the United States would be prepared to examine the position of Japan in a spirit of amity and of desire for peaceful and just settlement.

On April 17, 1934, the spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office, Amau Eiji, made his declaration which claimed for Japan the right to act single-handed in the maintenance of peace and order in East Asia. The United States protested because of the possible effect of this declaration on American policies of aid to China. By that time, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation had granted a three-year, \$50,000,000 wheat and cotton credit to the Chinese government. American firms, particularly Pan-American, had shared in the development of commercial aviation in China, and the Curtiss-Wright Corporation had built an assembly plant in China for military aircraft. American aviation officers had established training schools for Chinese pilots and crews at Hangchow and Canton. Sales of American aircraft and accessories to China, including military planes, had risen from \$150,000 in 1932 to \$1,750,000 in 1933. The American protest reaffirmed its historic position on its treaty rights and legitimate interests.

As Japan moved toward its overlordship in Manchuria and in China

south of the Great Wall, Ambassador Grew in Tokyo informed the American government of the growing vim of certain elements in the armed services and the patriotic societies. Intense nationalists were determined to expand their empire toward its ultimate destiny of subjugating and ruling the world. Ambassador Grew reported the triumph of the swashbuckling temperament over somnolent liberalism, and warned his government that it would be criminally negligent to discount the possibility of eventual war with Japan. He advised a rearmament program, a situation of strength as the only cold fact which the militarists and chauvinists in Japan could grasp and understand. That was in December, 1934.

Similar warnings reached Washington from Germany. The American response was an arms embargo, or Neutrality Act, in August, 1935, which forbade the export of arms, ammunition, or implements of war to any belligerent country. The neutrality program was not designed to prevent wars, to stop existing wars, or to pass judgment on the merits of belligerents. It was devoted to the one hardheaded purpose of keeping America out of war. The authorized strength of the United States Army was increased from 115,000 in 1933 to 165,000 in 1935; and the Navy began in 1934 a construction program to build up to the limits of the Washington and London Naval Treaties. In 1935 Pan-American extended its commercial clipper service across the Pacific.

Undue military weakness hampered diplomacy and invited aggressive, war-breeding violation of national rights. After Italy plunged into war in Ethiopia, President Roosevelt spoke out against being drawn into any war anywhere. On December 5, 1935, Secretary Hull brought American attention back to the Far East by calling attention to Japan's intrigues to acquire autonomy of North China by stating again:

It seems to this Government most important in this period of world-wide political unrest and economic instability that governments and peoples keep faith in principles and pledges. . . . This Government adheres to the provisions of the treaties to which it is a party and continues to bespeak respect for the provisions of treaties solemnly entered into for the purpose of facilitating and regulating, to reciprocal and common advantage, the contacts between and among the countries signatory.

The Japanese challenge to the Nine-Power Treaty undermined the Washington Conference system in the Pacific area. Progressive inability to enforce the Nine-Power Treaty went hand-in-hand with the collapse of naval limitation. Trade frictions and fishing disputes, especially the question of the Japanese excursion into Alaskan waters for salmon, were minor irritants compared with the American anger at Japan's aggression in China and co-operation with the Axis in Europe. In the summer of 1935, at its

Seventh International Congress, the Comintern adopted the policy of the United Front. The next year Hitler tore up the Treaty of Locarno, fortified the Rhineland, and entered into the Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan. In 1936 also President Roosevelt was elected for a second term. A spirit of economic optimism was reborn. Defense measures were speeded up and American thinking cautiously progressed from keeping out of war to assuming responsibilities for resisting aggression.

The Road to War

On May 1, 1937, two months before the incident at the Marco Polo Bridge, the American Congress passed a revised and strengthened Neutrality Act. This act made the arms embargo applicable whenever the president found that a state of war existed between foreign states or whenever a state of civil strife likely to endanger the peace of the United States existed in a foreign state. The President was given discretionary authority to place other commodities on a "cash-and-carry basis." The strong current of isolationist sentiment hoped to insulate the United States from the unpleasant effects of aggression. The renewal of Sino-Japanese hostilities forced the ostrich to pull its head out of the sand.

On July 16, 1937, Secretary Hull issued a statement of fundamental principles of international policy. He said that the following principles were advocated by the United States: maintenance of peace; national and international self-restraint; abstinence from the use of force in the pursuit of policy; abstinence from interference in the internal affairs of other nations; adjustment of problems in international relations by processes of peaceful negotiation and agreement; faithful observance of international agreements; modification of provisions of treaties by orderly processes; respect by all nations for the rights of others and performance by all nations of established obligations; revitalization and strengthening of international law; promotion of economic security and stability the world over; lowering or removing excessive barriers of international trade; effective equality of commercial opportunity and application of the principle of equality of treatment; and limitation and reduction of armaments.

The Japanese government commented that it, too, concurred in these principles, but it believed they could be attained in the Far East only by full recognition and practical consideration of the particular circumstances in that region. The constant reference to principles on the part of the United States was looked upon in Japan not as high-mindedness but as a technique for the protection and promotion of American national interests.

Through August and most of September, 1937, the United States weighed two concrete issues: protection of American citizens in China and invocation of the Neutrality Act. Slight infantry and marine reinforcements were dispatched to China in pursuance of a middle-of-the-road policy, neither pulling out American troops from China nor dispatching excessively large military and naval forces. American citizens were warned to evacuate China or to stay at their own risk. By the end of October, 4,500 Americans left China and only 5,800 remained there. Inside the United States some people and pressure groups advocated invocation of the Neutrality Act, but the administration felt that an embargo would hurt China more than Japan and would render more difficult the protection of American citizens and their interests. On August 23, 1937, Secretary Hull issued a statement declaring that the issues and problems at stake in the Pacific went far beyond the immediate problems of protection and had a direct and fundamental relationship with the general principles of policy made public on July 16.

The State Department began to despair of its efforts to promote co-operation between Japan and China and gradually shifted from its pretended friendship for both to an attitude unmistakably critical of Japan. Public opinion was outraged by Japanese military brutality in China, and on September 2, 1937, three months before the shocking rape of Nanking, Secretary Hull asked Ambassador Grew to "suggest to Japanese officials that Japan, by the course it was pursuing, was destroying the good will of the world and was laying up for itself among the people of the world a liability of distrust, suspicion, popular antipathy, and potential ostracism, the liquidation of which would take many, many years of benevolent endeavor by Japan." President Roosevelt began to think of economic measures which would not apply indiscriminately to China and Japan as prescribed by the Neutrality Act but which would exert unilateral pressure against Japan. On September 14, 1937, a kind of economic warfare against Japan was inaugurated by the United States. President Roosevelt ordered that "merchant vessels owned by the Government of the United States would not be permitted to transport to China or Japan any arms, ammunition, or implements of war; and that any other merchant vessel flying the American flag which attempted to transport such articles would do so at its own risk." This provision itself worked against China more than against Japan, but it set a precedent for subsequent executive orders which were deliberately unneutral and designedly hostile to Japan.

Toward the end of September, extensive Japanese air raids on Chinese cities reduced the popular American demand for security through neutrality and provoked the administration to protest to Japan that "any general bombing of an extensive area wherein there resides a large populace

engaged in peaceful pursuits is unwarranted and contrary to principles of law and humanity." The American government reserved all rights in respect to damages which might result from Japanese military operations in the Nanking area and expressed the earnest hope that further bombing in and around the city of Nanking would be avoided. Japan excused its actions on the grounds of military necessity, but it failed to alleviate the tensions which gripped the Western world.

On October 5, 1937, President Roosevelt delivered at Chicago his famous "quarantine speech." He declared that the existing reign of terror and international lawlessness had reached the stage where the very foundations of civilization were seriously threatened. He cited the spread of the epidemic of world lawlessness and called attention to the parallel that "in case of an epidemic of physical disease the community joins in a quarantine of the patient." He called upon the peace-loving nations to express their will for peace to the end that nations tempted to violate their agreements and the rights of others would desist.

America itself was not ready for the action which President Roosevelt called for. It joined with the League of Nations in condemning Japanese action in China as a violation of treaty obligations and participated with eighteen other nations in a conference at Brussels from November 3 to November 24, 1937, to consider peaceable means to hasten the end of the conflict between China and Japan. The conference began in defeatism and ended in gloom; the counsel of patience and indifference prevailed over the desire for sanctions or positive action.

On December 12, 1937, a United States gunboat on the Yangtze, the "Panay," was sent to the bottom by Japanese aircraft. The government of the United States protested and demanded an expression of regret and indemnification. Japan responded by making apologies and paying full damages.

In 1938 both Europe and Asia marched along the road to war. Austria fell to the Nazis; then the Sudetenland. The war of nerves in Europe culminated in the crisis at Munich, a crossroads between war and peace. President Roosevelt steered the United States away from extreme isolation. His speeches awakened the American public to a sense of its own danger. His legislative program included substantial increases in the army and the navy, but even in 1938 the American Chief of Staff reported that the army ranked only eighteenth among the standing armies of the world.

At no time in the dreary ten-year period of lust and loot in the Far East did the American government condone a single offensive act by Japan. The United States sought to balance its conflicting objectives: to protect its nationals, to keep out of war, to restrain Japan, and to work for the

re-establishment of peace and the enforcement of orderly processes in international relationships. American opinion clamored for the imposition of economic embargoes against Japan, but the government believed that sanctions could be effective only if backed by force. The diplomacy of the United States sought to apply the maximum economic pressure which could be risked without probability of serious retaliation. As a moral embargo, on July 1, 1938, the Department of State notified aircraft manufacturers and exporters that it was strongly opposed to the sale of airplanes and aeronautical equipment to countries which bombed civilian populations. In 1939 the moral embargo was extended to materials essential for airplane manufacture and to plans, plants, and technical information for the production of aviation gasoline. The government also discouraged the extension of credit to nationals of Japan.

On frequent occasions, the United States protested against Japanese interference with the rights of its nationals in China. It objected to the closing of the China market to American competition, to the Japanese control of China's foreign exchange, to alterations in the tariff and the administration of the customs, to the setting up of special companies and monopolies, to the censorship of American mails, to restrictions upon residence and travel rights of Americans in China, and to interference with trade and shipping. The Japanese replied that the New Order created a new situation and that any attempt to apply to the conditions of today and tomorrow the inapplicable ideas and principles of the past would not solve the immediate issues. The diplomatic notes were supported by modest actions in aid of China. The United States placed a credit of \$25,000,000 at China's disposal and extended an earlier agreement by which China was enabled to exchange its silver for American dollars. On January 4, 1939, the president showed the rising temper of the American people and government when he declared in his message to Congress:

Words may be futile, but war is not the only means of commanding a decent respect for the opinions of mankind. There are many methods short of war, but stronger and more effective than mere words, of bringing home to aggressor governments the aggregate sentiments of our own people.

The Japanese speeded up their Asia-for-the-Asiatics campaign in China. They flaunted their power in deliberate attacks against the Americans and the British, whom they berated as the real snakes in the bosom of Chiang Kai-shek. The Japanese were guilty of indignities against individuals and they perpetrated some two or three hundred "accidents," including the bombing of American schools and hospitals. They closed the Yangtze to foreign shipping, they injected their growing power into the administra-

tion of the foreign settlements and concessions, and they blockaded the China coast. Early in 1939 they occupied Hainan Island and the Spratly Islands off the coast of Indo-China. In retaliation, the United States on July 11, 1939, gave notice of the termination of the 1911 trade treaty with Japan, effective six months later, a cancellation which removed the legal obstacle to an embargo on exports to Japan. Japan's arrogance suddenly disappeared when, at the end of August, they were left with their flank exposed by the German-Russian nonaggression pact.

The Year 1940

After the outbreak of the war in Europe, Japan and the United States dealt with each other with attitudes of greater reasonableness. Japan, in particular, needed to discover which side seemed stronger and more likely to win. While the stalemate existed on the western front in Europe, Japan avoided any crisis with the United States and suggested an informal understanding on China and the Pacific. Japan's caution and hesitancy disappeared with the German victories over the Netherlands, Belgium, and France. On April 15, 1940, Foreign Minister Arita spoke of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and said that relations of economic interdependence, coexistence, and co-prosperity between Japan and the Netherlands East Indies must be maintained whatever happened in the Low Countries. He warned that the Japanese government could not but be deeply concerned over any developments that might affect the *status quo* of the Netherlands East Indies. Two days later Secretary Hull accepted this warning as a challenge to the United States and replied that intervention in the Netherlands Indies or any alteration of their *status quo* by other than peaceful processes would be prejudicial to the cause of stability, peace, and security in the entire Pacific area. Arita then proposed a new commercial treaty between the United States and Japan, a division of control over the Pacific between the United States and Japan, and an American agreement to stop aid to Chiang Kai-shek and to assist Japan in the rebuilding of China.

American diplomatic mildness gave way to political firmness. The United States initiated a program to stock-pile strategic materials like rubber and tin, and moved the base of the Pacific fleet westward from San Diego to Hawaii. On July 2, 1940, a National Defense Materials Act became law. This authorized the president to prohibit or control export of any military equipment, munitions, machinery, tools, and materials or supplies for the manufacturing, servicing, or operation thereof when necessary in

the interests of national defense. Licenses might be provided for sales to friendly countries; nothing would be available to potential enemies. Prohibitions followed on sales of various strategic minerals and chemicals; aircraft engines, parts, and equipment; aviation gasoline; lubricating oils; iron and steel scrap. The Japanese ambassador called this an "unfriendly act" and remarked to Secretary Hull that strife between the United States and Japan would be extremely tragic for both.

The Battle of Britain reached a crucial stage in the late summer of 1940. The United States believed the danger from Germany to be greater than the danger from Japan. It contemplated the possible loss of its character as a free society and its political independence in a world about to be engulfed by Fascist totalitarianism. Its Far East policies did not go beyond admonitions and deterrents. Chungking, Paris, and London pleaded for strong American countermeasures as the Japanese advised the retirement of foreign troops and ships from China, the closure of the Burma Road, and the right to utilize Indo-China for military purposes. The United States ignored the advice to withdraw troops and ships, stigmatized the Burma Road episode as an unwarranted imposition of an obstacle to world trade, and meekly commented to Japan that its action in Indo-China was inconsistent with the *status quo*.

In 1940 President Roosevelt was nominated and elected for a precedent-shattering third term. Election rivalries diluted concentrated efforts for the aid of Britain and obscured issues involved in the greater resistance to Japan. On June 15, 1940, the president set up the National Defense Research Committee and made the Uranium Committee a subcommittee of the new organization. For more than a year a group including Alexander Sachs, Albert Einstein (who knew what was going on in Germany in his field), Leo Szilard, Enrico Fermi, and other physicists had urged upon the president the necessity for developing an atomic bomb. On July 10, 1940, the president laid before the Congress a complete defense program covering the requirements for the army, the navy, the air force, and for industrial expansion. It was still understood that "we will not send our men to take part in European wars." On August 28, 1940, the Selective Service Act was passed, and on September 2, 1940, a deal was concluded with Great Britain which exchanged over-aged destroyers for the use of bases vital to American defense. It warned the remaining 16,000 Americans in Asia to evacuate, and started a stream of military trainees and reinforcements toward Hawaii and the Philippines. New credits were extended to Chiang Kai-shek—\$25,000,000 at one time and \$100,000,000 at another.

Meanwhile, in Japan the militarists saw their golden opportunity to fulfill their dreams of expansion. German victories went to their heads like strong wine. Japan concluded its alliance with Germany and Italy on

September 27, 1940, and saw within its grasp the control not only of China but also of Indo-China, the Malay Peninsula and Singapore, the Netherlands East Indies, and perhaps even the Philippines. President Roosevelt determined not to be diverted from Europe and to avoid an outright quarrel with Japan. He backed down on no issue, reserved the right to exert economic pressure, and compromised within the framework of American traditional policies. On October 8, 1940, it was reported that he expressed his conviction that the United States would not be provoked to war even if Japan attacked the Netherlands East Indies or the Philippines, "but eventually Japan might make mistakes which would bring us in."

On December 14, 1940, Ambassador Grew reported that his work for understanding and peace had been swept away as if by a typhoon. "Japan has become openly and unashamedly one of the predatory nations and part of a system which aims to wreck everything that the United States stands for." It was his opinion that unless the United States was prepared to withdraw bag and baggage (which God forbid), it was bound eventually to come to a head-on clash with Japan. President Roosevelt's reply was that "our self-defense must be a global strategy which takes account of every front." By December, 1940, the blackest part of night had passed: the Battle of Britain had been won, and the German attention had shifted eastward toward an invasion of Russia. In a bold, impassioned speech, President Roosevelt announced to the world that the United States would become an arsenal for the democracies, and his words were as electric in Tokyo as they were in Berlin or Rome. Every shipload of munitions carried with it a cargo of good will. Every Nazi submarine which sent a merchantman to the bottom torpedoed also the doctrine of nonintervention. As nazism spread through western Europe, into the Baltic and the Balkans, it blotted out the last American pretensions to neutrality.

Bombs Away

The seeds of the war in the Pacific sprouted in soil fertilized by the conflicts across the Atlantic. On January 6, 1941, President Roosevelt declared, "At no previous time has American security been as seriously threatened as it is today." He looked forward to a world founded upon four essential human freedoms:

- Freedom of speech and expression
- Freedom of every person to worship God in his own way
- Freedom from want
- Freedom from fear.

He interpreted the advance of the aggressors as a deadly peril and adopted the attitude that American self-defense called no longer for neutrality but all-out aid for those resisting attack. A Lend-Lease Law of March 11, 1941, ended "the urging that we get along with the dictators and compromise with tyranny." Every plane, every instrument of war which could be spared, would be sent overseas. "The great task of the democracies is to move products from the assembly line of our factories to the battle lines of the democracies—now." American protection was extended to Iceland and Greenland, and American ships were sent on patrol duty throughout the North and South Atlantic. On May 27, 1941, President Roosevelt proclaimed the existence of an unlimited national emergency.

After Germany attacked Russia, the president met with Prime Minister Churchill in the North Atlantic. They co-ordinated a program of assistance to Russia and considered the possibility of joint measures against Japan. On August 12, 1941, they drew up the "Atlantic Charter," which expressed the aims of the war and the diplomacy of the United States and Great Britain. The Charter contained eight statements of principles:

Neither country will seek any aggrandizement, territorial or otherwise.

Territorial changes should be based on the will of the people.

People should be free to choose their own form of government.

All nations should enjoy access on equal terms to trade and raw materials needed for their prosperity.

There should be greater economic collaboration, improved labor standards, economic advancement, and social security.

After destruction of Nazi tyranny, there should be peace and freedom from want.

There should be "freedom of the seas."

The use of force should be abandoned and aggressors disarmed; aid and encouragement should be given all measures looking to reduction of armaments.

By the end of September, 1941, incidents on the Atlantic brought the United States and Germany to the verge of war. One American ship was sunk on the way to Africa; two others, American-owned but flying the flag of Panama, were sunk on the way to Iceland; another was sunk by German aircraft in the Red Sea; and an American destroyer also carrying mail to Iceland was attacked by a German submarine. On September 11, 1941, President Roosevelt announced that American naval vessels and American planes would no longer wait for Axis submarines lurking under the waters or for Axis raiders on the surface of the sea to strike their deadly blows first. The president concluded his Navy Day address, October 27, 1941,

with the declaration, "We Americans have cleared our decks and taken our battle stations." Two weeks later the Congress amended the Neutrality Laws to permit the arming of American merchantmen and the carrying of cargoes to belligerent ports anywhere. By the time of the Pearl Harbor surprise, American entry into the war in Europe seemed only a matter of hours or days or possibly weeks.

The relations between the United States and Japan in 1941 rocked from crisis to crisis, in rhythm with the metronome in Europe. Japanese of all persuasions believed that the time had come for taking advantage of the international situation to strike somewhere—deeper in China, against Russia to the north, or against the United States and Great Britain in the Southern Regions. The Japanese had a powerful army and a navy whose strength was greater than that of its potential enemies in the Pacific. They hoped to strike swiftly, entrench themselves firmly in a limited area, and force a quick compromise settlement. The war machine was in gear, resources were stock-piled, public opinion was at a fever pitch, caution and fear of failure were discarded.

Japan opened the year with a naval demonstration in the Gulf of Siam and forced its mediation of the Indo-China-Siam border dispute. Japan pushed on in China, tightened its relations with the Axis, sent Foreign Minister Matsuoka to explore the European diplomatic situation, and intensified its preparations and training for war. On January 27, 1941, Ambassador Grew cabled the State Department that there were reports from many sources in Tokyo that Japanese military forces planned a surprise mass attack at Pearl Harbor in case of trouble with the United States. Three days earlier the Secretary of the Navy advised the Secretary of War that the increased gravity of the Japanese situation prompted a restudy of the problems of security of the Pacific fleet while it was at anchor in Pearl Harbor. It was observed at that time that if war eventuated with Japan, hostilities might be initiated by a surprise attack at Pearl Harbor. It was even suggested that Sunday morning, after a typical Saturday night ashore, would be an ideal time from the enemy's point of view.

On the eve of Matsuoka's trip to Europe, Great Britain feared that Japan might begin hostilities against the British position in Asia. Foreign Secretary Eden warned the Japanese ambassador, Shigemitsu, that Japan must not assume that England was so decadent as to admit the right of Japan to control the destiny of East Asia. On February 15, 1941, Churchill wrote President Roosevelt about his fear of Japan's intentions. "Anything you can do to inspire the Japanese with the fear of a double war may avert the danger." It was Churchill's opinion that Germany wanted Japan

to strike at the British Empire. He thought that neither Germany nor Japan desired a war against the United States.

On April 2, 1941, Churchill sent a memorandum to Matsuoka, then in Europe, asking whether the Japanese Foreign Minister really believed that the Germans would be able to invade England or prevent American supplies from reaching England. He asked if the Tripartite Pact made more likely or less likely American entrance into the war in Europe, and if the combined American and British Navies could not dispose of the Axis before turning their attention to Japan. He asked if Italy was a strength or a burden to Germany, if the British Air Force would be stronger than the German Air Force by the end of 1941, and if the victims of Germany would like the Germans more or less as the years went by. Finally, he asked how the Japanese steel production would compare with the combined totals of the United States and Great Britain after the defeat of Germany. He suggested that the answers to those questions might enable Japan to avoid a serious catastrophe and to improve its relations with the two great sea powers of the West. Matsuoka was not impressed. He concluded the neutrality pact with Russia on April 13, 1941, and he replied to Churchill with a stiff statement that Japan wanted no conquest, no exploitation, no oppression—only peace and *Hakko Ichiu*.

In January, 1941, Japan sent Admiral Nomura as its ambassador to the United States. His instructions were to look to a fundamental readjustment of the problems between the United States and Japan. Matsuoka told Nomura that if war were to break out between the two countries, and even if the United States should defeat Japan, such a war would ruin both countries and would bolshevizize Asia. Therefore the United States should not meddle in Japan's sphere in East Asia. Some Americans believed that Admiral Nomura never had any intention of making any concessions, that his sole function was to negotiate as a cover for military attack, symbolic of Japan's whole program of fraud, guile, and duplicity. The admiral met with President Roosevelt eight times and with Secretary Hull some fifty or sixty times. The secretary was not too mistrustful of Admiral Nomura but he believed that Matsuoka in Tokyo was "as crooked as a barrel of fish-hooks." Mr. Hull realized that it would be difficult to reach an understanding with Japan because Japan had gone too far, and with too much apparent success, to stop. He clutched at every small hope of agreement, because it worked to American advantage to gain time and to "baby Japan along." As President Roosevelt expressed it, "I simply haven't got enough navy to go around."

The Japanese representative made the proposals and made the concessions. His was the initiative. The American position was that there would be

no need or cause for special negotiations if Japan would live up to its treaty obligations. Hull told Nomura pointedly at the outset that the United States had no intention of sitting quietly by while the militarists of two or three nations threatened to conquer the balance of the earth, including the seven seas and all trade routes and the other four continents. If Japan expected a successful outcome for its efforts, it would have to abandon its aggression and accept four fundamental principles:

- (1) Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations;
- (2) Noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries;
- (3) The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity;
- (4) Nondisturbance of the *status quo* in the Pacific except by peaceful means.

On May 12, 1941, Admiral Nomura delivered the first draft proposal to Secretary Hull. According to it, the United States should recognize that the Tripartite Pact was defensive and designed to keep others out of the European war. The United States should agree to recognize the New Order, request Chiang Kai-shek to negotiate with Japan, and withdraw aid from Chiang if he did not negotiate for peace. Japan's terms with Chiang would be no annexation and no indemnities, recognition of the independence of Manchukuo, and withdrawal of Japanese troops from China but a Chinese-Japanese agreement for joint defense against communism. Other terms in the draft proposal included mutual efforts toward restoration of normal economic relations, mutual co-operation for the production and procurement of needed raw materials, and a joint guarantee of the independence and the permanent neutrality of the Philippines.

The secretary did not break off negotiations in the face of these hopeless proposals. The respective staffs of the State Department and the Japanese Embassy struggled through the long, hot Washington summer on the apparently insoluble questions of Japanese co-operation with its partners in Europe, Japan in China, and Japan in Southeast Asia. There were no threats or bluster, but there was a continuing stream of supplies for Europe and a continuing exertion of economic pressure on Japan. Export bans were expanded and shipping restrictions were multiplied. Careful watch was kept for cleavages within Japan in order to detect persons or opportunities favorable to the United States. Diplomatic messages between the Japanese Foreign Office and the embassy in Washington were intercepted and decoded. These messages were primarily diplomatic and not military. They did not specify an attack at Pearl Harbor or any particular place. For example, through these messages known by the code name of MAGIC, it was learned on December 1, 1941, that the four Japanese offices in London,

Hongkong, Singapore, and Manila were instructed to abandon the use of code machines and to dispose of them. On November 5, the interceptions disclosed that "all arrangements for the signing of this agreement must be completed by the twenty-fifth of this month," and on November 16 that "the fate of an empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days." Mr. Hull often knew Admiral Nomura's instructions more quickly than the Japanese representative himself.

After Germany's move against Russia, Japan prepared for its advance to the south. Matsuoka was forced out of the Foreign Office in favor of Admiral Toyoda, whose views were that "Japan must take measures to secure raw materials from the South Seas; to break asunder this ever-strengthening chain of encirclement we must act like a cunning dragon seemingly asleep." Japan, in late July, 1941, extracted from the Vichy government an agreement for the joint defense of Indo-China that permitted Japan to station its troops and take over air bases in the vicinity of Saigon, which outflanked Manila and placed Japan in striking distance of Singapore.

On July 24, 1941, President Roosevelt invited Admiral Nomura to the White House and told him that if Japan would call off its move into Indo-China the United States would enter into a neutrality guarantee for Indo-China which would assure Japan continued supplies of rice from that area. Then President Roosevelt tactfully mused that so far his administration had stayed away from an embargo on petroleum products to Japan because of his feeling that an embargo would give Japan a pretext to strike at the oil fields in the Netherlands East Indies. It was his desire to keep war out of the Pacific area, but he intimated that this desire might be altered. Two days later he issued orders freezing the assets of Axis nationals. By these decrees, which also applied to the Philippines, all Japanese finance and trade were strictly controlled. Inspectors were placed in Japanese banks, withdrawals were limited, and transfers were rigidly supervised and limited. Property titles were frozen and Japanese ships hastily left ports because of fear of confiscation. An effective economic blockade was established against Japan. At the same time the United States created USAFFE—the United States Armed Forces in the Far East—and recalled General MacArthur to active duty as its commander in chief. The Philippine armed forces were called up and placed under American command. A military mission under General Magruder was sent to assist Chiang Kai-shek, and American troops and gunboats were ordered from Chinese waters to the greater protection of the Philippines. American shipping to the Orient was provided with cruiser escorts, and merchant ships were routed through the Torres Straits north of Australia to avoid Japanese waters.

In this atmosphere, Admiral Nomura on August 6 offered some new proposals. He would agree to no further military advances beyond Indo-China and he would accept Japanese withdrawal from Indo-China *after* the achievement of a political agreement with Chiang Kai-shek. Japan asked in return American pressure on Chiang to accept Japan's position; discontinuance of aid to Chiang, the Netherlands, and the British in the Southwest Pacific; suspension of military measures in the Southwest Pacific; recognition of Japan's special position in Indo-China; restoration of normal trade; and co-operation for the increased production and procurement of raw materials. The president took these proposals with him for the North Atlantic meeting with Churchill. Together they discussed what their attitude would be if Japan entered the war as a consequence of possible American entry into the war against Germany and whether the United States would go to war against Japan if Japan were to attack non-American territories in Asia. There was no disposition to give in to the demands of Japan. It was agreed to make parallel warnings to Japan upon appropriate occasions and to continue the American-Japanese negotiations. On August 17, 1941, after his return to Washington, the president issued an American warning that

if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary toward safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and American nationals and toward insuring the safety and security of the United States.

The British counterpart came at the Pilgrim's Dinner in London where on November 10 Prime Minister Churchill asserted that if the United States and Japan should become involved in war, the British declaration would follow within the hour.

These warnings went beyond negotiations and looked toward clearing the decks for action in the Pacific as well as the Atlantic. Prince Konoye and Admiral Nomura suggested a meeting of the heads of states to overcome the threatened diplomatic stalemate. Ambassador Grew strongly urged this meeting. The American attitude was negative, in the belief that unless prior understandings were reached, the suggested conference would only lead to deeper cleavages and more bitter feelings. Throughout August and September, Admiral Nomura tried to persuade the American government to his point of view and said that Prince Konoye and a distinguished entourage were ready to depart for such a conference at any time.

Time became the master of strategy in Japanese-American negotiations,

but one "did not mind its passing while the other was crazed by the tick of the clock." On September 6 (Tokyo date—that is, September 5, Washington date), the Supreme War Council in Tokyo, intoxicated by the spectacular German drive into Russia, fixed its minimum demands and maximum concessions and resolved that if by early October these were not met by England and the United States "we will make up our minds to get ready for war." The next day, September 6 (Washington date), Admiral Nomura tried again. His proposals were old dolls in slightly new dresses: Japan would evacuate Indo-China as soon as peace was established in the Far East; would not advance beyond Indo-China; would make up its mind independently if the United States should enter the war in Europe; would settle the China affair alone, if the United States would cease its aid to Chiang; would not interfere with Japan in Indo-China; and would stop its military activities in the Southwest Pacific. Mr. Hull delayed his reply for a full month—until October 2—when he repeated his insistence upon principles and said, in effect, "get out of Indo-China first."

On October 17, 1941, General Tojo replaced Prince Konoye as prime minister. Admiral Nomura asked to be relieved of his post because he felt that "I am already a dead horse. For me it is painful to continue in a deceptive existence, deceiving myself and others." The Tojo cabinet had little faith in negotiations and proceeded with its war plans in anticipation of diplomatic failure. On November 1 the final text of Fleet Operational Order Number 1 was completed. On November 8 the date of Sunday, December 7, was fixed as D-Day. On November 20 the fleet rendezvoused in the Kuriles. On November 27 it sailed east from Hittokappu Bay, and on December 6 it turned to the south under cover of darkness.

On November 3 Ambassador Grew warned against any theory that the weakening and exhaustion of Japan's financial and economic resources would result in the collapse of Japan's power. He called it shortsighted to believe that Japan was simply saber-rattling. He said it was entirely possible that Japan would adopt measures with dramatic and dangerous suddenness which might make inevitable a war with the United States. Four days later Secretary Hull warned the cabinet that negotiations were deadlocked and that Japan at any time might start a new military movement of conquest by force. A series of speeches by cabinet officials informed the American public that "the waves of world conquest were breaking high both in the East and the West and were threatening more and more to engulf our shores." On November 17 Ambassador Grew warned once more against tactical surprise and initiative.

The Tojo cabinet submitted two further proposals, "A" and "B," to the United States—the first on November 10 and the second, ten days later.

These were simply variations on the fundamental Japanese themes and were completely unacceptable to the Americans. Special Ambassador Kurusu, who arrived in Washington on November 17, was no more persuasive than Admiral Nomura. The Tokyo government ordered its diplomats to work against deadlines: first, late October; then, November 25; then, November 29; and finally, December 7. If no agreement were reached by then, things automatically would be going to happen.

On November 22 Secretary Hull ascertained from the British and the Chinese that they bitterly opposed acceptance of the Japanese proposals. He consulted also with Admiral Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations, who on November 24 advised Admiral Kimmel in Hawaii and Admiral Hart in Manila "that a surprise attack in any direction is a possibility." On November 25 the secretary considered a temporary *modus vivendi* which would have granted Japan a monthly allotment of petroleum in exchange for a Japanese retirement from southern Indo-China and a "hope" that Japan and China would negotiate directly but on terms of law, order, and justice. The project was abandoned because it seemed to sell Chiang Kai-shek down the river or, as Churchill expressed it, to provide Chiang with a pretty thin diet.

On November 26 Secretary Hull handed the Japanese representatives a note which the Japanese called an "ultimatum" but which the Americans considered as a recapitulation of their constant position. The Americans knew that the Japanese deadline was only three days off and they were fully aware of the possibility of Japanese military attack. This note proposed that both Japan and the United States pledge themselves to a treaty system; recognize the four principles elaborated earlier; concede full protection to the interests of consuming countries; provide financial aid for essential enterprises; sign a multilateral nonaggression pact (China, Great Britain, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand, and the United States); sign another pact covering Indo-China; refrain from seeking preferential economic treatment in Indo-China; agree to support only Chiang Kai-shek in China and give up their unequal treaty privileges; conclude a trade agreement removing freezing restrictions and stabilizing the yen-dollar exchange; and agree to no other arrangements with third powers in conflict with these proposals. The Japanese should withdraw their troops from Indo-China and China, and it was assumed that the United States would be free to proceed in Europe in accordance with the requirements of its own self-defense. Secretary Hull repeated the warning to his own colleagues that diplomacy was exhausted, that the matter was now in the hands of the army and the navy, and that Japan might move suddenly. On December 6 President Roosevelt telegraphed the emperor of

Japan a personal appeal to dispel the darkening clouds and to prevent further death and destruction in the world.

The reactions in Japan were immediate and belligerent. On November 29 a meeting of the former prime ministers—the modern *genro*—agreed that a protracted war would be difficult, but if it were for self-existence it would be necessary. Two days later an imperial conference decided to send its last note to be delivered in Washington on December 7 at 1:00 P.M. and at the same time to open hostilities. In Japan it was still hoped that the Germans would be in Moscow by Christmas.

Meanwhile, the United States government received reports of continued troop movements in Indo-China and was informed that the Japanese were alarmed over the increasing naval and military preparations of the ABCD (American-British-Chinese-Dutch) forces. The Japanese press talked a great deal about the dangers of military encirclement or ABCD encirclement and not without a certain amount of reason. While the Americans negotiated, they speeded up their own military measures in East Asia. American strategists, consulting with their British and Dutch opposite numbers in the fall of 1941, envisaged the defense of Southeast Asia and the Indies chiefly from the air, with bombers capable of harassing the Japanese fleet and rendering the South China Sea between Hongkong and Manila untenable for the enemy. They would build up power in China and India to propel a vast and irresistible offensive which would roll the Japanese back to their home islands. This was designated the "Rainbow Plan" because of the long, looping arcs of transport and logistics involved. The Allies—and potential Allies—held military conferences in Washington, Singapore, and Manila and moved their planes into the Far East area. Airfields were developed in Rabaul and Port Darwin; American marines were withdrawn from Shanghai; Canadian reinforcements were sent to Hongkong; and the waters of Manila Bay were mined. The signs of impending hostilities were as "plain as though they were written on the blackboard for children." Just a few moments before the sickening news of the day which "will live in infamy" reached the White House, the president told his guest, the Chinese ambassador, that he expected foul play. He had a feeling that within forty-eight hours something nasty might happen in Thailand, Malaya, the Dutch Indies, or possibly the Philippines. On December 8 (Tokyo time) at 0045 the Japanese swung into action at the Shanghai Bund, at 0140 Japanese planes bombarded Kota Bahru, at 0320 Pearl Harbor, and at 0420 the Japanese note was delivered to Secretary Hull.

The secretary called this note more than an insult. It said that the American proposals ignored Japan's sacrifices in the four years of the China affair, menaced the empire's existence itself, and disparaged its honor and prestige.

It accused the United States of conspiring against the New Order, and said that in view of the attitude of the United States, the Japanese government could not but consider it impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations. Ambassador Kurusu stigmatized American measures as deliberate, premeditated, and provocative and the American attitude as entirely devoid of the slightest spirit of conciliation. He said that the American propaganda of a "sneak attack" was merely a cover-up for its own negligence, since the war was life or death—"devour or be devoured." On November 30 Prime Minister Tojo declared in a public address:

The fact that Chiang Kai-shek is dancing to the tune of Britain, America, and Communism at the expense of able-bodied and promising young men in his futile resistance against Japan is only due to the desire of Britain and the United States to fish in the troubled waters of East Asia by pitting the East Asiatic peoples against each other and to grasp the hegemony of East Asia. . . .

For the honor and pride of mankind we must purge this sort of practice from East Asia with a vengeance.

This tone predominated in the imperial rescript which declared war on the United States and Great Britain on December 8, 1941 (Tokyo time). "Eager for the realization of their inordinate ambition to dominate the Orient, both America and Britain, giving support to the Chungking regime, have aggravated the disturbance in East Asia," the rescript said. "They have increased military pressures, obstructed peaceful commerce, and intensified economic and political pressure to compel Japan to submit." In the emperor's own words, "For existence and self-defense Our Empire has no other recourse but to appeal to arms. . . . It has been truly unavoidable and far from Our wishes that Our Empire has now been brought to cross swords with America and Britain."

When the war had ended and Prime Minister Tojo was on trial for his life before the IMTFE, he wrote:

May I reiterate that the policy of Japan, and certainly the choice of her duly constituted officials of state, involved neither aggression nor exploitation. Step by step, through numerous, legally selected cabinets and without a variance in regularly constituted governmental procedure, our country finally was brought face to face with stark reality, and to us who were at that period weighted with the duty of deciding the fate of our nation, a war of self-existence was the only alternative. We staked the fate of our country on that decision and lost, bringing about the present plight as we see it before our eyes.

^ The query as to whether or not the war was a just one considered from the viewpoint of international law and the responsibility for defeat are two

different matters clearly distinguishable. The former is a problem between foreign countries and a legal one, but I believe firmly and will contend to the last that it was a war of self-defense and in no manner a violation of presently acknowledged international law. Never at any time did I ever conceive that the waging of this war would or could be challenged by the victors as an international crime, or that regularly constituted public officials of the vanquished nation would be charged individually as criminals under any recognized international law or under alleged violations of treaties between nations.

As to the other question, the responsibility for defeat, I feel that it devolves upon myself as Premier. The responsibility in that sense, I am not only willing but sincerely desire to accept fully.

Suggested Reading

- CHARLES A. BEARD, *President Roosevelt and the Coming of War* (New Haven, 1948).
 WINSTON CHURCHILL, *The Second World War*, 6 volumes (New York, 1948-1953).
 FORREST DAVIS AND ERNEST K. LINDLEY, *How War Came* (New York, 1942).
 HERBERT FEIS, *The Road to Pearl Harbor* (Princeton, 1950).
 JOSEPH GREW, *Ten Years in Japan* (New York, 1944).
 ———, *The Turbulent Era* (New York, 1953).
 CORDELL HULL, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, 2 volumes (New York, 1948).
International Military Tribunal for the Far East. (Of special interest are the defense documents, particularly the affidavit of Premier Tojo.)
 W. C. JOHNSTONE, *The United States and Japan's New Order* (New York, 1941).
 WILLIAM L. LANGER AND S. EVERETT GLEASON, *The Challenge to Isolation, 1937-1940* (New York, 1952).
 ———, *The Undeclared War, 1940-1941* (New York, 1953).
 WALTER MILLIS, *This is Pearl! The United States and Japan 1941* (New York, 1947).
 GEORGE MORGENSTERN, *Pearl Harbor: The Story of the Secret War* (New York, 1947).
 BASIL RAUCH, *Roosevelt: From Munich to Pearl Harbor* (New York, 1950).
 C. C. TANSILL, *Back Door to War: The Roosevelt Foreign Policy, 1933-1941* (Chicago, 1952).
 R. A. THEOBALD, *The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor* (New York, 1954).
 U. S. CONGRESS, *Events Leading up to World War II*, House Documents 541, 78th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, 1942).
 U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, *Foreign Relations of the United States. Japan: 1931-1941*, 2 volumes (Washington, 1942).
 U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, *Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941* (Washington, 1942).
 U. S. SENATE, *Senate Executive Document, No. 244, Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*, 79th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, 1946).

PART THREE

**World War II in
the Far East**

Introduction

For four years, from 1941 to 1945, our destinies and the shape of things to come were hammered out by men of war. Nations devoted their total energies to the demands of battle; private citizens dedicated life and limb to the service of the state. International diplomacy was subordinated to the compelling necessity of winning the war. Planning for peace was secondary to co-operating for victory.

After 1945 the statesmen faced new tasks. They had to cope with the economic wreckage and psychological hatreds which devastated the wealth of nations and the spirits of men. A generation would have to pass before they could regain the ground lost in the savagery of war and readdress themselves to the historic conflicts of policy which had plunged mankind into catastrophe.

The years of war brought death and defeat to the Axis powers and they brought suffering and destruction to the victors. Very few nations, notably the United States, found themselves stronger at the war's end than at the war's beginning. Their homelands escaped the bombs and shells and their busy factories were spared from fires or destruction. The United States reached a new peak of power and its people inherited unfamiliar responsibilities. A new world, emerging from the rubble and the ashes of the old, challenged its youth to profit from the shortcomings of the past and to create new abilities and a new spirit for analyzing and solving the increasingly troublesome problems of a complex, shrinking world.

CHAPTER 22

World War II in the Pacific

Pearl Harbor clarified the issues between the hostile camps and merged the separate wars in Europe and Asia in one vast global conflict. The harassed powers of Great Britain and China and the countries under the conqueror's heel such as the Netherlands, France, Belgium, and Norway looked beyond the debris at Pearl Harbor and saw in the suicidal action of Japan the dawn of their own salvation. The day after Pearl Harbor, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and China committed themselves to the war against Japan. Within a few days the European members of the Axis alignment declared war against the United States. The Soviet Union remained neutral in the Far East, overwhelmed as it was in Europe, until two days after the atomic bomb obliterated Hiroshima.

Round one in the Pacific was completely Japan's. In six months Japan gained control of 1,500,000 square miles of territory and 140,000,000 people. Round two went to the forces of the United Nations. The long journey back culminated in Japan's surrender aboard the battleship "Missouri" on September 2, 1945. Even in the midst of hostilities, the "democracies" planned for co-operation in victory and reconstruction. They launched a fresh effort to build a brave, new world dedicated to collective security and peace.

Japan's Initial Successes

While the United States groped for a dramatic name for World War II, Japan understood exactly that its war was the War of Greater East Asia. That title expressed accurately Japan's grandiose war plans. Japan counted on the neutrality of the USSR and at least the sympathetic support of its

European allies. It concentrated on the consolidation of its position in China and the immediate destruction of the Anglo-Saxon domination in South-east Asia and the western Pacific. It estimated that five months would be required to isolate Chiang Kai-shek, to conquer the Philippines, Malaya, Burma, and the Netherlands Indies, and to establish a defense perimeter extending in a giant arc from the Kuriles, through the Marshall Islands, the Bismarck Archipelago, New Guinea, and Timor, and past the tip of Sumatra to the borders of India. It attacked the Pacific Fleet, not as a preliminary to landings, but as a means of removing a menace on its own flanks. Within this area, Japan planned to create an impregnable military fortress and a self-sustaining economic Co-Prosperity Sphere. Japan indicated that it would require at least two years for the United States to recover from the initial blows against it and that American spirit would prefer a compromise peace to the cost and discipline of a long-drawn-out war of attrition.

Admiral Yamamoto, the commander in chief of the Japanese fleet was one of few who opposed these roscate Japanese plans. He wrote:

Should hostilities once break out, it is not enough to take Guam and the Philippines, not even Hawaii and San Francisco. We would have to march into Washington and sign the treaty; i.e., dictate the terms of peace in the White House. I wonder if our politicians who speak so lightly of a Japanese-American war have confidence as to the outcome and are prepared to make the necessary sacrifices.

The Japanese home front was not in tune with the sober reflections of Admiral Yamamoto. The Imperial Rule Assistance Association made every Japanese a member of a monolithic political structure; the total mobilization laws geared Japan's economic machine to the requirements of unlimited war. The Japanese hoped for a short, decisive war which would bring them liberation from ABCD encirclement and a prosperous, independent economic future. Well-informed and responsible Japanese leaders thrust their own helpless followers into the mouths of cannon. Trusted Japanese officials disregarded the political rights of their neighbors and stretched greedy fingers over the economic assets of half a continent. The zaibatsu pledged their energies to the prosecution of the war and the bankers supplied the financial talent which set the juggernaut in motion. Propagandists trumpeted good intentions by press and radio while Japanese armies and navies prepared to spread death and destruction. Even the little people contributed their inspired enthusiasm, their patriotic best, and eventually their broken hearts and lifeless bodies.

A Japanese enthusiast expressed their wild spirit of *Hakko Ichiu*:

We will plant the Rising Sun flag, dyed with our life blood, on the farthest corners of the earth, in the far desert with its twinkling stars, and where the lion roars beneath the trees. We will drag the very crocodiles from the Ganges, where it flows at the foot of the Himalayas. The paper carp shall flutter high above the city of London. Today Berlin, tomorrow Moscow and Snowy Siberia shall be in our hands. Our grandchildren shall raise a monument to us in a Chicago purged of gangsters. And when our time comes to cross the Styx, we will wrestle with the shades themselves.

Japan considered the Inner Bloc—Korea, Formosa, and Manchukuo—as an integral part of its home front. It afforded military bases, man power, and vital resources. The Inner Bloc was a Japanese domain; it had no voice in administering its own affairs or in preparing for its own destiny. (This explains why it was so rudderless and helpless after the Japanese defeat.) With China, circumstances were different. Japan pretended that it controlled China as much as it wanted to, but the fact seemed to be that China was too big and too complicated for Japan to grasp. Japan utilized its puppet Wang Ching-wei as the fulcrum for the exertion of its power, but Wang Ching-wei never represented any more of China than the Japanese armies were able actually to occupy and administer. In spite of China's sufferings, never did Chiang Kai-shek bend to the will of Japan. When World War II began for the United States, China was already in the fifth year of its war. China had lost its cities and its important communications arteries. It was bleeding to death. By December, 1941, it had a million casualties and an additional 60,000,000 sufferers who were driven from their destroyed homes, farms, shops, or villages, and who fled the invader and roved the countryside without shelter, without medical aid, and in most cases without the barest means of existence. The Japanese were baffled about China, even when they won their spectacular victories over the Americans and the British and their allies.

The attitude throughout the entire Pacific Ocean area on the fateful morning of December 7 was utter disbelief, then wild exultation in Japan, and appalling tragedy in the United States. In Hawaii the Japanese aviators attacked the Kaneohe Naval Air Station, the Marine Corps air base at Ewa, Wheeler Field, Hickham Field, Ford Island, and the fleet at anchor. In one hour, the American battle strength in the Pacific was cut to three capital ships, and more than 3,000 Americans died in the first combat action in the Pacific. Within ten hours, the Japanese struck at the Philippines. One stick of bombs in less than a minute destroyed the effectiveness of the naval base at Cavite. Another put Nichols Field out of commission, and an

attack on Clark and Iba Fields caught the B-17's on the ground and obliterated whatever chance an American air force might have had to battle it out against the Japanese. Guam, Wake, and Hongkong fell before Christmas, and the Japanese were free to rove at will throughout the western Pacific.

The main Japanese force which moved into Southeast Asia was ridiculously small. Japan's early conquest was accomplished by a mere thirteen divisions, 1,175 land planes, 475 carrier planes, plus a handful of marines. The Japanese struck out from their recently acquired bases at Saigon and Camranh Bay and landed at Kota Bahru in Malaya. Some units drove into Thailand, which offered no resistance, and took Bangkok and two vital airfields at Singora and Patani. On December 21 Thailand signed a treaty of alliance with Japan, and on January 25, 1942, Thailand declared war on the United States and Great Britain.

The Japanese then approached Singapore from the land side, out of the range of the British guns which were aimed toward the sea. In a march of fifty-five days, the Japanese defeated British, Australians, Indians, and Malaysians, and on February 15, 1942, planted their flag at Singapore. In the first days of battle, Japanese airplanes sank the capital ships "Repulse" and "Prince of Wales." In accepting the British surrender, the Japanese offered no conditions; their commanding officer curtly stated: "I want a simple 'yes' or 'no.'" He mused, "One hundred years from now, when the Japanese children read in their history textbooks about the War of Greater East Asia, they will not read of eventual victory or defeat—they will read only of the glorious march of an outnumbered army through supposedly impassable jungles, rubber plantations, and rice fields to defeat the cream of the Western imperialists." Japanese forces diverted spearheads into Burma to cut the route of supplies to Chiang Kai-shek. On March 10, 1942, Rangoon fell, and by the end of April the Irrawaddy Valley was in the hands of the invaders. The Japanese gave what General Stilwell called a "hell of a beating" to the British, Indian, and Chinese forces who retreated through the jungles to havens at home.

In December, 1941, Japanese forces landed north and south of Manila and subjected the capital of the Philippines to repeated bombings. The American Army evacuated the "open city" and retired to the Bataan Peninsula and Corregidor. The Japanese occupied Manila on January 2, 1942, took Bataan after bitter fighting on April 9, 1942, and accepted the surrender of Corregidor less than a month later on May 6. In the meantime, the Japanese pressed toward the Netherlands East Indies with their precious reserves of petroleum, bauxite, and rubber. Japanese parachute troops crossed from Singapore into Sumatra so fast that the Dutch had no

time to destroy oil derricks and set fire to the wells. Organized resistance in Java ended with the capitulation of Batavia on March 9, 1942.

Almost according to schedule, the Japanese in five months gained their anticipated objectives. They set to work to make their conquests pay by ruthless economic exploitation. They organized "independence" movements and put their puppets in charge. They liberated and used for their own purposes political prisoners whom the former masters had put in jail or doomed to exile. Men like Aguinaldo and Ramos in the Philippines, Sukarno in the Indies, and Ba Maw in Burma became Japanese collaborators. A noted Indian nationalist, Subha Chandra Bose, looked to the Japanese to drive the British out of India; like-minded Indians organized in Singapore an Indian Independence League and a Free Indian Army. The established government in the Philippines, left behind by President Quezon when he came to the United States, collaborated completely with the Japanese. In every occupied area, guerillas, or the Maquis of Southeast Asia, took to the hills or the jungles. Often local Communist leaders became the moving spirits of the anti-Japanese underground. Local Chinese were mishandled by the Japanese—shot to death if accused of being pro-Chiang Kai-shek and squeezed into bankruptcy if they stooped to collaboration. "Asia for the Asiatics" became a popular slogan as Japan played upon nationalism and local pride. Theoretically, the Japanese propaganda was based on a sound approach; actually, it was defeated by the brutality of the Japanese soldiers and the haughty new imperialism of Japan itself.

The Japanese cut into the social fabric of each neighboring country. Economic thievery and spiritual debauchery became instruments of policy. Resentment and hatred accumulated, paving the way for the chaos, revolution, and communism which followed liberation in Southeast Asia.

The glories of the moment blinded Japan to the tribulations of the future. On the first anniversary of the war, the *Nippon Times* editorialized:

Our successes are due to His Majesty the Emperor. . . . From the icy rocks of the Aleutians, across the vast expanse of the Pacific and among its countless islands, down the littoral of the Asiatic continent, through the fabled lands of the Indies to the very gates of the Antipodes, and then around into the Indian Ocean, the undisputed power of Japan has been established. The sting of Japan's lash has been felt as far afield as the mainland of America, in the harbors of Australia, off the coast of Africa, and even in the Atlantic. Over tens of thousands of miles, from the Arctic to the tropics, over the seven seas and on five continents, the land has rumbled to the tread of Japan's legions and the skies have thundered to the roar of Japan's winged knights of the air.

Counteroffensive: Roads to Tokyo

The Japanese miscalculated the recuperative ability of the United States, the scope of its economic power, and the depth of American spirit. They refused to believe that the "creampuffs" who never "won a battle except in Hollywood" could produce and master—quickly—the mightiest war machine the world had ever seen. Global strategy called for concentration upon Germany, with secondary holding actions in the Far East. Hawaii would be held at all costs and the supply line to Australia protected. A carrier striking force would be built, giving the Americans a seagoing air power far superior to that which the Japanese had successfully utilized at Pearl Harbor. Small hit-and-run bombing raids were carried out against the Japanese in the Gilbert and Marshall Islands and in New Guinea. On April 18, 1942, Lieutenant Colonel James Doolittle carried out a spectacular air attack on Tokyo.

The Japanese then decided to expand their defense perimeter to the Aleutians, Midway, Samoa, Fiji, New Caledonia, and the whole of New Guinea. Landings were effected in the Aleutians, but on June 4, 1942, efforts to occupy Midway were thwarted. The naval battle of Midway Island was the turning point of the war in the Pacific. The Americans unleashed an immediate counteroffensive, a two-pronged attack across the central Pacific and up from Australia. The first was the Nimitz highway and the second the MacArthur road to Tokyo. On the theory of "breakfasting on the enemy before he dines on you," the Americans seized beachheads on Guadalcanal and Florida Islands in the Solomons and occupied Tulagi on August 7, 1942. Together with the successful defense of Port Moresby in New Guinea and the naval battle of the Coral Sea, these operations contained the advance of Japan and made secure the supply line to Australia. Bitter fighting by land pitted army and marines against Japanese who fought to the death. Of 30,000 Japanese, one third were killed, one third starved, and the remainder evacuated in terrible physical condition. Disease and the jungle were as relentless as human enemies. No fewer than five major naval engagements were fought between August, 1942, and November, 1943, before Japan yielded the mastery of the seas in the region of the Solomons. Then the Solomons became the forgotten battlefields with Americans holding beachheads and airfields, in spite of the tropical downpours and the occasional artillery shells from the beleaguered Japanese who were holed up in the hills.

By November, 1943, the navy was ready to strike against the protective island barrier which shielded the Japanese conquests in the southwest

Pacific, the Philippines, Formosa, and the Japanese mainland. The navy prepared to seize the more important islands and to "leap-frog" over the rest, leaving the marooned Japanese garrisons on the bypassed islands to wither on the vine. Bombardments preceded amphibious assaults and the hand-to-hand fighting on the shores. On November 20, 1943, after horrible slaughter, Tarawa and Makin in the Gilberts were retaken. In January and February, 1944, after a bombardment which dumped 2,500 tons of bombs and shells per square mile, the Marshalls (Kwajalein, Majuro, and Eniwetok) were reoccupied. In the Carolines, the Japanese strongholds at Truk and Ponape were bypassed and in the Marianas, Saipan, Tinian, Rota, and Guam were captured in the summer of 1944. That one colorless sentence sums up an operation that demanded the lifeblood of thousands of young men and a month's economic output of a total nation at work. On June 19, 1944, while covering the landings at Saipan, the Americans met the Japanese in the Battle of the Philippine Sea and shattered the sea-borne air power of Japan. More than 400 Japanese planes were brought down in a "turkey shoot" which lasted but a single day. In September strategic points in the Palau Islands were wrested from the Japanese.

The fall of Saipan led to the dismissal of the Tojo government. Japan's southern defense regions were cut off from the mainland and Tokyo was exposed to attacks from heavy bombers based in the Marianas. For a long time American submarines had been preying upon Japanese merchantmen and tankers in the Southern Regions, and now the way was open for surface craft to join in the kill. The Japanese Navy was in a precarious situation, and the army was scattered in remote regions a long way from home and entirely cut off from its source of supplies.

Meanwhile, General MacArthur accomplished the arduous return to the Philippines. From Port Moresby, his men crossed over the Owen Stanley range and occupied town after town along the northern coast of New Guinea. "What hellish fighting it was—with Japanese only a few yards away in the ten-foot-high Kunai grass on the coastal plain and with deadly snipers in every banyan tree!" One GI said, "The South Pacific is the only place in the world where you can be in mud up to your waist and wipe the dust out of your eyes." General MacArthur gained command of New Britain and pinched off the Japanese who were left powerless at Rabaul. Then the Allied forces moved up the thousand-mile coastline of northern New Guinea. On September 15, 1944, the day of the landings in the Palaus, those same troops occupied the island of Morotai, north of Halmahera, and set themselves for the jump into the Philippines.

The two prongs of the counteroffensive converged at Leyte, the first occupation point in the Philippines, on and after October 19, 1944. Battles by sea and air knocked out the Japanese and opened the entire Philippine

group for the liberation. More men went ashore on the first day of the Leyte invasion than landed in Normandy on D-Day. The Leyte campaign was over by Christmas, and Manila was in American hands within a month. The bombardment and destruction were appalling. Island after island, town after town, fell to the liberating forces, but the mopping-up operations cost as many casualties as the original landings.

Iwojima and Okinawa were the last bloody stops on the road to Tokyo. Iwo was bombed for seventy-five consecutive days by the strategic air force and was blasted unmercifully by a navy task force. Landings were made on February 19, 1945, and the next twenty-six days of fighting cost 16,000 casualties. Okinawa, more than 800 miles west of Iwo, was equally valuable and equally costly. After it was secured in April, 1945, it opened the way for surface craft to operate against the coasts of China and Korea and provided an advance base for air attack or amphibious landings on Japan.

By March, 1945, prior to heavy direct air attack on the home islands, Japan was reeling. Its fleet had been sunk or immobilized, and its merchant marine had been decimated. Its building program had never been able to keep up with its losses. Allied submarines and planes had completely cut off the oil resources of the Southern Regions and interdicted supplies to Japanese armies in the field. Japan's casualties were catastrophic. Only the unique willingness of the Japanese soldiers to face death and to endure hardships preserved their lingering effectiveness as a respectable fighting force. The conventional air power of Japan had been reduced to *kamikaze*, or suicide, tactics, which, according to American estimates, registered about 475 hits for an average of one in every five missions. The strangulation of Japan's economy was well under way before the devastating rain of bombs from "Mr. B-29." The Twentieth Air Force, in charge of strategic bombing, flew over 100,000,000 miles, made 32,612 sorties, and dropped 169,421 tons of bombs to reduce Japan's cities to ashes and to destroy Japan's will to fight. The atomic bomb was the culmination of a job which had already been practically completed. The plight of Japan was underestimated by the Allies, who calculated that the do-or-die spirit of fanatical defenders would require the sacrifice of a million lives in an invasion attempt.

The China-Burma-India Theater

The triumphal drives to Tokyo bypassed the China-Burma-India theater, where Allied troubles compounded as the war progressed. General Stilwell explained that the original defeat by the Japanese was due to bitter

antagonism between British, Chinese, and Americans at the top command; a hostile Burmese population which was as willing to put knives in the backs of the British as to betray the Japanese; superior Japanese initiative which enabled their soldiers to march 300 miles in eighteen days; an inferior military position on the part of the Allies; "stupid, gutless" leadership; and a defeatist attitude. Stilwell wanted to reorganize the Chinese Army and to recapture Burma, but he was in constant conflict with both British and Chinese—and with General Chennault and the advocates of emphasis on air power. He could not attract adequate help or supplies for his campaign. "The Peanut [Chiang Kai-shek] and I are on a raft with a sandwich between us," he confided to his diary, "and the rescue ship is headed in the other direction."

Lacking the ability to supply landing craft, tanks, guns, and planes, the Allies tried to keep China's resistance alive by diplomatic encouragement, economic aid, and a trickle of military supplies over the mountains between Burma and China known as the Hump. China's war against Japan became enmeshed in the web of China's internal politics. Forays and skirmishes between Nationalists and Communists vitiated the United Front. The Communists capitalized on every hardship which the war brought to China. They blamed the Nationalists for corruption, neglect of the people's welfare, conscription, tax extortion, and dictatorship, deliberately ignoring the tragic spiritual and economic toll which the long years of fight and flight had taken from a harried, responsible government and its war-weary people. It was easy to criticize Chiang Kai-shek for his apparent determination to entrench himself against the Communists and to stand aside while the Allies carried on the main burdens of defeating Japan on the continent of Asia.

It was difficult to satisfy China with inadequate substitutes for military relief. From the beginning, the British and the Americans pledged Chiang they would be prepared to negotiate for the abolition of extraterritorial rights, the surrender of concessions, and the revision of treaties on the basis of reciprocity and equality. A grim sort of unreality surrounded this promise to return what had been deprived of its meaning and value. Nevertheless, on January 11, 1943, the United States and Great Britain agreed to terminate their rights under the Boxer Protocol of 1901, to transfer the control of the International Settlements at Shanghai and Amoy and the British concessions at Tientsin and Canton to China, and to relinquish extraterritorial, consular, and related privileges. The contracting powers agreed to negotiate a comprehensive modern treaty of friendship, commerce, navigation, and consular rights after the cessation of hostilities. Not to be outdone, the Japanese concluded a similar engagement with the

Wang Ching-wei puppet regime; so, whoever won the war, China was in position to see the last of its unequal treaties when the fighting should end. On December 17, 1943, President Roosevelt signed an act which removed long-standing legislative discriminations against the Chinese. The act repealed the Chinese Exclusion Laws, established an annual immigration quota, and made legally admitted Chinese eligible to naturalization as American citizens.

While the China question challenged the ingenuity of statesmen and diplomats—this will be discussed later—the importance of China as a military factor in the defeat of Japan diminished. In view of the overwhelming demands for men and materiel in Europe and in the Pacific, it became increasingly difficult to obtain allotments for the neglected China-Burma-India theater. Stilwell labored against hopeless odds, without a glimmer of encouragement to relieve his bitterness and frustration. Talk and dollars were insufficient to overcome the threat of Japan or remove the causes of civil war. The Hump, called for more tonnage than the Allies could spare, and the New Burma relief route presented superhuman obstacles in terrain, weather, and sickness. In the summer of 1944, the Japanese moved to take advantage of the Allied weaknesses. But they were too late. They were cut to pieces in Burma and driven back to Rangoon to await surrender. The Burma Road was reopened, but too late to be of practical advantage in winning the war. Simultaneously, in China, the Japanese launched large-scale attacks against east coast ports between Canton and Shanghai, where they feared a Nimitz landing, and north and south along the railroads from Hankow. The objective of this move was to cut Free China in half, to gain control over the whole length of the Peking-Hankow-Canton Railway, and to establish direct rail and highway overland connections between Korea and Singapore. Land connections became imperative as submarine and air attacks wiped out Japan's shipping lanes.

The Japanese drive north of Hankow encountered a demoralized Chinese populace in Honan. The peasants often turned against the Kuomintang, and in despair looked to the Japanese and their puppet troops for relief. The Communists did not distinguish themselves by any show of resistance but stayed in the background until they considered it safe to engage in nuisance raids. The Japanese propaganda blared the theme to the Chinese that Japan hoped that Chungking, too, would return to the fold of true Asiatics. The Japanese march to the south reached its climax in the capture of the air bases which Americans and Chinese had worked under appalling handicaps to build. During these operations, General Stilwell was recalled, Ambassador Gauss resigned, and an aroused American

leadership addressed itself to the problems of China. General Wedemeyer succeeded Stilwell as commander of American troops, and General Patrick Hurley became the new American ambassador. Neither American assistance nor American promises were able to stop the cat-and-mouse game between Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists or to bring about a unified war council in Chungking which would mobilize all Chinese parties and opinions in a national war effort. In the fall of 1944 the entire front in China was threatened. The China war effort lost its vitality, as war-weariness fastened its grip on the Kuomintang. Chinese troops were lined up against each other, as Kuomintang-Communist talks dragged on, and the ominous shadow of the Soviet Union began to stretch toward the landscape of East Asia.

The China theater was given up as a base for the final assault upon Japan. The Pacific route proved more valuable. China continued to keep Japanese man power and supplies pinned down and to harass the Japanese garrisons and lines of communication. A half million Japanese in China, fortunately, were not available as a reception committee for the Americans on Leyte. China could not boast of spectacular victories, but it could take pride in its persistence and determination in its long war of attrition. China was the demonstration of the shallowness of Japan's psychological warfare and the denial of Japan's promises to the peoples of Asia. China deserved a great share of credit for its part in the defeat of Japan and expected to be looked upon as one of the heroes at the time of final victory. Instead, China at the end of the war found itself helpless and ignored. Its military weakness was matched by its economic exhaustion and topped by its political dissension. The whole question of China's future replaced the defeat and control of Japan as the primary stake of international diplomacy with regard to the Far East.

Wartime Diplomacy

The diplomats were less assertive and less important than the military officials during the actual period of hostilities. However, even when the fighting was most deadly and the outcome most doubtful, the professionals in the State Department and the Foreign Service were obliged to plan for peace. Soldiers, sailors, and diplomats made a team, under the control and guidance of the single executive authority, to win the victory and determine how best to utilize that victory for the best interests of the postwar world.

Before the United States joined in the shooting war, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill sketched a rough outline of their war aims in the Atlantic Charter. The salutes to the will of the people, to their

freedom to choose their own form of government, and to their economic advancement and freedom from want, as contained in the Atlantic Charter, were revolutionary when framed in the background of Asia. The people of Indonesia and Indo-China, perhaps also of Hongkong and Singapore, asked if this meant the death knell of imperialism.

On January 1, 1942, the representatives of twenty-six nations signed at Washington the Declaration of the United Nations. The signatory governments, "convinced that complete victory over their enemies is essential to defend life, liberty, independence, and religious freedom and to preserve human rights and justice in their own lands as well as in other lands, and that they are now engaged in a common struggle against savage and brutal forces seeking to subjugate the world" pledged themselves to employ their full resources, military or economic, against the members of the Tripartite Pact and its adherents and not to make a separate armistice or peace with any enemy.

A major diplomatic conference was held in January, 1943, when Roosevelt and Churchill, "their spirits high, shared the sunshine of Casablanca with the invading forces." The Europe-first strategy was reaffirmed. The essential means were to be provided for the two-way advance against Japan. Plans were approved for a tentative campaign in Burma, with a target date of November 15, and emphasis was placed upon the urgency of reinforcements for General Chennault. As early as Casablanca, President Roosevelt suggested that it would be very desirable, if at all possible, to get a definite engagement—secret if necessary—from Russia that Russia would join in the struggle against Japan once Germany was out of the war. In the conference communiqué the Allied nations stated their determination to continue the war until the Axis powers were forced to unconditional surrender.

During the spring and summer of 1943, Stalin pressed for more American action in Europe and the opening of the second front. Churchill's prime interests were likewise in Europe, and the American high command concentrated on the Solomon Islands and the forthcoming invasion of the Gilbert Islands. At the "Trident" Conference in Washington in May, 1943, the China-Burma-India (CBI) theater was given short shrift. Churchill hated the idea of reconquering Burma by an advance along the miserable communications of Assam, and he preferred to start operations against the tip of Sumatra or the waist of Malaya at Penang. Although the combined chiefs of staff upheld the position that the campaign to recapture Burma was essential, the president veered toward the conviction that the quick way to victory in China was according to the persuasion of General Chennault. "Trident" gave Chiang little more than a promise of more

tonnage over the Hump and left him with a deep and poignant feeling of neglect.

Roosevelt and Churchill met again at Quebec in the middle of August for conference "Quadrant." By then the Italian government had surrendered, the Soviet was pounding the Germans back, and more optimistic voices whispered about the possible defeat of Germany before the end of 1944. The future entry of Russia into the Pacific war came up in the discussions. When Stalin was informed of the Quadrant decisions, he seemed puzzled because of the slight attention given to the part that the Soviet Union might bear in the fighting. He remarked that *"there had been no change in the Russian attitude but if the United States and Great Britain preferred to bring Japan to her knees without Russian participation, he was ready to agree."*

Military priorities remained: Germany first, then the Pacific theater, and finally the CBI. Churchill became more outspoken against a detrimental and disadvantageous drive through the swamps and jungles of Burma. In deference to American wishes and in order to make sure that Chiang Kai-shek would remain an active Allied partner, he agreed to plans for an attack against Upper Burma in 1944, a small amphibious landing in Lower Burma, and an increase in the air effort from India to China. A new command setup separated the Southeast Asia command from China, with Lord Mountbatten in charge of the former and Chiang in charge of the latter. General Stilwell was deputy to both. The Chinese were not invited to participate in the making of these decisions; they were given only such information as the Allies deemed advisable. It was argued that there were no military secrets at Chungking; any information to Chiang filtered immediately to the agents of Japan.

President Roosevelt believed that his personal touch might be effective in allaying the generalissimo's resentment of his neglect and shabby treatment. He would have liked to bring the Chinese and Soviet governments together in a direct accord of lasting value because the fear grew that the civil war in China might explode into a dangerous international crisis. China had to be assured that it was not overlooked in the war against Japan and that it was included among the great powers which were to guide the world after the war. It was hoped that China could be made strong enough to resist any possible rebirth of aggressive or imperialistic designs of the Soviet Union in East Asia and to exercise the influence which had been wielded by Japan in the Oriental balance of power. The president and the secretary of state sought to carry out these purposes in a series of conferences at Moscow, Cairo, and Teheran.

On October 30, 1943, the Council of Foreign Ministers, at the con-

clusion of their conference at Moscow, announced a Declaration of Principles. Its text was approved by Chiang Kai-shek, so China appeared as one of the original signers. This recognition of status as one of the Big Four went far toward restoring China's shattered ego. The governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China jointly declared that their united action would be continued for the organization and maintenance of peace and security; that they recognized the necessity of an international organization of "peace-loving" states; and that after the termination of hostilities they would not employ their military forces within the territory of other states except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration and after joint consultation. During the course of the conference, Stalin astonished Hull by saying unequivocally that the Soviet Union would join in the war against Japan after the defeat of Germany.

The president wanted to talk with Chiang Kai-shek and Stalin, but he could not arrange a joint meeting because the Soviet Union was still a neutral in the war in the Far East. He and Churchill arranged to meet Chiang at Cairo and afterward Stalin at Teheran. The Cairo Conference was held in November, 1943, when the Kuomintang-Communist differences in China threatened civil war, when the Chiang-Stilwell feud seemed beyond reconciliation, when the long drive back across the Pacific was just beginning, and when the destructive power of the new long-range B-29's was prompting a reconsideration of the strategy in China. The president, the British prime minister, and the generalissimo discussed the return to China of territories lost to Japan, military assistance to China, the implications of an agreement between China and the Soviet Union, and the possible role of China in world affairs after the war. Their agreements were formalized in the Cairo Declaration, released to the press December 1, 1943:

It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great Powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.

When the conference site shifted from Cairo to Teheran, Stalin was shown the Cairo Declaration and he approved its contents. He reaffirmed the Soviet plan to join the Pacific war, an act which gladdened the president, the prime minister, and their staffs who were eager to avoid a long-drawn-out war of attrition. The military staffs discussed the possibilities

of American air bases in the Maritime Provinces, and advance planning for air and naval operations against Japan. That was in December, 1943, and Stalin showed himself less eager to move rapidly against Japan than the Allies would have liked. It was also clear that Stalin in his own good time would come forward with the price which the Soviet Union would demand for its participation. Almost the whole realm of Soviet claims that were later adjusted at Yalta were touched upon and discussed in a provisional way.

When President Roosevelt returned to Washington, he reported to the Pacific War Council about the Cairo and Teheran meetings. The Chinese ambassador was a member of that council and he presumably passed on to Chiang Kai-shek the information about the president's report. It was made known then and there that Stalin agreed that Manchuria should be returned to China, that Korea was to be put under a forty-year tutelage, that Dairen should be made a free port, that special consideration should be accorded Russia in the railways of Manchuria, and that Sakhalin and the Kuriles should be turned over to Russia. Even with this knowledge, Chiang Kai-shek appreciated the advisability of a fundamental treaty understanding with the Soviet Union.

Throughout 1944 the aim of diplomacy with regard to China was to use the reward of the future to redress the weakness of the present. While the power of the Allies smashed Germany and Japan, the diplomats planned at Dumbarton Oaks in Washington for an organization of the United Nations. A place was prepared for China internationally which China was scarcely able to fill. In June, 1944, Vice-President Wallace was sent to China to bolster Chiang's morale and to explore possible new sources for strength and regeneration. The Japanese offensives offset American assurances and reduced China to new lows in spirit and hope.

Chiang's anxieties multiplied as he could only guess what plans the Big Three were making for Soviet entry into the Pacific war. It was generally expected, even by the Russians, that Japanese resistance on the mainland would be strong and determined. Soviet military authorities therefore contemplated action as far south as Peking and Kalgan in order to prevent the Japanese from moving their troops from China into Manchuria. They thought that within three months after the defeat of Germany they could accumulate enough men and supplies in Siberia to deal Japan a mortal blow. Before they embarked upon their program, it seemed more urgent than ever to conclude appropriate political understandings. Ambassador Harriman from Moscow warned that if there was no arrangement between the Soviet and Chinese governments before the Soviet Union entered the Pacific war, the Soviet Union might back the Chinese Communists in the

north and turn over to them the administration of the Chinese territories which the Red Army would liberate. Chiang Kai-shek felt the pressure to reach an understanding with the Communists in China and he wanted to send a representative, either his own son or T. V. Soong, to Moscow in quest of a treaty.

After President Roosevelt's election for a fourth term, he expedited plans for the meeting at Yalta with Churchill and Stalin. He wanted a personal exchange of views about Germany, Poland, Austria, and Yugoslavia; treatment of states liberated from the Nazis; and plans for the United Nations, the Council of Foreign Ministers, and the Far East. His aims with regard to China were to help China repossess its territories, to help China gain and hold its place as a great power, to bring internal unity by peaceful means, and to assure Soviet entry into the Pacific war as soon as possible, while guarding against undue Soviet demands as a reward. It was still accepted policy that Soviet assistance would help win the war and save countless Allied lives.

The secret agreement regarding the Far East at Yalta, February 11, 1945, read as follows:

The leaders of the three Great Powers—the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain—have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe has terminated the Soviet Union shall enter into the war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that:

1. The status quo in Outer-Mongolia (The Mongolian People's Republic) shall be preserved;
2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz:
 - (a) the southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union,
 - (b) the commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the USSR restored,
 - (c) the Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South-Manchurian Railroad which provides an outlet to Dairen shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese Company it being understood that the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria;

3. The Kurile islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.

It is understood, that the agreement concerning Outer-Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred to above will require concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The President will take measures in order to obtain this concurrence on advice from Marshal Stalin.

The Heads of the three Great Powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.

For its part the Soviet Union expresses its readiness to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the USSR and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.

When President Roosevelt left Yalta, according to Hopkins, "we really believed in our hearts that this was the dawn of the new day we had all been praying for and talking about for so many years." No new day appeared to Chiang, who did not even know the text of the Yalta agreement. The brightest new day came for Stalin, who proceeded to interpret the European clauses of the Yalta agreement according to his own pleasure and to move on to the Far East for the kill. On April 6, 1945, Russia informed Japan that the neutrality pact had lost its meaning and continuance of the pact was impossible. It was supposed to be in effect for another year.

On April 12, 1945, President Roosevelt died. On May 1 Hitler disappeared from the scene and one week later German resistance ended. United States aid was rushed to Murmansk, Iran, and Vladivostok for Russian troops en route to the east. News of Russia's military measures reached Chungking, but the contents of the Yalta agreement were not made known officially to Chiang until June 15. Chiang seemed "disappointed," but sent T. V. Soong to Moscow to negotiate a treaty at the end of the San Francisco Conference on the United Nations. While Soong was at Moscow, the Japanese approached Stalin with peace feelers and negotiations were broken off while Stalin attended the Potsdam Conference.

While Truman, Churchill (later Attlee), and Stalin were in Potsdam, July 17 to August 2, 1945, all the unsettled business of the war against Japan was flung upon them. Decisions had to be made about the surrender of Japan, Soviet entry into the war, and the Sino-Soviet treaty. The news of the successful explosion of the atomic bomb forced a new appraisal of the factors for victory, but it was too late to bring about any fundamental change in the agreements of Yalta. Truman was soberly impressed with the news of the bomb, Churchill called it "the second coming in wrath," but Stalin seemed uninterested. For at least a month the Soviet Intelligence Service had had full knowledge of the bomb and the coming first test.

At Potsdam the American and Soviet chiefs of staff worked out a basic agreement to synchronize operations against Japan. The line delimiting the Soviet area of operations ran from the interior of Asia, through Manchuria, down to Busui Tan (Cape Boltina) on the Korean coast, then through the Sea of Japan to a point on the La Perouse Straits, between

Sakhalin and Hokkaido. Part of South Manchuria and practically all of Korea were in the American zone of operations. On July 26 the Potsdam Declaration was released which defined the terms for Japan's surrender:

There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest . . .

. . . Points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied . . .

The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.

We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals. . . . The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights, shall be established.

Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind.

Japan's Surrender

When the pounding of the B-29's made it impossible to bear the unbearable any longer, Japanese leaders sought to end the war by negotiation. They explored several avenues, but the most promising one seemed to be by way of Moscow. The Japanese ambassador asked permission for the entry of a peace delegation under Prince Konoye on the eve of Stalin's departure for Potsdam. The Japanese overtures came to an abrupt halt when the terms of the Potsdam Declaration reached Tokyo by radio. On August 6 the atomic bomb blew Hiroshima into history and President Truman announced, "If they do not now accept our terms they may expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has never been seen on this earth." On August 8 the Soviet Union entered the war. Their declaration said, "Taking into consideration the refusal of Japan to capitulate, the Allies submitted to the Soviet Government a proposal to join the war against Japanese aggression and thus shorten the duration of the war. . . . Loyal to its Allied duty, the Soviet Government has accepted the proposal of the Allied Powers of July 26 . . . and from tomorrow the Soviet Government will consider itself at war with Japan."

On August 9 a second atomic bomb shook Nagasaki and on the next day

the Japanese announced a conditional acceptance of the Potsdam ultimatum, provided the imperial institution was preserved. On August 11 Secretary Byrnes replied: "From the moment of surrender the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the State shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the surrender terms." Some hearts were heavy in Tokyo, some wills were unbroken. Some distinguished Japanese military leaders destroyed themselves in the traditional Japanese fashion rather than follow the emperor's painful lead in bowing down to *the victorious enemy*. At midday, August 14, the high-pitched imperial voice told his people that he had issued an imperial rescript ending the war.

Should we continue the fight, it would not only result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization. Such being the case, how are we to save the millions of our subjects, and atone ourselves before the hallowed spirits of our Imperial ancestors?

Half a world away, at Moscow, the Chinese delegates on the same day affixed their signatures to nine Sino-Soviet agreements. T. V. Soong held out as long as he could for more favorable terms, but he felt obliged to sign quickly on the heels of the Japanese collapse. According to the treaty of friendship and alliance, the high contracting parties agreed to work together in close and friendly collaboration after the coming of peace and to act according to the principles of mutual respect for their sovereignty and territorial integrity and of noninterference in each other's internal affairs. The government of the USSR agreed to render to China moral support and aid in military supplies and other material resources, such support and aid to be entirely given to the Nationalist government as the central government of China. The government of the USSR regarded the three Eastern Provinces as part of China, reaffirmed its respect for China's full sovereignty over them, and recognized their territorial and administrative integrity. China agreed to recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia if a plebiscite after the defeat of Japan confirmed that such was the desire of the Outer Mongolian people. Dairen was to become a free port under Chinese administration, but half its port facilities were to be leased free to the Soviet Union. Port Arthur was to be used jointly by China and the USSR as a naval base, and the Manchurian railways were to be jointly owned and operated by the two powers. Detailed measures were worked out for the reoccupation of Manchuria, whereby authority would be orig-

inally vested in the commander in chief of the Soviet forces and gradually transferred to the representatives of the Nationalist government.

Chiang Kai-shek expressed himself as "generally satisfied" when he affixed his signature to these arrangements on August 24, 1945. Opinion in the United States accepted the accords as contributions to peace and stability. American representatives in Moscow and Chungking were more cautious, pointing out that the pacts did little more than recognize the implications of the actual Soviet military position. Chinese Communists were already filtering into Manchuria, and the Soviet tactic of overt support to Chiang Kai-shek was subject to momentary alteration. Japan itself was scarcely in worse condition than China at the end of the war. The Communists were on the point of acquiring more and better equipment from the surrendering Japanese; inflation was threatening the economic life of the nation; and a complete standstill of transportation facilities throttled the revival of China's idle industries. A chicken or a bunch of carrots was worth its weight in paper money. The rural economy was shattered by eight years of neglect and destruction. There were more than 1,000,000 Japanese soldiers in China and almost as many in Manchuria, almost 1,000,000 puppet troops left wandering and rootless, and 750,000 Soviet troops in Manchuria. Local loyalties to Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang were precarious, and the Communists were on the move. The Communists were apparently distressed by the USSR-China agreements, but they became more bellicose in their verbal blasts at Chiang Kai-shek and more defiant in their determination to force the surrender of Japanese units to themselves.

General Order Number One, issued by General MacArthur on August 15, 1945, ordered the Japanese in China (excluding Manchuria), Formosa, and Indo-China north of sixteen degrees north latitude to surrender only to Chiang Kai-shek. Japanese within Manchuria, Korea north of the Thirty-eighth Parallel, and Sakhalin were to surrender to the Soviet. Japanese elsewhere would surrender to the United States and its Allies. The Communists at Yen-an asserted that they had the title and the quality to accept Japanese surrender. They demanded also the right to participate in the formalities of the surrender of Japan, in the occupation and control of Japan, and in the peace conference with Japan. These claims were accompanied by requests that the American government at once cease to give lend-lease aid to the Kuomintang and refuse to help the Kuomintang in any way if civil war occurred in China. Civil war seemed inevitable, but it was worth the effort to continue to work for compromise. The Soviet government was on record to refrain from supporting the Communists in China, and the American government gave its support to Chiang Kai-shek.

Ambassador Hurley brought Mao Tse-tung to Chungking for talks, but while the Communist leader was in the Chinese capital from August 28 to September 27, 1945, American planes and ships moved government troops and officials into the vital ports and cities of east and central China. Soviet troops "pacified" Manchuria, and government and Communist forces engaged in frantic skirmishes all over the provinces of North China.

In contrast with obscurity in China, the situation in Japan approached the climax of surrender with unbelievable clarity. On August 14 President Truman announced that the war was over and that General MacArthur was designated Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) to accept Japan's surrender and to carry out the occupation of Japan in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration. Late in August American naval units steamed into Tokyo Bay and small advance units of the Eleventh Airborne Division landed without incident at Atsugi Airport. On September 1 the main forces of the United States Fifth Army landed, and with the co-operation of Japanese officials assumed their control throughout the Tokyo Bay area. Formal surrender ceremonies took place on September 2 aboard Admiral Halsey's flagship, the "U.S.S. Missouri," and almost at the same time the emperor issued an imperial rescript announcing the formal surrender. In his own agony of spirit, he penned a moving poem:

Man should be like the manly pine
That does not change its color
Though bearing the fallen snow.

For Japan, it was a time of humiliation and defeat; for the United Nations, a day of rejoicing and victory. It was for no one a time of exultation. There were too many tears amid the shouts and tumult. Southeast Asia was littered with ashes; China was faced with trials as bitter as those which it had just experienced. An old order in East Asia lay writhing in agony, hoping for the will and wisdom of men to create a new order from its ruins.

Suggested Reading

- RUSSELL BRINES, *Until They Eat Stones* (Philadelphia, 1944).
 ROBERT J. C. BUTOW, *Japan's Decision to Surrender* (Stanford, 1954).
 CHIANG KAI-SHEK, *China's Destiny* (New York, 1947).
 WESLEY FRANK CRAVEN AND JAMES LEA CATE, eds., *The Army Air Forces in World War II*, 5 volumes (Chicago, 1948 and after).
 KENT ROBERTS GREENFIELD, general ed., *The United States Army in World War II*.

The subseries under the direction of Louis Morton is titled *The War in the Pacific*. (Appearing as completed.)

JOHN HERSEY, *Hiroshima* (New York, 1947).

TOSHIKAZU KASE, *Journey to the "Missouri"* (New Haven, 1950).

MASUO KATO, *The Last War* (New York, 1946).

ADMIRAL WILLIAM D. LEAHY, *I Was There* (New York, 1950).

CLARK LEE, *They Call It Pacific* (New York, 1943).

P. M. A. LINEBARGER, *The China of Chiang Kai-shek* (Boston, 1941).

WALTER MILLIS, ed., *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York, 1951).

SAMUEL E. MORISON, *History of the United States Naval Operations in World War II*.

Of particular interest is Vol. 3, *The Rising Sun in the Pacific* (Boston, 1948).

HARLEY A. NOTTER, *A Post-War Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945* (Washington, 1950).

REPORTS OF THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY.

CHARLES F. ROMANUS AND RILEY SUNDERLAND, *Stilwell's Mission to China* (Washington, 1952).

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER, *China's Wartime Politics* (Princeton, 1944).

D. N. ROWE, *China Among the Powers* (New York, 1945).

ROBERT E. SHERWOOD, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History* (New York, 1948).

GENERAL JOSEPH STILWELL, *The Stilwell Paper* (New York, 1948).

ARTHUR H. VANDENBERG, *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg*, edited by Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr. (Boston, 1952).

WAR REPORTS OF GENERAL OF THE ARMY GEORGE. C. MARSHALL, GENERAL OF THE ARMY H. H. ARNOLD, FLEET ADMIRAL ERNEST J. KING (New York, 1947).

PART FOUR

A Decade of Transition

Introduction

World War II did not create a new Far East. It accentuated ageless conditions and exposed them to new forces. It added new impetus to changes which were long aborning and slow in gathering momentum. It brought suffering and death, destruction and occupation, but it also gave a new meaning to individual liberty and national independence. It brought home to Asia the deep conviction that Asians, too, are entitled to the Four Freedoms.

World War II accelerated the passing of the old order. The undeniable contributions of Asia's heritage in international affairs failed to compensate for its shortcomings and servitudes. The sweep of the armies of Japan throughout East Asia, with their propaganda message of the Co-Prosperity Sphere and Asia for the Asiatics dealt the *coup de grâce* to orderly processes in the job of integrating Asia into the modern world system on a basis of equality and reciprocity. Time and tide would no longer await the pleasure of the powers of the West. The United States bowed out of the Philippines, Great Britain followed in its exodus from India and Burma. The Dutch lagged in Indonesia, the French hesitated in Indo-China, and the British endeavored to forestall demands for self-determination in Malaya, Singapore, and Hongkong.

All of Asia added nationalism to its pantheon of political gods. The enthusiasm for freedom obscured the inadequacies of nationalism in this shrinking, interdependent world. The legitimate complaints and understandable aspirations of Asians, together with their desperate need for leadership, made them unusually vulnerable to the subtle promises of Communist colonialism. The warnings of the West against the fraudulent char-

acter of so-called independence under Communist control fell upon deaf or unwilling ears.

Because of benevolent policies of the Occupation, Japan discovered a new basis for confidence in the United States. The Philippines of its own free will chose to identify itself closely with the free world. China, on the other hand, under the control of the Communists chose to lean to the side of the Soviet Union. India, Pakistan, and Ceylon welcomed an association as *respected partners with Great Britain without committing themselves irrevocably to common action in matters of foreign policy*. Malaya, in spite of guerilla warfare euphemistically dubbed the "Emergency," groped for a broadened basis of self-government. Indonesia and Burma became the typical battlegrounds of the cold war, independent but harassed by the complications of political immaturity and economic inexperience. Korea and Indo-China did not escape with a mere "cold war": their hills and jungles were drenched with the blood of men who gave up their lives in the service of, or at the demand of, their respective ideologies.

In Asia, as elsewhere, nothing appeared so permanent as change itself. Within a decade after World War II, no one could talk of the return of peace. Stability and progress were equally elusive. Only the factors of change were discernible, with the Asians hoping and fighting to improve their lot, the Communists trying to channel the changes for their own benefit, and the former imperialist powers striving to contain communism and to keep the changes in Asia within the bounds of law, order, and the interests of self-preservation.

CHAPTER 23

The Occupation of Japan

Japan's dream of empire vanished in the flames and smoke of Tokyo. Japan's soldiers went to war with flags waving and crowds cheering, but those who returned were as spiritless and bewildered as the wretched relatives or friends who lived to greet them. As the overlords of Asia, the Japanese were arrogant and domineering; as the enemy in the foxholes they were fanatic and ruthless; but as the beaten foe, they were polite, obedient, and industrious.

When the Occupation forces entered Japan, fresh from the campaigns of New Guinea and the Philippines, they were determined to correct the conditions which had plunged Japan into war. They resolved that Japan should never again become a menace to the peace of East Asia. When they saw for themselves the magnitude of Japan's defeat, they readjusted their views. They spent more effort on the job of helping Japan up than on the job of keeping Japan down. They rallied the Japanese behind the leadership of General MacArthur and directed the country in the path of reconstruction. To some of Japan's neighbors, the United States seemed soft and hoodwinked. To them Japan's rebirth was unpleasant and dangerous. But by the United States, Japan's new-found friend and ally, the resurrection of Japan was heralded as a counterbalance to the power of the Communists.

From the Japanese point of view, the Occupation marked a new stage in Japan's meteoric modernization. The Meiji revolution produced a strong, centralized nation-state and provided an industrial base for its expanding economy. The leaders planned and the people followed. Outward forms were grafted on to the fundamentals of society which the Japanese were loath to abandon. The pace proved too rapid for Japan's own security and welfare. The reliance on the military tradition, without the modifying

effects of liberalism or popular sovereignty, hastened Japan to its brief moment of glory—and doom. The Occupation showed Japan the way which the United States had discovered to strength and stability and extended a helping hand to convert a former symbol of aggression to an exponent of peace and international co-operation. The Occupation served as critic and guide; it was up to Japan to demonstrate how effectively it would absorb its lessons and to make the necessary changes in its national make-up and code of behavior.

From an American point of view, the Occupation was the brightest achievement of the immediate postwar period in Asia. It converted a former enemy into a potentially strong ally. The United States carried forward reforms with missionary zeal, and it substituted rehabilitation for reform the moment its original crusading idealism recognized the depressing realities of Japan's fundamental economic plight. At first, demilitarization, deconcentration of industry, and democratization—the magic formulae of Potsdam—were offered as panaceas for all Japan's ills. But the cruel pressure of Japan's ever-increasing population quickly revealed to the occupying power the intensity of the forces which had driven the long-suffering people of prewar Japan to submit to the excesses of militarism and totalitarian regimentation in their political and economic life.

The Occupation exposed Japan to an unprecedented number of Americans and to an unusual degree of Americanism. It brought the bad along with the good. The intimacy and extent of Japanese-American relations aggravated some old wounds and created some new antipathies, but to an overwhelming degree and above all, it gave Japan a taste of the pleasures and a sense of the values which Americans cherish. In the imagery of Hollywood, the Occupation of Japan was a colossal spectacle with the United States as the producer and General MacArthur as the director and the leading star. The emperor of Japan was given second billing. American officers and civilian officials, Japanese bureaucrats new-style, the Far Eastern Commission, and the Allied Council for Japan were the supporting players. The cast included 70,000,000 Japanese and the entire army of the Occupation. The stage itself was a revolving stage. World capitals entered the scene repeatedly, but the main action took place against the backdrop of the destruction which was Japan. The plot was a soul-stirring, triple-barreled drama of politics, economics, and psychology.

Machinery of the Occupation

In legal form, the Occupation was international; in practice, it was an American operation, but within the framework of international legal agree-

ments. The top-level international policy-making body was the Far Eastern Commission (FEC), established by the Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow in December, 1945. The FEC met in Washington and consisted of the representatives of the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, China, France, the Netherlands, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, India, and the Philippine Islands. Later, Pakistan and Burma were added. These were the nations with major interests in the Pacific or with a more vital stake in the future of Japan.

The Far Eastern Commission had two main responsibilities: to "formulate the policies, principles, and standards" by means of which Japan could fulfill its obligations under the surrender terms; and to "review any directive or action of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers [SCAP] involving policy decisions." With this high-sounding definition of its responsibilities and in view of the auspices under which it was created, the FEC might have assumed a dominant role in the Occupation. It developed otherwise. The FEC came late upon the scene—after General MacArthur's Headquarters was already in charge of the situation—and it was hamstrung by the difference of opinions among its members. Decisions within the FEC were taken upon majority vote, provided the majority included all the members of the Big Four, and were often made after the issues involved had been solved by practical measures taken by officials on the spot. The existence of the FEC served alternately as a curb and support for American officials in Tokyo.

The second international body concerned with the Occupation was the Allied Council for Japan (ACJ), also set up by the Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow in December, 1945. This council consisted of four members, representing the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and the British Commonwealth, and it met in the Meiji Building in Tokyo. It had no authority to control the Supreme Commander (in contrast to the Allied Control Council in Berlin) and exercised only the functions of consulting with and advising the Occupation authorities on the implementation of the terms of the surrender. It was worse than impotent and its meetings were often caricatures of international gatherings. Sometimes it met for roll call and adjourned within seconds. Its sessions were marred by acrimonious and undignified exchanges among Americans, British, and Russians, or by undiluted outbursts of propaganda.

Neither of the international bodies (the FEC or the ACJ) detracted from the dominant position of the United States. The United States government was the only channel through which the FEC could transmit its decisions to Tokyo, and Washington was empowered to issue interim directives "whenever urgent matters arise not covered by policies already formulated." Washington meant, in practice, the president and the Joint

Chiefs of Staff. SCAP was the sole authority for the administration of the Occupation and was the primary factor in the determination of policy.

The name "SCAP" had two meanings: it applied to General MacArthur personally or to the General Headquarters (GHQ) devoted to the administration of the Occupation. General MacArthur also wore two hats: he was "SCAP" and he was also the commanding general of the Far Eastern Command, or the tactical forces of the United States in the Far East. The American Eighth Army, with troops from the British Commonwealth, acted as the police agent for the Occupation. Until 1949 civil affairs teams carried out the tasks of military government in the prefectures and in local communities.

An elaborate bureaucracy grew in Tokyo at GHQ-SCAP. The organization included more than 3,000 military officers and civilians, appropriately *divided into staff sections*. The names of the sections indicated the scope of their responsibilities: Diplomatic, Economic and Scientific, Legal, Public Health and Welfare, Natural Resources, Government, Civil Information and Education, Civil Transport, and Civil Communications. They corresponded with parallel functions or organizations in the Japanese government. The victorious powers chose not to depose the emperor or destroy the framework of government but rather to work through the existing structure in a manner reminiscent of the ancient *bakufu*. The Japanese bureaucrats carried on their responsibilities, oftentimes reluctantly, and they received their instructions or directives either orally or in writing from their counterparts in SCAP. Premier Suzuki carried through the weighty task of the unconditional surrender and then resigned in favor of Prince Higashikuni. The prestige of the imperial rank weathered the first shocks of defeat, after which a regular political figure, the elderly Baron Shidehara, took over the delicate task of co-operating with the Occupation masters. By the time of Baron Shidehara's resignation, April 22, 1946, the patterns of Occupation procedures were clearly established.

First Phase of the Occupation

The principal American share in the Occupation was the natural consequence of the war in the Pacific. The United States possessed the military forces, the transportation facilities, and the economic assets to undertake the job. After the liberation of the Philippines, the United States began its preparations for the Occupation of Japan. At the end of August, 1945, a State, War, and Navy Co-ordinating Committee (SWNCC) completed an Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan which was sent to General Mac-

Arthur as his guiding directive. This was adopted by the FEC with minor modifications as its own statement of policy in June, 1947.

According to this directive, the Occupation was to achieve two major objectives: to insure that Japan would not again become a menace to the United States or to the peace and security of the world, and to bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and responsible government in Japan which would conform as closely as possible to the principles of democratic self-government. These two objectives were to be achieved by the following means: (1) limiting Japanese sovereignty to Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and such minor islands as may be determined; (2) effecting Japan's complete disarmament and demilitarization; (3) encouraging the Japanese to desire individual liberties, respect fundamental human rights, and form democratic and representative organizations; and (4) affording the Japanese the opportunity to develop an economy which would permit the peacetime requirements of the population to be met.

The directive characterized the military Occupation as an operation in behalf of the principal Allied powers acting in the interests of the United Nations at war with Japan. In the event of differences of opinion among the powers regarding the Occupation and control of Japan, the policies of the United States would govern. It listed in detail the political and economic objectives of the Occupation: (1) politically, Japan should be demilitarized and disarmed, war criminals should be tried, political parties should be encouraged, unpalatable legislation of prewar Japan should be modified or abolished, secret societies should be broken up, political prisoners should be released, and the desire for individual liberties and democratic processes should be fostered; (2) economically, industry should be demilitarized and democratized, organizations in labor, industry, and agriculture should be favored, trusts should be dissolved, appropriate production and trade should be resumed and controlled, identifiable loot should be restored, and Occupation expenses and reparations should be collected. The philosophy was that Japan's internal maladjustments caused its resort to war—cure the social ailments and Japan would follow the paths of peace.

The first year of the Occupation was the year of frantic reform. SCAP assumed some of the characteristics of a missionary enterprise—dynamic, paternal, evangelical. More than 1,000 directives from SCAP to the Japanese government ordered the remolding of Japan. General MacArthur determined the tone and the tempo of a frantic, yet deliberate process of cultural diffusion. Every office in Tokyo, every man in the street, and even the little people in the highways and byways of rural Japan were made conscious of the nationwide drive for democratization or Americanization. General MacArthur chose the methods of teaching and leadership rather

than the imperious display of command and order. He refused to go as fast or as far as his leftist critics would have liked and he fixed his own eyes on democratic, Christian goals as he conceived them. He sought to guide the Japanese in chipping away the abuses of power and in laying the foundations for a vital, liberal society. In the heat of war many excesses on the part of the conqueror might have been expected and forgiven, but the attitude of the Occupation officials was magnanimous rather than vindictive. General MacArthur himself remained aloof from the Japanese. He seldom ventured from the beaten path between his residence at the American embassy and his headquarters at the imposing marble Dai-Ichi Insurance Building in downtown Tokyo across from the Imperial Palace. Occasionally, he visited the airport to welcome or to send off a distinguished visitor, but all VIP's and Japanese, including the emperor, called on him when they wanted the privilege of talking with him.

In carrying out his political directive, General MacArthur's first order of business was the elimination of the remnants of militarism. SCAP issued the orders and the Japanese government carried out the program of disarmament and demilitarization. Together they disbanded the Imperial General Headquarters and the Ministries of War and the Navy. They demobilized all the Japanese in the armed services, rendered useless the country's defense installations, and destroyed every shred of Japanese war materiel. They banned the manufacture of arms, munitions, and weapons, and stopped all research in such subjects as nuclear physics and aerodynamics. They melted down rifles and cannons for scrap and they detonated explosives or dumped them into the sea. The authorities eliminated Japan's civil aviation industry which once produced 2,700 planes per month and barred even the construction of model planes. They permitted GI's to send home tons of samurai swords for souvenirs. Within a few months, they reduced Japan's military power to nothing more than a disastrous memory.

At the end of the war more than 6,500,000 Japanese—soldiers and civilians—were scattered throughout Asia and the Pacific islands. SCAP undertook the tremendous task of bringing them home and repatriated more than 5,000,000 within a year. China, Korea, and the Philippines were glad to see the last of the Japanese old order, but the departure of the Japanese also represented an irreparable economic loss. The Soviet government never gave an accounting which was considered satisfactory by SCAP for more than 300,000 prisoners and internees allegedly retained in Soviet custody in North Korea, Siberia, and Manchuria.

SCAP set up in Tokyo an International Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) "to mete out stern justice to all war criminals including those

who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners." The trials lasted for two and a half years and ended with sentences of death for seven of the defendants, life imprisonment for sixteen, and lesser prison terms for two. Twenty-eight men, including Tojo, the former prime minister; Doihara and Itagaki, the chief architects of Japan's continental policies; Matsui, the commander of the Japanese forces during the rape of Nanking; and Hirota, the civilian front-man for the army cabal—these were held personally responsible for conspiring to wage aggressive war and committing crimes against peace and conventional laws. Their punishment satisfied a sense of justice on the part of the victorious, but it brought little consolation to the spirits of the losers. The Japanese doubted the justice of heaping the guilt of the nation on the shoulders of its leaders. The definition of their crime depended not upon legal abstractions but upon the devastating reality that Japan lost. The emperor was not subjected to trial, nor was Prince Higashikuni, who condemned the captured Doolittle flyers to death by beheading.

As many as 5,000 war criminals of lesser importance were tried and punished in courts set up in the former occupied areas and in Japan itself. Generals Yamashita and Homma were among the war criminals executed in the Philippines. The USSR tried and punished twelve Japanese army officers for plotting to use bacteriological warfare, and they used the device of the military courts to settle old scores with notorious White Russians, like General Semenov, who had been intriguing with the Japanese against the Soviet government for years in Northeast Asia. No trials were conducted anywhere for personnel of the victorious nations who might have been accused of crimes against the peace or of atrocities.

SCAP's demilitarization program left the Japanese unconvinced of the unimportance of military strength. Because of their own suffering due to the bombs, they had a deep aversion to war. They argued that at any cost they would never give occasion again for hostile planes to darken the skies over Japan. But they also realized that it was the superior military strength of the United States which beat them. American armies drove their armies out of the Southern Regions and the Pacific; the American Navy sank their tankers; and the American Air Force leveled their cities. Alien forces occupied their divine land, enemy ships rode at anchor in their harbors, and hostile tanks and guns rattled over their streets. Occupation troops rode in comfort in Japanese trains while their own boys jammed through the windows and vestibules of the old wooden cars. The Japanese were convinced of the superior military power of the United Nations, but they were skeptical of the better value of the American way of life. Some even thought that their emperor would discover a new mission for Japan and would

regain the international prestige for Japan which blundering generals and admirals had lost.

The Political Reorientation of Japan

The subtle process of democratization demanded more wisdom and finesse than the mechanical process of demilitarization. SCAP's directive was to use the existing government of Japan, not to support it. Changes initiated by the Japanese in the direction of modifying the feudal or authoritarian tendencies in government were to be permitted or favored. SCAP's objective was to achieve the eventual establishment of a peaceful and responsible government conforming to the principles of democratic self-government. SCAP itself was an autocratic military organization which in spite of a distinguished battery of civilian assistants exhibited a certain amount of naïveté about the practical workings of a democratic government.

Japanese exponents of militarism and militant nationalism were removed and excluded from public office and from any position of public or substantial private responsibility. Ultranationalistic organizations like the Reserve Officers' Association and the Black Dragon Society were dissolved. The program of the purge removed 120,000 teachers (one out of every four) and about 200,000 others who had served in the armed services, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the secret police and militaristic societies, and the economic oligarchy. The purge did much to eliminate temporarily the old leadership group, but it compounded Japan's difficulties in the absence of a new leadership.

The Civil Information and Education (CI and E) Section of SCAP launched a wholesale revamping of Japan's system of education. CI and E broke up the dictatorial control of the Ministry of Education over every phase of the learning process. It abolished military training and endeavored to eliminate the spirit of militarism from the curriculum. It eliminated from all schools the small shrines which housed pictures of the emperor and the empress and stopped the enforced visits by school children to Shinto shrines. It abolished courses called "morals" or "ethics," which were in large part used for nationalistic indoctrination, and substituted social studies in their place. It censored old textbooks and ordered the preparation of new ones. It invited experts from the United States to recommend suitable changes at every level. It sought to place the control of the schools in the hands of the local communities and to provide the opportunity for a higher education to every Japanese boy and girl. It got

rid of the old fascistic teachers and tried to encourage a liberalism among teachers and students which would not at the same time constitute a sell-out to the Communists.

SCAP directives in the fall of 1945 accomplished an apparent emancipation of an entire people that had been victimized by a totalitarian imperial structure. Political prisoners were released (including the Communists); the secret police were abolished; the powers of the Home Ministry were curbed; basic freedoms of speech, press, association, and religion were introduced. Civil liberties were mentioned in the constitution of 1889, but they were subject to the operation of law or simple ordinance. Suddenly the prospect of genuine rights for the individual was opened up to the Japanese. It was up to them to preserve those rights and to learn to discharge the responsibilities and obligations which were the inescapable concomitants of those rights. Japan's embryo struggles for liberty had been eclipsed by the military; the Occupation afforded a new opportunity to take up the torch which had been lighted by a handful of prewar Japanese liberals.

It seemed imperative either to amend the old constitution or to draw up a new one. After fruitless negotiations with Japanese politicians, the Government Section of SCAP drafted a new constitution and transmitted it to the Japanese Diet for its consideration, modification, and adoption. In legal form the new constitution was an amendment of the old; in content it was completely new. It went into effect in May, 1947, and on paper was a most progressive political document. It placed sovereignty in the hands of the people, not the emperor, and took from the emperor most of his former prerogatives. It guaranteed civil liberties unconditionally, including the right to work, to bargain collectively, to receive protection against economic exploitation, and to enjoy complete social equality. It provided for separation of church and state, for more local autonomy in government, and for an independent judiciary with the right of judicial review.

Article 9 contained the revolutionary provision by which the Japanese people forever renounced war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes, and pledged themselves never to maintain land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential. The words were inspired by Americans who believed that Japan would never be able to protect itself by its own strength, but the sentiment was a reflection of the Japanese disillusion with their past experience. Even the gods were regarded quizzically. The *torii*, or arches, in the midst of the six square miles of desolation in Hiroshima looked strangely out of place with the inscription, "Dedicated to the warrior-gods who have given their lives for our divine country."

The new constitution made the bicameral Diet (elected by universal adult suffrage) the instrument to express the will of the people. The Diet consisted of an upper house, or House of Councilors, of 250 members, and a lower house, or House of Representatives, of 466 members. The Diet was vested with legislative responsibilities including the control of the budget. The prime minister was to be chosen by the Diet from among its members, and a majority of the ministers of state composing the cabinet were to be appointed from the Diet. The prime minister was made responsible for the cabinet, and the cabinet was obliged to resign in the event of a resolution of nonconfidence. The traditional Japanese system of the militarists and the bureaucrats was abandoned, and in its place was adopted a typical Western system of parliamentary responsibility.

It was clear from the beginning that more than a constitution would be required to bring about effective democratization. The emperor issued a decree on New Year's Day, 1946, that the people should no longer believe in the myths of the divine origin of the emperor institution. He adopted a program designed to humanize his position. He moved freely among the people, he did not oblige the bystanders to turn their backs upon his car when it passed, and he welcomed their cheers. He visited the scene of mine disasters, he attended public functions, and he even took his wife to the ball game. The disappearance of the emperor myth necessitated a corresponding growth of ordinary democratic processes, and this was difficult to produce.

Politicians as a group enjoyed little public respect, and the first year of the Occupation did little to enhance their reputation. The Diet members were helpless before the whims of the Occupation, and they were in no position to conceive or launch a dynamic program. They busied themselves in strengthening their own organizations. Japan held its first postwar elections in April, 1946, when for the first time women were allowed to vote. Old-line, conservative politicians with adequate financial backing and support from bureaucratic, agrarian, or financial interests corralled a working majority in the House of Representatives. Prewar Minseito and Seiyukai, with well-phrased conservative platforms, appeared before the voters as Progressives and Liberals. The purges thinned their ranks and gave a fillip to the Social Democrats and the Communists. Yoshida Shigeru, who had been associated with the Seiyukai positivist, Baron Tanaka, and who had been Japanese ambassador in London and Rome during crucial prewar years, emerged as the leader of the Liberals. The Communists hated him because of his connections with the bureaucrats and the economic royalists. He was acceptable to the Occupation because he had had the good fortune to be thrown into jail by the militarists early in 1945 for advocating

an early end to the war. He served as prime minister during the first surge of the Occupation's reform movement.

After nearly a year in office he called for new elections in April, 1947. The Social Democrats won the largest bloc of votes and named a Christian, Katayama Tetsu, as prime minister. He gave way to Ashida Hitoshi in February, 1948. Ashida was ousted because of a nasty bribery scandal, and Yoshida returned to power in October, 1948. After three months, in January, 1949, Yoshida called for Japan's third postwar election. The 1949 elections greatly strengthened both the right and the left at the expense of the center. They gave Yoshida a working majority which he retained until the end of the Occupation. The Social Democrats failed to capture any significant following among the Japanese voters, but the Communists showed a latent vote-getting potential. The Communists won thirty-five seats in the 1949 House of Representatives.

As a result of the first phase of the occupation, General MacArthur stated:

The Japanese citizen no longer cringes in the presence of police or other public authority; his home has become his castle, free from unwarranted intrusion, observation or violence; he registers his opinion on public issues, uncontrolled except by his own conscience; he enjoys the right of assembly and petition; he worships as he chooses, in accordance with his individual religious faith; he enjoys the untrammelled right, individually or collectively with his fellow workers, to demand correction of unjust labor practices and conditions; and Japanese children, 18,000,000 of whom are presently enrolled, enjoy the right to liberal and free education in 40,000 public schools, now open and dedicated to the study of the arts and sciences and the historical truth and the development of enlightened thought.

He declared that for the first time every Japanese citizen could do what he wanted, go where he wanted, and say what he wanted, within the liberal laws of his land. He could select his own work and choose his own method of relaxation and enjoyment. On his day of rest he could worship as he pleased, and always he could criticize and express his views on the actions of his government.

This is liberty. Yet inherent in it are its obligations to act with decorum and self-restraint and become acutely conscious of the responsibilities which a free society imposes upon its every segment.

Second Phase of the Occupation

The first phase of the Occupation featured the effort to demilitarize and to democratize and lasted until the middle of 1947; the second phase

concentrated on economic rehabilitation and lasted until the end of the Occupation. In keeping with the requirements of the cold war, the Occupation modified many of the decisions of the earlier days, overlooked what it had previously emphasized, and set up new standards for measuring the success of its mission.

SCAP's program of political reform promised immeasurable success until it encountered the fundamental economic problems which were endemic in Japan and aggravated by the war. Population pressure increased in spite of fantastic casualties, and raw materials and consumers' goods remained in short supply. Japan's economic empire was shattered. One fourth of its industrial capacity was totally obliterated and another third was damaged. Its merchant marine was sunk. Most of its cities were in ashes and a large part of its working population was hungry and jobless. In Tokyo alone, a million and a half people stood in line every noon hour to purchase a *skimpy bowl of porridge or a crust of bread*. Bread was more important than directives or propaganda. Men were hungry: they talked about food and they thought about food. As wives wasted away for want of nourishment, husbands became desperate and lost their reason; as children sobbed for a bowl of rice, fathers looked with contempt on the amenities of law and order. The exhaustion of the Japanese spirit matched the desolation of the physical environment.

SCAP's directive in the economic field stated, "You will not assume any responsibility for the economic rehabilitation of Japan or the Japanese economy." It also contained the contradictory instruction to insure that "Japanese authorities . . . develop and effectively carry out programs . . . to avoid acute economic distress." Local resources were to be supplemented with imported supplies to prevent such widespread disease or civil unrest as would endanger the occupying forces or interfere with military operations. At first SCAP accepted no responsibility for Japan's economic improvement and took no official interest in the scandals of graft, corruption, and bribery which were commonplace even at the top of the Japanese bureaucracy. The Americans contented themselves with directives, while the lethargy and inefficiency of the Japanese officials failed to meet the recurring crises of supply and demand. Production lagged, trade came to a practical standstill, prices skyrocketed while both Japanese and Americans concentrated on problems of reparations, monopolies, economic controls, annihilation of warmaking potential, labor unions, and agrarian reform. Bitter critics talked about the unholy combination of the military mind, the new deal, and the Japanese bureaucracy.

Those nations which suffered at the hands of Japan expected reparations and looked to the United States to exact from Japan just reparations in

kind. The Pauley mission in the spring of 1946 surveyed Japan's potentialities and recommended, as basic reparations policy, the elimination of all Japan's war-making capacity and a harsh program of removals which would have reduced Japan to a minimum standard of living. Japan's level of living was to be no higher than that in the neighboring countries against which Japan had been guilty of aggression.

As war fever subsided and as the high cost of removals and the dubious value of Japan's facilities became apparent, a second mission carried out by a private firm, Overseas Consultants, Inc., of New York recommended drastic scaling down of reparations demands. Modest transfers of machine tools, laboratory and electrical equipment, and some interim facilities were made to China, the Philippines, and the colonial territories of Great Britain and the Netherlands.

In mid-1948, as the world situation deteriorated and as the assets of a prosperous Japan were viewed in a different light, a third mission consisting of distinguished American businessmen called attention to the compelling necessity of taking Japan off the American dole. In spite of the protests of China and the Philippines, on May 12, 1949, the United States announced the suspension of reparations payments.

The Americans themselves originally spearheaded the drive to reform Japan's economic organization. They believed that the extreme degree of monopolistic control by the *zaibatsu* gave Japan competitive advantages in buying, selling, and reducing the costs of services like financing, insurance, and transportation but that it also facilitated the program of imperialistic expansion. It made a travesty of free enterprise and it prevented the growth of a prosperous middle class. In the interest of a democratic basis for Japan's economic activities, the United States determined that the *zaibatsu* should be broken up. The assets of the largest holding companies were frozen and their stocks were exchanged for nonnegotiable, noninterest-bearing, taxable government bonds. Laws and regulations fostering monopolies were repealed and contracts for participation in international cartels were terminated. Members of the Mitsui, Iwasaki (controlling Mitsubishi), Sumitomo, and Yasuda families were ordered to resign and to cease to influence the management of their companies. Their properties were to be sold to workers, trade unions, co-operatives, and private purchasers outside the family. To some Americans this program seemed socialistic and repugnant to the basic right of property. The Diet passed two laws, the Anti-Monopoly Law of 1947 and the Trade Association Law of 1948, designed to carry out the American directives and to prevent the reappearance of monopolistic companies and practices. The laws

were difficult to enforce and were as honored in the breach as in the observance.

SCAP also encouraged the growth of trade unions as a means of building a positive democratic force in Japan's economy. Labor was guaranteed the right to organize and to bargain collectively. Six and a half million workers joined various unions and federated into a General Council of Trade Unions and a Japan Federation of Trade Unions. Experts from the AFL and the CIO joined the Labor Division of the Economic and Scientific Section in SCAP to assist in the guidance of the new labor giant. A spate of laws fixed labor standards for men, women, and minors; regulated rates of pay and working conditions; provided for workmen's compensation, unemployment insurance, vocational guidance, and public employment exchanges; and fostered conciliation, mediation, or arbitration in the event of industrial disputes.

The Occupation authorities attempted to alleviate Japan's difficult agrarian problem, which was, basically, too little land for too many people. Because of the harsh conditions of life in the rural areas—small farms, heavy taxes and debts, little income, and a high rate of tenancy—Japan's farmers had accepted the aggressive program of the militarists as their hope for a better future. The Occupation tried to abolish absentee landlordism, to set up a system of government sale of land to tenants at low prices and on easy terms, and to limit the size of farms generally to 2.5 acres for noncultivating landlords and 7.5 acres for owner-cultivators. Tenant-cultivated land decreased from 46 per cent of all cultivated lands in 1944 to 12 per cent in 1949. Farm-tenant households dropped from 27 per cent of all farm households to 6 per cent. For a time the lot of the farmer improved, primarily because of the high price of rice, particularly on the black market. Those who tilled the soil enjoyed more of the rewards of their own labor. But rural prosperity tended to level off owing to the decline of the black market, the increasing burden of taxes, the rising prices of manufactured goods, and the relentless rise in the rural population. Government assistance in co-operatives helped the farmers to a certain extent, but the best will in the world on the part of the government could not increase significantly the yield per acre or the amount of acreage under cultivation. The fragmentation of landholding could not guarantee higher production, but it seemed like a worth-while, stabilizing effort to create a new, solid bloc of landholding free enterprisers.

The Japanese had been promised a viable peacetime economy, and the United States assumed the responsibility for keeping that promise. It spent more than \$1,000,000 a day to import foodstuffs to keep Japan alive. Some Chinese remarked that they guessed that they were on the wrong side in

the war—if only they had lost, the American Army would have taken care of them. As time passed and the Communist menace in Asia grew, the United States perceived no possible way to reduce its own commitments without significant recovery on the part of Japan. General MacArthur wrote that if the Occupation could have ended by 1947, “I could with a completely clear conscience have reviewed my policy directive and reported, ‘Mission Accomplished.’” He wanted to withdraw the army of the Occupation, terminate SCAP, give Japan a peace treaty, and welcome it back into the family of nations.

The Occupation was costly, the Japanese were restive but stable, and the pyramiding economic crises in Japan demanded a type of permanent action which went far beyond the original military concepts of the Occupation. Because of the inescapable demands for food and jobs on the part of the Japanese and the inability on the part of the occupying powers to reach an agreement on reparations and Japan’s industrial recovery, “fright and indecision stalked the corridors of the General Headquarters while hunger and confusion walked the streets of Tokyo and Osaka.” The cold war dissipated the postwar vision of peace and harmony, and the advance of the Communists in Asia made the problem of Japan a vital concern to American security. As a careful American observer phrased the situation, “The eagle’s wings shade the Japanese from the light of the sun goddess on the right and from the red star on the left, but first the eagle protects itself.”

The United States government took decisive action late in 1948 by announcing a nine-point Economic Stabilization Program. This marked a radical reversal in policy: SCAP no longer contented itself with reform directives; it entered energetically into the business of putting Japan back on its feet. It assisted farmers and fishermen and sent whaling ships to the Antarctic. It made raw materials available, put the labor force back to work, and talked of making Japan the workshop of Asia to spark the recovery of the entire Far East. The aims of the Economic Stabilization Program were: (1) to balance the budget, (2) to enforce tax collections, (3) to limit extensions of credit, (4) to stabilize wages, (5) to strengthen price controls, (6) to improve foreign trade and foreign exchange controls, (7) to improve the allocations and rationing systems, (8) to increase the production of raw materials and manufactured goods, and (9) to improve the food collection program. The distinctive feature of the new program was the rigor of its enforcement rather than the novelty of its provisions. Mr. Joseph Dodge, a Detroit banker who acted as General MacArthur’s special adviser, warned the Japanese coldly, “There must be less thinking solely in terms of how much aid will be forthcoming and

more thinking of increased production, decreased costs, and greater exports."

The Japanese government discharged nearly 500,000 employees and stopped easy credits and subsidies which had been advanced to favored corporations. It enlisted the aid of civil affairs teams to assist in the collection of crops in the country and tax levies in the cities. It decelerated the dissolution of the zaibatsu in the interest of efficiency and it depurged thousands of previous purgees in order to utilize their services. It amended labor laws to limit or deny the right to strike. The unions had displayed a tendency to abuse their privileges and had tolerated an undue amount of Communist leadership. The government reminded labor of its obligation to contribute to the public welfare.

SCAP approved the establishment of a United States Aid Counterpart Fund as a national pump-primer, a pegged exchange rate of 360 yen to the dollar, and the reopening of stock exchanges. It encouraged private trade and foreign investments in Japan. Its abandonment of the reparations program coincided with a reduction of corporate taxes, permission to rebuild the merchant marine, and encouragement of production for export. Under the auspices of SCAP, the label, "Made in Occupied Japan," became a trade-mark introduced into more than 100 countries from Aden to Zanzibar. SCAP learned what prewar Japanese officials understood thoroughly: Japan had to export or die. There was no other way to provide jobs for the millions who were unable to live off the land. Japanese industries again turned to the production of machinery, ships, rolling stock, autos, and machine tools, and they found ready markets in a world which gasped for consumers' goods after the orgy of war and destruction. By 1950 the 1930-1934 level of production was reached, real wages were double those of 1946, the price level was stabilized, imports and exports were balanced, and Japanese payments on Occupation costs had reached the point where they exceeded by 20 per cent the American grants in aid. Japan at the end of the Occupation had twelve more millions of people to take care of than it had at the beginning of the Occupation.

Preparation for Peace

Sometime the Occupation had to come to an end, and Japan had to return to the family of nations. Both SCAP and the Japanese government wanted to return to normalcy as quickly as possible. They took progressive measures to taper off the responsibilities of the Occupation in the affairs of Japan pending the conclusion of an international treaty of peace. The philosophy

of the Occupation changed from the stern rigidity of a military operation to the friendly guidance of a protective force. American troops were reduced in numbers and civilian employees were reduced in force. Japanese were given rapidly increasing responsibilities for administration, although the United States retained a supervisory watch over government policies. The Japanese gradually renewed their participation in international affairs. Technicians went to India, Pakistan, and Malaya, while students, professors, and national leaders traveled extensively throughout Europe and the United States. The Japanese could not send regular diplomats and consuls abroad, but they established overseas agencies. They attended meetings and conferences and joined the International Labor Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, and the World Health Organization.

The problem of rearmament arose to plague the Japanese. The demilitarization program had seemed like such a utopia, and it was so cheap to have no taxes for airplanes, ships, and armies. Then in 1949 the American undersecretary of the army stated that Japan, too, should share responsibility and the cost for its own defense. He intimated that in the event of an attack from Russia the United States might retire, but he added, "It is surprising how many people invite you to stay when you reach for your hat." General MacArthur immediately went on record as saying that "we would certainly defend Japan, [that] we never intended Japan as an ally, [that] all we wanted was Japan to remain neutral and preserve its role as the Switzerland of the Pacific."

It was suggested that Japan might create a national police reserve, with light arms, to crush subversives. The Occupation's program of emancipation for the Japanese ironically provided an opportunity for the first time since the early thirties for the Communists to become a significant force in Japanese politics. The watchdog attitude of the government before the war put the Communists out of business or in jail. The release of the political prisoners in October, 1945, included Communists whose ranks were swelled by the return of Japanese from overseas. Some Communists were rather welcomed into Japan because of the resistance they had displayed against fascism and ultranationalism. Communists, too, collected in front of the General Headquarters and shouted "MacArthur *banzai*." Able leadership and strong party organization enabled the Communists to win an effective position among laborers, students, and "intellectuals." In 1949 the struggle sharpened between the Communists, on the one hand, and the Occupation authorities, the Japanese government officials, and the majority of the Japanese people on the other. The Communists resorted to sabotage, riots, denunciation of the Occupation, and in some instances

physical violence on Occupation personnel. In retaliation, the Japanese government deprived Communists of public position, suspended the newspaper *Akahata*, or *Red Flag*, and forced party leaders into hiding. These actions, taken with the approval of the American authorities, seemed to conflict with the guarantees of civil liberties and aroused memories of thought control by the hated constitutional police. In September, 1949, General MacArthur stated his conviction:

As a result, the threat of Communism as a major issue in Japanese life is past. It fell victim of its own excesses. The Japanese mind penetrated the hypocrisy supporting its position. This test of strength, while disturbing to orderly progress, served to bring to light for the first time the full latent power of the Japanese devotion to the concepts of freedom and the integrity of their constitutional processes.

At the beginning of 1950, General MacArthur believed that Japan was an oasis of tranquillity and progress and that "no place on earth was more completely at peace." Then the outbreak of the war in Korea shed new light on Japan's helplessness and caused the Japanese to increase enlistments for the National Police Reserve and the Maritime Safety Board (the Japanese equivalent of the Coast Guard). General MacArthur reflected that the concept of the renunciation of war represented one of the highest ideals of the modern world, but he insisted that "by no sophistry of reasoning can it be interpreted as a complete negation of the inalienable right of self-defense against unprovoked attack." He argued that if international lawlessness continued to threaten peace and to exercise dominion over the lives of men, "it is inherent that this ideal must give way to the overwhelming law of self-preservation, and it will become your [Japan's] duty within the principles of the United Nations in concert with others who cherish freedom to mount force to repel force." The specter of a rearmed Japan alarmed its neighbors, who reminded the United States, "You have ideals, but we have memories."

The Korean crisis sent a wave of fear over Japan. The Japanese believed that Korea was no more than a preliminary to the main attack which the Communists would launch against Japan. Japan placed all its strength at the disposal of the United Nations, although it could not act as a full-fledged ally because of the restrictions of the Occupation. Furthermore, Japanese were not welcome in South Korea, even as participants in an international expedition. Japanese nurses took care of the sick and wounded in base hospitals in Japan, and Japanese gave invaluable service as interpreters and linguists. Japanese workers serviced planes and vehicles and reconditioned and manufactured items of light equipment. Japanese industry

staved off the recession which threatened when the United States stopped its program of direct aid by filling procurement orders for essential supplies for use in the Korean War.

When President Truman replaced General MacArthur with Lieutenant General Ridgway as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Japan experienced a sense of uneasiness which was later allayed by assurances that the United States contemplated no change in the transition to peacetime status. General Ridgway sought primarily to keep Japan on an even keel while the powers continued the process of negotiating a peace of reconciliation. He authorized the Japanese government to review the ordinances issued to implement Occupation directives. In short order Japan depurged 160,000 of those who had been on the official lists, placed cautious limits on trade unions and the exercise of some civil rights, modified the laws against the *zibatsu*, and reinstituted national control over the local police. These measures indicated significant trends in Japan's political and economic development.

As General MacArthur surveyed the Occupation, he declared:

From the ashes left in war's wake, there has arisen in Japan an edifice dedicated to the primacy of individual liberty and personal dignity, and in the ensuing process has been created a truly representative government committed to the advance of political morality, freedom of economic enterprise, and social justice. . . . From this period of trial has, indeed, come a measure of the moral stature of the Japanese nation and people, who have met the challenge of a flaming Asia with calm deliberation, unruffled composure and quiet determination.

Some Japanese were more critical in their assessment of the Occupation. They believed that the Occupation could not be isolated from the past history of Japan and could be given only partial credit for Japan's development. The history of Japan prepared the soil; SCAP planted new seeds. Many Japanese admitted the gifts of life and political enlightenment and expressed their gratitude for the annihilation of the last remnant of Japan's insularity, but they pointed out negative aspects of the Occupation. One university professor declared that he had a deepened feeling that "one's own country and race are dearer than others, just as one's own body is dearer to one's self." He added, "The Americans kindly taught us that all their lip service to righteousness, morality and humanity will reach only as far as they benefit their own country and race." Another lamented the loss of the spirit of self-reliance, the spirit of independence, and the passion for life. Still another objected to the cheapness of fraternization, "which led GI's and Japanese girls to dog-ear their phrase books in quest of universal words."

To many it seemed that "freedom was what we gained, and freedom was what we lost by the American Occupation. Freedom could not be equated with the oppression which carpetbaggers who ruled GHQ and the sycophantic Japanese scalawags brought to bear upon our people. Freedom was like a mirage in the desert or a tower built on sand; it was easily given and too easily taken away." Old Japan, beneath the façade of Americanization, preserved its fundamental native characteristics and groped for its own norms of liberty. It looked forward to the treaty of peace when it could reassume its sovereign right to mold its own way of life and to participate as a full-fledged member in the society of nations.

Suggested Reading

- W. MACMAHON HALL, *Japan, Enemy or Ally?* (New York, 1949).
 RUSSELL BRINES, *MacArthur's Japan* (Philadelphia, 1948).
 ALLEN S. CLIFTON, *Time of Fallen Blossoms* (New York, 1951).
 ROBERT C. FEAREY, *The Occupation of Japan: Second Phase, 1948-1950* (New York, 1950).
 MARK GAYN, *Japan Diary* (New York, 1948).
 GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, SUPREME COMMANDER ALLIED POWERS, GOVERNMENT SECTION, *Political Reorientation of Japan, September, 1945-September, 1948* (Washington, 1950).
 ———, *Monthly Summaries of Non-Military Activities in Japan* (Tokyo, 1945-1948).
 ———, *Selected Data on the Occupation of Japan* (Tokyo, 1950).
 JOHN GUNTHER, *The Riddle of MacArthur* (New York, 1951).
 NOEL HEMMENDINGER, *United States Relations with Japan, 1945-1952* (New York, 1953).
 EDWIN M. MARTIN, *The Allied Occupation of Japan* (New York, 1948).
 EDWIN O. REISCHAUER, *The United States and Japan* (Cambridge, 1950).
 ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, *Japan in Defeat* (London, 1945).
 ROBERT TEXTOR, *Failure in Japan* (New York, 1951).
 U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, *Occupation of Japan, Policy and Progress, Publication 2671, Far Eastern Series 17* (Washington, 1946).
 ———, *The Far Eastern Commission* (written by Dr. George Blakeslee), *Publication 5138, Far Eastern Series 60* (Washington, 1953).
 HARRY EMERSON WILDES, *Typhoon in Tokyo* (New York, 1954).

CHAPTER 24

The Peace Settlement with Japan

As the occupation of Japan tapered off, the need for military supervision of Japan disappeared. A military machine for purposes of further democratization seemed anomalous because Japan despised all military government, whether Japanese or American. Japan wanted the restoration of its sovereignty, and the United States wanted Japan as an independent ally. Japan was regarded as an important defense anchor in the island rim of the western Pacific, and a bastion of democracy in East Asia. Japan was only minutes away from bomber bases in Siberia. Its industries would be invaluable to a Russian-led, Asian, Communist coalition. The urgency for peace between Japan and the United States—a state which implied mutual understanding and friendship—was primarily due to the necessity of keeping Japan out of the Russian orbit.

In the summer of 1947 the United States extended an invitation to the powers on the Far Eastern Commission to meet in conference to determine upon a draft treaty of peace subject to majority rule and no veto. The USSR and China, then under Chiang Kai-shek, objected. The USSR proposed the adoption of the Potsdam formula which specified that a draft treaty be drawn up by the Council of Foreign Ministers subject to the right of veto. In the light of the German deadlock, the United States rejected the Russian proposal. The USSR seemed in no hurry and pointed to the declaration of January 1, 1942, by which the United Nations pledged themselves to make no separate armistice and no separate peace. Meanwhile, the United States bore the costs of the Occupation and took the criticism for militaristic rule in Japan.

The United States decided to take action after the Communist victory in China and the outbreak of the Korean War. It was impractical to revive the old formula of a conference of the members of the FEC because they

were divided half and half on the question whether Nationalists or Communists should represent China. Since it was impossible to talk to these nations collectively, the United States undertook negotiations with them all individually. President Truman voiced the American demand for peace with Japan—with Russia if possible, without Russia if necessary. He risked accusations of violating the declaration of the United Nations and he risked open war on the part of Red China and the USSR. On February 14, 1950, those nations announced their Treaty of Alliance, pledging mutual assistance in the event of aggression by Japan or any power in concert with Japan. On September 8, 1950, President Truman named John Foster Dulles as his special ambassador in charge of peacemaking with Japan, and the State Department assigned a distinguished career officer, John Allison, as his assistant.

Mr. Dulles began negotiations with the various delegations at the United Nations in New York. He listed seven principles as indicative of the American position: (1) any or all parties then at war with Japan should be parties to the treaty; (2) Japan's entry into the United Nations should be anticipated; (3) with regard to territorial adjustments, Japan should recognize the independence of Korea, agree to UN trusteeship with the United States as the administering authority for the Ryukyus and the Bonin Islands, accept a later decision of the Big Four about the future of Formosa, the Pescadores, southern Sakhalin, and the Kuriles, and renounce its special rights and interests in China; (4) for security, Japan should accept co-operative responsibility between the facilities of Japan and the forces of the United States and perhaps other powers; (5) Japan should be given most-favored-nation treatment pending new commercial treaties; (6) claims should be waived; and (7) lingering disputes should be settled by diplomacy or international adjudication.

The United States naturally encountered contrary points of view. Russia asked if the United States intended to proceed with a separate peace in spite of its obligations; to restore Formosa to China, and the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin to Russia; to press for the trusteeship arrangement for the Ryukyus and the Bonins in spite of its declarations of no annexation of territory; to withdraw its Occupation forces and to give guarantees against Japanese rearmament; to provide opportunity for the Japanese people to develop freely their own economy; and to discuss all these matters with Communist China. In reply, the United States, which felt strongly that it had contributed more than its share for victory, affirmed that no single nation should have the perpetual power to veto the conclusion of peace with Japan. It pointed out that the Cairo and Yalta agreements were not final and were subject to the views of others who were not at those con-

ferences. It refused to equate trusteeship with territorial expansion and to deprive Japan of reasonable assurance of collective security. It denied any intention of limiting Japan's peacetime economy and suggested that it could not seek to ascertain the views of Red China in peacemaking because of the absence of diplomatic channels.

Nationalist China argued that it had suffered most at the hands of Japan and wanted a settlement which would exact no revenge but would brook no coddling. It wanted substantial reparations, permanent elimination of Japan's militarism, reduction of Japan's industrial capacity, and outside control of Japan for fifty years. Red China shared the anti-Japanese sentiments of Nationalist China, but it demanded that Peking and not Formosa should participate in the preparation, drafting, and signing of the peace treaty.

The Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand rejected peace proposals without the creation of a strong fabric of peace in the Pacific which would guarantee their protection against possible renewed Japanese aggression. The Philippines expected reparations and they nurtured bitter memories of the sack of Manila. Australia would not soon forget the specter of Japanese invasion while its own boys were off in Africa. Nor would it forgive Japan for the inhuman treatment of prisoners of war in the jungles of Burma and Thailand. The Australians were not convinced that the Japanese nation had experienced any change of heart or had imported "democracy with Coca-Cola bottles." They wanted restrictions on Japan's economic revival, particularly on its heavy industries, shipping, and foreign trade. They argued for extended American control of Japan and warned against the ominous reappearance of militarism and economic monopoly in the island empire. They resisted stubbornly the concessions to Japan which the United States and the United Kingdom were inclined to make. On June 11, 1947, the *Sydney Sun* said:

The resumption of trade relations with the Japanese does not imply the slightest change of heart on our part. There can be no sympathy, no magnanimous forgive-and-forget philanthropy in our new dealings with that barbarous and suavely treacherous race. . . . So without burying our bitter memories of a dehumanized enemy's monstrous crime, we shall have to resume peaceful trade as a matter of sheer economic necessity.

India, Pakistan, and Indonesia insisted upon their important stakes in the peace arrangements. India and Pakistan had not felt the weight of the invader's heel and were content to deprive Japan of its former economic predominance in Asia. Indonesia, on the other hand, sought reparations and compensation for the loot which Japanese drained back to their homeland.

Korea was never consulted but publicly presented its case that after forty years of tragedy, humiliation, sorrow, misery, and hunger it was entitled to all Japanese property in Korea. "Even that would not pay one-tenth the debt that Japan owes to Korea." The British had some differences of opinion with the Americans but none vital except on the problem of who should represent China.

Japan itself had nothing to say about the shape of the treaty except by the courtesy of the American negotiators. Japan's officialdom chafed at the restrictions upon Japan and objected to the words "violence and greed" as used in the Cairo Declaration. Japan believed that its acquisitions in Asia were accomplished by processes then in vogue and sealed by universally recognized treaties. It was in no mood to jeopardize the good will which it had won during the Occupation and cherished in silence the rising importance which the United Nations assigned to the co-operation of the new Japan. Some Japanese began to conjecture about territorial rectifications *and to wonder—in private—whether they might not suggest the return of special interests in Korea, Manchuria, or Formosa as payment for their commitments in a possible world war.* Japan wanted a general peace pact with as many nations as would sign. Prime Minister Yoshida committed Japan "definitely and irrevocably to the side of the free world" and supported the Americans in their procedures which ignored the protests of the USSR and Red China. Yoshida said with regard to China, "Red or White, China remains our next-door neighbor. Geography and economic laws will, I believe, prevail in the long run over ideological differences and artificial trade barriers."

Mr. Dulles and his staff spent nearly a year in reconciling conflicting points of view. They visited Japan twice and conducted conversations in ten world capitals. Sometimes they talked with Russians, sometimes they exchanged notes, but they never acceded to Russia's filibustering tactics. After a series of drafts and amendments, they reached agreement with the British on a final text which was circulated in August, 1951, to the nations invited to the San Francisco Conference. This conference was not a discussion conference in the ordinary sense of the word, because the discussions were concluded before the conference assembled. The powers were invited to come and to sign, a technique with which the Russians themselves were intimately acquainted.

Analysis of the Treaty of Peace with Japan

The peace settlement with Japan was not limited to the single treaty of peace signed at San Francisco on September 8, 1951. It also properly

included a prior Mutual Assistance Treaty between the Philippines and the United States signed in Washington on August 30, 1951; a Mutual Security Pact between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States (the Anzus Pact) signed in San Francisco two days later; a bilateral Security Pact between the United States and Japan signed at the Presidio in San Francisco on September 8, 1951; an exchange of notes on the same date between the United States and Japan pledging Japan to permit and facilitate the support, in and about Japan, of the forces engaged in the United Nations action in the Far East; and an administrative agreement concluded on February 28, 1952, between the United States and Japan implementing their bilateral Security Pact.

The treaty of peace was a treaty of reconciliation. It was nonpunitive and nondiscriminatory, and restored Japan to dignity, equality, and opportunity in the family of nations. It was not merely an act of generosity toward a vanquished foe but was considered by the United Nations as an act of enlightened self-interest.

In the preamble, Japan declared its intention to apply for membership in the United Nations; to conform to the principles of the charter; to adhere to the new ideals of human rights and freedoms which were implanted in the constitution and laws of Japan; and in international trade, to conform to internationally accepted fair trade practices. The preamble was most notable for its omissions. It omitted any legal compulsion to preserve the reforms of the Occupation. The powers were convinced that 85,000,000 people could not be compelled against their will and must be accorded the right to determine for themselves the fate of the emperor system, the constitution, and the democratization program.

Chapter I of the treaty ended the state of war and recognized the full sovereignty of the Japanese people.

Chapter II dealt with territory. It ratified the Potsdam surrender terms which limited Japan's sovereignty to the four main islands and such minor islands as might be determined. Without providing for the disposition of territories taken from Japan, it obliged Japan to renounce all right, title, and claim to Korea, to Formosa and the Pescadores, to the Kurile Islands and southern Sakhalin, to its former mandates, to the Antarctic area, and to the Spratly and Paracel Islands. With regard to the Japanese Islands south of twenty-nine degrees (including the Ryukyus), Japan retained the sovereignty but recognized the American right of administration. Japan expressed its concurrence in any proposal to place these islands under the trusteeship system of the United Nations, with the United States as the sole administering authority. Before the war these territories were valuable as colonies but not as outlets for Japanese emigration. Formosa attracted only 350,000 Japanese, Korea 650,000, and southern Sakhalin 350,000.

Territorial losses might serve as excuses for future irredentist agitation, but they were not serious aggravations of Japan's basic population problem.

Chapter III was entitled "Security." It bound Japan to the peaceful principles of the United Nations, a precaution taken in view of the anticipated Russian veto of Japan's application for membership in the United Nations. It obligated Japan to refrain from the use of force in its international relations, but it recognized that Japan possessed the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense. All Occupation forces were to be withdrawn not later than ninety days after the coming into force of the treaty, but some of these forces might be retained and stationed in Japan in consequence of a bilateral or multilateral agreement between one or more of the Allied powers and Japan. Otherwise, Japan would be defenseless in the face of proved aggression. The provisions of the Potsdam Proclamation dealing with the return of the Japanese forces to their homeland were to be carried out. (This reference was for the benefit of the prisoners of war still in the hands of the Russians.) All Japanese property used by the Occupation was to be returned within ninety days of the coming into force of the treaty.

Chapter IV contained political and economic clauses. Japan was not to be subjected to any permanent discriminations and disabilities; her economy was to be unrestricted, and her right to trade, unlimited. Permanent agreements regarding trade and commerce, fishing on the high seas, and international air transport were to be negotiated between Japan and the Allied powers so desiring. For an interim period, each Allied power would be entitled to most-favored-nation treatment in customs duties—on a basis of reciprocity—and to national treatment with respect to shipping, navigation, and imported goods. Japan recognized the full force of all treaties terminating the late war in Europe, renounced all rights and interests derived from World War I, renounced all special rights and privileges in China, and accepted the judgments of the IMTFE and other Allied war crimes courts.

Chapter V, "Claims and Property," covered the controversial matter of reparations. It was implied that those who suffered at the hands of Japan were entitled to reparations, but that Japan *presently* simply could not pay if it were to maintain a viable economy and meet its other obligations. This chapter recognized clearly and unambiguously that Japan should pay reparations and obligated Japan promptly to enter into negotiations with Allied powers so desiring, whose present territories were occupied by Japanese forces, to make available the service of the Japanese people in production, salvaging, and other work. The victorious powers would supply the goods and the Japanese would do the work. The Allied powers were also

entitled to take over Japanese property in their jurisdiction. Japanese property in neutral or ex-enemy countries was to be transferred to the international Red Cross for the benefit of former prisoners of war or their families. Allied property in Japan was to be restored to its original owners or to be compensated for in blocked yen. Japan affirmed its liability for prewar external debts and for obligations to pay debts arising out of prewar contracts. It waived all claims arising from the war or the Occupation and recognized the validity of all transactions during the period of the Occupation.

Although Korea was never at war against Japan and although China was not represented at the San Francisco Conference, the treaty made special provision for the interests of Korea and China. It treated Korea like an Allied power. It provided for the recognition of Korea's independence by Japan and obligated Japan to enter into negotiations for the transfer of large holdings of Japanese property to Korea. Korea was placed on a parity as regarded postwar trading, maritime, fishing, and other commercial arrangements. China was given the right to a separate peace treaty with Japan on the same terms as the present treaty and was assured the renunciation of all Japan's special rights and interests in China.

The final chapters provided that any dispute concerning the interpretation or the execution of the treaty should be referred to the International Court of Justice and defined the process of ratification.

The Security Pact and the Administrative Agreement

When the Treaty of Peace was presented to the San Francisco Conference, it was generally accepted that if military rule continued indefinitely to be supreme in Japan the Occupation would degenerate into imperialism and colonialism. However, the realities of the Korean War and international communism in East Asia demanded something more than a treaty of peace with Japan. What good would it do to restore sovereignty to Japan if that were to condemn Japan to helplessness? It seemed essential to reinforce ideals with practical security arrangements. Therefore the Security Pact between the United States and Japan and the subsequent administrative agreement within its framework were integral parts of the peace settlement.

On February 2, 1951, at a luncheon of the Japan-American Society in Tokyo, Mr. Dulles said: "If Japan desired, the United States would sympathetically consider the retention of United States armed forces in and about Japan." Nine days later, Premier Yoshida replied, "In the face of the overt and devastating Communist aggression going on in Korea today,

[we] warmly welcome the ambassador's invitation." This was the core of the idea of the Security Pact: a provisional, temporary device to afford protection for a nation unable to exercise its own right of self-defense.

According to this short agreement, Japan granted and the United States accepted the right to dispose forces in and about Japan. Such forces might be utilized for maintenance of peace and security in the Far East and for the security of Japan against armed attack from without, including assistance given to the Japanese government to put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan caused through instigation or intervention by an outside power or powers. During the exercise of this right, Japan would not grant, without prior consent of the United States, any bases or any military rights whatsoever to any third power. The Security Pact would expire whenever in the opinion of the governments of the United States and Japan there should have come into force such United Nations arrangements or such alternative dispositions as would satisfactorily provide for peace and security in the area of Japan.

The subsequent administrative agreement (signed February 28, 1952) made the practical arrangements for the disposition of the American armed forces in Japan on the new post-Occupation basis. It covered the use of facilities and areas and the sharing of costs, privileges, and exemptions, including jurisdiction over persons. Pending the eventual relinquishment of the facilities and areas, the United States should have the right, power, and authority as necessary for their establishment, use, operation, defense, and control. American armed forces as well as the civilian component and their dependents were given special status with regard to taxes, customs, claims, and contracts and were extended limited extraterritorial privileges in judicial processes.

The San Francisco Conference

A formal peace conference usually precedes the conclusion of a treaty, but in this instance the delegations from fifty-two nations came to San Francisco to express their ideas or opinions and to sign the document already finalized. Surprisingly, the Soviet bloc decided to attend. The neutrals and ex-enemies in World War II were not invited. Burma and India chose not to attend: Burma, because it believed the treaty to be too liberal to Japan, and India, because it believed the treaty to be too harsh. India stated its conviction that the treaty did not concede to Japan a position of honor, equality, and contentment and that it would not enable all countries specially interested in the Far East to subscribe to the treaty sooner or later. Specifically, India

contended that Japan would want full sovereignty over territory of which the inhabitants have a historic affinity for her own people, like the Ryukyus and the Bonins. India argued that having Occupation troops stay in Japan was bound to give rise to the impression that the Security Pact did not represent free choice. It did not seem just nor expedient that Formosa, the Kuriles, and southern Sakhalin should be left to face an undetermined future.

In its reply to India the United States expressed surprise that India felt that the treaty did not provide Japan with a position of honor, equality, and contentment, particularly in view of Premier Yoshida's own testimony, "The treaty as it stands reflects abundantly American fairness, magnanimity, and idealism." The United States could not understand why India injected a new principle—historical affinity—as a basis for territorial redistribution when it had expressed no objection during five and a half years to the announced intention to limit Japan to four main islands and such minor islands as might be determined. Why should India object to an administrative arrangement with regard to the Ryukyus and still advocate the transfer of full sovereignty over the Kuriles to the USSR? India's security idea for Japan did not seem practical; neither Japan nor the United States wished that Japan should be totally defenseless in close proximity to proved aggressors. The United States regretted that it was impossible to arrive at any permanent solution for the future of Formosa and repeated its own distaste for colonialism and imperialism.

Everyone at San Francisco deplored the absence of a representative of the Chinese nation. The Soviet bloc missed Red China; the United States deplored the absence of the Nationalists. Chou En-lai, the Foreign Minister of Red China, said:

The American-British Draft Peace Treaty with Japan completely violates international agreements, infringes upon the interests of Allied Powers which took part in the war with Japan, is hostile to China and the Soviet Union, signifies a threat to the peoples of Asia, violates peace and security throughout the world and will be detrimental to the interests of the Japanese people.

The Nationalist government approved generally the terms of the treaty, but felt that it should have been invited to sign. It blamed Mr. Dulles for accepting the British point of view regarding Chinese participation and it would have welcomed an Allied statement that the treaty with Japan would go into effect only at the same time that a similar treaty between Japan and China should be concluded.

Delegations at San Francisco emphasized their own hopes and disappointments in the treaty. Nearly everyone was obliged to sacrifice some special

interest for the sake of unity and solidarity. The conference offered the last opportunity to complete the record. The United States and the United Kingdom were the co-sponsors of the conference. President Truman opened it. Secretary of State Acheson presided and Mr. Dulles, in his opening statement, explained the philosophy of the treaty and its contents. Mr. Younger spoke for the British Commonwealth and explained how three Commonwealth conferences—at Canberra in the summer of 1947, Colombo in January, 1950, and London in January, 1951—had supplemented the ordinary British diplomatic efforts at treaty-making.

The Soviet bloc endeavored to “confuse, disrupt, and divide” from the opening session. Mr. Gromyko called for the admission of Red China and *then offered nine objections and thirteen amendments to the treaty. His objections were that the treaty*

- (1) gave no guarantee against the rebirth of Japanese militarism or the renewal of Japanese aggression;
- (2) did not provide for the withdrawal of American troops;
- (3) did not prevent Japan from joining in an aggressive bloc in the Far East against China or the USSR;
- (4) did not provide for the continuation of democratization, nor prevent the rebirth of Fascist organizations in Japan;
- (5) did not restore to China territories including Formosa;
- (6) did not carry out the terms of the Yalta agreement regarding the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin;
- (7) made Japan's economy the slave of foreign monopolies;
- (8) ignored the legitimate claims of some nations for reparations, yet imposed upon Japanese labor a slavery-like obligation;
- (9) constituted not a treaty of peace but a preparation for a new war in the Far East.

Mr. Gromyko's amendments included territorial adjustments in favor of China and the USSR; Japanese retention of sovereignty over the Ryukyus, Bonins, and other small islands; exclusion of foreign troops and bases in Japan; provision for a conference on reparations; a veto right over the ratification process; guarantees of continued democratization; prohibition of resurgence of Fascist organizations in Japan; prohibition of any coalition or alliance against any of the ex-Allies; limitation of Japan's armed forces to 150,000 for the army, 25,000 personnel and 75,000 tons of ships for the navy, 20,000 personnel and 150 planes (no bombers) for the air force, and 200 medium and heavy tanks for the armored forces; limitation of military training; prohibition of atomic weapons, guided missiles, long-range guns, mines and torpedoes; unrestricted development of trade, peaceful industries, and access to raw materials; and demilitariza-

tion of the Straits of La Perouse, Nemuro, and the entire Japanese coast, with the straits open for passage of warships belonging to powers adjacent to the Sea of Japan. As Mr. Dulles pointed out, this last clause would have barred American and Allied ships from the Sea of Japan and converted it into a Russian lake.

The delegations from the USSR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia failed to win Asians by their propaganda. Some delegations—from France, Ceylon, and Nicaragua—were coldly logical and restrained in their opposition to the Russian point of view. Others, particularly New Zealand and Australia, were bitterly outspoken. Mr. Spender (Australia) was called a “provincial demagogue” by the Polish delegate but his words reflected a majority opinion at San Francisco. For example:

The treaty, it is further alleged by Soviet Russia, is not one for peace, but, they say, for another war. . . .

I do not know what the men in the Kremlin who direct the destiny of the Russian people think, for the devil himself knows not the minds of some men!

. . . [Do they believe], for instance, that we of Australia are willing to enter into any treaty . . . “to clear the path for Japan’s participation in an aggressive bloc?”

Then he continued:

. . . how are we to take seriously the representative of Soviet Russia, who pretends to be concerned that the Japanese shall be given these freedoms, not one of which Russia is prepared to give to its own people or the peoples of the nations that are subject to its iron determination? . . .

The lamps of freedom have been extinguished by Russia over vast portions of the globe, and if she had her way, the world would be plunged utterly into darkness. . . .

. . . I do not doubt that men and women throughout the world . . . are not greatly different from one another in their intense desire to dwell in peace. If, Sir, we could only remove some of the misunderstandings which presently confound us, if only we could break through the miasma of doubt, fear, suspicion, and often wilful misunderstandings which prevent us from seeing one another clearly, if only as a beginning we could reach agreement on even one or two of the issues which divide the world, little by little we may reach upward to the stars and find peace for humanity.¹

Most delegations limited themselves to statements of their special interests, but with disarming brevity the delegate from Iraq said, “I merely wish

¹ Japanese Government, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Provisional Verbatim Minutes of the Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Treaty of Peace with Japan* (Tokyo, n.d.), pp. 283, 288, 289, 291.

to state that I am under no instruction to make any comments on the Draft Peace Treaty with Japan. Thank you." The Latin Americans generally expressed their approval of the emphasis on principles, but Chile and the Argentine noted the waiving of Japanese claims to the Antarctic area. The Middle East—with Egypt as the prime spokesman—deplored the stationing of troops in Japan, cautioned that the Arab bloc had trading relations which would limit the privileges which might be given to Japan at a later time, and wished that the principle of self-determination might have been applied in the territories which were taken from Japan. Asian delegations generally referred to "the liberation" of Japan, another Asian nation. European delegations tended to emphasize the potential role of the new Japan in strengthening the democratic nations in the world system of collective security.

Norway asked that merchant seamen be given the same opportunity for indemnification as the members of the armed forces; the Netherlands hoped for a subsequent treaty with Japan which would take into account Dutch wishes relating to reparations, fisheries, waiver of claims, and indemnification of internees and prisoners of war; New Zealand expressed less than complete satisfaction with the political and economic clauses. Australia could not discard its fears of Japan and would have wished to see included in the treaty some limitation upon Japan's right to rearm, the range and composition of Japan's defense forces, the extent of its shipbuilding capacity, and the manufacture of atomic weapons. Canada looked to subsequent negotiations to protect its interest in fisheries and to supplement Japan's agreement to conform to internationally accepted fair-trade practices.

Two of Japan's indignant and apprehensive neighbors, Indonesia and the Philippines, insisted firmly on their right to reparations. Indonesia demanded also that Japan promptly enter into negotiations for the regulation or limitation of fishing in Indonesian waters. The Philippines, in the person of Carlos P. Romulo, voiced its desire to see assistance given to Japan in developing its system of education and political institutions. General Romulo said:

... it is straining human credulity to believe that Japan . . . has been completely and permanently transformed from the aggressive, feudal, militarist police state which it has been for centuries, into a practicing and thorough-going democracy.

The Philippines, too, would have liked greater guarantees against Japanese rearmament and the resurgence of Japanese aggression. They were silenced only by the United States-Philippines Security Pact, just as Australia and New Zealand were silenced by the Anzus pact. General

Romulo made a brave effort to conceal the wounds of war which had scarred the souls of his people; still, he said:

'The cold print of a treaty does not automatically bring peace or create the reality of peaceful relations between Japan and its neighbors.

In his own graphic manner, he concluded his address by saying directly to the Japanese people:

You have done us a grievous injury, and words can never repair it nor all the gold or worldly goods you have. But fate has decreed that we must live together as neighbors, and as neighbors we should live in peace. We have a saying in Asia that all men are brothers under the canopy of heaven. But brotherhood is a way of the heart, and before it can blossom forth, the heart must be clean and pure. We are eager that the fangs of hatred shall be buried forever between us, but before this is done, before we extend the hand of forgiveness and brotherhood, we shall await some clear sign from you of spiritual contrition and renewal.²

No one at the Conference felt that the treaty was perfect, yet all but the Soviet bloc signed (forty-nine out of fifty-three). Mr. Dulles best characterized the attitude toward the treaty when he remarked, "There come times when to seek the perfect is to lose the good." Premier Yoshida paid his respects to "this fair and generous treaty" and then went on to speak with diffidence about certain points which caused him pain and anxiety. He referred to territorial losses, international economic prospects, and the repatriation of 340,000 Japanese who failed to return. He expressed Japan's keen determination to establish international relations of mutual trust and to work with other nations for the advancement of world freedom. He turned to the sinister thoughts of totalitarian oppression and tyranny whose forces were sweeping over half the Asian continent, sowing seeds of dissension, spreading unrest and confusion, and breaking out into open aggression at the very door of Japan, and declared:

. . . It is imperative for the sake of our very existence that we take an adequate security measure. This should not raise a bugbear of Japanese peril. Japan, beaten and battered, dispossessed of her overseas possessions and resources, is absolutely incapable of equipping herself for modern warfare to such an extent as to make her a military menace to [her] neighbors. For that she has not the material, she has not the means, she has not the will.³

He paid tribute to Generals MacArthur and Ridgway for what they had done for Japan under the Occupation, and expressed his sincere hope that Japan would be permitted to join the United Nations. Then he concluded:

² *Ibid.*, pp. 259, 266.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 330.

It is with feelings of sorrow that we recall the part played in that catastrophic human experience [World War II] by the old Japan. I speak of the old Japan because out of the ashes of the old Japan there has arisen a new Japan. My people have been among those who suffered greatly from the destruction and devastation of the recent war. Purged by that suffering of all untoward ambition, of all desire for the path of military conquest, my people burn now with a passionate desire to live at peace with their neighbors in the Far East and in the entire world and to rebuild their society so that it will in ever greater fullness yield better life for all.⁴

Japan's Reaction to the Peace Settlement

When the newspapers, radio, and moving pictures brought to Japan the news of the completion of the peace settlement, Japan reacted with consummate restraint. The Japanese people exhibited the discipline which advised continued restraint until the paper clauses should become legal realities. The Osaka paper lantern manufacturers had anticipated sales of millions, but they were obliged to unload at a loss. The Japanese showed a genuine appreciation of the responsibilities which came to them with the restoration of their sovereignty. No more Occupation militarism, to be sure; but then, no more positive assurance of American help. Japan was to be free, but the Japanese were fearful lest that freedom be marred by economic depression.

The Japanese were victims, in a sense, of the Communist aggression in Asia. Before the Korean War, the Japanese minority party, the Socialists, supported by trade unions, student federations, and some intellectuals had popularized a three-point program: over-all peace with all nations, permanent neutrality, and no foreign troops or bases in Japan. The Japanese disliked giving up the utopia of no arms and no war to which their constitution had dedicated them. They did not want to take sides in the world conflict, to build new armies, and to retain American troops, but there seemed no possible alternative. Leading Japanese newspapers stated, "To oppose stationing of troops in Japan is sheer sentimentality." "We cannot welcome foreign troops, but it is necessary." The *Nippon Times*, September 10, 1951, editorialized:

It is imperative that Japan seek refuge in the collective security structure of nations with whom she shares common aspirations for a free and peaceful world. [The Security Pact] is a natural and indispensable instrument of defense born of the confirmed rapaciousness of the Communists and of Japan's absolute defenselessness. . . . Where international bandits roam, weakness is an open invitation to aggression.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 331.

The former president of Keio University, Koizumi Shinzo, defended the Security Pact as serving the interests of the United States but also serving the interests of Japan. He admitted that it was by no means an honor for such a big country as Japan to defend herself with the help of foreign troops, but he thought that it was necessary to tolerate such conditions in the interest of peace. Curiously enough, the ultranationalists welcomed the peace settlement as the fastest way to resume Japan's mission in East Asia. A clear majority in Japan, perhaps as many as two to one, thought that the peace settlement exceeded reasonable expectations. But a vocative, isolated, and disorganized minority registered their doubts. Other leading Japanese newspapers wrote, "We do not like to deepen the gulf between ourselves and a neighboring nation, even if it is a Communist nation"; "Japan intends neither to antagonize unduly the so-called totalitarian nations nor aggravate the antagonism between the two worlds by joining the ranks of the free nations—our resolve for peace is much stronger than that expressed by Mr. Yoshida." President Nambara of Tokyo University thought that to abandon the renunciation of war and neutrality at its first real test was immoral and spiritually shattering. Hashimoto Tetsuma, a right-wing commentator, in referring to the stripping of Japan's territories, said:

We got our independence—84,000,000 people crowded into a prison with life sentences—and if American wisdom is limited to crowding us into such narrow confines expecting birth control to answer our problems, then I doubt whether Americans are intelligent enough to stop a third world war.

The Socialists continued to talk about their three-point program, although in the aggrieved tones of a lost cause. Some economic interests brought up the problem of trade with Red China and suggested being excused from reparations because of their own sufferings. Some Japanese expressed concern over "their loyal Ryukyuan brothers" and others tried to elicit sympathy for Japanese aspirations for the recovery of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. A respected magazine, featuring criticism of the peace settlement, sold five editions of its 272-page publication the first month. It was advertised as the stifled voice of the Japanese people. The articles bore such titles as "Abuse of Peace," "Avoid Rearmament," "Do Not Send Our Students Again to the Battlefields," "The Security Pact Does Not Guarantee Peace," and "We Must Now Cast Away Our Cowardly Silence." As a preface, the editor wrote:

Again we risk ravages of war against our families, our children, our modest happiness and all our humane hopes. Let us know the significance of our problem. Let us remember our fathers, husbands, brothers who per-

ished in the remote areas of the continent or the far-flung corners of the South Seas. They all died without even knowing for what they were fighting.

President Abe Yoshishige of the Peers School (which has the scions of the most illustrious families in Japan as its students and alumni) agreed that "the Treaty is not so much a peace treaty with Japan as a war treaty against other peoples." His colleague, Professor Shimizu Ikutaro, deplored the alliance with the United States, alleged that the militarists would soon be back again, and asserted that Japan would be the first target of the Russian A-bomb. He reflected the bitter Japanese conviction that an atom bomb is a personal device of the devil. Yamakawa Hitoshi called Dulles's "vacuum theory" a "vicious agitation propaganda aimed straight at driving the nation to rearmament and war by means of a false illusion." To him, rearmament was more dangerous than the threat of invasion. He said that the maximum army which Japan could afford would be so many toy soldiers and

no one except the great can depend on herself today—hence the United Nations. Rearmament is more an excuse for invasion than protection against it. . . . At any cost, adhere to the Constitution.

The Japanese welcomed the Treaty of Peace but accepted grudgingly the Security Pact. They worried about the costs, dangers, and inadequacies of rearmament. Premier Yoshida said in private conversation it would wreck Japan's budget even to build one warship, and he expressed his uncertainties about the constitutionality of a rearmament program. To him the Security Pact, "under which American forces at our request will be stationed in and about our territory," was the only means to protect unarmed Japan and to join in a common defense of the Pacific against the menace of communism, "which seeks to conquer the world through propaganda, infiltration, and force." The Communists were loud in their propaganda against the peace settlement. All Japanese except the very young—regardless of any alleged penchant for discipline and the glitter of military uniforms—had suffered too much because of the sword and resisted the vague day-dream that revived militarism promised economic prosperity. They therefore approved the Security Pact and its implied rearmament as the only possible alternative for their own self-defense.

Final Steps

Both houses of the Japanese Diet approved the Treaty of Peace and the Security Pact by overwhelming majorities. The emperor signed the treaties

on November 19, 1951, and sent his special envoy to deposit the Japanese ratifications in Washington on November 25. The British House of Commons and the American Senate approved the treaties with a sprinkling of negative votes. The British opposition argued in the main that the timing was wrong; it was wrong to exclude Peking and Moscow; and it was wrong to omit safeguards against unfair competition. The Americans needed to be satisfied that nothing in the treaties constituted an approval of the Yalta agreement.

In Australia, the Liberal-Country government had a more difficult time against the Labor minority. Mr. Casey, for the government, argued that

the potential enemy is international Communism and that is 100 times more important to us than Japan can be during the next decade. . . . Japan is the prize Communism covets and if a Communist Power ever takes over Japan, Australia would be seriously endangered. A rearmed Japan is less dangerous than a power vacuum.

Mr. Evatt, for the opposition, replied that it was a deadly delusion to think that Japan would fight for the free world. He thought that Japan still hated the West and its atomic bomb and that it might remain neutral or fight on whichever side would best serve its interests in the long run. He culminated his oratorical blast with the assertion, "This is not a hard peace or a soft peace but a scandalous peace, because it has been forced upon us in a Hitlerite manner with a minimum of discussion." The government ratified the treaty with Japan by a comfortable majority in April, 1952.

Indonesia and the Philippines delayed ratifications pending a settlement on reparations. But in accordance with the provision that the treaty would become effective upon ratification by the majority of signers including the United States, the treaty entered into force on April 28, 1952. On the same day Japan made peace with Nationalist China. China registered its faith that Japan had abandoned her imperialism and become an outpost for the world's defense against communism. Japan recognized Chiang Kai-shek as the sovereign authority in Formosa, the Pescadores, and the territories which might in the future come under his control. On June 9, 1952, Japan made peace with India. The two countries officially "renewed their ancient ties," dedicated themselves to peace and security within the framework of the United Nations, and granted each other reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment in commercial matters. On November 5, 1954, Japan came to terms with Burma. Only Russia remained legally at war

with Japan and Red China reserved the right to renegotiate a settlement on its own behalf.

First steps in peace-making with Japan were auspicious from the point of view of Japan and the United States. Japan had further tasks to perform. It had to complete the re-establishment of its diplomatic structure and negotiate new treaties of friendship, amity, and commerce. It wanted complete understandings on reparations, fisheries, and civil aviation. It desired most of all to prepare for entry into the United Nations and to resume its place as a great power in public and private international agencies. Russia, with Red China in the background, stood in the way of Japan's joining those nations which were determined that mankind's path of progress should be marked by a decent respect for all who wished to live in freedom and prosper in peace.

As a "national symbol" on the day that the peace treaty became effective, the emperor penned two slight and stylized poems:

As I see pigeons playing in my garden peacefully
I hope the world we live in will be like that.

and

Winter with bitter cold wind has gone,
And much-awaited spring comes round
With double cherry blossoms.

Suggested Reading

- BRITISH COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE, CANBERRA, AUSTRALIA, 1947, *The Japanese Peace Settlement* (Wellington, N. Z., 1947).
- CHIANG HSIU-HAI, "Treaty with Japan; A Chinese View," *Foreign Affairs* (New York, April, 1948).
- MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TOKYO, *Provisional Verbatim Minutes of the Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Treaty of Peace with Japan* (Tokyo, 1951).
- U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, *Draft Peace Treaty with Japan*, Publication No. 4330 (Washington, 1951).
- U. S. SENATE, 82ND CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION, *Senate Executive Report No. 2, Japanese Peace Treaty and other Treaties Relating to Security in the Pacific. Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations on Executives A, B, C, and D and Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations* (Washington, 1952).
- F. J. LEWE VAN ADUARD, *Japan: From Surrender to Peace* (New York, 1954).

CHAPTER 25

Back in the Family of Nations

Within ten years of the signing of the instrument of surrender, Japan resumed an important place in the society of nations. During the Occupation, Japan bent as the bamboo before the wind but without breaking. Humiliated by defeat, it sought to reconstruct its self-esteem and find its place in the world of its conquerors. It displayed a rare combination of resiliency and rigidity. Some Japanese shouted *banzai* to “de-mok-las-sie, boggie-woogie, and hot dogs” and others clung to their ancient traditions of loyalty and authority. Japanese changed less than the Americans who began the Occupation with the fervor of a spiritual revolution without precedent in the history of mankind, only to end it with a solemn warning from the commanding general to the soldiers, “Do not come barging in [to Japan] with any idea of revolutionizing their customs or of remolding their daily lives into a carbon copy of your own.” An overwhelming sentiment of Japanese nationalism eclipsed the neutralism of the intellectuals and the communism of the radicals. Japanese literature celebrated its new independence of spirit with writings of escapism, social significance, brutal realism, and antforeign defiance.

The Yamato race demonstrated its unique capacity to adjust itself to a new experience without changing its essential nature, modifying its thought processes, or revealing its inner emotions. Its intimate contacts with Americans undeniably aroused feelings of gratitude, perhaps envy, but they served to reinforce its own values of patience, self-control, timelessness, conformity, capacity to accept frustration, “bearing the unbearable,” and death rather than dishonor. “As a woman looking into a mirror decides that her neck is her best feature and henceforth dresses to accentuate its allure, the Japanese nation has looked long and intently into the mirror of national destiny and decided that trade and not armaments or expansion is the

weapon best fitted to advance the national interests." Japan emerged from the Occupation, not pro-American, pro-British, or pro-anything except pro-Japan.

Japan gradually edged toward its own past. Old national holidays were restored and the old national flag was jauntily flung to the breezes on frequent occasions. The Meiji Imperial Rescript on Education came back into the schools and the *Kimigayo* or national anthem opened and closed all public ceremonies. Japanese men dressed more often in native-style kimonos, and crowds of Japanese of all ages patronized more regularly the Shinto shrines. The government appropriated money for repairs and upkeep of shrines, but stopped short of making them a budget obligation. A steady stream of visitors hailed the emperor and on one holiday trampled each other to death in the melee to get a glimpse of him. The number of volunteers for free work in the gardens or the kitchens of the imperial estates was so great that further applications were rejected.

New armed services came into being and new thought-control legislation entered the books. In a single year more than 20,000 cases came before the Human Rights Protection Bureau. Double talk reappeared in Japanese conversations: the security forces were referred to as "visitors"; the Russians as "unwelcome guests atop Azabu hill"; and rearming as the gradual increase in defense strength. The constitutional restriction on "war potential" was held not to apply to Japan's defensive arming.

The gap between the rich and the poor widened as the rich crowded the geisha houses, golf courses, and expensive restaurants. The democratic system lumbered along, and the new bureaucracy flourished, with one Japanese out of seventeen on the government payroll. The old business combines returned to sharpen Japan's business practices. Unostentatiously, organizations came to public attention which recalled the shades of the Black Dragon Society—organizations with names like Patriotic Youth Volunteers' Committee, the National Martyrs' Youth Corps, and the Japan Reconstruction League. Ultrarightists gained seats in the Diet, including Colonel Tsuji Masanobu, who was once referred to as the god of strategy of the Pacific war and the only officer who dared to call Tojo "that private who is our prime minister." The traditional restlessness, ambition, and sense of mission again characterized the statements of political leaders like Premier Yoshida, who said:

Let us renew our will and determination to store up our national strength, elevate our ethical standards, advance our culture and civilization, so that we may leave to posterity a proud record as builders of new Japan.

Politics and Diplomacy

Premier Yoshida presided over the transition from the Occupation to independence. Many of his own followers condemned him for slavish obedience to American whims, but he displayed sufficient adroitness to satisfy capricious American authorities and impatient Japanese constituents. His government steered a steady course through the rough waters of the Dodge austerity program and the Korean War. It checked inflation, struck hard at radicalism (not without risks to civil liberties), and lined up Japan solidly with the pro-Western, anti-Communist group of nations. The prime minister engineered Japan's participation in the formalization of peace with dignity and credit.

In October, 1952, the government called for new elections. Fundamental issues prompted the appeal to the electorate. The reappearance of disquieting tendencies demanded a new consideration of democratization. The government had resigned itself to the force of circumstances and sought a new expression of popular confidence. Premier Yoshida faced a split in his own Liberal party, whose factions could not agree on the issues of rearmament and fiscal policy. The prime minister stood for ultraconservatism in spite of his party tag, and his intraparty rival, Hatoyama Ichiro, advocated Japan's complete independence by assumption of its own protection and the substitution of an expansionist, inflationary new deal for the restrictive Dodge line. The Progressive opposition party, under Shigemitsu Mamoru, shared generally the views of the Hatoyama Liberals. The Socialists divided into right and left: both opposed any change in the constitution and immediate rearmament; the right wing objected firmly to rearmament in principle, post-treaty bases, and the pro-American orientation in foreign policy. The left-wing partisans talked about Japan's rightful place in Asia, cannon fodder, atomic guinea pigs, and cheap Japanese blood for an imperial war. The Communists suffered from their connection with Russia and the aggression in Korea and they tried to associate their anti-Americanism with Japanese nationalism.

The Liberals won 240 seats in the House of Representatives with nearly half the popular votes; the Progressives, 85; the Right Socialists, 57; the Left Socialists, 54; the Communists, 0; and minor parties or independents captured the remaining 30. Six months of quarrels and bickering in the new Diet came to a climax when a Diet member asked the premier if he would explain Japan's foreign policy in his own words and not in the words of Eisenhower or Churchill. In a moment of forgetfulness or temper, the emperor's first minister whispered audibly, "Stupid idiot" or words to that

effect. The slip resulted in a vote of lack of confidence and another unnecessary and expensive election.

On April 19, 1953, the Yoshida Liberals won 199 seats in the House of Representatives; the Hatoyama Liberals, 35; the Progressives, 76; the right-wing Socialists, 66; the left-wing Socialists, 72; the Communists, 1; and the minor parties and independents, 17. At the same time, the conservative groups carried the elections to the House of Councilors. After the returns of 1953, the Liberals held 93 seats; the *Ryokufukai* or conservative Green Breeze Society, 34; the right-wing Socialists, 26; the left-wing Socialists, 40; the Progressives, 15; the Communists, 1; and others, 41.

The conservative ranks enjoyed a comfortable margin over the combined forces of the Left—enough to put through a constitutional amendment—but the conservatives were weakened by rivalries and personal jealousies among their leaders. They also suffered because the breath of scandal linked men of cabinet rank and important leaders from both the Liberal and Progressive parties with unsavory financial deals. Government officials made loans to shipping interests which in turn used part of the proceeds for bribes for further loans. Bankrupt investment firms admitted contributions to politicians for purposes of bribery or corruption. Members of both the Liberal and the Progressive parties joined in 1954 to form a new Democratic party and to topple the Yoshida administration from office. Hatoyama, with the significant support of former American purgees, became premier pending new elections in the spring of 1955. Japan closed the books on one era and opened new accounts for the future.

The Subversive Activities Prevention Law was the first major piece of legislation by independent Japan. It empowered the government to restrict the activities of or to dissolve organizations involved in terroristic, subversive activities. It was bitterly attacked as an active threat to basic rights guaranteed in the constitution and as the first step backward to the hated "peace preservation" laws of the past. It was supported because of the imminent danger from the Communist party and its international connections. The law was to become operative against organizations, not individuals, and only after the organization committed terroristic, subversive activities. It was to be applied only within the narrowest possible limits necessary for the preservation of the public safety. "Terroristic, subversive activities" included insurrection, treasonable acts, and ordinary crimes carried out for political motives. The law set up in the Ministry of Justice a Public Security Investigating Agency and a Public Security Examination Commission: the first, to investigate suspected organizations, and the second, for making decisions for the control of such organizations. Neither agency had police powers and both were independent of any law enforcement

body in the Japanese government. The law specified that investigators "cannot place any unlawful limitation on the rights and freedoms guaranteed to individuals in the Constitution" or interfere with the legitimate activities of organizations. It was a crime, carrying a maximum sentence of three years' imprisonment with or without hard labor, for any investigator to abuse his authority, interfere with individual rights, or force individuals to do things which by law they were not required to do. The careful drafting of this law was a tribute to the Occupation because the Japanese themselves showed their preoccupation with the constitution as an instrument to protect their rights and liberties.

The Japanese had cause to guard against the security risks of the Communists and their international connections. Before 1950 party membership approximated 100,000 with as many as 3,000,000 sympathizers, but their tactics were limited to nonviolence and bourgeois parliamentary efforts. Nozaka Sanzo's slogan was, "Let's make the Communist party a lovable party." The Communist ranks were invigorated by fellow-travelers among the 600,000 Koreans in Japan and some prisoners of war returned from Siberia, Sakhalin, or Manchuria. Moscow apparently looked upon the Japanese Communist party and its leadership as antidemocratic, anti-Socialist and anti-Japanese and sent out orders to increase revolutionary activities. Underground activities in Japan after the outbreak of the Korean War included the formation and training of guerilla units, the systematic gathering of intelligence, the infiltration of security agencies and Occupation offices, and the distribution of clandestine literature. The authorities guarded continuously against strikes; sabotage on power lines, communications, or transport facilities; and subtle penetration into the moving pictures, radio, and press.

Japanese and Americans argued whether to outlaw the Communist but went no further than disbarring their leaders from public office and discharging the editors of the Communist newspapers. The Communists on their part spread slogans, "Yankees, Go Home," "Down with the Emperor," "Do Not Rearm," "Nationalize Industry," "Ally with Russia and China," and "Out with the Capitalist Yoshida," and stirred up riots against policemen, tax officers, and Occupation personnel in Japan's major cities. Because of the seriousness of the Korean War, the authorities were in no mood to trifle with the Communists and they complained about the crippling limitations imposed on them by democratic procedures of arrest and interrogation. The Communists complained of police brutality and took refuge in their constitutional rights.

When the pressure increased, the nine party leaders went underground. The party lost the confidence of the Japanese people and split into divergent

factions. Nakanishi Ko, a pro-Moscow aide who supported the Cominform in its attack on Nozaka Sanzo, was ousted from the party, and Ito Ritsu was removed from positions of influence within the party because of betraying his colleagues to the police and introducing police spies into party meetings. Party membership decreased and public sympathy for the Communists seemed to evaporate. General MacArthur reported that the incessant and relentless efforts of the Reds to spread discord and dissension, to mutilate the masses, and impose atheistic and totalitarian enslavement upon them failed because of the common sense and conservatism of the Japanese, the concepts of democratic freedom planted by the Occupation, and the progressive improvement of living conditions. He believed that "the resulting rage and frustration produced unbridled vulgarity of expression which is the hallmark of propaganda and failure." Before he left Japan, he branded communism as the "rallying medium for malefactors, the corruptible and fools, based neither on political philosophy nor economic doctrine, the instrument of force and intimidation to permit minority elements by stealth, infiltration and deceit to seize political power." His sentiments reflected accurately the attitudes of the Yoshida government, which maintained its vigilance against the Communists and confined them to their underground cells. The Cabinet set up an Undemocratic Activities Countermeasures Council.

Teachers in Japan received particular legislative attention. Teachers were suspected of excessive neutralism or leftism and of using their profession to subvert the minds of children. Government-sponsored bills sought to prohibit politically oriented teaching and to make it illegal for teachers to engage in any kind of political activity. The government wanted to take the control of the teachers from the American-style local schoolboards and place it in the hands of its own instrumentalities, either at the national or prefectural level. With specific reference to the teachers' union, which the Japanese called "the white crane with the red top," the legislation deprived the teachers of the right to strike and forbade the union to instigate teachers to take political action. The government faced the same dilemma—between the horns of public security and civil rights—when it considered the problems of censorship of the press and the supervision of public assemblies. Police raids became more frequent, not as symbols of thought control, but as unavoidable safeguards of the democratic system.

Relations with the United States

Internal security was the chief domestic political concern of the Yoshida government and at the same time the core of diplomatic relations between

Japan and the United States. Japan wanted desperately to defend peace, to stay out of war; yet because of its complete reliance on the economic largesse of the United States, it was obliged to accept American views on Japan's obligations in the cold war. Japan and the United States agreed on the necessity of co-operation, but they differed in their analyses of their respective national interests. In the political realm, the two countries accepted the common ideals of democracy, freedom, and individual rights; but they diverged in the interpretation of the Communist menace, rearmament of Japan, the possible return of militarism and aggressive tendencies, the inadequacies and inequities of American security arrangements in the Pacific, and attitudes toward third countries—including Japan's Asian neighbors. Japan subordinated all these political differences to its overwhelming need for a decent level of living for its multiplying millions.

Japan was unwilling to trust its internal security to some of the democratic ideas of the Occupation and sought to revive the traditional strong central control of the processes of government. Local autonomy was threatened by a plan to reinstitute the appointment of prefectural governors. Officials toyed with the revival of the *tonari gumi* or neighborhood associations which docketed the opinions and recorded the habits of every citizen in Japan. The Ministry of Labor took over the powers of labor committees and, most important, the premier himself took command of the national safety forces.

Toward the end of the Occupation, Japan grudgingly created a National Police Reserve, a small organization of ground forces equipped with machine guns and other light weapons and a Maritime Safety Board or embryo coast guard. In accordance with the peace settlement, the United States retained the primary responsibility for the defense of Japan. More and more Japanese agitated for the evacuation of the American troops. Films, articles, and books complained about the blatantly immoral relations between the soldiers and the Japanese girls, the land and facilities set aside for American use, and the hotels, resorts, business buildings, and houses in the hands of the Americans. They objected to the air force in the Meiji Building, the army in the Finance Building, and the motor pool behind the Foreign Office in Tokyo's most expensive downtown property. A legal complaint argued that the Ernie Pyle Theater was not necessary for the defense of Japan, and a Communist handbill stated, "Workers of Japan, 30 per cent of your taxes go to keep the Americans living in luxury." Politicians, journalists, disgruntled purges, and Marxist intellectuals took advantage of political and economic confusion to snap their fingers at the United States. They criticized the Americans for being overconfident and underprepared, excessively militaristic, narrow-minded and intolerant,

materialistic and uncouth. The criticisms were more scornful than rabid, except on the part of the Communists, and represented a natural swing of the pendulum.

To the Japanese whose position vis-à-vis Communist Asia was more exposed than the American, the issue of defense was less pressing than the issue of economic assistance. The Japanese argued that their outpost position as a bastion of democracy increased rather than decreased the chance of military attack on their homeland. They preferred to base their diplomatic decisions on considerations of power rather than on ideological differences with their potentially useful neighbors. Japan remembered American vacillations of policy and felt that it would face national suicide if it placed itself irrevocably in the American network only to have the United States eventually pull out of Asia in consequence of "Europe First" or a new isolationism.

After the inauguration of President Eisenhower in 1953, many Japanese distrusted the slogan, "Use Asians to Fight Asians," and feared increased American pressure for faster rearmament. The Americans argued for defense first; the Japanese, for economy first. The Americans suggested they could not help those unwilling to help themselves and intimated that the Japanese should arouse themselves from their lethargy. At the risk of overassertiveness, the Americans emphasized the obligations of sacrifice and self-defense and played down the Japanese apprehensions about the rebirth of militarism, violation of the constitution, and risk of a disastrous economic crisis.

The Yoshida government cautiously converted the National Police Reserve into a National Safety Corps and the Maritime Safety Board into a National Safety Board. It increased the personnel and expanded the equipment to include tanks, artillery, and bazookas. In this manner it re-established the armed forces in all but name and placed them under the direct control of the premier and the Diet. Yoshida moved with extreme caution because he was criticized by the neutralists for bartering the lives and blood of his people for foreign money and by the neo-nationalists for slavish capitulation to American demands. Few Japanese relished the return of the generals to their positions of power and influence, and those Japanese officers who eyed the prospect of new commands did not want an army already indoctrinated and committed to an inevitable enemy. They wanted a 100 per cent Japanese Army, without American ideals and pay, "not obligated to fight for the United States in World War III, but for Japan in World War IV or V."

The government's policies were fortified by continuous aid and encouragement from the United States. On November 12, 1952, Japan received some

seventy frigates and landing craft for coast guard duties on a lend-lease basis. On September 30, 1953, Japan and the United States signed documents of ratification for a new treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation to replace the similar treaty which had been abrogated thirteen years earlier in the heat of controversy. On October 30, 1953, a special representative of Premier Yoshida and Assistant Secretary of State Walter S. Robertson announced their fundamental agreement on American supplies for Japan's defense build-up, on continued American economic assistance, on foreign investments, and on temporary controls over trade with Communist China. The day before Christmas, 1953, the United States relinquished its rights over the Amami-Oshima group of the Ryukyus but reserved its rights in the other islands as long as conditions of threat and tension existed in the Far East. Because of the demands of strategic defense of the whole Pacific, the United States announced its intention to remain as custodian in the foreseeable future.

The American gesture eased at least a slight portion of the Japanese resentment caused by the loss of its territories and aroused hopes about Sakhalin and the Kuriles. It caused some Japanese chauvinists again to cast covetous eyes toward Formosa, Korea, and Manchuria. On October 29, 1953, new arrangements went into effect which gave Japan the primary right to try members of the United States military services for offenses committed off duty and off military reservations, and on February 19, 1954, seven other nations signed similar agreements for their soldiers in Japan in the service of the United Nations.

On March 8, 1954, Japan and the United States signed seven fundamental mutual defense agreements. By these agreements Japan undertook to rearm itself progressively to the limit of its man power and economic resources. In return the United States promised to supply arms, equipment advice, food, and financial assistance. Japan promised to convert its National Safety Corps into Self-Defense Forces and to boost its numbers to 130,000 men equipped with tanks and medium and heavy artillery. It would create an embryo navy of 12,000 men, with destroyers, submarines, mine sweepers, and auxiliary craft, and an air force of 6,000 men equipped with some jets but primarily trained for ground support and interception. It would set up a Self-Defense Agency with an advisory Joint Staff Council, a unified supreme command headed by a civilian and subordinate to the premier, and a general staff corps of 12,000. This figure seemed disproportionately large, but a large staff seemed essential for expansion which would have to take place upon anticipated American withdrawal from the mainland of Japan to Okinawa, the Marianas, and the Philippines. The Americans agreed to provide a military advisory group of 700 officers to

serve with Japan's defense forces. Within the framework of the constitution, the principles of the United Nations, and the collective security arrangements with the United States, Japan agreed to take all reasonable measures not only for its own defense but for the defense of the free world. Japan was assured that its young men would not be sent abroad but would be used solely for purposes of defense of the home islands. Japan was obliged to enact measures to protect military secrets, to promise not to sell goods received from the United States to any third party, and to restrict its trade with countries which threatened the peace of the world.

The United States immediately began to pump \$100,000,000 into Japan's shaky economy in the form of subsidies for munitions makers, purchases of weapons, and shipments of food. The FOA in November, 1954, *set up an office in Tokyo to supervise expenditures of yen obtained from sales to Japanese of surplus American agricultural commodities.* Japanese factories continued the prosperity of procurement orders and contemplated the profits of becoming the arsenal for Asia. The Kawasaki bomber factory signed a contract with Lockheed under which Japanese began the production of jets. In spite of the apparent American generosity (you supply the men and the undershirts and we will supply the rest), the Japanese manifested little enthusiasm for the mutual defense arrangements. The psychological fears of rearmament persisted and the dangerous cost of the new program fell far short of a positive guarantee of absolute security. The humiliating contrasts between the Japanese and the Americans in their bargaining positions were painfully apparent in bilateral negotiations, whereas they might have been softened or avoided had the Japanese been able to take advantage of a multilateral arrangement for security and aid through the United Nations.

Relations with Other Nations

Japan gained confidence as it gained strength and it tended to minimize the importance of the American protective shield. In its determination to avoid becoming a second Korea, it sought salvation and glory in assuming a new role as the merger of the civilizations of the East and the West. It felt its own importance as a vital cog in any machinery for collective security in the Pacific and as an indispensable purveyor of vital skills in any program for development of backward areas. It became more conscious of its own grievances and more impressed with its value and contribution to the free world. The United States and Japan were like Siamese twins that could not be cut apart without danger to both. Unless Japan prospered, peace and

stability in Asia were unthinkable. Japan considered itself not as an American puppet but as the molder of the history of the future with more power to counterpoise Russia and Red China than the combined potential of South Koreans, Chinese Nationalists, guerillas on the mainland, and the anti-Communists in Indo-China and Malaya. Japan was vulnerable and therefore in need of the United States but, on the other hand, it was the richest prize which the Communists could ever hope to win in Asia. Some Japanese whispered that they had crossed the Rubicon to the side of the forces of democracy, but they were free to swim back if the inducements were sufficiently attractive or the provocations sufficiently severe. A rearmed Japan loomed as a force for good, but it contained the possibility of catastrophe if it should ever join forces with the Communists.

Japan had no traditional inclination toward Russia or toward communism. Quite the contrary. One of the strong ties between Japan and the United States was the feeling in Japan that the United States succeeded to Japan's historic task of stopping the expansion of Russia in East Asia. Japan opposed Russia during the Occupation as adamantly as it supported the United States. The government of Japan resented the ties between Moscow and the Japanese Communists and it protested repeatedly about the Russian retention of the Japanese prisoners of war. POW's who returned told how Russians forced them to work, to sweat, and to die in the construction of homes, mines, factories, and sawmills. They told of brain-washing and endless indoctrination. They told of their comrades who enlisted in special service corps of Communist armies in Manchuria and who made up the nucleus of a liberation army in the Russian territories north of Japan.

The Russians avoided outspoken condemnation of Japan's pro-American orientation and kept the door open for possible future *rapprochement*. Russia appreciated the value of Japan's factories, skilled labor, and technical know-how, and the enormity of the threat to the free world if Russia's resources and China's man power could be integrated with Japan's industrial potential. At the same time, Russia treated Japan without any compromise of its own crass power position. Russian aircraft flew regularly over Japanese territory; Russians seized Japanese fishing vessels which ventured beyond their territorial waters; and Russian searchlights played on Japanese towns and villages. The irritations suggested the incidents of the decade of the thirties, but the Japanese in Hokkaido took the philosophical attitude that "when you live at the foot of a volcano, you don't worry about lava."

As long as Stalin lived, he understood the implications of a Russia-Japan entente. In a New Year's message in 1952 to the people of Japan, he wished them freedom and happiness and full success in their gallant struggle for

the independence of their homeland. He said that the Russians, too, understood the horrors of foreign occupation. He wished the Japanese workers deliverance from unemployment and low wages and elimination of high prices of consumers' goods. He wished the Japanese peasants deliverance from landlessness and land shortage and elimination of high taxes. He wished the entire Japanese people and the intelligentsia full victory for the democratic forces of Japan, revival and advancement of the country's economic life, the flowering of the national culture, science, and art, and success in the struggle for the preservation of peace. In other Russian propaganda appeals to Japan, Russia emphasized the aggressive intent of the United States and contrasted that with the peaceful desires of Russia for the expansion of mutually profitable trade relations. *Radio Free Japan* (a Communist propaganda organ on the Asian mainland) called upon Communists in Japan to overthrow the government and warned of possible bombing attacks. At the same time, it dangled before the Japanese the prospect of expanded trade, fishing rights, and shipping opportunities.

Russia in 1953 engaged to export manganese ore, wheat, asbestos, heavy oil, and potassium, in addition to coal from Sakhalin, to Japan in exchange for the repair and construction of small ships in Japanese yards. During the Occupation, the Japanese built scores of wooden tugs and trawlers for the Russians and accepted lumber and coal in payment. In spite of the bitter feeling over incidents, Japanese co-operation with the United States, prisoners of war, the unwelcome Russian mission in Tokyo, and the territories lost by Japan to Russia in World War II, the two nations kept alive the slender possibility of improved relations. In 1954 Russia invited the members of the Science Council of Japan—210 of them—to visit the USSR for intensive all-expenses-paid study of Russian scientific methods, and Japan opened its doors for a Soviet trade mission.

Next to the United States and Russia, Japan paid closest attention to its relations with China. Premier Yoshida adopted the attitude that China exercised little influence in Japan and that Japan need not worry even if China were completely conquered by the Reds. He said, "It has been my experience that a Red Chinese is fundamentally a Chinese and in that country over the years red is one color that bleaches rapidly." He expressed his desire ultimately to have a full measure of political peace and commercial intercourse with China, Japan's close neighbor. But he assumed a different attitude in his relations with the United States. He wrote to Secretary Dulles that he had no intention of concluding a treaty with Communist China because of its action against the United Nations in Korea and its treaty with the Soviet Union which was in effect a military alliance aimed at Japan. Japan disliked the restrictions on China trade and submitted

to them only because of the compensations granted by the United States. Japanese businessmen believed that they should take advantage of every opportunity for profitable barter and they sent representatives to Peking in search of contracts. Japanese labor also wanted the benefits of the China market. On September 14, 1953, Fujita Tataro, chairman of the leftist General Council of Trade Unions and delegate to the Third Regional Asian Conference of the International Labor Organization, proposed the membership of Red China in a gesture which was as shocking in its way as the handshake between the Japanese Socialist, Katayama, and the Russian Socialist, Plekhanov, in an international conference at the time of the Russo-Japanese War.

Japan revived friendly relations with the Republic of China on Formosa. It reopened its embassy and stretched to the utmost its possibilities of trade. Japan sent economic advisers to assist the Chinese government and cultural-economic groups with the object of promoting better understanding. On June 14, 1953, Japan and Formosa signed a trade pact for the barter of machinery, fertilizer, textiles, and metal, agricultural, and marine products for rice, raw sugar, bananas, salt, and coal to the extent of \$75,000,000 per year.

General Tojo in his will said that the basic cause of Japan's defeat in World War II was the failure to gain the co-operation of other Asians and he advised his people not to make that mistake again. Japan wanted harmonious relations with its neighbors, but it could not easily wipe out the memories of its own misdeeds. It discovered new bonds of sympathy with India. Both countries felt a deep attachment to the policies of neutrality, and the pacifism of India matched the disillusionment in Japan as an opponent of militarism. Both sought to concentrate on the improvement of the welfare of their respective peoples and both insisted upon the treatment of communism as an internal danger. Both believed in the virtues of expanded trade with China and refused to accept the thesis that Peking was no more than Moscow's helpless satellite. Japan lost a large share of its prewar market in India, but it found new opportunities for technical assistance. Japan also realized that if ever India entered the diplomatic game of establishing a favorable balance of power in the Far East, Japan and India together could constitute a pair of pincers to exert effective pressure on China. And in Pakistan Japan found even more sympathy than in India.

The deepest scars of the war in East Asia resulted from the wounds inflicted by Japan on China, Korea, Burma, Indonesia, Malaya, the Philippine Islands, and Australia. The arrogance and imperiousness of Japan in Korea engendered an equally intense hatred on the part of some Koreans. For a half century, Japan felt that Japan determined the future of Korea

and it looked upon Koreans as unappreciative rebels, "the Irish of the Far East." When the Japanese were defeated, the Koreans in positions of political power insisted that the Japanese should go home and never come back. Koreans preferred to let their fields lie fallow, their mines, factories, and railways idle, rather than to utilize the Japanese skills.

When war broke out in Korea in 1950, a reservoir of 300,000 Japanese who had had valuable experience in Korea was unavailable to the United Nations because of the Korean refusal to let any Japanese return. President Rhee's sentiments were that "on the day the Japanese soldiers come back to Korea, we quit fighting Communists until we drive out the Japanese." He said he still found it hard to imagine a Japanese kimono without a knife in the sleeve. The United Nations troops were able to make only the most limited use of the Japanese, as pilots on naval vessels and mine sweepers off the coasts, as laborers in the staging areas in Japan, and as operators of LST's which transported vehicles and personnel. Japan would have taken a more active part in the Korean affair had the United Nations permitted. Premier Yoshida pledged total co-operation with the democracies and urged all Japanese to help prevent acts of sabotage. He declared Japan had no room for noninvolvement or neutrality and was in the heart of the maelstrom of the Korean conflict.

In the years after the Japanese peace settlement, neither Japan nor Korea manifested simple gestures of forgiveness in their quarrels. According to Article 4 of the Japanese peace treaty, Japan and Korea agreed that the disposition of property in Korea and claims, including debts, should be the subject of subsequent bilateral arrangements. Japanese nationals had owned 80 per cent of all commercial and industrial property in Korea and more than half the farmland. Japan wanted credit or compensation for as much of this property as possible. The Koreans took the position that if Japan were to surrender every dollar of the property of its nationals in Korea it could still not pay for 1 per cent of the suffering, exploitation, and humiliation which Japan had caused in its era of imperialism. The two nations also argued about the rights of 600,000 Koreans living in Japan, the disposition of Korean ships taken to Japan at the end of the war, the gold and the national art treasures stolen from Korea and shipped to Japan, the sovereignty over some disputed islands, and the right of Japanese to fish in Korean territorial waters.

On January 18, 1952, Rhee announced that he would follow the American precedent and assume Korean sovereignty over the continental shelf. He claimed that his offshore jurisdiction extended 150 to 200 miles out to sea and passed within five miles of Tsushima Island and at one point within sixty miles of the coast of Japan. He ordered Japanese fishing boats outside

the line. The Japanese estimated that 40,000 fishermen caught 225,000 tons of fish annually with a value of \$36,000,000 in the waters which were prohibited by the proclamation of the "Rhee Line." They tended to ignore the order until Korean patrol boats began to fire on Japanese vessels. Koreans confiscated Japanese boats and imprisoned the crews. The Koreans protested against the expenditure of United States aid funds in Japan for acquisition of materials to be used in Korea because they objected to the rehabilitation of Japanese industries at the expense of Korea. They insisted that the army of the Republic of Korea should never be inferior to the reconstituted forces of Japan.

The Japanese encountered rough sailing in their attempts to rebuild their political fortunes in Southeast Asia and Australia. Those nations objected bitterly to the American soft policy toward Japan and warned repeatedly of the risks involved in Japan's rearmament. Japan tried to end the rift over reparations, but it experienced difficulty in meeting the demands of Burma, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Japan sent diplomatic missions and established governmental economic agencies to study the problems of reparations, trade promotion, and economic co-operation. It hoped to participate in British and American plans for economic development, but Japan faced difficult psychological handicaps. It was not permitted to join in the Colombo plan until 1954.

It was universally recognized that were it not for emotional considerations Japan could make valuable contributions to economic progress and could stimulate the flow of international trade. Japan negotiated many profitable barter agreements, but usually on a cautious, short-term basis. No nation liked to pay for articles it felt entitled to receive free on a reparations account. No nation chose to refuse Japanese goods which sold cheaply on the local markets, but none wished to risk buying large quantities of Japanese products which would shatter its own dreams of industrialization. Psychological attitudes improved gradually. Immediately after the war, any Japanese returning to Southeast Asia would have experienced danger to life and limb, but within ten years, 70 per cent of the people were prepared to welcome the peaceful Japanese merchant and his wares.

Australia retained longer its suspicions of and objections to Japan's aggressiveness. Australia opposed the expedition of Japan's whalers to the Antarctic during the Occupation and resisted Japan's proposals to seek admission to the Colombo plan. Hotelkeepers at Darwin refused rooms to parties of Japanese pearlers who wished to return to North Australia. Pearlers were responsible for information about Darwin and Broome in 1942 and rode in the Japanese planes which took part in the bombing. Australia followed the precedents set by the United States and Korea and

claimed sovereign rights over the continental shelf off the Australian mainland and New Guinea to a depth of 100 fathoms. Australian laws provided that pearling within those limits should be subject to license and practiced only within allotted areas. In 1954 infuriated ex-servicemen in the Australian parliament objected to the employment of Japanese technicians in a hydrographic survey of the waters adjacent to New Guinea as part of the Australia-New Zealand-United States (Anzus) arrangement. But Australians could not forever blind themselves to the value of improved relations with Japan, particularly because Japan became Australia's third-best customer and purchased eight times as much as it sold "down under."

Japan derived more satisfaction than displeasure from its postwar relations with the United Kingdom. Both Premier Yoshida and opposition leader Shigemitsu were former ambassadors to Great Britain and perhaps greater admirers of the quiet British than of the brash Americans. Japan respected the dignity and independence of the British during the Occupation and noted that the British did not try to make Japan over in their image. The shapers of the new status for the emperor studied the traditions and etiquette of the Court of St. James as their model. Aristocratic Japanese were prone to copy the manners of the British and to teach their children English-English rather than the American idiom. Japan and Great Britain both recalled with pride their long years of alliance and overlooked their subsequent clash of interests. But economic difficulties could not be obscured. The British flared up when a Japanese company bought Iranian oil. Many British merchants protested against a British-Japanese barter agreement for 1954 which permitted an increase in Japanese exports to the Commonwealth and the colonies. The British feared the return of unfair trade methods and outright dumping, but made concessions to Japan's critical need to balance its international income account.

Japan's Economic Problems

Postwar Japan measured its diplomatic achievements in terms of its underlying economic problems. Japan's fundamental problem of too many people on too little land got worse instead of better as the years passed. Life was made tolerable for the Japanese only by American economic assistance, which made it so difficult for a Japanese government to oppose American political policies. The Japanese population raced toward an estimated plateau of 125,000,000 without any corresponding expansion in the opportunities to earn a decent living. Japan's only method of existence was to import food and raw materials to provide jobs for its tremendous

laboring population. It would sell the processed goods for foreign exchange to pay for more food and raw materials. The imbalance in the cycle, the excess of imports over exports, accounted for the almost desperate nature and world-wide extent of Japan's postwar diplomacy. In 1951 Japan provided less than 2 per cent of the world's exports and absorbed 2.5 per cent of the world's imports. By volume Japan's foreign trade was less than half the prewar volume, yet Japan's exports represented 11 per cent and its imports 16 per cent of its national income. Japan faced a situation of "export or die" and called upon every artifice and resource to aid in its export drive.

The Japanese sought to modernize their plant and equipment and to improve their methods of production and trade. Buildings had been destroyed, machinery had become obsolescent or worn out, and industrial processes had become outmoded and overly expensive in the light of the progress of Western industries. Japan re-established its credit abroad and invited foreign capitalists to compete against the high domestic borrowing rates of 8 per cent to 12 per cent. More than 200 American firms extended loans on a company-to-company basis and entered into agreements for joint use of patents, employment of foreign advisers, and allocation of markets. Judging from royalties remitted, this private Point Four program about equaled in magnitude the entire public Point Four program for all of Asia and the Middle East. Americans bought gilt-edged securities on the Tokyo stock exchange and provided the capital for power plants, transmission lines, petroleum refineries, chemical plants, rubber factories, and joint enterprises in aviation, motion pictures, and foreign trade. Japan liberalized its investment laws so that Americans could collect their dividends in dollars and repatriate their original investments completely in seven years.

Inside Japan, big business profited from financial help, but little business deteriorated. The zaibatsu recovered their prewar position of dominance. After September, 1953, cartels were permitted in order to combat depression and to reduce primary costs. Export and import associations were encouraged, and corporations were allowed to own stock in competing companies, to have interlocking directorates, and to enter into price-fixing contracts. When the ban on zaibatsu names and trade-marks was lifted, the old Mitsubishi, Mitsui, and similar giant combinations came back into prominence. The risk of abuse of power seemed less important than the rationalization of production and trade because Japan was considered too small and too poor for cutthroat competition. The government attempted to revive a whole series of controls over the importation and marketing of key commodities and moved Japan progressively away from the free enterprise system.

This development augured ill for labor. Sporadic strikes or short-term work stoppages occurred in power, transportation, and communication industries. Management argued that it was saddled with American labor standards without American wealth, and that it would go bankrupt if it met all of labor's demands. It warned that labor unrest might become the tool of the Communists and urged the government to take action against strikes and walkouts which would endanger or inflict irreparable damage on the nation's daily life and economy. The government hesitated to modify the labor legislation of the Occupation because of the economic and political strength of the labor organizations. *Sohyo* or the General Council of Trade Unions claimed approximately 5,000,000 members and supported the left-wing Socialists. *Sodomei* or the Japan Federation of Trade Unions (JFTU) boasted of 1,000,000 members and tended to support the right-wing Socialists. *Sodomei* accused *Sohyo* of Red domination, but the latter denied the accusation, asserting that less than 1 per cent of its membership was Communist.

Labor generally opposed the Yoshida government. Labor charged the government with using the Communist bogey and the legislation against subversive activities as covers for attacks against the unions. Labor argued that it lived at the barest subsistence level, that its demands were modest, and that it could be best protected against communism by an alleviation of its straitened economic circumstances. Labor pointed out that half of its income went for food and that six months' savings were required for a suit of clothes. It insisted that it did not benefit proportionately from the inflationary spiral and that its neglect was Japan's fundamental national peril. Labor could not be expected to starve in silence even in the interest of cheaper production costs and expanded export markets.

The end of American expenditures and subsidies during the Occupation and the stoppage of special procurement orders for goods to be used in Korea forced Japan to cut down its imports or to speed up its exports. Without drastic action the adverse trade balance in a single year would exhaust Japan's accumulations of foreign exchange. Slight savings could be effected by limitations upon shiny new American automobiles, whisky, cigarettes, gasoline, bananas, and sugar, but essential imports of foods, textile fibers, iron ore and coal, petroleum, and other raw materials had to be maintained in order to keep the wheels of industry turning. Imports were expensive because so many came from the United States and had to be paid for in dollars. Nearby Asian sources of supplies were denied to Japan: this meant that coal had to come from Seattle instead of Tientsin; rice and substitutes, from Southeast Asia or North America instead of Korea and Formosa; iron ore, from the Philippines, India, or Malaya

instead of China; and salt, from Mediterranean countries instead of Shantung. Freight charges added extra burdens to Japanese consumers.

The increase of exports depended upon circumstances over which Japan had little control. Japan negotiated bilateral agreements which covered the world: whale oil and silk to Germany for chemicals and machinery; capital equipment and sundries to India for raw materials; textiles, machinery, and rolling stock to Burma for rice; steel, locomotives, and machine tools to the Philippines for logs, metals, copra, ramie, and abaca; and iron and steel products to the Argentine for wheat and wool. Well-disciplined, neatly dressed Japanese drummers with portable typewriters and well-filled brief cases competed with British, Americans, and Germans in the markets of Latin America, Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. Japanese engineers, fishermen, technical experts, and financiers negotiated contracts to develop hitherto inaccessible sources of raw materials in India, Formosa, Southeast Asia, the islands of the Pacific, Pakistan, and Kashmir. They indulged in these marginal activities because of the loss of their more profitable prewar markets. In spite of superhuman sales efforts, Japan's negative trade balance in 1953 exceeded a billion dollars.

Before the war, Japan ordinarily sent about 40 per cent of its exports to nearby markets in Asia—particularly China—and about 15 per cent (primarily in the form of raw silk) to the United States. Japan was effectively barred from China, and its prospects in Southeast Asia were limited by the low purchasing power, the political instability, and the industrialization programs of the countries in that area. Japan encountered stiff sales resistance in the United States, and it drew a sharp British warning that, if necessary, Great Britain would meet Japanese commercial competition by quotas, licenses, or other administrative devices.

Japan's fishermen were excluded from the East Pacific and Bering Sea areas and from Korea and the coastal waters of Southeast Asia, and Japanese shippers faced insuperable obstacles in trying to capture their prewar share of the world's carrying trade. The first Japanese merchant ship entered New York harbor after the war early in 1951 with a cargo of Philippine sugar. Within two years, eight Japanese concerns, operating fifty-six new and modern vessels built in Japanese yards, offered a Japanese flag service between the United States and the Far East. Japan anticipated a merchant fleet of 4,000,000 tons by the end of 1957 which would be able to carry all its own foreign trade and earn an additional substantial sum in competition for the business of others. Its plans prompted some American organizations of shippers, shipbuilders, maritime labor, and veterans to oppose any unwarranted expansion of Japanese shipping and shipbuilding

industries. Japanese shipbuilders let it be known that they could also build warships and welcomed inquiries from Brazil, Burma, Pakistan, and others.

The Japanese determination to encourage the zaibatsu and to depress, if necessary, the general level of living to capture world markets echoed the experience of the years immediately preceding World War II. The United States was well aware of the danger of history's repeating itself and warned Japan of the necessity of curbing the elements and the tendencies which had led to disaster. Caught between the pressures of inflation and austerity, Japan balanced its budget, reduced some taxes, retired a substantial part of the public debt, honored its prewar financial obligations, and joined the International Bank and Monetary Fund. It was impossible in Japan as elsewhere to distribute economic burdens equitably; so some people clipped coupons while others tightened their belts. Statistics of recovery looked impressive, but they failed to disclose inequities in the distribution of the fruits of recovery. Tokyo displayed huge new office buildings, but reported a shortage of 3,000,000 dwellings. The Japanese spent a billion yen for research but bet fifty times that amount on the horses; they spent three billion yen on books but squandered twenty times that on the pinball machines. The leisured rich experienced little difficulty in getting gasoline for their week ends to Karuizawa in the mountains or Atami by the sea. Common people went back to lunches of barley and wheat instead of heaping bowls of rice and to *su-fu* or staple fibre instead of cotton or wool for their suits and uniforms.

Behind the government which tried desperately to balance the expenditures for guns and butter, the business groups whispered with a great deal of justice, "Give us access to raw materials and markets and we will not need to depend upon the largesse of the United States." And then with a certain ominous ring they added, "If the West won't help us, we shall have to reconsider our policies—no nation starves quietly—the winds of world economy may be biting cold and Japan dare not go its way alone."

Suggested Reading

JEROME B. COHEN, *Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction* (Minneapolis, 1949).

———, "Private Point Four in Japan," *Fortune* (New York, April, 1953).

ROYDEN DANGERFIELD, "The New Japan," *Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series*, No. 102 (New York, 1953).

FRANK GIBNEY, *Five Gentlemen of Japan: The Portrait of a Nation's Character* (New York, 1953).

JAPANESE EMBASSY, WASHINGTON, *Memorandum on Japan's Economy and Foreign Trade* (no date, but indication is Fall, 1953).

MANCHESTER GUARDIAN (weekly).

NEW YORK TIMES.

NIPPON TIMES.

S. TAKAHATA, *Quo Vadis, Japan?* (Osaka, 1954).

CHAPTER 26

The Rise of the Chinese Communists

The history of the Kuomintang and of the diplomacy of the Soviet Union casts incidental light upon the origin and rise of the Chinese Communists but not sufficient to disclose the extent and the importance of the influence of Communist China upon the Far East in world affairs. With deep ideological roots, a small group of toughened, intellectually astute Chinese took advantage of China's political and social unrest to grasp positions of power. They fought as a traditional faction in civil war but with unusual energy and zeal. With flexibility in tactics and ruthlessness in action, they twisted the sorrows of China's war for their own benefit. They captivated the surging tides of revolution in China and utilized them to put themselves in power and to sweep China into the Communist orbit. They dedicated themselves to the complete remolding of China's internal structure and to the remaking of the world according to Communist blueprints and under Russian leadership. The weight of China's numbers, multiplied by the intensity of China's convictions, aroused the slumbering giant to the consciousness of its strength. Regardless of consequences, Communist China proclaimed the end of the era of humiliation and insult and asserted its demand for what it considered its rightful place with the seats of the mighty.

Roots of the Communists

The first Marxist study groups in China were organized in 1918 under Professors Li Tao-chao and Ch'en Tu-hsiu at Peking University. As Chinese

already in the midst of two revolutions—the one for dignity and equality in the international political realm and the other for a higher level of living—the Communist intellectuals were ready to accept a philosophy which explained China's humiliation as a nation and which offered a plan for progress. They had joined with other patriotic elements in Peking to protest against China's betrayal at the Conference of Versailles before links were established with Moscow. They welcomed the Leninist interpretation of Marx which affirmed that the backward nations of the world could conduct their revolutions against imperialism and feudalism without going through the intermediate stage of capitalism and bourgeois democracy, provided they would organize peasant soviets and take their ideological guidance from Moscow. They accepted eagerly the organizational help of the agents from Moscow. The Russians had no need or opportunity to create revolution; they needed only to capture the leadership of the revolutions already in progress.

The fiery pen of Ch'en Tu-hsiu, in his magazine, *New China*, appealed to youth to break down the old prejudices, discard the old ways, and merge the great thinkers of Chinese history with new ideas in politics, morality, and economic life. "Our ideal society is honest, progressive, positive, free, equalitarian, creative, beautiful, good, peaceful, co-operative, toilsome, but happy for the many." He pleaded that the young should be conscious of the power and responsibility of their youth and should use all their intelligence to get rid of those who were old and decadent. He warned that Chinese society would perish if the young in age permitted themselves to be old in spirit and he called for youth to show unbounded courage "if we are to get rid of corruption" and survive.

By September, 1920, Ch'en Tu-hsiu, with the assistance of the agents from Moscow, assembled leftists of varying shades in Shanghai and founded the nucleus of the Chinese Communist party (CCP). Similar cells were organized in Peking, in Hunan (under Mao Tse-tung), in Hupeh (under Tung Pi-wu), in Japan, and in Paris (under Chou En-lai and Li Li-san). In Shanghai the dynamic Professor Ch'en undertook the establishment of trade unions. Early in 1921 he became chief of the Board of Education in Canton and, once installed in that city, he formed a party cell, set up a training school, and started to draft a party platform.

In July, 1921, the Communist leaders convened the first national party congress at Shanghai with twelve delegates and Maring from Moscow in attendance. Ch'en was not among those present, but he was elected chairman of the Central Committee. Many of the leaders of the Chinese People's Republic were among the original founders of the CCP: Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, Chu Teh, and Liu Shao-ch'i. Mao was a normal-school grad-

uate from Hunan. Before he accepted the principles of Marxism, he studied deeply the philosophies of Adam Smith, Charles Darwin, John Stuart Mill, and Herbert Spencer. Mao was a genuine intellectual, but he was destined to become battle-scarred and utterly earthy before achieving the heights of party power.

The CCP dedicated itself to the gradual achievement of a dictatorship of workers and peasants and affiliated itself with the Communist International. Together with the Kuomintang, the CCP sent about thirty delegates to the Congress of the Toilers in the Far East in 1922 to become acquainted with Bolshevik views and techniques. It maintained continuous contact with Moscow. In 1922 the CCP announced its goals as the dictatorship of workers and peasants, the abolition of private property, and the gradual attainment of a Communist society. It dodged the issue whether these goals could be achieved in a single state or whether they necessitated the co-operation of the proletariat in other advanced states. The CCP accepted Lenin's apparatus of democratic centralism which made concessions to democracy but retained control in the central core over the party and elements which were susceptible to its influence. It subordinated the philosophy of the withering away of the state to the immediate need of a bureaucracy, a standing army and a police service to oppress the reactionary hostile classes. It distinguished sharply between the leaders and the led—the party constituted the leaders, and the peasants and urban proletariat made up the essential followers. The CCP used the internal unrest generated by the poor peasants and the workers to broaden the base of its popular appeal. It planned its rise to power and its foreign policy in accord with global Communist strategy. It considered the Soviet Union as more than a nation and pledged its loyalty beyond China to the Soviet Union as the indispensable bulwark of the international Communist system. Without the strength of the Soviet Union, there could be no successful internal revolution in China.

The CCP initiated modest practical measures to implement its grandiose theories. Without tinkering with its platform of anti-imperialism, anti-war-lordism, labor reform, and democratic revolution, it found common ground for a United Front with the Kuomintang in its recognition of China's paramount problem of the achievement of national unification and independence. It rationalized the amalgamation of nationalist issues and social issues and advocated co-ordinated action on the part of all willing segments of society as a tactical advance toward its ultimate goals. It gave permission to its party members to join the Kuomintang as individuals, without surrendering its right to seek additional members for its own party among the peasants, workers, students, defeated soldiers of the war lords'

armies, and the overseas Chinese. The CCP manifesto of April 1, 1926, set forth the basis for the coalition in accepting the Nationalist government as the central dynamic force for the Nationalist revolution and as the headquarters for anti-imperialism in China. The Communists were no less eager than the Kuomintang for the mutually beneficial first United Front. Ch'en Tu-hsiu moaned that the Communists did the coolie labor for the Kuomintang, but, as Borodin shrewdly observed, "Any attempt on the part of the peasants and workers to take an independent course toward political power would have gone down in a sea of blood."

Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Kai-shek themselves symbolized the United Front during the period between 1922 and 1927. Mao was at once the head of the Peasant Department of the Central Committee of the CCP and a member of the Political Bureau of the Kuomintang. By the end of 1925 he was the editor of the *Political Daily* and the head of the Propaganda Bureau of the Kuomintang.

Chiang, for his part, admitted that "our alliance with the Soviet Union, with the world revolution, is actually an alliance with all the revolutionary parties which are fighting in common against the world imperialists to carry through the world revolution." On one occasion he said, "The [Nationalist] revolution cannot rule without Dr. Sun's three principles, nor can the revolution neglect Communism. . . . Knowing that we cannot separate the Chinese revolution from the world revolution, why should there be any quarrel amongst us about the three peoples' principles and [the] Communists?" Chiang vacillated between his theoretic acceptance of the United Front and his practical difficulties in working with the Communists. In March, 1926, he dismissed pro-Communist leftists from positions in the government of Canton and barred Communists from top posts in the Kuomintang. But two months later, at the Third National Labor Conference in Canton, Chiang referred to himself as the younger brother of labor and concluded his speech to the conference by shouting, "Long Live the Revolution."

During this period of co-operation, the CCP increased its membership, developed its techniques in propaganda and military and party organization, and received a firsthand acquaintance with terroristic methods. While the armies (of Nationalists and Communists) marched from victory to victory on the Northward March, the revolution spread in the countryside and in the cities. It was reported that by 1927 2,500,000 people belonged to labor unions and 12,000,000 belonged to peasant unions. These peasant unions according to their own propaganda made only two fundamental demands—the immediate establishment of local governments with militia

to support them against lawless bandits and reactionaries and the immediate establishment of co-operative stores and government credit agencies for the peasants. In a spectacular way they fined and paraded opium-smokers, burned mah-jongg and gambling paraphernalia, abolished foot-binding, and attacked local superstitions. They initiated public works, made a start at clearing public lands, and established unpretentious public schools. Current newspaper accounts described how young organizers went from village to village, playing phonograph records and doing magic tricks to attract audiences, and then orated for lower rents and tenant unions. Local unions often established schools, propaganda headquarters, and pharmacies. They rallied the people against the landlords and the magistrates and took *the law into their own hands when the magistrate dared to oppose their machinations*. Thousands of peasants paraded magistrates through the streets shouting, "Long Live the Peasantry! Down with the Landowners!" and these wild demonstrations constituted the early manifestations of "agrarian reform." Landlords abandoned their farms and fled for their lives rather than risk the wrath of the howling mobs.

The social goals of the revolution were submerged in the rising tide of the political power of the United Front. Kuomintang and CCP jockeyed for control, and in 1927 the stronger Kuomintang ordered the Communists out of their positions in the party, the government, and the army. The disillusioned Borodin discounted the slogans of the Kuomintang as masks for military assistance. He remarked, "When the next Chinese general comes to Moscow and shouts, 'Hail to the World Revolution,' we had better send at once for the GPU. . . . All that any of them want is rifles." In the Kuomintang purges of the Communists which followed, thousands lost their lives. The Communists received paralyzing blows which would have annihilated a less resilient people and a less determined movement. The United Front came to an end in chaos and unrest. Workers' associations, which had looked for utopia, faced higher costs of living and unemployment. The peasants, who had destroyed the stability and tranquillity of the countryside in their quest for equal distribution of the land and local power, brought on themselves the wrath and retaliation of the landlords, the local gentry, and Kuomintang officialdom. The first United Front could not withstand the ruthlessness of the militarists, the intrigues of party politicians on both sides, the antireligious activities of the Communists, and the complications of the policies of the foreign powers. The CCP went underground and created for itself a new slogan, "All power to the councils of the delegates of the workers, peasants, soldiers, and the city-poor—the soviets."

Civil War

The Communists shaped their organization, defined their policies, and perfected their tactics after the debacle in Central China. As the Kuomintang and the militarists stamped out labor unions and Communist cells in the urban areas, Mao Tse-tung took over the leadership of the peasants in the abortive autumn harvest revolt in 1927. Chu Teh at the same time worked with peasants, miners, and soldiers in South Hunan. Mao and Chu merged their forces and set up a series of soviets in the rugged interior. They worked with the peasants, not because of any gifted insight into the value of the peasantry as an agency of revolution, but primarily because they had no alternative. They had the consolation of Lenin's faith in peasant soviets, but they also shared Trotsky's view that peasants are not adequate revolutionaries but are rather the packhorses of civilization. With only the peasants as their supporters, Mao and Chu adopted the practical program of land reform, guerilla warfare, and avoidance of the cities. Land reform simply meant hunt and slay landlords, confiscate and redistribute their land, and side with the peasants against the Kuomintang. It also called for less taxation, reduced rents, and the abolition of usury. Mao said, "The people are the sea, we are the fish; as long as we can swim in that sea, we will survive."

The outstanding theorists in the party disappeared into the International Settlement, the French concession, or the native city in Shanghai. From these cells they carried out their intrigues throughout the Far East and conducted effective propaganda against the imperialistic Kuomintang, the Western powers, and Japan. They were unable to dodge the police authorities, even with the help of Pavel Mif and the students from Moscow, and they furtively filtered into the mountain areas of Hunan and Kiangsi.

During the years 1932-1934, when the Communists set up their headquarters in Juichin (or Juikin), they exhibited their flair for survival and growth. They roved about the countryside in small bands in the best Chinese tradition of half-outlaw and half-bandit. Soldiers, straggling students, and workers continuously replenished their ranks. The first Red armies which acknowledged the leadership of the Communist party emerged in 1928. These armies observed rigid discipline and wandered about parts of Kiangsi, the Kiangsi-Fukien border area, Hupeh, and subsequently north of the Yangtze in Honan and Anhwei. These armies had little policy beyond mere survival and they were isolated from the peasants even in their own localities. They played hide-and-seek with government

troops and militia and received nothing more than apathy and hostility from the people in the villages. They darted about from one place to another, sweeping the country clean of all resources. When their food was ample, they retired to feast; when they were hungry, they broke out with dead certainty against the weakest victims. They knew the countryside like a book, and until they settled back into remoter villages to undertake land and administrative reforms, they moved about like "flowing water and moving clouds." They plundered, foraged, denuded the rice areas, and dislodged or destroyed perhaps as many as half of the entire population of interior Kiangsi.

The chief asset of the Red Army was the sad deterioration of government prestige, linked with the economic anemia produced by long years of oppressive taxation and devastation. Chiang Kai-shek's pacification campaigns could not reduce effectively the Red islands on the map as long as conditions of grinding poverty plagued the ordinarily uncomplaining and industrious peasant.

On November 7, 1932, the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, the Communists convened the first All-China Soviet Congress in Juichin and chose Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh as their leaders. While Russians, Germans, and Chinese intellectuals presided over the party apparatus in cells deep in the Shanghai underground, the hinterland of China of necessity lived and developed by its own independence and fortitude. Mao had only the peasants and a sprinkling of workers as his revolutionary vanguard, but with them he found the singleness of purpose, the hardness of will, and the suppleness of principle necessary for seizing and holding power. Mao lived with a price on his head and he discovered that "revolution is not a dinner party, nor literary composition, nor painting, nor embroidery." It could not be done "gently, kindly, politely, plainly and modestly," according to the Confucian precepts, but only by the violent action of one class overthrowing the power of another. He deepened his conviction that the gentry's power must be totally liquidated, the gentry knocked down, even trodden upon. Within a short time, he foresaw that hundreds of millions of peasants would rise in Central, South, and North China with the fury of a hurricane and break the shackles which bound them. He predicted that they would rush toward the road of liberation and "all imperialists, war lords, corrupt officials and bad gentry will meet their doom at the hands of the peasants."

At Juichin the Communists established a central soviet government, adopted a constitution, and promulgated laws to broaden the proletarian base of the new government. They boasted that their soviet republic was not a bourgeois state, and they deprived the landlords and the *bourgeoisie*

of their economic livelihood and political rights. At the same time, they admitted that it was not yet a proletarian state because it was not yet able to undertake the immediate tasks of annihilating capitalism and constructing socialism. Their policies reflected the Russian prototype. They confiscated land and stock of the landlords, gentry, and *kulaks*; liquidated usurers; regulated trade and handicrafts (but without socialization); and set up agencies for state and public aid in seeds, animals, and credit for the peasants. They used agrarian reform not as a matter of improving the lot of the peasants but as a means of carrying out class warfare. They championed the hired hands, the tenants, and the poor peasants, in alliance with the middle peasants, against the richer farmers and the gentry. The Communists made every effort to encourage the Red armies and to inspire their growth.

The Kiangsi Republic did not control large areas or large proportions of people—only 46 out of 1,958 *hsien* in a total territory of 4,000 square miles and only 6,500,000 out of China's 450,000,000 people. Economically, its scale of living was crude, but self-sustaining, except for salt. It had its own bank, schools, postal system, and newspapers. Only the sons of soldiers or poor peasants were permitted the luxury of education; the others worked or fought. Its propaganda glorified the peasants, the workers, the army, and the Soviet alliance, in spite of the fact that it received little if any assistance from Moscow and had no significant Russian leadership.

The areas under Red control offered a preview of conditions under the subsequent Chinese People's Republic. The enemies of the people were tried before people's courts. Lands were confiscated and redistributed; deeds were destroyed in public bonfires at the magistrate's office, and field markers or corner posts were destroyed. Stores of rice and grain were commandeered and personal property of the wealthy (anyone who had more than \$100 was considered wealthy) was taken away. Those who refused to join the Young Communist International Division were publicly humiliated or drafted into the coolie corps. Orders for mobilization were carried out by kidnapping, conscription, or under a pretext that the person was being sent somewhere for a conference or political training. All prices were state-controlled. Commodity prices were lowered drastically and the exchange rate between silver and copper was altered in favor of copper. Usurious debts were canceled and existing taxes were abolished in favor of a graduated single tax. Squeezers and userers were shot on the spot. Utopian land and labor laws were put on the books. Both sexes were enfranchised and given equal right to hold office; but both men and women were given equal obligations for communal working of mines, forests, and farmlands. Both sexes were responsible for military service. In the villages lodgings were

distributed regardless of ownership and shops were placed on a co-operative basis. Sealed boxes were placed in conspicuous locations for the deposit of complaints. Organizations of every kind were established to interest all groups and classes in assorted Communist activities and policies.

The regular Red armies were supplemented by Red vanguards or local militia that "protected" the village and provincial soviets. Flying columns of young farmers were called into a mobilized reserve. The army was drilled in shooting, marching, mountain-climbing, and propaganda. It was taught to sing, to shout slogans, and to practice war cries. Even on maneuver the Reds would filter into the ranks of government troops and create havoc in general. Oftentimes through mutual agreement, Reds and Kuo mintang took time off to trade guns or opium, or to barter salt and cigarettes. The Reds progressed from ordinary banditry to well-disciplined procedures. When they entered a town, they took what they felt entitled to. They looted banks and public buildings, plundered the grain stores, and squeezed the local chamber of commerce. They took arms from the local militia, made speeches at forced mass meetings, and moved on.

In fighting against these operations, the government faced baffling handicaps. It sent enormous numbers of soldiers on ineffective expeditions and built up an elaborate system of blockhouses and communications. But the morale of the government troops left much to be desired. It was reported that Nationalist commanders could not give their soldiers more than five rounds of ammunition or the soldiers would sell the surplus. Government troops were considered by the Reds as ammunition trains, and the troops themselves were often persuaded by money or propaganda to switch to the Reds. In this peculiar war the government troops also tried to buy from the Reds. Twenty cents was the regular price for a bullet, \$100 for a rifle, and \$800 for a machine gun. Any Communist soldier who surrendered was placed in a repentance camp and offered the regular army pay. Government commanders lacked no confidence in ultimate victory and despised the power of the Reds. General Lu Ti-ping said that if the Communists were not suppressed in six months, he would take off his own head beneath his country's flag. For four years the Communists outmaneuvered and outwitted the best Kuomintang generals and the best foreign advisers. The Communists succumbed eventually to overwhelming military pressure and to an effective economic blockade of salt, flour, rice, and medicine.

During those years, the Communists and the Kuomintang battled against each other and matched wits to gain the support of the populace. The ordinary farmers at first looked to the regime of the Red Army as to a savior. People everywhere had lost a large proportion of their crops and even their livestock to satisfy taxes. They were inclined to think "after the

fashion of simple folk," as a missionary expressed it, that anything must be better. Wealthy persons made no attempt to flee and suddenly it was too late. The Communists alienated the substantial middle-class farmers by their seizures of property and conscription of sons. The impression grew that the Reds were a hundred times worse than the soldiers of former days. Instead of carrying out their promises to educate the people, the Reds satisfied themselves only with their soapbox orations on the benefits of communism and the Soviet system. Their huge slogans and inscriptions, scribbled on the walls of houses and other buildings, were unsatisfying to earthy peasants' appetites. The masses understood nothing of the political side of the haranguing; they only understood that they would not have to work so hard as they had in the past, that they were to share all benefits equally with the rich, and that they and their children were to become educated—hence, they joined the Reds. But in spite of speeches, slogans, and empty promises, the people remained as illiterate and as ignorant as ever.

Still, the Kuomintang could not afford to ignore the social ferment produced by Red propaganda. It proved easier to recognize land redistribution in reconquered areas than to try to undo what the Communists had done. Redistribution had been popular with the poorer peasants and the Kuomintang wished to avoid the label, "tool of the capitalists." The government, the China International Famine Relief Commission, and the Chinese Christians undertook rehabilitation activities in rural education, health, agriculture, afforestation, co-operatives, and village industries in a manner designed to be more honest and more attractive than the programs of the Communists. As the noose of the Kuomintang tightened about the Soviet Republic in Kiangsi, the party leadership undertook the desperate "Long March" from South and Central China to the northwest. After eighteen months and 6,000 miles across mountain passes, rivers, and empty grasslands; after struggling through intense cold and heat, through wind, snow and rain; after fighting against half the armies of Chiang Kai-shek and the local militia in a dozen provinces—the Reds reached northern Shensi in October, 1935, and established their base in that part of China closest to the Soviet Union.

During the period of civil war, Mao Tse-tung rose to a position of undisputed command within the party. He overcame his personal rivals for power, Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Li Li-san, and Chang Kuo-t'ao. He overruled the returned students as dogmatists and unrealistic theoreticians. Mao sneered, "There are people who think that Marxism is a kind of magic truth with which one can cure any disease. We should tell them that dogmas are more useless than cow dung. Dung can be used as fertilizer." Mao demonstrated

that communism in China could not be dealt with exclusively as a military problem. More Communists appeared to replace those who were killed or suppressed. By the end of the period of civil war, the Chinese Communists had strengthened their ties with the Communist International and adopted their unequivocal pro-Russian policy in international affairs.

The Second United Front

Two days after the Mukden incident, that is, on September 20, 1931, the Chinese Communists referred to that event as a "warning signal for the world proletariat; the harbinger of a second World War, of a war against the Soviet Union." They accused Chiang of groveling before Japan in a most shameful manner, and in their haven in the hills in Kiangsi they hammered out a party platform in foreign affairs. They called for the abrogation of unequal treaties; repudiation of all foreign debts contracted by the ruling classes of China for the suppression of the masses; unconditional surrender of all foreign settlements, concessions, and leased territories; immediate withdrawal of all imperialist land, air, and naval forces from Chinese soil; confiscation of all imperialist banks, factories, mines, and transportation and communications enterprises. They declared that they would not remain content with the overthrow of imperialism in China, but on the contrary would aim at the ultimate objective of a war against world imperialism until "the latter is all blown up." They announced their readiness to form a united revolutionary front with the world proletariat and all oppressed nations and to proclaim the Soviet Union, the "land of the proletarian dictatorship," as its loyal ally.

In February, 1932, after the Japanese attacked Shanghai, the Communists declared war upon Japan. They called upon the masses of the Chinese people to join them, and at their congress at Juichin they offered to enter into a fighting alliance with any army or body of troops against the Japanese invasion and against the "treachery and sabotage of the Kuomintang agents." They linked civil war with external aggression, and they masked their ambitions by posing as China's defenders. The Communists reasoned that war against Japan would discredit the Kuomintang and would therefore enhance their own relative position within China. If Japan should defeat China, the Kuomintang would bear the stigma; and if Japan should exhaust itself in stalemate, then the Communists believed that they would have the advantage over the Kuomintang in guerilla warfare. The Communists saw their way to ultimate triumph through the disasters which war would surely bring to China.

While Chiang's government was bound by restrictions which flowed from responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs, the Communists organized anti-Japanese mass meetings and aroused the popular hatred of Japan to a fever pitch. During the time the Communists played cat-and-mouse with the government armies, they agitated for a second United Front. After the Long March, they worked on the sentiments of the troops (either from Manchuria or Northwest China) sent to suppress the "bandits" and infected those troops with the United Front propaganda. In December, 1936, the generalissimo flew to headquarters at Sian to view the situation firsthand. Two of his own subordinate commanders, Chang Hsueh-liang (the Young Marshal of Manchuria) and Yang Hu-ch'eng (the commander of the northwest troops), kidnaped Chiang and held him prisoner for a fortnight. As the life of Chiang and the fate of the nation hung in the balance, Nationalist generals conferred among themselves and called in their "enemies," the Communists, for consultation. The Communists could have decreed the death of the generalissimo, but in accord with the advice of Moscow they advocated his release. It was reported that Stalin himself sent a plain telegram to Yen-an (where the Communists had moved their headquarters) which expressed the opinion that Chiang's life should be spared. The Communists took advantage of aroused nationalism to formalize understandings with the Kuomintang on a United Front.

The Communists promised to abandon the policy of armed insurrection against the Kuomintang and to stop their program of land confiscation. They promised to give up their propaganda warfare and to strive for the realization of the three principles of Dr. Sun. They agreed to abolish the autonomous Soviet governments in the border regions of Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia and Shansi-Hopei-Chahar and to reorganize those governments as local organs of the National Government. They also agreed to reorganize their armies as national revolutionary armies subject to the command of Chiang Kai-shek. The Eighth Route Army of the Communists headed by Chu Teh and his vice-commander-in-chief, P'eng Teh-huai, consisted of three divisions under Lin Piao, Ho Lung, and Liu Po-ch'eng. Its roster included 45,000 regular army personnel and an additional 12,000 partisans.

On its part, the Kuomintang agreed to assume responsibility for the Communist armies, to assign them particular areas of operation, and to subsidize them to the approximate extent of \$500,000 per month. The Kuomintang also promised to cease civil war, to release political prisoners, and to accept the Communist demands for civil liberties, land reform, and an accelerated pace toward constitutionalism. The Japanese attack on the Chinese at Lukouchiao on July 7, 1937, speeded the adjustment of dif-

ferences and occasioned a new basis for the United Front at home and for the renewed diplomatic entente between China and Russia.

The Kuomintang—as the party in power—bore all the responsibility for the functions of government: local order, economic welfare, and military resistance against the Japanese. The Communists—as the opposition—played their own game. Mao appeared to have little interest in the immediate realization of his ultimate goals, and carried on restrained programs of land reform, military enlistments, and consolidation of political control in the areas under his jurisdiction. He professed agreement with the principles of the Kuomintang, but he affirmed that he would never abandon his Communist ideals. He defined his policy as “70 per cent self-development, 20 per cent compromise, and 10 per cent fighting the Japanese.” He wanted first to achieve equality with the Kuomintang and then to take away from the Kuomintang its leading position.

He concentrated on protecting the army and expanding his political power, while giving his revolutionary objectives a strategic respite. The Communists entered the United Front in 1937 with a party of 100,000 members in control of an area where 3,000,000 people lived; the Communists at the end of World War II had a party of 1,200,000 in control of an area containing from 60,000,000 to 80,000,000 inhabitants. At the same time, the Communists had 300,000 men in their Fourth Route Army and twice as many in the Eighth Route Army, and controlled eighteen seimautonomous anti-Japanese military bases.

The Communists waged an irregular campaign against the Japanese. Sometimes they fought creditably, stinging the Nipponese like hornets; at other times they concentrated on staying out of the reach of the enemy. Primarily, they avoided positional warfare and conducted military operations. A Japanese commander said that the guerillas were “like flies on your face: if you brush them away, they come right back.” Another Japanese officer testified, “If we send out small patrols, they never come back; if we send out larger detachments, they never find the Communists.”

In the areas which they occupied, the Communists perfected their military training and they developed some very simple but effective administrative techniques. They eased up their tax collections and brought pressures to bear for rent reductions. They subjected their party workers to rigid discipline and they sharpened their indoctrination methods by self-criticism, intensive study, and public confession meetings. They set up their own version of democratic government and studied how to adapt the abstractions of Moscow theories to the changing realities of China.

Mao Tse-tung expounded his principles in a pamphlet entitled “The New Democracy” in 1940. He explained that the Chinese revolution, led by

the proletariat, could only be achieved in two stages. The second stage of ultimate socialism was out of the question before the anti-imperialist and antifeudal revolution was fulfilled. The first stage, which he called the "New Democracy," necessitated compromises with bourgeois capitalism, pending the establishment of a new democratic society and a new socialist state. Mao advocated a temporary coalition government or combined dictatorship of all revolutionary classes to administer the new democracy. He based his political appeals on Chinese nationalism, agrarian reform, and a mixed economy of state-owned, private, and co-operative enterprise, and thus elicited the support of intellectuals, peasants, labor, and some business elements. All these elements would be represented in his coalition government subject to the leadership of the Communist party. The party represented the working classes, even though the majority of members were of peasant origin. This pamphlet seemed to be a plausible exposition of Chinese Communist philosophy and it proved to be an effective blueprint for power. In 1943 the CCP adopted its program "to fight the enemy, improve the army and the administration, unify leadership and support the government, love the people, increase production, correct wrong tendencies, realize the two-thirds system [one third of the positions to party members, two thirds to non-Communists], reduce rents and interest, investigate cadre workers, and educate the masses."

The United Front was never more than an uneasy truce. It did not represent genuine reconciliation of interests or mutual trusts. It existed only because neither party had the power to exterminate the other; neither had any alternative more acceptable than ostensible co-operation. As early as 1938, while Communist delegates attended the meetings of the People's Political Council of the Kuomintang at Chungking, the Communists extended their military operations into Honan, Shantung, Suiyuan, East Hopei, and Chekiang, all of which were areas beyond the scope of the Kuomintang-Communist agreement. As the war continued against the Japanese and their Chinese puppets, Chiang threw a cordon of troops around the Communists. After 1939 co-operation was sporadic and insincere. At the end of 1940, the United Front nearly collapsed. Chungking stopped the flow of guns and supplies to Yen-an and inaugurated a rigorous economic and military blockade of the Communist-controlled border regions. In 1941 the Fourth Route Army incident occurred. The Kuomintang general, Ku Chu-t'ung, attacked the headquarters of the Communist Fourth Route Army, killing its commander and capturing its vice-commander. General Ku disbanded the Fourth Route Army, whose remnants escaped into northern Kiangsu and Shantung.

After Pearl Harbor, when China's civil war became part of the global picture, China's domestic crises became matters of international concern. The United Front continued as a convenient façade. Beneath its surface smoldered mutual hatred and suspicion. "At the top they drink toasts to one another, but here [in the deep interior] we plunge the white sword in and drag the red sword out."

Renewal of Civil War, 1945–1950

The approaching end of World War II increased the pressure for Chinese unity. Chinese, as well as Americans, were thoroughly heartsick because of the devastation of war and looked forward to reconstruction and rehabilitation. The Kuomintang and the Communists preached the need for co-operation for national resurrection. At the National Congress of the CCP early in 1945, the party called on the National Government to relinquish one-party control and to form a government of all parties, including the Communists. Coalition seemed to be a good tactical device—it was acceptable to the United States and it put Chiang in the position of agreeing or bearing the onus for prolonging a civil war.

After the defeat of the Japanese, the Kuomintang officials were welcomed in the cities to which they returned. Popular disillusionment set in quickly because no Chinese officials could possibly have fulfilled the hopes of the suffering populace. They could not cope with the inflation which ruined the middle classes, the corruption which tempted the humblest functionaries, and the police rule which resulted from the fear of Communist successes. China seemed to slip from the grasp of Chiang Kai-shek. His strength was primarily the strength of the Americans who supported him. War lords of the old school remained in charge of their traditional localities. Dissension within the Kuomintang intensified the cleavages between the youth groups, the CC (Ch'en Kuo-fu and his brother, Ch'en Li-fu) clique, the political science group, the Whampoa cadets, and the independents. Behind the scenes, landlords, business and financial interests, and old-line generals clashed for power. Very few seemed to retain faith in the ability of the Kuomintang to run the nation wisely, well, or honestly.

The Communists were not content to confine themselves to their war-time areas. Their lands were inhospitable and isolated from the urban centers. They needed access to the city workers. With the bursting of the shackles imposed by the war, they swarmed into Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Shantung, and strategic centers in Central China. They insisted upon their right to accept the surrender and the disarmament of the

Japanese. In an effort to confine the expansive surge of the Communists, the Americans participated in an effort to make the wartime United Front an honest reality rather than a hollow shell of political expediency.

Americans had demonstrated their interest in the United Front, particularly since the visit of Vice-President Wallace to China in 1944. On August 26, 1945, Ambassador Hurley flew Mao Tse-tung to Chungking for peace talks with Chiang Kai-shek. Both Mao and Chiang seemed to welcome the American initiative. On October 11 they issued a joint peace statement, but by the end of the month their words were made a mockery by military clashes in eleven provinces. The Russians scrambled into Manchuria and checked any designs which Chiang Kai-shek might have had for the re-occupation of that rich industrial area. The government of the United States sent General Marshall to China to try to bring an end to the civil war and to endeavor to broaden the basis of the national government through fair and effective representation of other groups. To that end a People's Consultative Conference (PCC) assembled at Chungking in December, 1945, consisting of eight delegates from the Kuomintang, seven from the Communists, and eleven from third parties.

In January, 1946, a genuine United Front seemed like a plausible achievement. But the strength of the Kuomintang was scattered over large areas and the strength of the Communists was concentrated in comparatively small enclaves. As the two factions raced to take over from Japan, conflicts seemed inevitable but not fatal. Largely through General Marshall's good offices, both sides accepted a cease-fire agreement. The PCC adopted resolutions which provided for a mutually acceptable reorganization of the State Council and the Executive Yüan, the nationalization of the armed forces, a review of the constitution, the guarantee of civil liberties, and reforms in agriculture, industry, and education.

Throughout 1946 China seesawed between the United Front and the civil war. Hostilities swept over Manchuria and North China. Each side accused the other of bad faith and showed a willingness or unwillingness to compromise in direct proportion to the military status in the field. The Communists improved as the Kuomintang deteriorated. After General Marshall's departure from China, the CCP delegation left Nanking and plunged China into a state of open civil war. For a year (mid-1947 to mid-1948) the Communists were unable to match the Kuomintang; then they began a campaign which swept them to the mastery of all China. They captured Mukden, Tientsin, Peking, Nanking, Shanghai, and Canton in comparatively rapid succession.

As the Chinese people withdrew their support from the Kuomintang, its whole military establishment disintegrated. The Communists were shrewd

enough to mount the great revolutionary forces which moved out from under Chiang Kai-shek and to ride them to victory and to power. The Communists became a war-hardened, perfectly disciplined, efficient, and fully indoctrinated group not swayed by temporary passion or resentment but completely cognizant of their objectives and confident of their victory. They took over city after city in good working order, established stable, smoothly functioning administrations, and fostered good relations between the local populations and the entering officials and troops. They behaved with extreme care, and utilized existing organizations and personnel until they could perfect their own machinery. They permitted the people to go about their normal business and conducted the take-over in a systematic, undramatic, and bloodless manner.

In Peking the new troops were well equipped and tightly disciplined and they paraded under their banner, "Liberation from the Kuomintang Reactionaries and the American Imperialists." The Communist mayor, Yeh Chien-ying, told the Municipal Council, "We've been living in the hills right along and we know much less than you gentlemen about municipal government; henceforth, we must learn from you."

When the Communists entered the city, some residents were enthusiastic, some moderately hopeful or acquiescent, but, in the words of a qualified observer, "almost everyone at the time accepted the Communists as the wave of the future." When the Communists took Shanghai, they proceeded in the same methodic manner. The 1,200 Americans who left the city on the "SS General Gordon" seemed glad to "be leaving the wickedest city on earth which the Communists had converted into a nightmare of morality." Evangelism on the part of the Communists led to re-education and to repentance and apology. Gradually the old order disappeared, and the military and political bigwigs of the new regime took over the mansions of the departed Kuomintang officials and bureaucratic capitalists.

On January 14, 1949, Mao Tse-tung listed his eight-point program for peace. This included punishment of the Kuomintang leaders as war criminals, abolition of the Nanking government, reorganization of the Kuomintang armies, agrarian reform, and the calling of a Political Consultative Conference without reactionary elements to establish a coalition government which would take over power from the Kuomintang. Mao understood that the cause of the Kuomintang was hopeless and that they could not possibly accept his terms of peace. He had anticipated the responsibilities which would come to the Communists as the ruling party in China and had made careful political preparations for his assumption of power.

Before the end of 1948 the Communists had reconvened the All-China Labor Federation in Harbin; they called for a Cominform for the Far East

and launched an embryo North China People's Government at Shihchia-chwang. By early 1949 they had formed an All-China Students' Federation, an All-China Women's Congress, a new Democratic Youth League, and a League of Writers and Artists. The Central Committee of the party decided to shift attention from rural to urban areas and to call on party leaders to learn wholeheartedly industrial techniques. In June, 1949, the party convened a preparatory committee for a People's Political Consultative Committee (PPCC), and on July 1 Mao Tse-tung published his definitive article on the "People's Democratic Dictatorship."

This article or pamphlet outlined his fundamental concepts of the new state. The New Democracy became the People's Democratic Dictatorship, defined as an alliance of four classes: labor, the peasantry, the petty *bourgeoisie*, and the national *bourgeoisie* (those merchants or industrialists untainted by foreign imperialism). The dictatorship was to be led by the working classes—labor and the peasantry—acting through the Communist party. The red flag of the Communists showed four yellow stars clustered in a crescent about a larger star, representing the party. "Yes, my dear sirs, you are right," said Mao, "we are actually establishing a dictatorship. The people—at this stage the working class, the peasant class, the petty *bourgeoisie*, and the national *bourgeoisie*—theirs is the dictatorship over the lackeys of imperialism, the landowning class, and the bureaucratic capitalists." Only the people were to have the right to express themselves and to suppress the reactionaries.

Mao repeated the Marxian view of the eventual abolition of state power, but he added that "we cannot afford to abolish state power just now because imperialism still exists and internally reactionaries and classes still exist." Mao pledged himself to use democratic methods of persuasion to reform bad habits and thoughts among the people, but to use compulsory reform in the case of the reactionaries. Mao stated his current policy to be control of capitalism rather than elimination, because of the backward nature of China's economy. He concluded that China should develop steadily from an agricultural into an industrial country and from a new democracy into a Socialist and, eventually, a Communist society eliminating classes and realizing universal harmony. In September the PPCC convened in Peking, adopted an Organic Law and Common Program, and on October 1 the Chinese People's Republic announced its own birth.

Summary

The Chinese Communists sprang from proletarian roots and, aided by intellectuals, transformed themselves into a bureaucratic caste. Their fa-

vorite means were combinations of military force and political opportunism in the context of a convulsive Chinese social environment. They sought popular support from all segments of Chinese society and tailored their political appeals to the various classes without any regard for honesty or consistency. They promised to be all things to all people. They cherished less any dogma or creativity in thought than the usefulness of an idea or strategy which seemed to contribute to a new and Communist-controlled society. They shifted their tactics to conform to circumstances and through two decades alternated between the United Front and civil war. They depended upon military strength and a strong material base for their armies. They tried to win the friendship of the population in the areas of operation, but if friendship failed they resorted to force. That was the only sure way to power. They subordinated their theories to the central issue of power, and shifted their lines to meet the demands of expediency. They fought among themselves for leadership, and the strongest and most astute emerged triumphant. The Chinese masses pushed aside the Kuomintang as a falling wall and they inclined to the new Communist leadership as "blades of grass bend before the wind." The masses were the victims and guinea pigs as the newly launched Communist People's Republic experimented with untried internal policies and sailed into uncharted seas in international affairs.

Suggested Reading

- CLAIRE AND WILLIAM BAND, *Two Years with the Chinese Communists* (New Haven, 1948).
- CONRAD BRANDT, BENJAMIN SCHWARTZ, AND JOHN K. FAIRBANK, *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism* (Cambridge, 1951).
- EVANS F. CARLSON, *Twain Stars of China* (New York, 1941).
- BOYD COMPTON, *Mao's China: Party Reform Documents, 1942-1944* (Seattle, 1952).
- ROBERT S. ELEGANT, *China's Red Masters* (New York, 1951).
- ISRAEL EPSTEIN, *The Unfinished Revolution in China* (Boston, 1947).
- ROBERT PAYNE, *Mao Tse-Tung, Ruler of Red China* (New York, 1950).
- BENJAMIN I. SCHWARTZ, *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao* (Cambridge, 1951).
- EDGAR SNOW, *Red Star over China* (New York, 1938).
- GUENTHER STEIN, *The Challenge of Red China* (New York, 1945).
- U. S. CONGRESS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SUBCOMMITTEE NO. 5 ON NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENTS, *Report: The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism* (Washington, 1948).
- , *Supplement I, One Hundred Years of Communism* (Washington, 1948).
- , *Supplement III, Country Studies, C. Communism in China* (Washington, 1948).

U. S. WAR DEPARTMENT, *The Chinese Communist Movement*, as reproduced in the United States Senate, Committee on the judiciary, Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings Before the Sub-Committee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Security Laws, Part 7a, Appendix II (Washington, 1952).

OTTO B. VAN DER SPENKEL, ROBERT GUILLAIN, AND MICHAEL LINDSAY, *New China: Three Views* (New York, 1951).

NYM WALFS, *Red Dust: Autobiographies of Chinese Communists* (Stanford, 1952).

CHAPTER 27

Internal Policies of the Chinese Red Regime

With the rise of Mao Tse-tung to power, China transformed the unchanging East into the most rapidly changing area in the world. When Chiang Kai-shek's cause seemed lost, the Chinese bowed to the facts of the situation and submitted to the new regime. They transferred the mandate of heaven, in accordance with their ancient traditions, from a government whose greatest crime was failure to another whose outstanding virtue was success. They shifted their allegiance from the Kuomintang to the Communists without any compulsion of inner conviction. To the Chinese masses the Communists' doctrines were incomprehensible and their institutions were untried.

Mao Tse-tung described his victory as the first step in a march of 10,000 *li*. That first step was a giant stride which brought China under the control of a unified, national administration. A single party could dominate a government for the entire country, could decree its political processes and manipulate its economic development. The Communists could use their strength to stamp out opposition elements, including guerillas, and to get a national economy rolling. They improved the railways and highways to tie the people more closely together and to make more instant and effective the extension of their own power. They sought the fullest political advantages to be derived from the unification of currency, the stabilization of prices, and the mobilization of labor.

That first long stride brought stars to the eyes of the party apparatus, which consolidated its leadership; of students who thought they were assured of national independence and the "New Democracy"; of self-assertive laborers who believed they had an influential voice in running the country; of tenant farmers who gasped in sheer amazement at their

first land title; and of the members of the old Kuomintang who could scarcely believe the political amnesty accorded them. The next step was sobering in its effect. Popular acquiescence and support for Peking became submission, and the enthusiasm of the masses dropped away as the dictatorship "claimed its victims by thousands on public execution grounds trampled by obscenely cheering masses of frightened people." Sentiments ranging from bewilderment to dull hatred marked the Communist attack on the mores and the morality of the Chinese family, "voluntary" service in the army, confiscation and expropriation of property, extortionate taxation, "voluntary" contributions, the struggle meetings, slave labor, and the secret police.

Then the Communists settled down to the deadly serious business of welding the party and the masses into a granitelike, monolithic organism, a hundred times more effective than anything China had ever seen. With utter disregard for the welfare of the individual, the Red regime inaugurated a system of party and government intended to make its own position permanent and unshakable. It adopted political, social, and economic policies designed to increase the prestige and power of the Chinese state and to enhance the stridency of the voice with which it spoke in international affairs.

The Party Apparatus

The party was enshrined as the heart and the head of the Chinese regime. It consisted of an elite of about 6,000,000 members at the end of the first decade after World War II, or approximately one Chinese out of every seventy-five. Members were divided into two categories: the rank and file of dues-paying members and the "cadres," who were bureaucrats or full-time activist party workers. They subjected themselves to strict discipline and unquestioned acceptance of the infallible party line. As long as they were in good standing, they were given special privileges commensurate with their precarious responsibilities. They were forbidden to drink, philander, and smoke opium and were warned against the cardinal sins of corruption, waste, bureaucratism, and commandism.

The Chinese Communist party (CCP) was recognized as a privileged entity, with its own administrative apparatus distinct from that of the government. Starting at the top with the central organization, the structural hierarchy descended through various levels of organization—regional, provincial, municipal, county, town, and district—to the basic cells which were formed in every factory, mine, shop, school, military unit, city street,

or rural village. The chief function of the cells was to organize the masses, indoctrinate members, and carry out the party line. Each level had an executive committee as a directing organ which was chosen by the party congress at the corresponding level. The relations between the different levels of party organization were controlled by the principles of democratic centralism.

The central party organization was dominated by a National Party Congress which was supposed to meet every three years. It was subject to call by the party's Central Committee. The Seventh National Party Congress met in Yenan in April, 1945, seventeen years after the Sixth Congress which met in Moscow in 1928. The congress was ordinarily a large assembly of hand-picked delegates that listened to reports and speeches and elected the members of the Central Committee. During the long intervals when the congress was not in session, its powers were delegated to the Central Committee.

The Seventh Central Committee had forty-four regular members and thirty-five reserve members, and they chose the members of the Political Bureau and the Central Secretariat. The chairman of the National Congress was also chairman of the Political Bureau and the Central Secretariat. Within this pyramid of power, the Political Bureau, as in Russia, was the ultimate source of authority. It determined policies, formulated the line, dictated tactics, and through committees and departments carried out party functions such as organization, training, research, propaganda, finance, and United Front activities. The Central Committee had regional bureaus, parallel to the administrative regions of the government structure.

Institutions were less important than personalities, and at the apex of the pyramid were Mao Tse-tung and a handful of associates who made all the major decisions of policy. In 1952 thirteen members of the Political Bureau had at least twenty years of experience in the service of the Communists. Nine had participated in the Long March. None came from working-class parents, four from wealthy landlord antecedents, one from small landlord officials, four from well-to-do landlords, and two from unknown origins. The educational level of that directorate was generally high. Nine had attended advanced institutions of learning: three had received part of their education in Japan; two, in Germany; and one, in France. At least one, Chang Wen-t'ien, used the library of the University of California while working on a Chinese language newspaper in San Francisco. Eight or more had studied in the Soviet Union; two—perhaps more—had served on the faculties of Russian educational institutions.

The best-known leaders after Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh were Liu Shao-ch'i, a scholarly Hunanese party member since 1921; Chou En-lai,

who studied in Japan, France, and Germany and who became the Communists' best-known diplomatic representative; and Kao Kang, who rose from obscure origin as a guerilla leader in Shensi province to become the boss of Manchuria. This leadership was mature, well established, well disciplined, and self-reliant. Performance in China was the acid test of leadership and, compared to Russia, the men at the top seemed remarkably free from intrigues and cliquism. When a Chinese leader fell from grace, he was more often reindoctrinated or reassigned than purged.

Government Structure

The government structure was purposely made subordinate to the party apparatus, but the two were parallel from top to bottom. Party officials often doubled as government bureaucrats. The structure of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, as it was officially christened, was established in September, 1949, by three documents of a quasi-constitutional nature. These documents were the Organic Law of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the Organic Law of the Central People's Government (CPG), and the Common Program of the CPPCC.

These were superseded in large measure by the constitution which was adopted on September 21, 1954, by the first National People's Congress (NPC). This congress, which met in Peking, was made up of some 1,200 delegates elected Russian-style on the basis of universal suffrage. The delegates represented the people's congresses of provinces, municipalities, national minorities, the armed forces, and Chinese residents abroad. The NPC replaced the CPPCC as the supreme political authority within the state.

The constitution was based upon and was a development of the Common Program. It recognized that China was still in a stage of transition and was far from its goal of socialism. The Chinese document summarized the Communist estimate of its own progress and the concept of its own objectives. It contained no inkling of the gap which separated constitutional theory and political actuality.

The Preamble proclaimed "the great victory of the democratic dictatorship" over imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism and its confidence in the peaceful elimination of exploitation and poverty. It defined the central task of the state to be to bring about step by step Socialist industrialization and transformation of agriculture, handicrafts, capitalist industry, and commerce. It stated that as a basis for this task, "our people have successfully reformed the land system, resisted United States aggres-

sion and aided Korea, suppressed counter-revolutionaries and rehabilitated the national economy."

The Preamble recalled that in the struggle to establish the People's Republic of China (PRC) "the people" forged a United Front led by the Communist party, and pledged that in the future the United Front would continue to play its part. All nationalities in China were declared to be united, free, and equal in a big family of nations and they were promised the protection of the state. The Preamble concluded with the affirmation of China's "indestructible friendship with the great USSR and the People's Democracies" and with the promise of establishing and developing diplomatic relations with all countries, based on the principle of equality, mutual benefit, and mutual respect for territorial sovereignty.

Chapter I of the Constitution—entitled "General Principles"—reaffirmed the philosophy of the Common Program. The PRC was designated as a people's democratic state led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants. "All power belongs to the people and shall be exercised through the National People's Congress and the local people's congresses at every level." All organs of the state were without exception to practice democratic centralism.

The ownership of the means of production was divided into four categories: state ownership, co-operative ownership, ownership by individual working people, and capitalist ownership. State ownership was recognized as the leading force in the national economy and the foremost target in the Socialist transformation. Co-operative ownership was defined as a transitional stage between the state and individual ownership. Individual ownership—whether of land by the peasants or of other property by workers—was to be protected by the state. But the policy of the state toward rich peasant economy was one of restriction and gradual elimination; while toward individual peasants and handicraftsmen it was one of guidance, assistance, and the encouragement of voluntary co-operatives.

The state was to guarantee the ownership of the means of production and other property of capitalists according to law. State policy toward capitalist industry and commerce was to use, restrict, and transform. Capitalists were warned that they would not be permitted to endanger the public interest, disturb the social-economic order, or undermine the national economic plan by any kind of illegal activity. The state was to protect the rights of citizens to the ownership of lawful incomes and of savings, houses, and the means of life. Private inheritance was permitted according to law, but all private property was subject to the fundamental right of the state to requisition and nationalization.

Work was stated to be a matter of honor for every citizen. All public

servants were required to be loyal to the people's democratic system, observe the constitution and the law, and strive to serve the people. They must be good security risks, Communist-style, and they were reminded that traitors and counterrevolutionaries would be punished. Feudal landlords and bureaucratic capitalists could be deprived of political rights, but, in contrast to the earlier period, were to be provided with a way to live in order to reform themselves. The last "General Principle" in Chapter I of the constitution declared that the armed forces belonged to the people. Their duty was to defend the gains of the revolution and to defend the security, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of the country.

Chapter II detailed the fundamentals of the state structure. It focused immediately upon the National People's Congress which was described as the highest organ of state power and the sole organ exercising the legislative power of the state. Its functions were to:

- (1) Amend the constitution;
- (2) Enact laws;
- (3) Supervise the enforcement of the constitution;
- (4) Elect the chairman and vice-chairman of the PRC;
- (5) Decide on the appointment of the premier of the State Council upon nomination by the chairman of the PRC; and of the membership of the State Council upon nomination by the premier;
- (6) Decide upon the appointment of the vice-chairman of the PRC, and members of the National Defense Council upon nomination by the chairman of the PRC;
- (7) Elect the president of the Supreme Court;
- (8) Appoint the procurator-general;
- (9) Decide on the national economic plan;
- (10) Examine and approve the state budget and the report of its execution;
- (11) Ratify the status and boundaries of provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly subordinate to the central authority;
- (12) Decide on general amnesties;
- (13) Decide on questions of war and peace;
- (14) Exercise all other functions which the NPC considered necessary.

The NPC was to operate through a permanent Standing Committee which exercised plenary functions and powers between the annual sessions of the NPC. The Standing Committee was the nucleus of government authority, and it supervised the operations of the State Council, the Supreme Court, the procurator-general and the people's congresses at lower levels. The Standing Committee was empowered to decide on the ratification and abrogation of treaties and on the proclamation of a state of war when the NPC was not in session.

The NPC itself was given the right to elect the chairman of the PRC for a four-year term. The chairman was to promulgate all laws and decrees, appoint or remove the premier, vice-premiers, ministers, chairmen of commissions, and the secretary-general of the State Council. He was to represent the PRC in its relations with foreign states, be empowered to proclaim a state of war, command the armed forces, and preside over the National Defense Council. He was to be assisted by a vice-chairman and he was given the right, whenever necessary, to convene a Supreme State Conference consisting of the vice-chairman, the chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC, the premier of the State Council, and others concerned. This small group of men, in times of emergency, could discuss and decide upon fundamental Chinese policies and actions.

The State Council, referred to as the government of the PRC, was defined as the executive body of the highest organ of state power and the highest administrative organ of the state. It was subservient to and not independent of the legislature and it was defined as an *administrative* rather than an *executive* body. It was composed of the premier, the vice-premiers, the ministers, the chairmen of commissions, and the secretary-general. It carried out the functions of an ordinary cabinet and in addition co-ordinated the work of the local people's councils.

On local levels the country was divided into provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly subordinate to the central authority. The provinces and autonomous regions were further subdivided into *chou* or districts, counties, and municipalities. The counties were administratively divided into *hsiang* or groups of villages and towns. Every unit of local government was ruled by an elected people's congress which chose its own administrative agency or people's council. Only the deputies to the congresses at the lowest levels were elected directly by the people. The deputies at higher levels were elected by the people's congresses at the next lower level. In accordance with the principle of democratic centralism, each congress or council at a higher level had the right to revise or amend unsuitable decrees and orders of the congress or council at the lower level.

Special sections in Chapter II laid down the rules for the Local Autonomous Organs of the Areas of National Autonomy. These permitted non-Chinese to set up forms of government according to the wishes of the majority and to exercise a degree of autonomy. Within limits they could administer their own finances, organize their local public security forces, and draw up special regulations suited to their political, economic, and cultural characteristics. They could use their own language, and were entitled to protection of their rights on the part of the higher administrative organs of the state.

A Supreme People's Court, local people's courts, and special courts were established by law to exercise judicial authority. The system of people's assessors was applied at every level, and all trials were to be public unless otherwise provided for by law. The courts were not independent. The Supreme Court was responsible to the NPC or its Standing Committee and the local courts were responsible to the local people's congresses. The procurator-general was also responsible to the NPC. He and his chain of subordinates "exercised supreme supervisory power" over all cabinet offices, local administrative organs, personnel organs of the state, and all citizens "to ensure observance of the law." The judiciary instead of being a bulwark against tyranny was designed to serve as an effective agency of the totalitarian apparatus.

Chapter III of the constitution repeated and enlarged the "Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens" which had been listed in a single article in the Common Program. All citizens were to be equal before the law, to have the right to vote and hold office (after the age of eighteen), to have freedom of speech, the press, assembly, association, procession and demonstration, to enjoy freedom of religious belief, and to be free from arbitrary arrest. The homes of citizens were to be inviolable, and the privacy of correspondence was to be protected. Citizens were to be free to live where they chose and to move when they pleased.

Extensions of the usual philosophy of freedom were the guarantee to citizens of the right to work and the right to rest; the right to material assistance in old age, in illness, or in disability. Citizens were guaranteed the rights to education and to engage in scientific research, literary and artistic creation, and other cultural activities. Women were granted equal rights with men and protection by law with regard to marriage and the family. Citizens were given the right to make charges against any government worker for transgression of law or neglect of duty, and persons who sustained loss as a result of infringement of their rights were entitled to compensation.

The PRC assumed the obligation to protect Chinese residents abroad, and offered asylum to any foreign national persecuted for supporting a just cause, for taking part in a peace movement, or for scientific activities. Citizens were enjoined to abide by the constitution and the law, preserve labor discipline and public order, respect social ethics, respect and safeguard public property, pay taxes, defend the homeland, and perform military service according to law.

The fourth and last chapter of the constitution fixed the design of the red flag of China with its five stars; selected as the state emblem one of the famous gates of Peking under the five stars framed with ears of grain and

with a cogwheel at the base; and designated Peking as the capital of the PRC.

The test of the constitution was not to be found in its words but rather in the spirit with which those words were to be enforced. The high-sounding phrases could not disguise the Communists' determination to push the revolution toward its ultimate objectives. The atmosphere of struggle and tension was continued, and was designed to stimulate highly disciplined functionaries to give China an aggressive, tightly knit government unlike anything ever attained under the empire, the republic, or the Kuomintang.

Party and government were closely interlocked, were without checks and balances, and were subject to the will of the same individuals. Mao Tse-tung was at the same time the chairman of the National Party Congress, the Central Committee, the Political Bureau, and the Central Secretariat in the party hierarchy; the chairman of the PRC in the government structure; and in addition the chairman of the National Defense Council. Chu Teh, Liu Shao-ch'i, and Chou En-lai—influential party leaders—were chosen respectively as vice-chairman of the PRC, chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC, and premier of the State Council.

At the lower levels, party functionaries also served concurrently as government officials. Thus, at one time, Kao Kang, in addition to his jobs at Peking served as secretary to the CCP and chairman of the People's Government Council in Mukden. In the capital cities in the administrative regions—Shanghai, Sian, Hankow, and Chungking—the same individual was likely to be the secretary of the party, the chairman of the local council, and the commanding general of the Revolutionary Army. This arrangement provided the means for strict supervision from top to bottom. The central government exercised full control over the regional councils and through them over the entire political apparatus at the local levels. There was no grass-root democracy or local autonomy in Communist China. In practice the principle of democratic centralism was a travesty on democracy and a clever, substantial guarantee of dictatorship. The People's Republic was a series of wheels within wheels and the CCP was its central hub.

Subject to the direction of the party apparatus, the Communists constructed the façade of a United Front. Mao appealed repeatedly to all "democratic" groups to fight together to destroy the Kuomintang and to build a new China. He advertised his government as a United Front dominated by the left, in contrast to the old United Front dominated by the right. He mobilized non-Communist groups behind policies which they had little if any part in formulating. By the device of the United Front he provided safety valves for minority elements and afforded an alternative for subversive activities. He made a great display of tolerance, but he could

not disguise the factor of coercion. The price of existence was slavish subscription to party dogma and to the constitution.

Political and Social Policies

The launching of the Chinese Communist government marked the end of one era and the beginning of another. As soon as the Communists completed the framework of government, they embarked upon internal policies which revealed intense concentration upon the further course of the "revolution." They wasted little time in celebration of past achievements; they talked and planned for future tasks. The party was the chosen instrument to uproot the ancient patterns of life and to enlist the support of the masses for the Common Program. During the period of rapid growth, the party absorbed an inevitable number of local toughs and weak-minded opportunists. This necessitated constant purging of the ranks and continuous flagellation of the revolutionary spirit. The successful leaders of the fighting peasant phase of the struggle needed to broaden the base of their command by the addition of significant numbers of the urban proletariat. If the working class as defined by Mao Tse-tung failed to shift its focus from farm to city, from peasants to city labor, the Chinese revolution could never follow the classic lines of standard international movements as prescribed by Marx and Lenin.

In the process of expansion, old and unfit party members were expelled while newly indoctrinated members were enrolled. Most new members were recruited from the urban areas, and most administrative jobs were given to representatives of the workers, the clerical groups, and the students. Only half of the 6,000,000 members came from the rural areas; the other half came from the army, government organs, factories, mines, and schools. New members were chosen on the basis of eight qualifications: understanding that the CCP is the organized vanguard of the Chinese working class; realization that the final aim of communism in China is the transformation of the New Democracy into socialism and eventually into communism; determination to carry on the revolutionary struggle for the rest of their lives; observation of party discipline; acceptance of the proposition that the party is the people whose interests are above personal interests; willingness to subject their own work to perpetual self-criticism; service to the masses, in keeping the party and the masses in fundamental accord; mastery of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and the thought of Mao Tse-tung.

Recruits were attracted by street corner speeches, blackboard announcements, magic lanterns, loud speakers, wall newspapers, and posters. In the

cities the campaigns were sparked by radio and moving pictures. It was not too easy to attract the numbers which the leaders wanted because the risks of party responsibilities outweighed the advantages. Good activists or cadre leaders were particularly difficult to discover. The rigid qualifications in practice were reduced to four essentials: good social status, enthusiasm, good example for the masses—particularly zeal in production—and dependability in sticking with the party through thick and thin. Training programs were rigorous and searching. Indoctrination was carried out in small classes which mastered the “line” in party history, agricultural policies, current problems, and the ideological concept of the long-term struggle against the enemy. The Chinese party members were by no means social misfits and economic riffraff; they constituted a well-trained, thoroughly disciplined elite.

The ranks were subjected to constant overhauling. Mao warned against conceit, pride, and self-complacency, and from time to time he or a designated member of the hierarchy deplored the major errors of waste, corruption, commandism, and bureaucracy. He warned against departures from the will of the people and overzealousness on the part of some errant cadres. He cautioned his staff not to succumb to the sugar-coated bullets of the *bourgeoisie* in the moment of their success. He was the sworn enemy of relaxation and he preached the philosophy of struggle.

He insisted upon ideological conformity against all deviations. He carried through a rectification campaign and a “three-anti” campaign (antiwaste, anticorruption, and antibureaucratism) which in a year caused the expulsion of about one in ten of all the party members. Expulsion did not mean death except in most serious cases, but rather demotion, reassignment, or punishment by forced labor. After the “three-anti” campaign, the party launched a “five-too-many” movement which aimed at eradicating too many meetings, too many documents and forms, too many training courses, too many organizations, and too many useless political jobs. As the cadres were “purified” and the search for capable yeomen was pressed, the morale of the “old revolutionaries” was buffeted by inescapable strains. Even the most fanatic Chinese recognized limits upon the “hero’s life” and thought about rewards as well as punishments. The activists worked long hours for little pay and were enjoined not to accept even a cigarette for “squeeze.” Personal reactions were blanketed by iron discipline. Whatever factionalism might have existed in the administrative regime was sufficiently controlled to prevent for a long period of time any major defections in the highest party echelons.

The Communists used the methods of the police state for the imposition of tyrannical control. They whipped the people into a condition of pathological fear of an underground capitalistic conspiracy allegedly fostering

the devilish machinations of the United States, the Kuomintang, and other reactionary counterrevolutionaries. The Bureau of Social Affairs of the party and the Ministry of Public Security for the government were responsible for public security on a national scale, but every local cell organized its own public security committee. Peasants' associations or village militia units took care of all local security risks, real or imagined. Residents' committees were created in villages and cities to assist the police and public security outposts. Neighborhood associations were substituted for the traditional *pao chia*, or military protective system, and converted into a nationwide net of espionage. Families were told that they were less important than the state and that they must report the deviations of their own members. Houses might be searched at any time and residents subjected to hours of questioning. Permits were necessary for meetings of five or more persons, and police notification was required if family members went away for a night or entertained overnight guests. Supervision was usually performed by secret agents rather than by uniformed police.

These totalitarian policies throttled opposition, but they spawned attitudes of sullen silence and suspicion. At accusation rallies brother accused brother, employee accused employer, and students hurled hateful charges against professors. Struggle meetings—like old-time religious revivals or confession meetings—incited individuals to conform and apparently aroused within them added enthusiasm for the cause. The Communists tried to identify the concept of a strong and free China with the party and the concepts of weakness and corruption with anticommunism. They eliminated the hopeless counterrevolutionaries but undertook re-education or reform for those with a residual capacity to “serve the people.” The prescribed cures included working on the railroads or irrigation projects or “volunteering” for duty in Korea.

Victims of accusations were at the mercy of the people's courts. The measure of justice was the will of the party and the severity of the punishment depended upon the decree of the masses. In six years the people's courts tried more than 1,000,000 cases. A typical news dispatch from a small Chinese community revealed the extent and tone of the mass trials. It stated that “in Liuchow fifty-two reactionary foremen and corrupt unionist running-dogs of counterrevolutionaries and exploiting subcontractors were removed from their jobs and turned over to the security police for punishment under the democratic reform movement.” That was in one small community and in one isolated incident. The extremes of the mass trials were exemplified by the execution of a comprador of a printing firm in Shanghai, which was ordered because 900 women employees of the company all swore publicly that he had raped them. Death sentences were

passed on those who owed blood debts—that is, those who had injured the national interest in the highest degree—but sentences of compulsory labor were imposed for lesser crimes.

An American Assistant Secretary of State told the House of Representatives Appropriations Committee that from 1949 to 1954 it was estimated that—including deaths from starvation plus the liquidations (that is, liquidations of the political opposition, landowners, business people, and others whom the Communists wanted to exterminate, often by herding their victims into public squares and turning machine guns on them)—the Communists had eliminated about 15,000,000 people. The Communist officials offered no apologies for these procedures but used them openly and deliberately for purposes of reform. Local officials promised their superiors in Peking that they would not relax their vigilance but would conduct campaigns of ever-increasing severity against spies, saboteurs, and counterrevolutionaries.

The Communists were sufficiently astute to provide attractions and diversions to offset the rigors of the police state. They applied circus psychology to their endless campaigns—campaigns entitled agrarian reform, “three-anti,” “five-too-many,” elimination of counterrevolutionaries, and “resisting America, aiding Korea, protecting your home and family.” They encouraged flag-waving, street dances, and parades—with prizes for the best bands and peasants, in that order. They emphasized quantity at the expense of quality both in the sense of courses offered and students in schools. In the lower grades they embodied the spirit of their education in stories like the following:

A workman who refuses to turn the records of his work over to the Kuomintang later makes them available to the Communists and is duly rewarded. A group of Red Army soldiers return a pair of ducks to their rightful owner. A poem asks God [sic] to delay the rains so as not to interfere with the operations of the “People’s Liberation Army.” A patriotic schoolboy devotes his lunch hour to party work. A Soviet girl risks her life to save sixty-five calves from the burning barn of a state farm. A mother gives her son the name Tse-tung in honor of Chairman Mao. A poem urges children to imitate Stalin and Mao and predicts that in time China will become a second Soviet Union and the whole world will go Communist. The Soviet Union is praised for its role in developing the mineral resources of Sinkiang (in reality, the meager evidence available suggests that this exploitation is being carried on in anything but an unselfish spirit). The invention of the airplane is attributed to a Russian. Communist regimes or movements in other lands (Southeast Asia, Outer Mongolia, North Korea, and Eastern Europe) are praised in extravagant terms. The non-Communist world is pictured as being generally under the domination of the United States, whose population is given as only 30 million, and which is said to be dominated in turn by a handful of

wealthy families. The United States is written off as doomed to eventual destruction at the hands of the "democratic" nations.¹

The Communists adapted the system of higher education to their political requirements, with the same emphasis on the soviets and dialectical materialism. They placed prime importance on the training of technical personnel, and they declassified some of China's best-known colleges and universities into technical schools. Institutions which were ideologically suspect were deprived of their liberal arts courses and mission schools were nationalized. Curricula were frequently rearranged on the principle of "one school, one speciality." The Communists permitted students to indicate the school and the department desired, but they granted admissions on the basis of the country's requirements for its construction program. In one year, for example, they set a quota in institutions of higher learning of 70,000 students: in engineering, 29,000; teachers' colleges, 18,000; science, 4,000; agriculture, 3,000; liberal arts, 3,000; economics and finance, 2,000; physical education, 800; law and political science, 1,000 (including 100 for international relations); and fine arts, 300. The Communists subjected the professors to constant brain-washing, and forced some world-renowned Chinese scholars to recant publicly their former "foolish and fallacious" thoughts.

The Communists attacked all faiths—Moslem, Buddhist, and Christian—and subordinated religion to political policy. They systematically attacked Catholics and Protestants and forced the Chinese Christians to sever their overseas connections. At the start of the severe persecution of Catholics in 1951, about 3,000 foreign priests and a small number of lay brothers in thirty-five mission societies, representing thirty nationalities, labored in China. Foreign Catholic sisters numbered about 2,000 and represented more than fifty societies. Their record was one of suffering and martyrdom as they were accused of practicing espionage under the guise of teaching religion. Three years of persecution, brain-washing, jail, death, and expulsion reduced the numbers in China to approximately 250 foreign priests and lay brothers and 120 sisters. The Communists took away from the Catholics their lands, schools, and printing presses, and they organized a "Catholic Reformed Church" movement which they boasted would put the Catholic church out of business in China in twenty years. Yet one Catholic missionary in sad exile in Hongkong testified after his expulsion in 1953 from his lifelong labors in China, "Never have I seen so much interest in religion in China; it is difficult to find houses large enough for the people who want to attend."

The Communists attacked the Protestant churches more cautiously be-

¹ Department of State, *Far Eastern Notes*, Number 3, April 15, 1953, p. 8.

cause they classified the Protestants at first as "progressive elements capable of reform." Premier Chou En-lai summoned the Chinese Protestant leaders to Peking and told them that they could carry on their work for a little while but without foreign aid and foreign missionaries. After the Korean War, the Protestants were subjected to the same persecution as the Catholics. Chinese Christians were called upon for extraordinary financial contributions for Chinese in Korea and were subjected to most intense political supervision. Religious schools, colleges, hospitals, and publishing companies were taken over by the government, and Protestants were ordered to purge themselves by the "three-self" movement: self-government, self-preaching, and self-support. Bishop Chiang Chang-chuan in a struggle meeting was obliged to carry out a thoroughgoing examination of his mistake in having baptized Chiang Kai-shek.

The Communists used the dissemination of news as an effective agency of social control. They took their foreign news from Russian sources and monopolized the domestic news by the official New China News Agency (NCNA). They simply did not tolerate "the bourgeois concept of objectivity." The *Peking People's Daily* always carried the correct editorial line which the other Chinese papers copied. Newspaper reading was considered a patriotic duty, and it was supplemented by attentive regard for the political commentaries carried on a nationwide radio network. The Communist state owned and operated more than sixty publishing houses and printed a half dozen times as many books and magazines as the Kuomintang before the war. Papers and periodicals for foreign circulation were subjected to strict censorship.

The Communists carried drab regimentation to unprecedented extremes: almost 6,000,000 party members in a quarter million branches; 10,000,000 on the government payroll; tens of millions in mass organizations; and millions of nonparty shock troops and youth eager for recognition and promotion. They claimed astronomic figures for membership in Peasants' Associations, the Democratic Women's Federation, the Federation of Democratic Youth, the Young Pioneers, the Students' Federation, the Federation of Labor, and the Federation of Commerce and Industry. They perfected a pattern of mass organizations which gave no clue of their cohesiveness or inner spirit. The Chinese demonstrated through the years a baffling power of resistance against excessive discipline and control, and the Communists were constrained to recognize the lessons of the historical background of Chinese peasant revolts. The Communists dealt forcefully or gingerly, as the occasion demanded, with the peasants, and sent their best activists to deal with the local gentry, the village headmen, and the secret societies. Minimum concessions to the peasants in the form of improvements in their

level of living, suppression of bandits, and establishment of local militia constituted irreducible requirements in retaining the confidence of the rural masses and strait-jacketing their social inertia for the purposes of the revolution.

The Communists, for all practical purposes, crushed the power of the peasants to revolt and eliminated the menace of organized guerillas. They created an army which proved capable of preserving internal law and order and upsetting the external balance of power in Asia. The Chinese built up a regular army of some 3,000,000 men supplemented by 700,000 in the security forces and 12,000,000 in the trained and disciplined militia. They standardized their organization and equipment and annihilated once and for all the contempt which the Western world customarily showered upon the military strength of China. They developed a deadly artillery and a respectable air force. They modernized China's transportation system to consolidate their national strategic position and they guided their industrialization program to provide the arsenals and the economic requirements for their military establishment. Most important, they imparted a fervent do-or-die spirit in soldiers whose record had been tainted with compromise, corruption, and retreat. The Communists discarded the old social outlook on the soldier in favor of an attitude of respect and admiration. They identified the army with the people and they made a code of courtesy a part of discipline. The "three disciplines" of the army were: "Obey orders, do not take a single needle or thread from the people, and hand in all booty to the government." The "eight points of attention" which were the soldiers' eight commandments were: "Talk to the people politely, deal fairly, return borrowed articles, pay for everything you have damaged, do not beat or scold the people, do not damage crops, do not fool around with women, and do not ill-treat prisoners of war."

The Communists displayed their skill in tightrope walking in their policies toward minorities and the overseas Chinese. As early as 1931, Mao promised national minorities in China their right to complete separation from China and to the formation of an independent state for each minority group. He indicated that all Mongolians, Tibetans, Miao, Yao, Koreans, and others living on the territory of China might either join the Chinese state or form a separate state, as they preferred. Five years later Mao repeated that Korea, Tibet, and Formosa were entitled to their independence. By 1949 Mao had receded from that position. He acknowledged the right of minorities to develop their own dialects and language, but the right to independent existence had withered away from his political philosophy.

Mao wanted to incorporate into the Chinese community of culture the regions where minorities clustered. The attitude of Peking toward the

minority peoples and their homes was a mixture of caution and expediency, endeavoring to avoid the twin pitfalls of chauvinism on the part of the central government and narrow nationalism on the part of the minorities. In practice, the minority policies of the Communists evolved according to China's power potential and "defense" needs without clear indication whether the party made strong friends or bitter enemies in the minority areas.

The Communists pledged themselves to the protection and promotion of the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese residing abroad. The compromises with capitalism in the stage of the New Democracy appealed to the wealthy, successful Chinese living overseas. The Chinese, rather than the Russians, assumed the directorship of the Communist hierarchy in East Asia. The Communists set up a National Commission on Overseas Chinese Affairs within the government structure and induced some of the wealthiest Chinese abroad to serve as members. They organized local associations in Fukien and Kwangtung for service and assistance to overseas Chinese. The headquarters doubled as places for good fellowship and centers for propaganda control. The Peking government encouraged student exchanges and good will tours and exploited every means to multiply emigrants' remittances and investments in Chinese industries. It tailored propaganda programs to overseas Chinese and without doubt explored ways and means to convert them into successful fifth columns for possible moments of crisis.

Economic Policies

Economic policies dealt with agriculture, industry, trade, and labor. Agricultural policies were most urgent because of the endemic crises which plagued the Chinese peasants and the overwhelming importance of food production in the Chinese economy. On June 28, 1950, the Communists put into effect the Agrarian Reform Law. That law provided for the confiscation and redistribution of land; new class divisions of the peasants into rich peasants, middle peasants, and poor peasants; regularization of rural taxes; agricultural loans and credits; and encouragement of crafts and rural industries as additional sources of income. The peasants temperamentally resisted change and organization but they were driven toward the Communists' formulae by the conviction that things could not be any worse. Thousands of cadre workers flocked to the countryside to liquidate armed opposition to their program and to organize and indoctrinate the masses. The peasants' associations produced a new type of rural elite—a kind of

party boss, country-style—in place of the horny-handed tiller of the soil. The Communists then enforced rent reductions and made the landlords return the deposits advanced by the peasants. The peasants naturally approved. The “strangers from the cities” then reclassified the land and the peasants, and actually distributed the land titles to the unbelieving peasants. Within three years the Communists announced the completion of that phase of their program.

In spite of the peasants’ inertia, the party theorists plunged ahead with their Socialist policies. The theorists argued that redistribution was not an end in itself and was, in fact, a dangerous stage in the evolution toward ultimate collectivization. They charged that small peasant plots—no matter how much the peasant liked his land—gave birth to capitalism and petty bourgeois practices of renting at usurious rates or buying and selling land for profit. They spoke of the need to subjugate the capitalist trends of the peasants and to co-ordinate the socialization of agriculture with industrial development.

They changed their policies slowly in order to minimize peasant opposition and to avoid the excesses of the *kulaks*’ extermination in the Soviet Union. They combined peasants into mutual aid teams where perhaps a half dozen families worked jointly, used each others’ tools and animals, aided in grain collections, learned to improve their farming methods, and pooled their resources for credit contracts from the state banks.

The Communists advocated a further voluntary step from the mutual aid teams toward producers’ co-operatives. They stated that they had organized 14,000 co-operatives by the end of 1953 and that their goal was 800,000 by 1957. The co-operatives were larger units which necessitated unified management and collective labor, but they were still based on private property. Members invested their land in a common enterprise and received a corresponding number of shares. The advantages of the system were improved management, specialization of labor, combination of farming and subsidiary occupations, planned production, and a more extensive and economical use of modern, expensive agricultural implements. Even the co-operatives were looked upon as way stations on the road to ultimate collectivization. The Communists worked hard to convince the peasants of the utopia achieved in the Soviet Union by the magic of scientific, mechanized, collectivized farming.

The party gave the peasants a blueprint for organization and action, but it waged an unfinished, uneven battle to solve China’s fundamental agricultural problems. Even under the Communists, food shortages followed natural calamities such as late frosts, invasion of locusts, floods, and droughts. Distress conditions obliged the bureaucracy to let up in its reck-

less drive toward collectivization and to check the unreasonable concentration of economic attention on the interests of the cities at the expense of the country. The government could not provide farm implements or extend rural credits and technical aid as it had promised. It ran into trouble with its nationalization program which in 1954 monopolized rural procurement and urban distribution of grain.

The peasants resented compulsory grain collections and they remained skeptical about the advantages attributed to the mutual aid societies and producers' co-operatives. Too many human factors militated against the harmonious functioning of the socialized groups. This prompted the government to conduct more extensive purges against cadre workers who incurred the wrath of indignant peasants. The peasants realized that no amount of discipline or coercion could substitute for careful cultivation in increasing production. The peasants murmured in protest and some even deserted the farms for Peking and the other urban areas. They insisted that their welfare should determine the tempo of further reform.

Like other nations in the Far East, China pinned its hope of greatness on industrialization. When the Communists succeeded to power, they inherited a rickety railway system, a damaged network of posts, telegraphs, and telephones, and such light and heavy industries as the government had taken over from the Kuomintang, the Japanese, and miscellaneous other foreigners. The Communists lacked the capital, the managerial skills, and the technical know-how to nationalize all industries immediately; so they contented themselves with provisions in the Common Program that state-owned enterprise should be the leading force in the entire Socialist economy and that the people's government should encourage private industries beneficial to the national welfare and the people's livelihood. The New Democracy allowed for an intermediate stage on the way to ultimate socialization in industry as in agriculture.

The government siphoned off profits in the form of taxes, subscriptions to Victory Bonds, and Arms Donations campaigns during the first years of toleration of private enterprise. Then in 1952 the government launched the "five-anti" campaign—antibribery, antifraud, anti-tax-evasion, antitheft of state property, and anti-giving-away of state economic secrets—which broke the will and the economic backbone of the urban middle class. It was estimated that in six months the government netted a quarter billion dollars in "squeeze" and payment of back taxes. Businessmen were forced to confess their alleged transgressions, such as black-marketing, speculating, and cheating on government contracts. The public was invited to make accusations against lawbreaking elements and to drop complaint slips into the nearest mailbox. Manufacturers and merchants were punished in

accordance with the classification assigned them, whether law-abiding, basically law-abiding, semi-law-abiding, or serious lawbreakers.

The Communists tried to force the pace of socialization, but they were stymied by insurmountable obstacles. They drew up a scheme for an intermediate stage of state capitalism in which they would utilize the individual entrepreneurs while planning their eventual elimination. They assigned highest priorities to the development of the social sector of the national economy: electric power, arsenals, strategic railways, and the over-all industrialization of Manchuria and West China. To a secondary degree they planned to reform and restrict the remnants of private enterprise. They increased state operations as purchasing and selling agents and enlarged the areas within which the state should fix and control prices. They decreed that some industries should deal only with the government—the government should place all orders, supply all raw materials, and purchase the entire product. They pressed for the formation of joint state-private enterprises in which the government would participate in every step of the management. They warned that if industries tried to sabotage the government program the industries would be heading for self-destruction.

In 1953 the Communists launched the first Five-Year Plan amid great fanfare. They plastered walls with posters telling how to lay bricks, tend machines, or operate tractors. They announced modest production goals, but they soon discovered that a huge gap separated the plan and the performance. They failed to reach their targets, even in Manchuria, and they talked publicly about their shortages in steel, copper tubing, electric motors, and railway cars. They called for more austerity, more belt-tightening, and more intense economic mobilization. They threatened and coaxed private businessmen, and they overhauled repeatedly their administrative machinery in charge of economics and finance. They resorted to further bond issues, and in September, 1953, they bargained with the Soviet Union for further assistance. Economic stringencies could not fail to influence Chinese attitudes in international affairs. By the Chinese-Russian agreement, the Russians promised to expend \$338,000,000 in industrial aid in exchange for raw materials during a four-year period ending in 1957.

State trading companies controlled 90 per cent of the distribution of farm products, 40 to 100 per cent of the trade in various wholesale lines, and 30 per cent of all retail trade by the end of 1954. The state monopolized foreign trade. Canton alone reported that 2,200 private companies had entered the orbit of state capitalism in such varied types of businesses as food retailing, shipping, buses, telecommunication supplies, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, dyestuffs, pigments, bamboo wares, fuels, cigarettes, and wines. Peking and Shanghai reported similar activity. The

privacy of the company books disappeared, and the competitive initiative for which the Chinese businessmen were so famous vanished with the system of fixed prices, fixed quotas, and controlled markets. The All-China Federation of Commerce and Industry became an effective agency of business control, and the labor unions took over from the guilds the important role of policing the employers.

When the Communists first tackled the problems of labor, they saluted labor as the master of state and society. The honeymoon ended quickly. The urban laborers complained of rising costs and unemployment and presented demands for better protection, higher wages, and improved working conditions. The bureaucracy pushed aside immediate demands while they groped for a permanent policy. They considered the weakness of China's laboring force—only 13,000,000 persons—of whom 3,000,000 were in industry and the rest were administrative personnel. The Communist bureaucrats, the intelligentsia, considered themselves as a Confucian elite, but they appreciated the necessity of accepting the social prestige of labor. They urged labor to forget its grievances and to subordinate its interests to the welfare of the state. They preached to labor about its mission to stimulate production, to work harder, to become more inventive, and to cast aside its slovenly habits. They exhorted workers to be punctual, not to spend more than twenty minutes in the washroom, to give up ceremonial feasts, to eat plain food, and to let five persons eat the rice of three. They encouraged unions—enrolling nearly 10,000,000 in the Federation of Labor—and charged the unions to protect the property of the state and the administrative authority of the good capitalists. They instructed the unions at the same time to supervise closely the operations of their employers under government direction and not to allow capitalists to continue illegal actions. The Communists guaranteed the rights of arbitration and mediation but they outlawed the right to strike. Rabble-rousing union leaders became anachronisms and the union meetings degenerated into consultation meetings and forums for political harangues.

No rights of any description were accorded China's slave labor. China made no attempt to conceal its treatment of the millions of "counter-revolutionary culprits" who bent their backs and strained their muscles to accomplish reform by labor. Forced labor accounted for prodigious public works in irrigation, drainage, flood control, highway and railway construction. Old trunk lines were extended and new railways were built with Chinese steel in China's southwest and far west, opening new routes to Indo-China and to Russia's trans-Asian transportation systems.

The Communists put their transportation and communications facilities into first-rate condition and they offered improved service. They kept their

trains clean, operated them on time, and disciplined the coolies and porters. They expanded domestic and international (Russian) air services and they multiplied bus lines. It was reported possible to travel commercially between Peking and Lhasa within a week.

After the short span of a few years, it was difficult to adjudge the success or failure of Communist economic policies. The scars of the war against Japan and the civil war were erased from the Chinese landscape as farms were rehabilitated, houses rebuilt, cities restored, and the economic machine thrown into gear. Harvests reached prewar levels but were determined by the bounty or anger of nature rather than the ingenuity of the Communist agrarian policies. Food seemed as plentiful and as well distributed as under the Kuomintang. Imported delicacies disappeared from the Chinese markets, but rice, wheat, chickens, eggs, vegetables, and ham remained in steady supply, comparatively immune from a naval blockade. The gaps seemed neither so great nor so frequent between the relative scales of living for the rich and the poor. Public officials disciplined themselves and offered paper programs for improved public welfare. While the village elders lamented the breakup of the old society, the young people talked about hygiene, sanitation, the new marriage laws, and the possibility of a new era for farms and factories. The reality of revolutionary changes could not be ignored, whatever the causes which produced them or the effects which sprouted from them. China faced the dilemma of its humanity or its rice bowl, of its freedom in poverty or its regimentation in pursuit of illusory goals. A party elite gambled the destiny of the nation with its phrenetic policies and compounded the risk by attaching the country to the kite of a new imperialism.

Suggested Reading

DERK BODDE, *Peking Diary* (New York, 1950).

EDWARD HUNTER, *Brain-Washing in Red China* (New York, 1951).

RAJA HUTHEESING, *The Great Peace* (New York, 1953).

FRANK MORAES, *Report on Mao's China* (New York, 1953).

H. ARTHUR STEINER, ed., "Report on China," *The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science* (Philadelphia, September, 1951).

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE: Obtainable are the most valuable publications of the American Consulate General, Hongkong. Teachers or students who are interested should write directly to the Department of State for information about these publications. They are equally valuable for the chapter which follows.

CHAPTER 28

International Policies of Communist China

When the Chinese Communists took over the direction of their nation's foreign policies, they represented the merging of two boiling streams of thought. They inherited the qualities of the Chinese race and a Confucian political ideology which had persisted from the time of Christ. In addition, they adhered to the philosophy and techniques of international communism. They saw no conflict between the ideology of the moment and the legacy of China's past living in their own people. In place of an effete imperial bureaucracy, they constructed a solid administrative machinery. Instead of limiting themselves to the anachronistic universalism of Confucius coterminous with China, they embraced an authoritarian doctrine which they hoped to make the basis of a radically reconstructed world.

The new government made no distinction between the fight for the people's democracy and national independence. It integrated domestic matters and foreign policies and made every decision, great or small, on the basis of its relationship to the compulsions of the Communist creed. With the handicaps of national bankruptcy, economic devastation, and spiritual demoralization, the government embarked upon the long, tortuous road to internal strength and international respectability. The logic of the situation demanded peace, trade, and assistance from the Western nations which had the skills and the resources to aid China, but the government chose to abandon logic for the dictates of its ideological program. Mao declared, "If it takes 200 years to build up China without the aid of the West, we will do it."

Fundamentals

In internal policies, the Communist leadership constantly shifted its tactics within the framework of the doctrines of Marx, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao Tse-tung. In foreign policies, it followed the same flexible procedures always in accord with the requirements of the world-wide struggle of communism for power. In common with the Soviet Union, it sought alliance with the proletariat everywhere in its struggle against the imperialists. Its doctrine permitted temporary coalitions or alliances with bourgeois or capitalist nations or groups in colonial countries, provided these arrangements achieved certain progress toward the immutable, ultimate goal. Mao Tse-tung wrote:

You lean to one side. Precisely so. 'The forty years' experience of Sun Yat-sen and the twenty-eight years' experience of the Chinese Communist Party have taught us to believe that in order to win and consolidate the victory we must lean to one side. The experience of forty years and twenty-eight years respectively shows that, without exception, the Chinese people either lean to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. To sit on the fence is impossible; a third road does not exist. We oppose the Chiang Kai-shek reactionary clique who lean to the side of imperialism; we also oppose the illusion of a third road. Not only in China, but also in the world, without exception, one either leans to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. Neutrality is a mere camouflage and does not exist.¹

The Communists rejected isolationism and recognized that they could not consolidate their revolution without outside help. They admitted that their accomplishments owed much to the victories over the Fascist nations in World War II, the liberation movements among other oppressed peoples, and the struggles of the proletariat in capitalistic countries. They insisted upon full and complete sovereignty for China, and they regarded themselves as the staunchest and best-equipped leaders for other independence movements. They promised to refrain from oppression of national minorities in China and to assist unconditionally all liberation movements, particularly in Southeast Asia. They aligned themselves with nationalists outside China by stressing the common interest of anti-imperialism but they parted company with bourgeois nationalists *after the achievement of independence* whenever in their opinion the *bourgeoisie*

¹ Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz, John K. Fairbank, *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1952), pp. 453-454.

sought to gratify its own appetite for profits rather than the interests of the masses.

The Communists admitted no contradiction between proletarian internationalism and national patriotism. They interpreted true patriotism as warm love for one's own motherland based upon unselfish devotion to the public welfare. According to them, proletarian patriotism, or good patriotism, could never deteriorate into oppression or exploitation of others; proletarian internationalism, which fundamentally demanded loyalty to the Soviet Union, meant service to the cause of liberation. These ends were compatible and they justified every means. The Communists considered all their tactics for good purposes and therefore justified; all enemy tactics were for destructive purposes and therefore damnable. They interpreted Russian aid for China as great evidence of sympathy and understanding; American aid for Formosa as disguised imperialism. It depended upon whose hand wielded the weapon and against whom.

The Communists distilled a brew of bitterness from the modern history of China, with its imperialist invasions and obstructions to Chinese independence and sovereignty. They accepted Lenin's view that imperialism symbolized the death spasms of capitalism, and they blamed Sun Yat-sen for his weak-kneed opposition to foreign encroachments. They warned that they would not compromise with imperialists sending their lackeys to penetrate into China to carry out the work of disintegration and disruption and who might even send their armed forces to China's frontiers. They dismissed the arguments of legal rights, diplomatic techniques, and provocations and castigated imperialism in terms of its political, economic, and social consequences. They taught their own people that "the enemy's camp is unstable—it is a camp divided and isolated from its people." They argued that the apparent strength of the capitalist countries was a hollow sham, weakened by one inevitable economic crisis after another.

The fundamentals of doctrine could not prescribe the exact course of day-to-day operations and developments of China's international policies. The principles were vague and subject to continuous interpretation and adaptation. Tactics were unpredictable and flexible. Whenever compromises were adjudged to be essential for national survival, they were neatly explained by some pat phrases of doctrine. Many things which Chinese Communists credited to the excellence and infallibility of their doctrine were fundamentally things which Chinese governments before them had attempted to do. Their international policies stemmed from the dynamic factors of security, defense, geography, enhanced welfare, and the objective realities of the immediate international situation as well as from the intellectual acrobatics of the party theorists.

The Common Program of the CPCC in September 1949 best outlined the projected role of the Chinese Communists in world affairs. It revealed their aspirations and attitudes and exposed their indifference to the traditional concepts of international law and diplomatic practice. Their principle of principles, in Article 11, stated, "The People's Republic of China shall unite with all peace-loving and freedom-loving countries and peoples throughout the world, first of all with the USSR, all People's Democracies and all oppressed nations. It shall take its stand in the camp of international peace and democracy to oppose jointly imperialist aggression and defend lasting world peace." The Communists associated peace-loving, freedom-loving, progress of humanity, and democracy with their own policies, and they labeled their enemies as imperialists, Fascists, reactionaries, bandits, warmongers, or worse. When they spoke of the people, they referred to their own privileged classes—the party, the soldiers, the workers, and the peasants.

Seven articles of the Common Program listed the highest guiding principles for the foreign policy pursued "at present" by the People's Republic of China.

Article 54. The principle of the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China is protection of the independence, freedom, integrity of territory and sovereignty of the country, upholding of lasting international peace and friendly co-operation between the peoples of all countries, and opposition to the imperialist policy of aggression and war.

Article 55. The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China shall examine the treaties and agreements concluded between the Kuomintang and foreign governments, and shall recognize, abrogate, revise or renegotiate them according to their respective contents.

Article 56. The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China may, on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for territory and sovereignty, negotiate with foreign governments which have severed relations with the Kuomintang reactionary clique and which adopt a friendly attitude toward the People's Republic of China, and may establish diplomatic relations with them.

Article 57. The People's Republic of China may restore and develop commercial relations with foreign governments and peoples on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.

Article 58. The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China shall do its utmost to protect the proper rights and interests of Chinese residing abroad.

Article 59. The People's Government of the People's Republic of China protects law-abiding foreign nationals in China.

Article 60. The People's Republic of China shall accord the right of asylum

to foreign nationals who seek refuge in China because they have been oppressed by their own governments for supporting the people's interests and taking part in the struggle for peace and democracy.

They changed none of the concepts of the Common Program in the adoption of their constitution in 1954. In practice, the Communists acted with confidence which approached arrogance, with intransigence which defied understanding. They mastered the arts of opportunism and equated the possible with the good. They bowed only to superior force and rationalized their strategic retreats as tactical necessities.

They boasted that their concept of foreign policies was brand-new and that their stand for independence and sovereignty wiped out 150 years of national disgrace. They said, "For years, foreign soldiers, foreign sentries, foreign policemen were part of the Peking scene. Today there is not a foreign soldier in the streets of Peking. The Legation Quarter with its gray stone wall, heavy gates, and soldiers' barracks, was for many years a state within a state. Now the gray stone wall has been pulled down and the Legation Quarter is a thing of the past." They discounted the Kuomintang's successes in that direction and they overlooked the new imperialist privileges which they extended to Soviet Russia. They unblushingly accepted the restoration of the position which the Russians had lost to the Japanese, and they traded old chains for new in tying themselves to the needs of international Communism as plotted by Moscow. With regard to the unequal treaties, they refused to bear any obligations for loans, treaties, agreements, understandings, or any other contracts of national betrayal. They categorically refused to honor the Kuomintang agreements, primarily with the United States, which provided for loans and supplies and special economic and legal rights. The Communists rejected the arrangements made by Chiang Kai-shek for foreign troops, military assistance, and foreign intervention in internal affairs. The Communists shelved their objections "in principle" when they concluded agreements with the USSR.

The cataloguing of conditions in Article 56 showed that the Communists intended to bargain for recognition. The conditions implied that the price of recognition would be admission that the last inch of Chinese soil (including Formosa) should be subject to China's sovereignty; that China would protect foreign nationals according to its own whims and not in accordance with the old treaty system; and that China should itself be the judge of "mutual benefit" and "friendly attitudes." As his first official act, the Foreign Minister, Chou En-lai, communicated Mao's proclamation of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China to foreign

embassies with an expression of his belief that it was necessary to establish normal relations. Within four hours the Soviet Union notified China of its decision to establish diplomatic relations, and within the next four days China received similar recognition from seven other states in the Soviet sphere. Yugoslavia made advances but received only snubs in return. Without significant delay, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, Great Britain, Holland, Switzerland and the Scandinavian states undertook formal relations with the new government.

Those nations labeled imperialist gained little by their overtures. Great Britain in particular suffered rather humiliating treatment—the British recognized the Communists as the *de jure* government of China but the Chinese hedged in their recognition of the British Empire. They accepted the British representative “sent to Peking for the purpose of carrying on negotiations on the question of diplomatic relations.” But the highest Chinese officials did not receive him, nor did they send any Communist representative to London until 1954. The Chinese did not credit Great Britain with a friendly attitude in view of the British abstention on several votes on the admission of Communist China into the United Nations, the treatment of Chinese in Hongkong, and questions of Chinese property, particularly the airplanes of General Chennault which were detained at the Hongkong airport. British efforts to normalize relations got nowhere, in spite of the apparent advantages which China might have derived in applying velvet-glove treatment to the British to widen the gaps between the British and the Americans. The Chinese believed that time was on their side in dealing with the British.

Diplomatic and consular privileges were taken from those nations which did not extend recognition to the Chinese government. The American chargé in Peking was not allowed to communicate with the Chinese government. An American vice-consul was held in Shanghai, and in Mukden the consul and his staff were detained on trumped-up charges under house arrest and finally expelled from China by order of the people's court. The American ambassador himself was obliged to apply in person for his exit permit and to post two “shop guarantees” the same as any other individual when he left the country.²

Foreign nationals remained in China at their own risk and peril and at the mercy of the phrase, “law-abiding.” They lost their treaty protection and they became subject to the vagaries of the people's courts. They found it impossible to defend themselves against charges of espionage, counter-revolution, and harboring dangerous elements. Their innocent houseboys

² A “shop guarantee” is a guarantee by a business firm that unpaid bills will be taken care of.

were ridiculed and abused as dangerous running dogs of imperialism. Traders were classified as honest only if they contributed to the fulfillment of the planned economy. They were welcomed if they were considered essential for industrialization or the balancing of the international income account. Their personal safety and welfare were disregarded and the sanctity of their contracts was destroyed. Business houses which had flourished for a century were forced out of China. The commercial as well as the political field was swept clean for the Communists and their Russian allies.

China and the Soviet Union

For the fourth time in recent history, the Chinese turned to Russia for support. Prince Kung had relied upon Count Ignatiev to restrain the Allies in Peking in 1860; Li Hung-chang had negotiated an alliance with Count Witte to block the Japanese in Northeast Asia at the turn of the century; Sun Yat-sen had bargained with Joffe to assist the young revolution in 1923; and Mao Tse-tung led China into the camp of Russia after World War II. Mao's action was not incidental or desperate—it was deliberately calculated and was regarded as a positive benefit rather than a necessary evil. He declared that the People's Republic would stand resolutely on the side of the international camp of peace and democracy headed by the Soviet Union with which it had the most friendly and fraternal relations. At the time of Stalin's death, Mao telegraphed Malenkov, "Russia remains the theoretical fountainhead of Communism and the model for China now as in the past. . . . Sino-Russian friendship is unbreakable." At Stalin's funeral, Malenkov was flanked by Beria (purged shortly thereafter) and Chou En-lai.

Mao Tse-tung was apparently the only foreigner to achieve first magnitude in the Communist galaxy. Mao was hailed as a "creative Marxist" and his adaptations were treated as ingenious interpretations, not deviations. He was recognized as a powerful figure in international communism because of his success in using all means—including doctrine—to attain his ends. He accepted the intellectual tutelage and political guidance of the Soviet Communists, not because of the ingenuity or insight of their emissaries or their doctrines, but because they added additional weapons to his own quest for leadership. Mao could scarcely credit Stalin with infallible capacity to direct China's revolution after Stalin's lack of clarity in estimating the relative force of the revolutionary factors in ferment in 1926–1927. In spite of Stalin's warnings and remonstrances, Mao "listened reverently,

noded approvingly, and then, coolly ignoring Stalin's counsel of wisdom and caution, led Chinese communism to its triumph."

Mao stifled any expression of resentment against Stalin for his underestimation of Communist strength at the time of the Potsdam Conference. After Mao demonstrated his mastery of China beyond further doubt, Stalin hailed the Communist victory in China as the strongest blow dealt world imperialism since the October revolution, the inspiration to other colonial and independent countries fighting for their freedom, and proof of the infallibility and vitality of the theory of social revolution. Mao, whatever his personal feelings, said, "We owe thanks to Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin who gave us weapons. These weapons are not machine guns but Marxism-Leninism." Subsequently and until the day of his death, Stalin gave minimum cause for Chinese suspicion, refrained from territorial aggrandizement and unmasked intervention in internal affairs, and allowed Peking a degree of expression and action which he had previously denied to Tito.

Chinese masses could not shift their attitudes as quickly as the Chinese leaders. The masses had few contacts with Russians. The few who knew anything about Russians were inclined to remember the worst of the czarist imperialists and the most unfortunate of the victims of the Russian revolution who eked out a cruel existence in Harbin, Mukden, and Shanghai. The Chinese leaders consequently undertook a vigorous propaganda campaign to sell the Soviet Union to the masses. They printed uncritical praise of Russia—"its art is the best in the world," "the technical standards of the Soviet Union are the highest in the world," "there is no denying that Soviet science is the most advanced in the world"—and they repeated endlessly the slogan, "Russia's Today is Our Tomorrow." The Shanghai *Ta Kung Pao* (a leading newspaper) editorialized, "The friendly love which exists between the brotherly Russian and Chinese peoples, so true, so intense, so sincere, and so everlasting, is now freely manifested and no demons shall be able to obstruct it." They organized Sino-Soviet Friendship Associations which claimed some 40,000,000 members in four or five thousand branches throughout China. They sponsored student and teacher exchanges, festivals of art and culture, international broadcasts, translations of books and periodicals, and exhibits of films and photographs. They paraded at the slightest provocation and dedicated themselves to an active, nationwide campaign to liquidate all vestiges of anti-Soviet thoughts and "to eliminate the misgivings of the masses in relation to Sino-Soviet friendship."

In statements of policy the Chinese Communists expressed their first loyalty to proletarian internationalism, which in actuality connoted loyalty to the Soviet Union. The Communists were not so impolitic as to equate

their patriotism with loyalty to Russia, but they denounced as slander any attempt to brand Mao with Titoism. They said that whoever opposed the USSR would inevitably become an obedient lackey of imperialism. They endorsed the USSR without reservation and considered it incapable of being aggressive or even expansive. They considered themselves separate from Russia, with parallel interests, entirely capable of sustaining themselves ideologically, militarily, and economically. They denied a satellite relationship to Russia—"as the Churchills and the De Gaulles bow before the United States"—but they acknowledged the strength which they received from the broad cover of Soviet world policy. Peking and Moscow spoke with one voice in the international scene: war and peace in Korea, the recognition of Ho Chi Minh, propaganda for peace, and all-out opposition to the United States. The Chinese did not condemn Soviet despoliation of the industries of Manchuria in 1945-1946, did not protest the presence of Soviet forces on Chinese soil, and did not oppose significantly Soviet machinations in Mongolia and Sinkiang. Whether from grim necessity or personal choice, from compulsion or friendship, from conviction or conspiracy, the Chinese Communists associated themselves unreservedly with the USSR, "the Socialist fatherland of the working peoples of the world."

China and Russia abrogated their old treaties and entered into new agreements on February 14, 1950. For the first time in his life, Mao visited Moscow during the negotiations. He did not go with hat in hand but rather as a hard, Oriental, Communist bargainer. The two nations concluded a treaty of friendship, alliance, and mutual aid, together with supplementary agreements and exchanges of notes. Article I of the treaty provided that both signatories would adopt all necessary measures at their disposal to prevent new aggression by Japan or any other state which might collaborate with Japan directly or indirectly in acts of aggression. The treaty continued, "In the event of one of the contracting parties being attacked by Japan or any state allied with her, thus being involved in a state of war, the other contracting party shall immediately render military and other assistance by any means at its disposal." China and Russia agreed to work for an early conclusion of the peace treaty with Japan, to consult with each other on all important international problems of common interest, to participate in all international actions aimed at securing peace and security throughout the world, and to establish close economic and cultural ties.

In an agreement for the transfer of the Chinese-Changchun Railway, Port Arthur, and Dairen to the Chinese government, the Soviet government agreed to transfer without compensation all its rights to joint administration of the railway with all property belonging to the railway. The transfer was to be effected immediately after the conclusion of the peace

treaty with Japan but not later than the end of 1952. Soviet troops were to be withdrawn from Port Arthur at the same time. However, the USSR was granted joint use of Port Arthur on China's proposal and in agreement with China in the event that either party should be the victim of an attack by Japan or any state collaborating with Japan. The question of Dairen was to be subjected to consideration after the conclusion of the peace treaty with Japan. The transfers of the railway and Dairen were accomplished by the end of 1952, but on China's suggestion and request the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the jointly controlled naval base at Port Arthur was postponed indefinitely.

In another agreement, a credit of \$300,000,000 at 1 per cent interest was provided for China, payable in five annual installments and repayable in ten annual installments beginning December 31, 1954. The credit was to be used for equipment and materials for electric power stations, metallurgical and engineering plants, mining equipment for the extraction of coal and ores, railway and other transport equipment, and other materials for the restoration and development of the national economy of China. Repayment was to be made in deliveries of raw materials, tea, gold, and American dollars. Secret codicils were subjects of rumors to the effect that the Russians demanded control of Chinese ports, separate residential areas in China, selected segments of the Chinese economy, and exorbitant payments in immediate shipments of food.

Exchanges of notes affirmed the complete guarantee of the independent status of the Mongolian People's Republic and arranged for the return without compensation of property "acquired by Soviet business organizations from Japanese organizations in Manchuria and buildings of former Soviet military settlements in Peking."

On March 27, 1950, agreements were signed for the establishment of joint-stock companies to exploit oil and nonferrous metals in Sinkiang and to organize and operate civilian airlines between Peking and Chita, Peking and Irkutsk, and Peking and Alma-Ata. A series of agreements at later dates provided for details of trade—through-rail connections, through-tickets, and bills of lading—and further shipments of Russian machinery. Ordinary trade relationships were shunted to the background by the Chinese participation in the Korean War, but were revived with enthusiasm after the armistice. They were geared to the demands of China's industrialization program.

Russia noted the burgeoning strength of China in Korea and had no intention of facilitating the development of a China sufficiently industrialized to pose a threat to Soviet power. It held the key to China's industrialization and limited its aid to the extent of China's own resources

and accumulations of capital. Russia was careful in rearming China. Russia sent finished war materials in preference to machinery and capital goods.

Russia placed heavy stress upon the border areas where it developed the capacity, if it chose, to unleash political storms which could shake China to its roots. Both countries exercised restraint in their relationships in Manchuria, Mongolia, and Sinkiang. Manchuria contained such a large proportion of China's wealth that Chinese could no more reconcile themselves to the loss of Manchuria than Russians could to a possible loss of the Ukraine. The Chinese, however, seemed to welcome the Russians in Manchuria because as long as the Russians were there the Chinese believed that they had a guarantee against a Russian sell-out elsewhere in Asia. The Russians seemed content to recognize the Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria and to safeguard their own interests by troops in Port Arthur, strong military concentrations on the Siberian border, assured access across North Manchuria by rail to Vladivostok, and the economic leverage maintained by Soviet technicians in Manchuria. Russia did not underestimate the strategic importance of Manchuria nor its economic and psychological importance to all Chinese, Communist and non-Communist alike. The two nations likewise submerged their rivalries in Sinkiang in their mutual self-interest. They developed military bases, ousted foreign consulates, and concentrated on the construction of highways, railways, and telegraph lines and on the exploitation of natural resources.

Russia sent many technicians and advisers to China (some estimates said 500,000) and they brought Chinese workers to Russia for training in industrial plants, mines, and railways. The Chinese praised the Russians lavishly for their help in Manchuria, in railway construction in China proper (the Peking-Hankow, the Hankow-Canton, the Chengtu-Chungking, and the Tsienhsui-Lanchow Railways), on the Hwai River project, on the Sinkiang water-detention bases in the middle reaches of the Yangtze, and on the Tangku harbor construction project near Tientsin. Little was said about any assistance for agricultural enterprises. Russian technicians brought problems as well as benefits to China. They segregated themselves, and they lived in a lusty Russian manner which shocked the Chinese Communists who were still in the initial throes of their austerity campaigns.

The satellite countries combined with Russia to stimulate China's trade and to minimize the dangers of an American blockade. China conducted about 70 per cent of its trade with the Iron Curtain countries—on a barter basis—in 1954. A Chinese official said:

We receive from the USSR industrial equipment for factories, mills and power stations; indispensable raw and industrial materials; locomotives, box-cars and rails for railway transport; tractors, combines and other agricultural

machinery and so forth. We also receive from Poland rolled steel, metal ware, chemical products and all kinds of piece goods. From Czechoslovakia we receive capital goods and products of the metallurgical industry, trucks and passenger cars, chemicals, pharmaceutical goods and so forth. From the German Democratic Republic [East Germany] we receive various types of industrial materials and equipment, chemicals and dyes. Even from Hungary we receive raw materials and industrial equipment. In the course of our own industrial development we will need more than what these countries can export to us. We definitely want to increase our imports from the United States, Britain, France, Japan, and India. However, the trade rupture with China, caused by the policy initiated by the United States and adopted by Western Europe, will cost the blockading nations infinitely more than the damage done to us.

Most of China's foreign trade used the Trans-Siberian Railway and depended upon satisfactory terms with Russia. Russia granted new loans and credits in 1953 to launch the industrialization program and to provide for the construction of ninety-one new enterprises and the renovation of fifty others. The sum was substantial—perhaps a third of a billion dollars—yet it was small in light of China's tremendous needs. According to reports, Russia agreed to supply further industrial raw materials, aid in the development of machine tools and electric equipment industries, construct (primarily at Paotow and Tayeh) metallurgical plants, rebuild mines and coal-processing plants, double China's electric power producing capacity in Manchuria, expand aluminum mills at Fushun and tin mills in Yünnan, build a refinery in Kansu, and assist in the construction and renovation of miscellaneous light industries. China was to send back to Russia nonferrous metals, food, rice and grains, wool, jute, tobacco, and soya beans. Plans were stupendous, the scope of the agreement was impressive, but the possibilities of delivery and fulfillment were at the very least problematical.

The Peking-Moscow axis showed signs of durability, but it also disclosed some significant structural weaknesses. The common ideology combined with realities of power to link Russia and China in a mutually satisfactory alliance. They supplemented each other in military strength, guarded respectively the European and Asian extremities of their geopolitical position, shared the exhilaration of their gains in Asia, and subscribed to mutual aims in international relations. Russia was careful to avoid the mistake of attempting in China the kind of interference that drove Tito out of the fraternity of Communist states. China seemed too vast geographically and too different politically and emotionally to be ruled from Moscow. The USSR, subject to pressure from the West, had to accord a relatively free hand to China in Asia. Moscow was well advised to permit a fairly inde-

pendent Peking to pull its chestnuts out of the Asian fire. For Russia it was most satisfactory to be able to make trouble for the democracies—to extend, pin down, and exhaust their forces—by encouraging China to pursue policies which could be undertaken in safety because of Russia's direct or indirect protection. Both nations believed that they profited from the horrible adventure in Korea and the aggravation of the conflicts in Southeast Asia.

The Kremlin customarily relied upon more than ideology to dominate its satellites—the army, propaganda, terror, all the forces of compulsion and subversion—but these instruments were of questionable value in the case of China. Mao defied Russia when expedient, commanded a self-reliant army, controlled an independent bureaucracy, and within limits expounded his own theories. Even the bonds of ideology between China and Russia were tenuous. If power rivalries pushed the two nations apart, the cement of dogma might lose its cohesive force. Doctrinal deviation could always be invoked to sanctify a clash of national interests. Therefore, it was vital for both nations to work in harmony. For the monopoly of China's attention, Russia extended economic and military aid and paid adequate heed to the wishes of China in all its diplomatic decisions. On its part, China deliberately nurtured its hostility to the West and cast itself at the mercy of Russia to make its dream of industrialization come true. Any tensions between China and Russia were less than critical as the two nations established a working basis for their joint pursuit of revolution.

China and the United States

China regarded the United States as its archenemy in the camp of the reactionary imperialists. The Chinese Communists held to this conviction independently of prodding from Russia. Presumably, they would have preserved their anti-American attitudes even had a breach divided Russia and China. Opposition to the United States crept into the statements of Chinese Communists before the end of World War II. On April 24, 1945, Mao expressed his gratitude to Great Britain and the United States, especially the latter, for their immense contributions to the common cause, but he warned that "any foreign government that helps the Chinese reactionaries to stop the Chinese people's pursuit of democracy will be committing a grave error." He predicted that struggles between anti-Fascist and remnant Fascist forces, between democratic and antidemocratic forces, would go on even after the close of the war. The stated position of the Communists endorsed General Marshall's efforts to achieve the unification

of China by peaceful, democratic methods. The Communists urged him repeatedly to continue his impartial efforts for the pacification of China, but they became bitterly hostile because of the American aid to the Kuomintang. After General Marshall returned home, the Communists bluntly accused the Americans of taking the place of the Fascists (Germany, Italy, and Japan) and of becoming the fortress of imperialism. The Communists lumped the United States with "bandit" Chiang and the Kuomintang reactionaries as the special enemies of the Chinese people and poured out against the United States the viruperation which had been heaped upon Japan. The Communists called the American treaty of November 4, 1946, the last of the unequal treaties and they propagandized their civil war as a war of national defense. The Communists advertised themselves as knights in shining armor and stigmatized the United States as the external aggressor.

They interpreted all American actions as manifestations of a despised social order and incarnations of evil. They charged the United States with plunging China into the abyss of suffering and using the war in Asia as an escape from internal crises. They treated Americans with disdain and whipped up a psychology of hatred which eventuated in the battlefields in Korea.

Their hate campaigns featured three themes: the United States was the deadly enemy of the Chinese people; the United States was a "rotten, imperialist" nation; the United States was a paper tiger. They rewrote the histories of China to emphasize the unfriendly role of the United States. To the Chinese children of the new generation, the United States became the ringleader in the Opium War, bolstered the corrupt Manchu regime against revolutionary elements, was the most subtle of the imperialists, sold China down the river at Versailles, bombarded innocent Chinese at Nanking in 1927, and aided the Kuomintang. The Communists denounced educational and missionary work as cultural imperialism, detrimental to the objectives of the revolution. They caricatured Uncle Sam as a monster with dripping hands and branded Americans as brutes and bullies.

They interpreted their move into Korea as self-defense, and they attempted to rally the Chinese masses to the war by the slogans, "Resist America and Aid the Korean People" and "Defend Korea and You Defend Your Own Home." Mao told the National Committee of the CPPCC in Peking in October 1951:

We are simply opposing imperialist aggression against our country. Everyone knows that if American forces had not occupied our Taiwan, had not invaded the Korean Democratic People's Republic and pushed their attacks to our northeastern borders, the Chinese peoples would not be fighting against American troops. But as the American invaders attacked us we could not

but raise the banner of anti-aggression. This was absolutely necessary and is perfectly just. . . . To continue this necessary and just struggle, what is required of us is to carry on with the strengthening of our work to resist American aggression and aid Korea, to increase production and practice rigid economy in support of the Chinese People's Volunteers.

The Chinese accused the Americans of restoring militarism and fascism in Japan and of using Japan for a springboard to Asia. They likewise blamed the United States for backing Syngman Rhee and for provoking civil war in Korea. They interpreted the Korean War as the first step in an "American plot" to take over Korea, Formosa, Indo-China, and the Philippines and as a further step in intervention in Asian affairs. They sent a representative to present their case to the Security Council of the United Nations. He argued that Americans twisted the meaning of words like defense and aggression, war and peace, and he asked, "How can fleets and planes operating five thousand miles from the United States and right on the borders of China be considered self-defense?" He said that the Chinese people retained their historical friendship for the American people but had only hatred for the American imperialists and the American ruling bloc. "You always think that you can buy the sovereignty of any country with your money," he hissed.

On February 1, 1951, the General Assembly labeled the Chinese intervention in Korea as aggression and on May 18, 1951, it recommended an embargo on war munitions and strategic materials to China and North Korea. On June 25, Russia's Malik suggested a cease-fire and for the next two years both sides in Korea worked for a formal truce. The Chinese during that time accused the Americans of using germ warfare, employing bacteriological and chemical weapons, dropping napalm bombs, and stalling at the truce conference. They told their own people that they really won the war, that they stopped the Americans from crossing the Yalu and forced the Americans to seek a truce. When Americans speeded up their military assistance to Formosa, the Communists explained, "Staggering under the deadly blows dealt by the people's forces in Korea, American aggressors now cast their hopes on the miserable mob ousted from the Chinese mainland."

The Chinese maintained a steady, creeping propaganda barrage against the United States. They identified the threat of a blockade as the latest manifestation of imperialism, but they contended that a blockade would not hurt them for ten years. In their opinion a blockade would only stop the trade in nonessentials and would harm only those Chinese who had fattened on Western bounty. They pretended lack of interest in recognition of their government but could not hide the pique to their pride. The prime

minister said, "Anyone who attempts to oust China, with its 500,000,000 people, from the United Nations Organization, anyone who disregards or undermines the interests of one fourth of mankind, anyone who rashly endeavors to find a unilateral solution for any Oriental problem directly affecting China, will inevitably come to grief." The Communists criticized non-Far Eastern aspects of American policy, charging it with making and unmaking dictators in Latin America, dominating its allies, and forcing others into such instruments of imperialism as NATO, the Middle East command, and the Anzus pact. With a thick smokescreen of words, they hoped to divert attention from their own problems and aggressive activities in the nearby countries of Asia.

Ambitions in Asia

Communist China's determination to assert its leadership in the Asian region followed and expanded the classic pattern of the strong dynasties of the past. When asked about the danger of spreading over Asia, Chou En-lai said, "We Asians have common memories of oppression and suppression. I know in the distant past China interfered in Korea, Japan, and other places but I disavow all that. We do not take pride in that tradition which is in itself a part of the folklore of imperialism. On the contrary, we are anxious to be helpful and friendly. We have our hands full in building up our own strength."

Nevertheless, the Chinese saw the possibilities of a "Union of East Asian Soviet Republics" with China as the core and with Peking as an Asian Moscow. China was the pioneer in the overthrow of imperialism and Mao was the symbol of revolution to the nationalist and left-wing leaders of the countries not yet independent. Russia conceded the value of the Chinese experience for the rest of Asia and rebuked the Communist leaders in Asia who attempted to bypass Peking by appealing direct to Moscow in matters of doctrine.

The Chinese took the initiative in assembling a major international conference of the trade unions of Asian and Australasian countries in Peking in December, 1949. They set up an Asian-Australian Liaison Bureau of the World Federation of Trade Unions, which served as an effective propaganda sounding board. Three years later they called an Asian-Pacific Peace Conference, with almost 400 delegates and observers from thirty-seven countries. That conference passed resolutions against the rebirth of Japanese militarism, for a just and reasonable settlement in Korea, for support to Asian national independence movements, and for the promotion of close

economic and cultural relations among the Asian and Pacific peoples. It also established a permanent Peace Liaison Committee which, with the Liaison Bureau of the WFTU, constituted a kind of Asian Cominform. These organizations did not spread the dogmas of Stalin's socialism but the teachings of Peking's democratic United Front, the thought of Mao Tse-tung. The "Asian Cominform" together with the Central Bureau of Overseas Affairs and the Far East Committee for People's Revolutionary Affairs made an effective organizational structure for the implementation of China's leadership in the Asian region.

China's revolutionary momentum carried beyond its national boundaries. In their exhilaration, the Communists boasted that their armies would continue their victorious march right down to Singapore. They blanketed the Far East with their revolutionary propaganda and they extended tactical advice, money, and training facilities to their friends to the limit of their capacity. The obstacles to the fulfillment of their ambitions were costs, capabilities, and the risk of World War III.

At the outset they analyzed their unredeemed territories: Formosa, Outer Mongolia, Hongkong, and Tibet. These were not regarded as alien lands or even neighbors but territories which historically belonged to China. Invasion of Formosa was impossible because of the American stand. They captured small islands off the coasts of Chekiang and Fukien which the Nationalists had used for coastal raids, naval blockade activities, and intelligence purposes. They bided their time for a possible assault on Formosa and strengthened their defenses against Chiang's return to the mainland. In his statement of June 28, 1950, Chou En-lai declared that no matter what obstructive action the United States might take, the fact that Taiwan is part of China would remain unchanged forever. He said, "All the people of our country will certainly fight to the end single-mindedly to liberate Taiwan from the grasp of the American aggressors." Four years later he added, "If America's rulers desire to conclude a so-called 'bilateral treaty of mutual security' or any other similar treaty with the Chiang Kai-shek gang on Taiwan, it would mean that they are determined to remain in a position of permanent hostility toward the 600,000,000 Chinese people."

They remained silent about Hongkong, because they were in no position, for the time being, to cope with British strength and determination. They buried the hatchet in Outer Mongolia. They accepted the credentials of the first Outer Mongolian diplomatic representative in Peking in 1950, and two years later they signed with Outer Mongolia a ten-year agreement for cultural and economic co-operation. They announced within months after establishing themselves in Peking that they considered the liberation of

Tibet as an immediate goal. They launched a war of nerves which took advantage of Tibet's uncertainties and factionalism. They sent troops to the Tibetan border areas in 1950 and set up a provisional government. India called this action deplorable and not in the interests of peace. China replied that India's opinion stemmed from foreign influence and that the Tibetan affair was strictly a matter of China's internal jurisdiction. India shied away from a diplomatic duel over Tibet and stated merely that it desired a reconciliation of Chinese suzerainty and Tibetan autonomy and a settlement of the problems by negotiation rather than by force. The atmosphere cooled as China shifted its major attention to Korea.

At the same time Chinese troops crossed the Yalu River into Korea, other Chinese troops penetrated into the heart of Tibet. On May 23, 1951, China signed an agreement with Tibet according to which China promised to respect Tibetan autonomy, preserve its political system, guarantee religious freedom, and maintain its existing habits and customs. China permitted the joint authority in Tibet of the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama (rivals for spiritual authority) but assumed the control of Tibet's foreign relations. It integrated Tibet's "fighting forces" into the Chinese Army and established military committees for Tibet. After the agreement, the Chinese tried to weaken the position of the Dalai Lama and the regular clergy and to build up the prestige and strength of their puppet, the Panchen Lama. They made the Red Army the real instrument of control and they appointed all the administrative officials. In October, 1951, the Reds moved into Lhasa and within a year they planted their flag at the summit of the vital passes which controlled the entrances and exists to the isolated lama land. Behind the military façade they talked about economic modernization and social improvement programs to be carried out with the help of Soviet technicians.

Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia received first priority in the determination of Red China's vital interests. The Communists shared the Kuomintang's bitterness against Japan and opposed the soft policies of the American Occupation. China supported all the Russian arguments against the peace treaty and protested against the tendencies within Japan to join forces with the Western democracies. In opposing the efforts of Japan to make itself the workshop of Asia and to resume its drive for foreign trade, China initiated a policy of "friendship for the Japanese people." This entailed opposition to the Japanese government, consideration for the Japanese "little people," and active interest in the affairs of the Japanese Communists. The Chinese granted limited rights to Japanese fishermen in China waters and repatriated Japanese civilians who were stranded in Peking. They sent gratuitous advice to the Japanese Communists at the time of the latter's

row with the Cominform to preserve unity and to expel disrupters and spies. Their action suggested a willingness on the part of Moscow to recognize the antagonisms of nationalism which lingered in Tokyo and to delegate to Peking a first-instance responsibility for the direction of party affairs in Japan. The Chinese dangled before Japan as a counter to Western influence the tempting bait of expanded trade and economic co-operation.

Chinese and Russians worked side by side with North Koreans for the conduct of military operations and for the settlement of peace. After the truce was signed, Kim Il-sung visited Peking and signed a ten-year pact to strengthen economic and cultural ties on the basis of friendship, mutual assistance, equality, and reciprocity. China wrote off all supplies given and expenses incurred in the course of the fighting and agreed to extend to Korea a reported \$317,000,000 for reconstruction between 1954 and 1957. China promised to send coal, cotton cloth, grains, building materials, communications equipment, metal products, machinery, agricultural tools, small fishing boats, paper, and supplies for the rehabilitation of Korean railways. China invited Koreans to China for study and to Manchuria to work in the industrial plants. Apparently, China wished to show to North Korea a generosity comparable to that of the Americans in South Korea and to rival the USSR in the race for the control of Korea's mineral resources. The Chinese offered assistance for Korean agriculture and for the fulfillment of North Korea's Three-Year Plan of industrial development. After the Chinese blood which was spilled on Korean hills, the Chinese showed no disposition to relinquish their grip on the strategic Korean Peninsula and its invaluable resources. Chou En-lai and Molotov with one accord supported the North Korean stand at the Geneva Conference.

The Communists made their cause the cause of Southeast Asia and assumed the right to meddle in internal affairs of the "Asian Balkans"—Indo-China, Thailand, Malaya, and Burma. The Viet-Minh Communist leader, Ho Chi Minh, led the underground resistance to Japan during the war and established the independent Republic of Viet-Nam in September, 1945, just after the Japanese surrender. As war broke out between the Viet-Minh and France, it seemed to be just another colonial skirmish until the Communists came to power in Peking. Then in 1950 the Chinese Communists and the Viet-Minh regime exchanged recognition and together joined the "camp of freedom and democracy led by the Soviet Union." The Chinese sent advisers and tons of supplies and equipment to the Reds in Indo-China and through their support converted a local colonial skirmish into a major front between the free world and its enemies.

In other areas the Chinese Communists remained in the background. In Burma they exacerbated the arguments between the government and the Chinese Nationalist guerillas, and in Malaya they undoubtedly extended

sympathy and perhaps some money to the Chinese Communist bands fighting in the jungles. In Thailand they worked among the students and laborers and exploited the anti-Chinese nationalistic legislation of the Thai government. In all areas they filled the air waves and the columns of newspapers with propaganda, and they fomented strikes or other troubles wherever they could embarrass the government or take the profits out of capitalistic enterprises. They sought support among the overseas Chinese who offered themselves as potential fifth-columnists. The Communists took it for granted that they would dominate Southeast Asia as the United States dominated the American continent, as Russia dominated Eastern Europe, and as India was destined to dominate the Indian Ocean. However, the Western powers warned China that they would treat aggression in Southeast Asia "with grave concern" and they intimated the possibilities of "massive retaliation."

China's great rival in Asia was India rather than the Western nations. India, too, was of Asia and spoke with a voice as authoritative as that of China to its weaker and undeveloped neighbors. Both India and China struggled to modernize their countries—the one by democratic methods, and the other by Communist methods. The rest of Asia watched the competition and compared the results. Both had identical interests in independence and anti-imperialism and both considered themselves destined for Asian leadership in world affairs. India recognized the Chinese Communist government at once and urged others to take the same step. Outside of Russia, India was the strongest champion of China's entry into the United Nations. India distinguished between communism as an internal problem and international communism as a challenge to India's security. India hoped to neutralize the ties between China and the USSR and sought to contribute to world peace and stability by the creation of a third-force Asian bloc.

India by no means sacrificed its independence of judgment in the interest of Communist China. India supported the United Nations resolution which condemned North Korea as the aggressor, but it voted against the resolution which charged Red China with participating in aggression. India refused to send troops to Korea and constantly championed the settlement of the Korean affair by peaceful means. It stressed the importance of the entry of Red China into the UN as a prerequisite of peace. It advised the UN forces under General MacArthur not to go north of the Thirty-eighth Parallel, and it led the Arab-Asian bloc which worked for a cease-fire agreement. It refused to vote on the resolution of the General Assembly which imposed an arms embargo on Communist China and North Korea, and took on the thankless job of heading the neutral mission which arranged for the exchange of prisoners.

India gave a modicum of satisfaction to China in opposing the Japanese

peace settlement. It pleased the Communists to have India argue for the return of Formosa to China and blast the military measures taken by the United States in Japan and on former Japanese territory. India's primary purpose was not to please China but to reduce or eliminate the influence of the West in Asia and to minimize the tensions of the cold war. India and China exchanged gestures of good will, such as cultural missions, students, films, and literary translations. But India could not afford to commit itself too closely to China because of its own internal Communist menace and its external dependence upon the West for the success of its industrialization program. India objected to China's dynamism and watched closely for possible attempts to extend Chinese control from Tibet into Nepal, Assam, and Burma. India and China were rivals for influence and markets in Southeast Asia and often pursued antagonistic power aims.

On April 29, 1954, India and China signed a trade and nonaggression treaty which governed relations with Tibet. India agreed to withdraw its troops stationed on the Tibetan trade routes at Yatung and Gyantse and to hand over to China all the rest houses and the postal, telegraph, and public telephone services in Tibet. China agreed to protect the person and property of Indian traders and pilgrims and agreed to the establishment of Indian trade agencies at Yatung, Gyantse, and Gartok within Tibet. The borders were guaranteed, and the Chinese were permitted to set up trade agencies in New Delhi, Calcutta, and Kalimpong. On October 14, 1954, India and Communist China signed the first trade agreement providing for use of Indian ports and transport facilities for goods moving from China into Tibet. The pact aimed at development and trade and paved the way for expanded exchange of detailed lists of commodities. Both countries hoped to restore the previous high levels of commerce which they had enjoyed.

China fluctuated in its treatment of India and vacillated in its respect for Indian sensibilities. China organized India-China friendship associations, but showed little real concern for the prestige or welfare of Indian diplomatic representatives or private citizens in China. On occasions Mao praised India for its unified struggle with China and the USSR in the interests of peace. But he also assured Indian Communists of his full support in their struggle for liberation from the oppression of Anglo-American imperialism and their Indian lackeys. He went so far as to apply to Nehru the hackneyed phrase, "running dog of British imperialism." But during a recess in the Geneva Conference, Chou En-lai visited Nehru in New Delhi and at the conclusion of their conversations, the two prime ministers issued a joint statement dedicating themselves to the "Five Principles." These principles were mutual respect for each other's sovereignty

and territorial integrity; nonaggression; noninterference in each other's internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence. Chou then visited Burma and issued a similar declaration jointly with Prime Minister U Nu.

China's internal preoccupation with the transition from the New Democracy to the stage of socialism, then communism, drained its energies and taxed its ingenuity. Its major international concerns centered in China's former traditional territories and its immediate neighbors in Asia. It looked to Russia to take care of their mutual interests beyond the Iron Curtain, pending the day when China could assume what it considered to be its rightful place among the great powers. Communist China gambled. It rejected the prospects for reasonable, orderly progress by understanding and co-operation with the West and staked its destiny on the game of the Soviet Union. It displayed limitless Oriental patience and fortified its own spirit with the belief that "time is on our side, and not on the side of our enemies." It considered as enemies primarily the Kuomintang reactionaries, the regime on Formosa, and those nations which rejected the Communist verbiage and regarded Formosa as the legitimate spokesman for the China which President Roosevelt had insisted was entitled to be classed as one of the Big Five.

Suggested Reading

- O. EDMUND CLUBB, "Chinese Communist Strategy in Foreign Relations," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (Philadelphia, September, 1951).
- TILLMAN DURDIN AND ROBERT AURA SMITH, *China and the World*, Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series, Number 99 (New York, 1953).
- WERNER LEVI, *Modern China's Foreign Policy* (Minneapolis, 1953).
- II. ARTHUR STEINER, "Mainsprings of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy," *American Journal of International Law*, (Washington, January, 1950).
- EMORY C. SWANK, "The Moscow-Peking Axis," External Research Staff, Office of Intelligence Research, U. S. Department of State (Washington, 1953).

CHAPTER 29

Nationalist China and Its Diplomacy

While the Chinese Communists marched from triumph to triumph, the Kuomintang drained its cup of humiliation and bitterness. The major nations, united against the Axis, expected that China would succeed to Japan's position in East Asia and, in preparation for its elevation to the ranks of the great powers, negotiated wartime treaties which erased the unequal privileges of the past. Given peace, it was assumed that China would become unified and prosperous.

When World War II ended, the government of Free China in Chungking faced grave but far from insuperable problems. It experienced a brisk revival of spirit due to the crushing of Japan. Chiang Kai-shek felt a certain confidence in his relations with the Soviet Union and he enjoyed the strong support of the United States. His government—with a mixed record of defeat and victory, of corruption and heroism—burst the chains which bound it to China's deep interior and trekked back to Nanking. Psychologically battered Kuomintang officials and militarists welcomed the new chance to mold China's future, and they anticipated a joyous reunion with the masses of their own people.

They rose above their suffering and misery and for a brief moment in the autumn of 1945 reveled in the intoxicating illusion of political freedom and economic prosperity. Their dreams evaporated as they failed to fulfill the promise of victory over the Communist rebels and they fell short of the glittering role to which they aspired in world affairs.

The Collapse of the Kuomintang

In anticipation of the Japanese surrender, Chiang ordered all Chinese Nationalist troops and puppet troops to retain their weapons and to stay at

their posts. Chu Teh also ordered Communist troops to stand by and to disarm all Japanese and puppet forces in his zone of operations. The race began for the control of cities, strategic areas, and rail lines. The American sailors and marines established themselves in North China, and American planes flew Chiang's troops to Shanghai and Nanking ahead of the Communists. The Communists entered important cities in North China and Manchuria and threatened civil war if Chiang attempted a mass movement of his forces over the important rail lines from Central China to Peking.

Chiang understood clearly the menace of the Communists and he attempted to work out a truce with them. From August 28 to October 11, 1945, he discussed with Mao Tse-tung in Chungking the Communist demands for the end of the one-party Kuomintang rule, a coalition government, and a multiparty National Assembly. Chiang insisted that the Communists must put down their arms as a prerequisite for any concessions. He would not tolerate an armed political party of opposition. Mao returned to Yen-an, and within two weeks the rival armies were in open conflict.

Confident that he could master China south of the Great Wall, Chiang directed his major effort toward the recovery of Manchuria. He ignored General Wedemeyer's advice that he should complete the pacification of Central China before spreading himself into the difficult, distant provinces of the northeast. Civil war threatened the whole of China, and in a world which yearned for peace President Truman sent his special emissary, General Marshall, to China to assist in the creation of a strong and peaceful, democratic and united nation. As Chiang poised to strike toward Manchuria, he faced a complicated diplomatic and political situation as well as a hazardous military venture.

In August, 1945, the Russians accepted the surrender of the Japanese in Manchuria after a minimum of fighting. Russian troops took over the railways, Japanese enterprises, and the vital ports including Dairen, Port Arthur, Yingkow, and Hulutao. The Russians confiscated or destroyed Japanese-owned plants and equipment as war booty and demanded joint operation of all Manchurian enterprises in the interest of Russian security. Marshal Malinovsky used the presence of his occupation forces to coerce the Chinese into a satisfactory agreement for economic co-operation. Then the Russian government promised to withdraw its troops within three months, by which time it was anticipated that the Chinese Nationalists would be prepared to take over the administration of Manchuria.

Chiang's troops were helpless against the Russians, so he relied upon diplomatic means to limit as far as possible the Russian penetration into the vital power center of Manchuria. He realized that some concessions would be necessary, and he had tried for a long time to appease the Soviet Union. At Cairo he had given his assent to the conversion of Dairen into a free

port provided there was no impairment of Chinese sovereignty. In June, 1944, he had intimated to Vice-President Wallace that he would go more than halfway in reaching an understanding with the USSR. On the occasion of the treaty understandings of August 14, 1945, he had expressed himself as disappointed on some matters but generally satisfied. He felt that he had obtained as much as could reasonably be expected and he was prepared to bargain about the interpretation of the respective Chinese and Russian rights in Mongolia, Sinkiang, and Manchuria.

Chiang looked to the United States to resist Russian pressures. He understood that the Americans objected to the thinly veiled Russian effort to swallow the riches of China in Manchuria. He relied upon the Americans to protect their own interests in the Open Door and to support him, Chiang Kai-shek, as their ally and champion in China.

The Russians were perturbed about American troops in North China and the growing identity of interest between the United States and the Kuomintang. Therefore, the Russians were as eager as the Americans for an understanding on China affairs. At its Moscow meeting at Christmas time, 1945, the Council of Foreign Ministers agreed as to the need for a unified and democratic China under the Nationalist government, for broad participation by democratic elements in all branches of the Nationalist government, and for a cessation of civil strife. The three Foreign Secretaries reaffirmed their policy of noninterference in internal affairs of China. Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Molotov expressed their complete accord on the desirability of withdrawal of Soviet and American forces from China at the earliest practical moment consistent with the discharge of their obligations and responsibilities.

In oblique and devious ways Russia violated its pledges not to interfere in China's civil war and to support only the central government. Chiang wished to send thirteen divisions direct from Kowloon to Dairen, but the Russians informed Chiang that his troops could not land at Dairen. They insisted that Dairen was a commercial city, not for troops, and that they would provide security for Dairen as long as a state of war existed officially against Japan. They also prevented the landing of Chiang's troops—even in American transports—at other Manchurian cities. They permitted a modest air-lift into Changchun and Mukden and they allowed some Nationalist troops to march along the rail line into Mukden. They blocked the Chinese resumption of authority at every turn and obliged Chiang to ask the Russians to postpone their evacuation. Chiang reasoned that it was better to have Russians than Chinese Communists in Manchuria.

The Russians played a cat-and-mouse game with Chiang regarding the entry of the Communists into Manchuria. The Russians forbade the entry

of Communist armies but they facilitated the entry of Communist individuals. The Russians made Japanese arms available to Communist stragglers, a gift which General Wedemeyer would have used seven divisions of Americans to prevent. General Wedemeyer had asked General MacArthur for seven divisions to preclude unilateral Soviet action in Manchuria and to take over the arms and the equipment of the Japanese forces. Because the troops could not be spared, the Japanese arms filtered through Russians into the hands of the Chinese Communists. While Chiang moved into the cities of Manchuria, the Communists with Russian help established a firm grip on the Manchurian countryside. The Nationalists depended upon open communications to bring in their food and military supplies, but the Communists lived off the land. It is important to note that the Nationalists ignored the puppet army of Manchukuo, and the Communists took over this ready-made force. Under those circumstances, the occupation of Manchuria implied grave dangers as well as apparent gains and eventually led to the doom of the forces of the Kuomintang.

From V-J Day until the final flight of the Nationalists to Formosa, Communists and Nationalists fought each other on the field of battle at the same time that their leaders carried on negotiations for truce. Both jockeyed for power and position and argued for peace or war depending upon the gauge of battle. When the Kuomintang seemed to enjoy military supremacy, it showed indifference toward mediation; when the Communists gained the upper hand, they became singularly adamant at the conference table. Truce hopes alternately flared and flickered, disclosing no steady universal desire for understanding but only reflecting someone's estimate of temporary advantage or opportunity.

On January 10, 1946, the two warring factions, with the assistance of General Marshall, reached a quick agreement on a multilateral Political Consultative Conference (PCC) and a cease-fire agreement. Within another six weeks, they arrived at a military accord which provided for the unification of the opposing armies. Chiang's forces outnumbered Mao's by a ratio of five to one. A comparative lull in the fighting lasted until the Russians completed their withdrawal from Manchuria at the end of April, 1946.

As Communists poured into Manchuria, Chiang strained his resources to capture Changchun, the Manchurian capital city of "Eternal Spring." Chiang believed in his own capacity for victory and he offered to continue negotiations for truce only if the Communists would guarantee to carry out truce arrangements, restore communications, respect the decisions of the Executive Headquarters, and incorporate their armies into the armies of Nationalist China. Chiang ignored the potential strength of the Communists

and disregarded the warnings of General Marshall and Ambassador Stuart of dangerous days ahead.

As the situation deteriorated, General Marshall ordered an embargo on shipments of arms and ammunition to Chiang which lasted for seven months. He reasoned that external pressure might influence Chiang to make concessions which would forestall disaster. The United States and China negotiated a surplus property agreement on August 30, 1946, which further antagonized Chinese Communists and Russians and which compromised General Marshall's efforts to present himself to both sides as an acceptable mediator. Chiang resented what he considered Marshall's restraining influence; the Communists resented his fundamental partiality to the other side. In 1946 the Nationalists improved their military position. They occupied Kalgan and Chihfeng, they cleared substantial parts of the railways of North China and Manchuria, and they seemed to be able to contain the swelling Communist tide. Government armies achieved unchallenged superiority in most fields of operation.

Behind a façade of self-assurance, Chiang negotiated with the United States on November 4, 1946, a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation. This treaty curtailed American rights in China and provided for reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment for five years. Chiang told his people with conviction that the American treaty signalized the end of imperialism and inaugurated a new era of complete equality in international relations. Chiang was as adamantly anti-imperialist as Mao Tse-tung. Chiang then took steps toward ending the "period of tutelage" and instituting the "period of constitutional government." He convened a popularly elected National Assembly—without the participation of the Communists and most members of the Democratic League—to draw up a constitution which was to become effective December 25, 1947.

By January, 1947, General Marshall despaired of success in his mission and returned to the United States. He blamed strong cliques and extremists on both sides for the frustration of his efforts and announced that China's salvation would depend upon the rise to power of liberals under Chiang Kai-shek. After General Marshall's departure, Chiang invited all political parties and groups to participate in the work of government, but he could not dissuade the Communists from civil war. Chiang gradually lost the initiative, particularly in Manchuria and Northeast China. Confronted by financial panic, military setbacks, and diplomatic defeats, he found it increasingly difficult to retain the confidence and support of the poverty-stricken Chinese people. As the Kuomintang power group fought against the Communist power group, the Kuomintang lost in discipline and devotion to cause while the Communists gained. The Kuomintang

banked upon the officials, the well-to-do, and the landlords for their revenues, while the Communists turned for support to the intellectuals and the peasants. The masses remained indifferent, until swayed by the fatal platitude that "things can't be any worse under some other party." The followers of the Kuomintang tumbled like a falling wall into the camp of the Communists.

In 1947 Communists and Nationalists grappled in a fight to the finish. On March 14 Molotov tried to have China included on the agenda of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow, but he was overruled by the Western bloc. The Council of Foreign Ministers was not the appropriate forum and Chiang seemed to be on his way to victory. Nationalist armies occupied additional cities, including the Communist capital at Yen-an, but they did not annihilate Communist armies nor did they eliminate the spirit of revolt. In many places the Nationalists behaved like carpetbaggers, and they exhibited a disquieting attitude of apathy and defeatism. While Nationalists expanded their areas of operation, Communists cut the railways and aggravated the problems of supply. Because of casualties and defections, the Nationalists lost in fighting man power while the Communists gained.

The Nationalists ordered general mobilization, and President Truman sent General Wedemeyer to China to investigate the causes of the mounting crisis. General Wedemeyer noted that the Kuomintang officials often abused their prerogatives, and in their corrupt practices alienated the rank and file of the common people. He suggested a thorough internal housecleaning in the areas under Kuomintang control before further efforts in Manchuria. As a means of keeping half a loaf rather than none, he suggested to Washington an American, Russian, and British trusteeship over Manchuria until the Nationalists should be ready to take over. To General Wedemeyer the alternatives were not Kuomintang or Communists in Manchuria, but rather Manchuria under Communist-Russian control or under a trusteeship. He did not believe that Chiang had the military power to occupy and develop Manchuria, but Chiang disagreed.

Chiang asked that his foreign friends should bear in mind the long and painful record of China's struggle for independence and equality and its sure but halting progress toward democracy. He emphasized the cruel heritage of the Japanese invasion and the unashamed role which Russia had assumed in backing the Communists and inflaming the civil war. In September, 1947, he showed no diminution in his faith in ultimate victory and he assured his followers that even without any foreign help whatever he could continue his fight against the Communists for another two years. He paid more attention to his military campaigns than he did to the political

and social ills with which his regime was plagued. But the combined tasks of defeating the enemy, preserving the morale of his own troops, overcoming the inflation, satisfying the people's hunger, and enhancing political stability were more than Chiang, or perhaps any other Chinese, could have accomplished.

The Chinese civil war expanded in scope to a battle between the Russian-Chinese Communist group and the American-Chiang Kai-shek combination. The amalgamations were inseparable. The tide shifted gradually away from the Kuomintang as Chiang tried to rally his own people and win more support from abroad. On March 28, 1948, the National Assembly elected Chiang the president of China and Li Tsung-jen vice-president. Chiang represented paramount power, but his power was nullified by the counterpressures generated by his own authoritarianism. The chaos of the times necessitated a strong leader, but the exercise of drastic authority increased the turmoil and alienated his democratic allies. The Kuomintang militarists were called upon for preservation of the state, but they derived little help or constructive restraint from the bureaucracy which was shot through with incompetence and venality. It could scarcely have been otherwise. Chiang himself in his inaugural address of May 20, 1948, said, "The principal task of the new government is to purge itself of corrupt officials." Vitriolic accusations were leveled at the privileged corporations which had received extraordinary financial advantages from the government, and tongues of scandal lashed the most distinguished families in the Kuomintang. Chiang criticized his own commanders for failing to win the people's support. His loyal friend, General Ch'en Ch'eng, icily commented, "We did not have the people's confidence and we did not deserve it." On the other hand, party members criticized Chiang because they were not sure whether his concern was for himself, his faith, his party, or his country. In the midst of dissension and disunity, the Kuomintang failed to withstand the Communist offensive.

As Communists surrounded isolated Nationalist garrisons in Manchuria, the government withdrew its main forces to Mukden and supplied them by air-lift. After months of siege, Mukden surrendered on November 1, 1948. The Communists spread like a raging flood over North China. They submerged one area after another, until the people began to feel it was useless to fight for the Kuomintang. Between September, 1948, and February, 1949, the Kuomintang troops were reduced from 2,723,000 to 1,500,000 and Communist strength grew from 1,150,000 to 1,622,000.

The story of inefficiency, faulty strategy, hopeless command, and spiritual disintegration characterized the Kuomintang defeat. It was clearly the effect of discernible faults rather than the appeal of any magic Com-

munist formula for positive action which accounted for China's irreparable disasters. Undoubtedly, "too little and too late" on the part of China's American ally compounded China's psychological grievances and contributed to the ultimate military debacle.

On November 9, 1948, Chiang sent an urgent appeal for help to President Truman, which for the first time officially blamed the general deterioration of the military situation on the nonobservance by the Soviet government of the Sino-Soviet treaty of friendship and alliance. The generalissimo reminded the president that "Your Excellency will doubtless recall the Chinese Government signed [the treaty] as a result of the well-intentioned advice from the United States Government." Chiang continued, "I need hardly point out that, but for the persistent Soviet aid, the Chinese Communists would not have been able to occupy Manchuria and develop into such a menace." President Truman's reply was non-committal and did not prevent—even if it could have prevented—the complete toppling of the house of cards.

The situation was beyond the capacity of Chiang's pliant, feckless advisers who included "such slimy villains as Chen Yi who terrorized Formosa, such flagrant traitors as Fu Tso-yi who sold Peking, such blithering incompetents as Tu Li-ming who lost Manchuria, and such public jokes as the rapacious old eunuch who commanded the Chinese navy until he went over to the Communists." Chiang offered to retire in January, 1949, if the Communists would negotiate peace but by that time the Communists sensed unconditional surrender. In desperation the Nanking government asked the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union to mediate, but the powers politely refused. Then Vice-President Li Tsung-jen made informal approaches to the Soviet Union alone after the United States made it painfully clear that it would take no decisive action until the dust settled.

Within the single eventful month of January, 1949, Peking and Tientsin surrendered to the Communists. Mao Tse-tung announced his terms for surrender, and Chiang Kai-shek retired as president of China. He entrusted the office to his vice-president, Li Tsung-jen, and withdrew to visit the graves of his ancestors in Chekiang. He kept within his personal control the Chinese Air Force and the government's specie reserve. This left Li in an uncomfortable and powerless position in Nanking. Some of the Kuomintang officials retired to Canton, determined to continue the hopeless fight, and Li joined them in April when the Communists, practically unopposed, swept across the Yangtze River.

Shanghai fell on May 20 and was followed by Hankow and Sian. The Nationalists gave up Canton without a struggle and retreated to Chung-

king and Chentu. Vice-President Li flew to Hongkong, entered a hospital for treatment of his stomach ulcers, and eventually continued his flight to New York.

In December, the harassed government went to Taipeh, Formosa, where Chiang Kai-shek took up the reins of government and tried to breathe new life into his battered organization. He regrouped the military units which had fled to Formosa from the mainland and ordered his navy and air force to close the ports of Communist-held China. While the deliriously excited Communists danced the *yang-ko* or peasant folk dance in the victory celebrations in Peking and Shanghai, the dejected, hungry Kuomintang sought sleep and "utter forgetfulness" in their island haven.

The Nationalist Government on Formosa

The Chinese considered Formosa (Taiwan) the richest prize of World War II. Formosa, under the Japanese, had achieved a level of living higher than any on the Asian mainland. The Japanese had developed Formosa's resources by monopolies operated by the government or giant business combines, and the Japanese had integrated Formosa's economy into the over-all patterns of empire. In the social field, the Japanese had enforced policies of assimilation. They gave the island good transportation and communications facilities, good education, and good health, but they exercised strict censorship of the press, thought control, and complete political regimentation. The Japanese military administration consisted of a small but efficient garrison which suppressed "every year an uprising, every five years a rebellion." The Formosans were more than 90 per cent of Chinese birth or descent and they preserved a vigorous spirit of individual assertiveness. The Japanese used Formosa as the springboard for the drive to the Southern Regions, and as such it had invited the attacks of American submarines and airplanes.

The Cairo Declaration stated that it was the purpose of the three great Allies that all territories Japan had stolen from China—such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores—should be returned to the Republic of China. The declaration—with Stalin adhering—was reaffirmed at Potsdam, and it presented no unusual problems as long as "China" referred to "Kuomintang China."

On October 25, 1945, the Chinese Government General of Taiwan under General Chen Yi, a former governor of Fukien, was inaugurated at Taipeh, the capital city. Chen Yi was regarded as a liberal member of the political science clique of the Kuomintang. He was welcomed by the Formosans,

who were not too sorry to see the Japanese driven out, but within months the native population complained that "the dogs go and the pigs come." Chen Yi's administration treated Formosa as a conquered province and its inhabitants as a subjugated people.

Inefficiency and corruption ruined the prosperity of the island and drove the people to revolt. The Chinese took over Japanese property and monopolized for themselves 90 per cent of all the industry and agriculture of the island. The Chinese drained the capital assets away from Formosa, reaped inordinate profits from the distribution of UNRRA supplies, and enriched themselves by manipulation of the black market and the printing of currency. To suppress the rebellious and bitter Formosans, the Chinese used blackmail, bribery, secret police, and ultimately cold-blooded murder. On February 28, 1947, the killing of an old woman selling bootleg cigarettes led to protests and rioting and precipitated the so-called "Tobacco Massacre" in which 10,000 Formosans were deliberately shot and bayoneted.

Chen Yi was recalled and executed for his barbarity. The government of Taiwan was reorganized and dedicated to the rectification of the gory mistakes of the first postwar Chinese regime. Early in 1949, Chiang Kai-shek anticipated the possibility of retreat to Formosa and sent his most able lieutenant, Ch'en Ch'eng, to prepare for the possible reception of the government-in-exile. He tried to attract active co-operation from the Formosans by providing for elections and by appointing Formosans to important administrative positions. Most significantly, he adopted measures to increase agricultural production and he ordered the reduction of land rentals from 60 per cent to 37.5 per cent of the main crop. Throughout the year of defeat, 1949, 1,000,000 civilian mainlanders and approximately 600,000 soldiers straggled into Formosan territory which compared in size to Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island combined. The added strain on resources coupled with the extraordinary chaos of military defeat made it seem that Formosa, too, would topple like a sitting duck should the Communists choose to attack.

Chiang Kai-shek again demonstrated his unusual qualities of leadership. He strengthened the defenses of the island and restored order. He organized a dual political administrative structure—a national government which continued the apparatus of the mainland, and a provincial government which looked after local affairs. It was not easy to avoid clashes between the national and the provincial governments, because the respective jurisdictions often overlapped. Chinese were more interested in national matters, Taiwanese in provincial matters. Such things as the conduct of

foreign affairs and the maintenance of the armed forces were clearly functions of the national government. On the other hand, education, taxation, land reform, road repairs, and government enterprises led to constant conflicts between the premier of China and the governor of Formosa, whose offices were not very far apart.

The relationship between the government and the party remained as it had been at Nanking. The Kuomintang—like the Communist party—was organized in accordance with the principle of democratic centralism. Its National Congress elected a Central Committee of some thirty members which in turn elected a ten-man steering committee. The working committees handled finance, planning, discipline, party affairs, information, intelligence, and affairs of overseas Chinese. Total party membership was reduced to fewer than 500,000 members. The cliques which had wrecked party efficiency in China disappeared in Formosa, but it was still Chiang who provided the ideology, the leadership, and the inspiration which held the Kuomintang together. Party cells were spiritless, and the Central Committee—called the Central Reform Committee—was little more than a sounding board. The same men who had been with Chiang for years, with the significant addition of his elder son, Chiang Ching-kuo, made up the senior statesmen and the inner council of advisers. Their standards of administration rose immeasurably, perhaps because their decisions and actions received so much publicity. They had time to reflect on the consequences of maladministration, and they received sufficient income to remove many of the temptations for irregular practices.

The structure of the national government was transferred from the mainland without significant modifications. The National Assembly, with a scant quorum present, met in 1954 for the first time in six years and re-elected Chiang as president for a six-year term. It chose Ch'en Ch'eng to replace Li Tsung-jen as vice-president and ousted Li from all his responsibilities because of "negligence of duty." Chiang exercised all practical executive authority by virtue of his threefold position as party chief of the Kuomintang, president of the national government, and commander in chief of the armed forces. He controlled the national purse and the secret police and dispensed patronage. He appointed premiers and cabinets at his discretion and surrounded himself with relatives and personal devotees.

The structure of the provincial government was changed to provide for elective municipal and county officials. A Provisional Assembly, with advisory powers only, was established. The governor continued to be appointed, but he was assisted by a Provincial Council on which seventeen out of some twenty provincial commissioners were ordinarily Taiwanese.

The miracle of Taiwan was that it was able to preserve its existence and enhance its welfare. Its stage was limited and it depended upon American assistance for three quarters of its income. Nevertheless, it registered creditable gains in education, public health, and economic improvement. It increased agricultural production to keep pace with the growing population and, as an index of industrial achievement, it nearly doubled the peak of electric power capacity developed under the Japanese occupation. It kept prices under control, eliminated the traditional financial freewheeling associated with the Chinese military, and enforced an equitable tax collection system. It sustained a favorable balance of trade at approximately the prewar levels. Fundamentally, it effected land reform which involved the sale of former Japanese public lands and excess holdings (over five acres) on the part of individual landlords. The owners received compensation in the form of government bonds or stocks in government corporations. One farm family out of every three in Formosa derived benefit from the redistribution. The tenants were permitted to pay for the confiscated plots in twenty installments over a ten-year period with interest at 4 per cent. Because the peasant was obliged to assume new burdens of the land tax, amortization charges, and interest, his added obligations tended to offset his gains. But he received written contracts and security of tenure and he began to get such benefits from the government as public health stations, advice on seeds, insecticides, quarantine and vaccination service, and help on rural co-operatives and credit associations. It was a new deal in agriculture and it was accomplished without the violence which marked land reform under the Communists on the mainland.

Formosa had its share of difficulties and shortcomings. Compared with Free China during World War II, Formosa was stagnant for lack of ideas, enthusiasm, and individual initiative. The division between Taiwanese and Chinese bred suspicion, and the cost of the transitory, rootless Chinese military machine strained the backs of the Taiwanese farmers. The dangers of Communist infiltration and Communist invasion complicated the ordinary problems of security. Civil rights were ignored and the secret police were ubiquitous. Whatever inclinations might have existed for a democratic regime, the atmosphere of emergency and crisis was an uncompromising taskmaster. Formosa had one government, one party, and one leader. The walls of government buildings and memorial arches were splashed with the familiar blue paint of the Kuomintang, and the portraits of Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek served as backgrounds for two predominant slogans—"Obey the Leader" and "Resist Russia and Recover the Mainland."

The Nationalist government lived to return to the good earth of the Chinese mainland, and the Formosans were eager for its departure. The

officials regarded Formosa as a temporary stopping place and its people as convenient hosts. The premier stated repeatedly, "We must return quickly or we will wither on the vine." He shared the generalissimo's bitter hatred of the Communist enslavement of the mainland, and he resented their attacks on time-honored institutions like the Chinese family. He believed firmly that the intellectuals and the *lao pai hsing* ("old hundred names" or the common people) would rally to the Nationalists, "if we can seize even one or two districts and hold them from three to six months."

The determination far exceeded the power, and short of total war or a successful counterrevolution in Red China the invasion was like an idle dream. An attack on the mainland was "as impertinent as attempting to overrun the whole of the United States from Staten Island." The forces of Formosa consisted of approximately 600,000 men with fewer than half able to qualify as combat effectives. Its ranks were swollen by 14,000 prisoners of war who came to Formosa from Korea, but other than that, its numerical ceiling was frozen. Every year the military establishment grew that much older and suffered a corresponding loss of physical vigor. The Chinese military organization could not escape its ancient heritage—personal favoritism, persistence of traditional military concepts, indifferent morale, too many of the old guard, and top-heavy organization. Surplus admirals and generals were justified on the ground that they were needed as a nucleus for instantaneous expansion once the drive to the continent was launched. In the meantime they enjoyed the prerogatives and the pay of senior officers. The American Military Advisory Group supplied training and advice; American dollars provided uniforms, equipment, ammunition, ships, and planes; but total American assistance could not halt the march of time nor satisfy all the Chinese needs in man power, material goods, and spiritual revival.

Nationalist forces conducted repeated raids on the near mainland and offshore islands. Their hopes for a full-scale assault on the mainland were fruitless without massive logistical support from the United States, including full naval participation and complete air cover. They strengthened their own defenses against a more imminent Communist offensive—after the release of Chinese troops from active fighting in Korea—while their leaders built up the strongest possible psychological and diplomatic front in their relations with the rest of the world. Formosa became in its own judgment the symbol of the freedom of China and the center of the anti-Communist crusade in Asia. It stood firmly against international compromise and tried to shake off a gnawing fear that Formosa might be stranded in the desire for a general settlement in the era of the hydrogen bomb.

Diplomacy of the Nationalist Government

The Nationalist government enjoyed very little freedom of choice or flexibility of maneuver in its diplomacy. While still at Nanking, it negotiated two important settlements, one with the United States and another with France.

A French treaty of February, 1946, was similar to the Sino-American and Sino-British treaties of January, 1943, which relinquished extraterritorial rights in China. It provided that the French compound in the Diplomatic Quarter in Peking and the French concessions in Shanghai, Tientsin, Hankow, and Canton should revert to the Chinese government. Under the treaty, France relinquished its rights to treaty ports, special courts, the entry of French war vessels, and its special privileges in coastal and inland navigation.

As part of the same settlement, France and China negotiated an agreement about Indo-China providing that the Chinese occupation forces in northern Indo-China be withdrawn and Chinese rights in Indo-China be redefined. France agreed to maintain facilities in Haiphong for the free transit of Chinese goods, to grant customs exemption for goods shipped to Haiphong via the Yünnan Railway, and to exempt from transit dues and taxes all goods shipped by rail. The ownership of the Kunming-Hokow Railway was to revert to China. France agreed to advance the purchase funds, which China would repay from reparations for losses in Indo-China.

The treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation with the United States of November 4, 1946, like the treaty with France, was primarily significant because it indicated a desire for mutual understanding. The long and complicated text never came into force.

In the case of the British, even the gesture of good will was lacking. The Chinese government had nothing to gain from the British by way of military assistance in the civil war, and they objected to the determined British effort to restore the commercial conditions which had existed before the war. The severest blow to British pride and British profit was the Chinese monopoly of river and coastal shipping. The Chinese and the British had not reached accord on a new basis for friendship, commerce, and navigation when the Nationalist government retired to Formosa.

Two governments—the Nationalist government of the Republic of China and the Central People's Government of the People's Republic—vied for recognition as the rightful representatives of China's millions. Actual hostilities ceased with the exodus of the Kuomintang, but the Nationalist government continued sporadic belligerent activities. Formosa ordered the

closure of mainland ports and the interception of vessels trading with Communist China. It ordered the air force to conduct bombing raids and reconnaissance flights. It conducted leaflet raids and tried to popularize the symbol "4" as the United Nations had popularized "V" for victory in World War II. The figure "4" stood for four Chinese characters—"Communist bandits must die." The Nationalist propaganda played up Communist excesses and denounced Soviet Russia. It advocated peasant revolts and guerilla movements and encouraged sabotage, particularly in the arsenals and on the railways. Any slogan or device was condoned if it tended to weaken the grip of the Reds.

Approximately one country out of three extended recognition to the People's Government at Peking, including the Soviet bloc, the neutralist nations in Asia, and the United Kingdom. Those who continued to deal with the Nationalist government in Formosa included the United States, the Latin American republics, the Philippines, Thailand, France, Belgium, and the members of the Commonwealth except the United Kingdom. The Nationalist government "viewed with mingled regret and astonishment the phenomenon of Great Britain rushing to offer recognition to the puppet Peiping Communist regime." That the nation which led the world in the institution of democracy should be among the first to have truck with a representative totalitarian regime in Asia came as a source of disappointment to the Chinese and prompted the recall of Nationalist China's diplomatic mission in Great Britain. In its statement on the British recognition of the Communist regime, the Nationalist government said:

At a time when Britain is enforcing costly measures—costly in resources and in human lives—in an attempt to check the infiltration of Communism into her possessions in Southern Asia, for her to open a sluice gate for a flood of Communist propaganda, with its inevitable consequences, must also cause bewilderment to millions of His Majesty's Asiatic subjects. To these people, who played no small part in the development of the Empire in Asia, Britain has long given assurances of eventual self-government and preservation of their freedom. We fear that this act of recognition may not be conducive to early realization of these assurances.

The Nationalist government took its case to the United Nations. It occupied a seat as a permanent member of the Security Council and represented China in the General Assembly and on the specialized agencies. It harbored no intention of losing that position or sharing it with representatives of Peking. It opposed any suggestion that the Nationalist delegate should represent Formosa only and that an additional delegation should represent Communist China. The USSR tried on every occasion to substitute a Communist delegation for the Nationalist delegation and even went

so far as to stage a walk-out when the majority ruled against the Russian contention.

In September, 1949, the Chinese delegation placed before the General Assembly a charge that Soviet violations of its treaty with China and of the charter of the United Nations constituted a threat to the political independence and territorial integrity of China and to the peace of the Far East. The Chinese called on the members of the General Assembly not to give military or economic aid to Communist China or to extend diplomatic recognition. The General Assembly demurred but passed a milder resolution which called upon all states to respect the political independence of China; to respect the right of the people of China now and in the future to choose freely their political institutions and to maintain a government independent of foreign control; to respect the existing treaties relating to China; and to refrain from (1) seeking to acquire spheres of influence or to create foreign-controlled regimes within the territory of China and (2) seeking to obtain special rights or privileges within the territory of China.

When the Korean War broke out, the nations of the world were still divided in their choice of Formosa or Peking. When President Truman unilaterally neutralized Formosa, the USSR objected. Some within the bloc of the free world disliked the linking of the problems of Korea and China. Chou En-lai, the Chinese Communist Foreign Minister, sent a cable to the United Nations which called the American action the total violation of the charter and affirmed the determination of the Chinese people to liberate "from the tentacles of the United States aggressors Taiwan and other territories belonging to China." The United States denied his allegations, stated that its actions were in the interest of peace, and welcomed an examination by the United Nations of the Formosan question.

The Formosan problem receded far into the international background when the Chinese Communists intervened in force in Korea. The special Communist representative at the United Nations meetings in November, 1950, tried to shunt attention from Korea to Formosa. In his intemperate diatribe against the United States, he repeated his demands for the ouster of the Nationalist delegation from the United Nations, and he restated the Communist dedication to the recovery of Formosa. Tsiang Ting-fu, the accredited Chinese delegate, said that until he heard the Communist representative, he had not thought it possible that any Chinese would ever have allowed himself to be led around by the nose to do his master's bidding. He said that to hand over Formosa to the Communists meant in effect handing it over to the Soviet.

Further discussions about Formosa in the United Nations were postponed

but issues were not resolved. A breathing spell brought a certain easing of the international tensions, but it was universally appreciated that the Formosan question could take at any moment a dramatic turn for the worse. On January 16, 1952, the Chinese delegate introduced a resolution renewing his charges against the USSR for violating its treaty obligations to Nationalist China and assisting Communist China. For the first time he officially stigmatized the Yalta agreement "as a great mistake, a disastrous mistake" which his government accepted in the hope it would deter the Soviet Union from its hostile policy in China. He said, "Without the Yalta agreement the whole history of China and Korea in the postwar period would have been different and happier." He spoke of the sufferings of the Chinese and Korean peoples at the hands of Communist China and Russia and he argued for the most uncompromising condemnations of their policies. On February 1, 1952, the General Assembly passed a resolution by a vote of twenty-five to nine with twenty-four abstentions which held that the Soviet Union failed to carry out its obligations under the treaty of August 14, 1945. This action had the effect of releasing China from its corresponding obligations under that treaty. Immediately the Formosan government formally abrogated the treaty, withdrew its recognition of Outer Mongolia, and reasserted its claims to authority over Dairen and Port Arthur. It reserved the right to seek compensation from the Soviet Union for any damage or loss which resulted from Soviet violations of its treaty promises. These actions produced no practical results other than keeping the record straight. They also afforded an opportunity to release the pent-up venom against those "who kicked us while we were down, encouraged the enemy to knock us out, and rejoiced in our defeat."

Nationalist China contested with Communist China for the favor and support of neighboring nations in Asia. In April, 1948, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chinese National Assembly suggested the idea of an anti-Communist alliance among Asians. Chiang and President Rhee—in the midst of their difficulties—wanted a strong military agreement and they approached President Quirino, of the Philippines, who sought political capital for his approaching election. Other Asians shied away from the idea. They looked upon Chiang as a weak reed and too closely identified with the Western powers to sympathize with any local movement for national independence. They were careful not to give any representative of China an opportunity to concern himself officially with the affairs of the overseas Chinese residents in their respective countries. President Quirino sounded out the reactions of the United States. He was not willing to antagonize his most affluent friend and he realized that no Pacific alliance could be effective without American support.

Secretary Acheson frowned on the concept of a Pacific military pact, because of the far-reaching potential consequences of the collapsing Chinese house of cards. He could not see that there existed in Asia a sufficiently powerful common interest to offset divergent policies and intraregional rivalries. He was not willing to undertake the responsibilities and assume the risks involved in an alliance relationship with Formosa and others, even in the name of an anti-Communist front. American hesitation minimized the effectiveness of the Chinese initiative and limited the understandings among Nationalist China, South Korea, and the Philippines to vague pronouncements about the value of economic and cultural co-operation.

In bitterness the Chinese assumed the attitude as early as 1949 that a regional understanding was useless unless it was anti-Communist, anti-aggression, and militarily enforceable. China continued to press for a joint-command setup for all anti-Communist forces in the Pacific and for a bilateral mutual defense pact with the United States. Chiang and his government were most persistent advocates for a regional understanding in spite of the diplomatic rebuffs which at the outset he received from the United States.

Normal international relations between Formosa and its neighbors were unspectacular. Formosa regularized its diplomatic and commercial relations with Japan. It signed a separate peace pact on the same day that the United Nations concluded its treaty of peace at San Francisco. It expanded trade and permitted some useful Japanese advisers to return to Formosa. It could not forget entirely the wounds of the Japanese invasion of China. It would have liked a more active and decisive role in the occupation of Japan and it felt more than a pang of jealousy because of the extensive help which the United States gave to the former enemy, Japan. It protested against the Christmas present which the Americans gave the Japanese in returning the small islands of the Ryukyus and the Amami-Oshima group. The Chinese stated they did not desire the islands themselves but they preferred the United States as an administrator. Above all, the Chinese government feared the evidences of Nehruism in Japan and dreaded the possibility that the Japanese would enter into political and economic relations with the Communist regime.

China and the Philippines enjoyed friendly relations. They exchanged good-will missions and concluded satisfactory arrangements about trade and civil aviation. However, the Chinese government viewed with grave concern and registered its protest against the legislation in the Philippines which discriminated against alien retail traders. China maintained a fundamental attitude of understanding and sympathy toward Thailand, in spite

of Thailand's nationalistic anti-Chinese legislation. To court the good will of Burma, Formosa agreed to repatriate the Kuomintang guerillas under Li Mi who plagued the government of Burma more than they disturbed the forces of Communist China. Chiang manifested a deep interest in overseas Chinese and tried to attract their loyalty to Formosa rather than to Peking. He showed little community of interest with Nehru or with those whom Hu Shih called "the very foolish people like Nehru who believe that there is a third force in the world." On the other hand, Chiang displayed a personal sympathy for President Rhee, perhaps because the fate of Rhee and Korea—like his own—depended so much upon the good-will assistance and determination of the United States.

Formosa was not in position to have a foreign policy apart from the United States. It looked to America for confidence and moral support and for technical, economic, and military assistance. It signed a mutual defense pact with the United States on December 2, 1954. Its hopes soared or waned depending upon American moods, and the Chinese government felt that it could do little to influence American public opinion. One official said solemnly, "It is hell doing business with you Americans; we are the victims of your vacillation and inconsistency." His attitude was that the Americans were with the Chinese, but not enough to make their position effective. He and most of his colleagues in Formosa feared that velvet-glove overtures from Red China might split the unity of the Western allies and eventually persuade the Americans that the Formosa game was not worth the candle.

On May 20, 1954, President Chiang Kai-shek was inaugurated for a second six-year term as the chief executive of the Nationalist government. On that occasion he repeated his devotion to the tasks of recovering the mainland and rebuilding the Chinese nation and identified his anti-Communist and resist-Russia struggle as essentially the universal struggle for freedom and democracy. He called upon all Asian countries facing the Communist menace to establish a strong collective organization against Soviet expansionism and the pervasive spread of communism. He wanted no appeasement because "war or cease-fire, line of demarcation or peace talk are all regular tricks in their aggression, and peace is only a continuation of war and nibblings are but a prelude to wholesale swallowing." Chiang seized every opportunity to reaffirm his conviction that the Communist world respected only strength and would come to terms if the democracies showed unity of purpose and "immediacy of concerted action." Formosa's fate depended upon the integrity of the free world, and its government had no desire to serve as the sacrificial lamb for any impending feast of Communist aggression.


Suggested Reading

- JOSEPH W. BALLANTINE, *Formosa* (Washington, 1952).
JACK BELDEN, *China Shakes the World* (New York, 1949).
CARSON CHANG, *Third Force in China* (New York, 1953).
HAROLD R. ISAACS, *New Cycle in Asia: Selected Documents on Major International Developments in the Far East, 1943-1947* (New York, 1947).
GEORGE KERR, "Formosa's Return to China," *Far Eastern Survey* (New York, October, 1947).
GRAHAM PECK, *Two Kinds of Time* (Boston, 1950).
FRED W. RIGGS, *Formosa and the Chinese Nationalist Rule* (New York, 1952).
H. ARTHUR STEINER, "The United States and the 'Two Chinas,'" *Far Eastern Survey* (New York, May, 1953).
FREDA UTLEY, *Last Chance in China* (New York, 1947).
THEODORE H. WHITE AND ANNALIE JACOBY, *Thunder Out of China* (New York, 1946).

1000 MILES



COMMUNIST AREAS



CHAPTER 30

Independent Countries of Southeast Asia

Thailand, Burma, Indonesia, and the Philippines emerged after World War II as major, independent Far Eastern factors in world affairs. Thailand had never lost its independence, but Burma became the first country since 1776 voluntarily to separate itself from the British Empire. Indonesia experienced a blood bath and a diplomatic assist from the United Nations before it was able to snap the cords of colonialism. The Philippines became independent as scheduled on July 4, 1946, and demonstrated an immediate ardor for regional and international leadership.

The entire region of Southeast Asia lost its characterization as something strange and exotic and appeared as an ordinary, understandable complex of neighboring nations, convulsed by the surge of conflicting forces which were released by the modernization of underdeveloped areas. Independence brought new responsibilities, economic development challenged centuries of colonial or semicolonial traditions, and the demand for social justice struggled against the grip of entrenched privilege. Psychological and cultural factors intensified political and economic conflicts and complicated the process of peaceful adjustment through the arts of international diplomacy. To Southeast Asians, pride and prestige loomed equally important with Western concepts of welfare and security.

The divergent peoples of Southeast Asia possessed no solid basis for common political or economic association because they differed so widely in cultural backgrounds, religious outlook, and political experience. Nevertheless they took cautious steps on their own toward regional co-operation. In March, 1947, representatives from twenty-five Asian nations held an Inter-Asian Relations Conference at New Delhi. Their discussions exposed their

common interests, but they revealed the many difficulties which might arise in the organization of a regional bloc. In January, 1949, a second conference met at New Delhi to discuss colonial matters, particularly the affairs of Indonesia. In May, 1950, the Philippines took the initiative in assembling Asians in Baguio to consider and discuss cultural and economic co-operation. In May, 1954, Asians met again at Colombo to consider a course of action with regard to the crisis in Indo-China.

In these meetings, the Asians showed their consciousness of geographic proximity and their latent desire to speak with one voice. The threads which knit them together, however, were weaker than the tensions which kept them apart. The Asians sought their own type of nationalism, ranging from that of the Malays, who showed the least interest in democracy and self-government, to the extreme chauvinism of the Filipinos and the Siamese. World War II destroyed the last barriers which isolated the Asians from the free thought of the modern world and inflamed their own desires for freedom, independence, and prosperity. Japan and later the USSR posed as the friends of the oppressed and the harbingers of liberation.

The impact of Japan toppled the colonial structure, revealed a scintillating vista of Asia for the Asiatics, and seemed to open the doorway to utopia. The dazed masses accepted the change of one set of foreign masters for another with little more than a shrug of fatalistic shoulders. Some chose to co-operate with Japan; some took to the hills. But whether collaborators or guerillas, they came to think more than ever in terms of their own national advantage. Former leaders of independence movements were released from jails or brought back from exile, and they used secret meetings or the press and radio to sharpen the nationalistic consciousness of the masses. More people were awakened to political realities, were given jobs on the public payroll, and were given military training and drilled in the use of weapons. Their minds were poisoned against the return of their former masters, and they clamored for independence, regardless of its effect upon the freedom of the individual or the popular welfare.

The interests of the great powers—strategic, economic, and cultural—were subordinated to the demands and the whims of the new nation-states. Japan exploded the myth of Western invincibility and annihilated the prestige of the Western powers. Japanese planes sank mighty battleships, Japan's fleet dominated the Southern Regions, and for a brief time Japan's armies tramped at will over the highways and trails of Southeast Asia. Japan treated its white prisoners of war with a calculated indignity and barbarity designed to strike awe and trepidation into the hearts of native peoples. As strong, husky whites who had been accustomed to giving orders all their lives lined up behind barbed-wire entanglements to humiliate

themselves for their daily bread, they symbolized the withering position of the West.

Japan might have ingratiated itself forever as a friend and leader had it not turned back the hands of the clock to become the butcher and the master. When the tide of Japanese aggression receded, it left the beaches strewn with litter and debris. They were the same beaches with the same sands; it was the same ocean with the same crosscurrents washing the same shores. But the mess had to be cleaned up before work on the breakwater could be started again and the harbor considered safe.

The war settled nothing but Japan's attempt to master the continent. "The war drew all the tangled threads of the past into a hard, swirling vortex, then flung them free again to assume new shapes and new combinations, and to create new patterns of conflict." The tempo of the "revolt of Asia" speeded up. Neither the will nor the power existed to restore the *status quo ante bellum*. As Japan suffered eclipse, the nations of the West also lost their hold on Asia. The United States gained military ascendancy in the entire Pacific basin. Russia re-entered the Pacific stage, expanding the role of the czars, and contested with the United States to fill the political vacuums and capture the minds and imaginations of the masses.

Asian peoples insisted upon a completely new approach to their role in world affairs. They expected immediate recognition of their new role and substantial help. They anticipated the benefits of the Atlantic Charter and the immediate fulfillment of wartime promises. As Sjahrir, in Indonesia, said: "We have learned to handle instruments of power, but we neither worship nor swear allegiance to power. We have faith in the future of humanity, in which a life based on humane principles will no longer be suppressed by power, in which there will be no wars and no reason for hostility between human beings." Recognizing the necessity for protection, they looked to the United Nations. Anticipating their own need for cheap consumers' goods, they asked for outside assistance to create industrial machines of their own. In the enthusiasm of their liberation they dreamed of accomplishing in a few years more than they had achieved in centuries. They were free. In Gandhi's words, they had gained the fifth freedom—the fundamental freedom to be free—and they meant to convert their pent-up energy into rapid modernization and industrialization. It was certain that they would never again be content with a bowl of rice per day or a menial role in a white man's paradise. Neither religious differences nor different nationalist aspirations could thwart them in the fulfillment of their revolutions.

The victory of Mao Tse-tung in China and the spread of international communism to their own territories turned the minds of the leaders of

Southeast Asia more than ever from the luxuries of berating the imperialists and dreaming of the future to the realities of the responsibilities of freedom. They did not share the same distrust and fear of communism which existed in the United States and western Europe. Southern Asia had no actual experience with Communist dictatorship and discounted the stories which were told about it. On the other hand, Asians had personal contact with the Western powers and reacted violently against them. Asians were obliged to recast their estimates of their own security, to determine whether the remnants of Western imperialism or Russian and Chinese Communist imperialism constituted the greater threat to their own independence and freedom. They were not immunized from the cold war and they could not find safety or comfort in policies of neutralism or isolation. They carped at the imperialistic sins of the West, but they needed the assistance of the West to expand their social services and improve their levels of living. Fundamentally they needed the protection of the West to hold the line against the Communists while they themselves labored to make their states and societies proof against the attacks of new aggressors from without and of seductive ideologies from within.

Thailand

Situated in the heart of Southeast Asia, Siam (the name was changed to Thailand in 1939) maintained a precarious independence in spite of constant wars with its neighbors, threats from China, and encroachments by aggressive Western powers. Siam managed to preserve a façade of freedom by playing off one power against the other. It lost significant portions of its territory to the British in Burma and Malaya, and to the French in Indo-China; and it suffered the division of its entire domain into respective spheres of influence by a series of Anglo-French agreements. Its sovereignty was impaired by a network of unequal treaties, and its resources and commerce were given over to foreign interests, primarily British. Between the two World Wars, Siam took tremendous strides on the way back to full sovereignty and recognized equality. It joined the League of Nations and negotiated new treaties which were more nearly reciprocal.

Enlightened kings undertook the modernization of Siam's administrative, judicial, and legal agencies. They relied upon a combination of military officers and civilian bureaucrats to effect national reforms. Siam had known military conscription since 1903 and had habitually devoted a substantial part of its budget to the armed services. The military officers and civilian officials constituted a social elite, and they blithely interchanged

posts at their pleasure. One king used his own special corps, "the Wild Tigers," as an instrument to awaken patriotism, and he encouraged the army as the chosen instrument to preserve internal order.

World depression in 1931 forced retrenchment measures on the royal government which took the form of salary cuts for civil servants and army personnel. Within a year these articulate groups revolted against the king and forced the establishment of a constitutional monarchy. The Western press spoke of a *coup d'état*, but the Siamese unrest was confined to Bangkok and its ruling cliques. The king abdicated and a Siamese law professor in Chulalongkorn University named Luang Pradist Manaudharm (personal name, Pridi Banomyong) became regent in his stead. He organized a "People's party" and he adopted an economic program which his enemies insisted was Communist in character. It was intensely nationalistic and anti-Chinese, and it inspired the new constitutional legislature to pass an "Act Concerning Communism" to make sure that communism would not reappear in Siam.

Until 1937 Pridi Banomyong, the leader of the civilian faction, struggled for power against Luang Phibun Songgram, the leader of the military faction. In those six years Phibun rose in rank from major to field marshal; he became the spokesman for the militant nationalist wing of the People's party, and in December, 1938, he took over as prime minister. He continued in that office until July, 1944, and he made of the government a virtual military dictatorship.

This was an unusual situation for a country which was referred to as an island of smiles in a sea of tears. The government began arresting, exiling, and even executing the political opposition. Civil rights were violated because of the imminent dangers of the Japanese invasion. By a series of social and cultural decrees, Marshal Phibun attempted to toughen the moral fabric of his nation. He ordered the people to stop chewing betel, to clean up the streets, to dress Western-style, to wear shoes and hats when appearing in public places, to sit on chairs rather than on the floor, to eat with knives and forks, to sleep not more than eight hours a day, to refrain from bathing in public, to cease playing practical jokes, and to stop enjoying other people's misfortunes. Furthermore, mothers were admonished to clothe their naked babies, spectators were ordered to applaud more heartily at sporting events, and waiters and barbers were told to be more pleasant to their customers. The educational system was overhauled by the nationalists, with special attention to indoctrination of teachers and control of the Malay and Chinese minorities. In the spirit of the times, the government also attempted to control the religious life of the nation when Buddhism was made synonymous with patriotism. In economics the government did not

go to the extremes advocated by Pridi's previous program, but it moved far on the road to national socialism. It took over many industries and eliminated aliens from the control of others.

In foreign affairs Siam before World War II sensed quickly the significance to it of the rise of Japan. In 1933 the Siamese delegate to the League of Nations refrained from voting on the Lytton report and so did not condemn Japanese aggression in Manchuria. Japan and Siam deliberately strengthened cultural and economic relations. On June 12, 1940, the two nations signed a treaty of peace and friendly relations which pledged mutual respect of territory and nonassistance to any third country which might attack either of the high contracting parties. In the course of a border dispute between Thailand and Indo-China, Japan assumed the role of mediator and awarded Thailand some 26,000 square miles of territory including the heavy rice-growing Cambodian provinces of Battambang, Siemreap (less Angkor-Vat), Sisophon, and the western bank of the Mekong River in Laos. On the day following the signing of the border agreement, March 11, 1941, Thailand and Indo-China both promised Japan that they would enter into "no agreement or understanding with any third power anticipating political, economic, or military co-operation against Japan." Japanese forces entered Thailand in the early hours of December 8, 1941, after issuing a midnight ultimatum demanding the right of passage across the country. Their immediate object was to use Thailand with its ports, airfields, and railways as a base of attack against Malaya and Burma. Furthermore, Thailand was to supply the Japanese forces with food, supplies, equipment, and military facilities, and was expected to join Japan in the defense of Thailand.

Marshal Phibun offered only token resistance and agreed to the Japanese demands. In January, 1942, he declared war on the side of Japan against Great Britain and the United States. He recognized the Japanese puppet creations in Nanking, Rangoon, the Philippines, and "Free India," and as a reward for collaboration, he received title to two Shan states from Burma and the four states which Siam had earlier ceded to Malaya. The unrepentant Phibun explained his actions by saying, "I saved Siam's independence. I saved the country from the fate of China and I saved the emerald Buddha from being carried off to Tokyo."

Pridi, on the other hand, resigned his post as minister of finance and made an abortive attempt to set up an independent resistance government in North Siam. On the surface Pridi served as regent but secretly he organized an effective underground. Privately, the majority of the Thai people remained totally unreconciled to the invasion of their country and regarded the Japanese at best as interlopers whose velvet words never

succeeded in covering the steel of their guns and ships of war. The guerillas received encouragement but not too much help from a Free Thai movement which was born in America and supported by Thai officials in Washington and London. The war ended too suddenly for the guerillas to come out into the open against Japan, but they exerted sufficient pressure to oust Phibun's government and to substitute a pro-Allied regime which was still in power when Japan surrendered.

The Japanese accorded Thailand special consideration as the only free country in Southeast Asia. They could not assume the role of deliverers or liberators as there was no terrible fate from which Thailand could be rescued. They clothed the occupation with a dress of legality and tried to bring the country under control militarily, politically, and economically under the guise of treaty agreements entered into by two sovereign states. According to the fiction, Thailand was not invaded—the Japanese merely obtained the right of transit across the country. Likewise Thailand was not patrolled by the troops of Japanese garrisons—50,000 Japanese soldiers merely obtained Thai permission to fight the common foe. Thailand was not forced to declare war; it acted of its own free will. The Japanese did not attempt to set up a military government or to force "advisers" upon Thai civilian officials. Although Japanese troops used Thai airfields as they pleased and the Japanese Foreign Office directed the foreign affairs of Thailand, the agricultural population, 95 per cent of the total, went on the even tenor of its ways undisturbed by the occupation.

The Japanese geared Thai economy to their own needs. Japanese business firms, bankers, and shippers swarmed into Thailand and took over the country's major industries and transportation facilities. They seized foreign-owned properties, including banks and business houses. They seized the port of Bangkok with its accumulated inventories of rice, teak, tin, and rubber, and they forced Japanese yen on reluctant merchants in payment for goods taken by individual Japanese. They monopolized all trade and manipulated the currency for their own benefit. Their harsh economic policies resulted in chaos and poverty and shattered any possible popular faith in Japan's intentions as advertised by its cultural missions and propagandists.

Japan's successive defeats shook the confidence of the Thai people in the value of Japan as an ally and in the wisdom of the policies of Marshal Phibun. On July 22, 1944, following the fall of the Tojo cabinet in Japan, the National Assembly overthrew the Phibun government and replaced it with an anti-Japanese administration. Pridi Banomyong was the power behind the scenes. He denounced the declarations of war and volunteered to return to Burma and to Malaya the territories which Thailand had

annexed in the early days of the war. He suggested that boundary disputes with France be referred to the United Nations. He relaxed restrictions on the minorities in Thailand and, in a burst of national humility, changed the haughty name of Thailand back to Siam. Thus, when the war finally ended, Siam was on the winning side and under a government which was in good repute with the United Nations.

Siam's postwar constitutional and political situation featured the continuing rivalry for power between Pridi and the resurrected Marshal Phibun. The governmental authority was vested in a cabinet nominally responsible to a unicameral legislature. The king was reduced to a political figurehead in spite of the fact that he was held in universal reverence because of his position as ceremonial chief of state and theocratic head of the Buddhist church. The essence of political power remained in the hands of the military aristocracy and the civilian intellectuals who had rallied around their respective leaders since the revolt of 1932. Pridi continued as the foremost power in Siam until 1947, when Phibun, who managed to escape trial as a collaborator, again seized control of the government and restored the name of Thailand.

Pridi escaped into exile, while Phibun survived coup after coup engineered primarily by his own military followers. King Rama IX (Phumiphon Adundet) remained aloof from politics and beyond the reach of the personal intrigues which swirled about his throne. Thailand's internal difficulties stemmed from personalities rather than ideologies and they reflected quarrels for top positions rather than any fundamental unrest or social grievances among the masses. In spite of instability at the top, the government in power continued a fairly consistent domestic policy of gradual modernization and Westernization.

Marshal Phibun was not entirely free from totalitarian practices in his postwar administration, and his national civil service did not maintain its prewar standards of honesty and efficiency. The government reinstituted its vigorous measures against Chinese, Malay, and Indian minority groups, but it did not attempt to continue the passionate pursuit of reform. It left the moderate, essentially humane peasantry to farm and fish in peace and to enjoy its amusements without interference from above. This divergence in outlook between the government and the people contained sources of both strength and weakness; changes in government did not necessarily mean changes in policy, but popular indifference bred a corresponding irresponsibility within the governing elite. The people were not prepared to cope with the menace of Communist imperialism or to exercise any check on a government which might be inclined to drift with the tide.

Postwar Siamese diplomacy lost none of its adroitness or agility in coping

with three hostile powers. Great Britain was inclined to impose an onerous peace upon Siam; France was irked because of the Thai attitude toward Indo-Chinese territory; and China, which also emerged from the war on the winning side, nursed long-time grievances against Siam because of the inconsiderate treatment of Chinese minorities. Only the United States assumed a friendly attitude toward Siam and advocated international policies of forgiveness. In the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of January 1, 1946, Siam escaped with the surrender of the Burma and Malay acquisitions; acceptance of agreements on tin, rubber, and teak; adjustment of claims; and a promise to deliver 1,500,000 tons of rice free of charge. The proposed economic controls were modified and the British were glad to pay for the rice in order to get it quickly for their hungry minions in Southeast Asia. Siam settled amicably its problems with China and returned to France the disputed territories of Indo-China. After settling its differences with the various Allied governments, including the Russian, Siam or Thailand, became on April 29, 1947, the fifty-fifth member of the United Nations.

The United States recognized all of Thailand's postwar cabinets as quickly as they were constituted, but it resented the return of Phibun Songgram. American criticism of his internal policies disappeared when he demonstrated an avowed anti-Communist attitude in international affairs. Phibun was nervous about the political storms in his neighboring countries, especially because he feared the return of his old rival, Pridi, as a consequence of any Communist or quasi-Communist penetration into Thailand. On May 4, 1948, the Soviet minister presented his credentials at Bangkok and established a rather pretentious office. Phibun suspected that this presaged support for the active, annoying Chinese, Viet-Minh, and Malayan underground. His misgivings prompted vigorous decisions, which were limited only by the delicacy of Thailand's geographic location in the midst of the turbulent areas. He strengthened his military forces, revived his cultural program, and pushed forward his plans for economic development. He accorded recognition to the Bao Dai regime in Viet-Nam, and he proposed a Buddhist bloc of nations--Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and possibly Burma--as a counterweight and answer to the challenge of Ho Chi Minh.

After the outbreak of the war in Korea, he dispatched a small expeditionary force to fight on the side of the United Nations. He permitted quietly the development of a regular underground railway funneling supplies to the Nationalist Chinese forces under General Li Mi, which operated in the Thailand-Burma border territory. In return for its co-operation, Thailand received extraordinary assistance from the United States, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the whole alphabet of United Nations agencies.

Phibun's anti-Communist stand displeased some Thais who hated the reappearance of despotism and who would have preferred a policy of neutralism. It antagonized more deeply the Chinese and Malay minorities. It also drew the increasing wrath of the Communist world, which blasted the premier for his "shameless betrayal of the Thai people" and his "ignominious role as the running dog of American imperialism."

Phibun's international position became exceedingly precarious. He ruled over a happy people. Siamese mores postulated that happiness "lies in living an accustomed life in the accustomed way, in having a wife and children and enough to eat, time for a cock-fight or a regatta, money and devotion to keep going to the local temple." His people were not infected by the virus of the cold war. He could not depend upon the vacillations of the United States and its allies for all-out support, and had to rely upon his own judgment and dexterity to choose when to stand up against and when to bend before the approaching Communist storm.

The Communists violated his borders, both from Malaya and Indo-China, and they threatened Thai's own territorial integrity in their thrust toward Laos and Cambodia. Phibun appealed to the United Nations for an observation team which would report any spread of aggression from Indo-China across the frontiers into Thailand. The Communists created autonomous political units among the Thai peoples living in Indo-China and Yünnan and propagandized openly for a Thai People's Republic. According to captured secret documents, the Communists agitated among dissident elements within Thailand for open violence and guerilla warfare. Although avowedly anti-Communist, Thailand stood athwart the main line of Communist expansion into Southeast Asia. It was painfully aware of its own weaknesses and its attractions in a political maelstrom from which it could not escape.

Burma

Burma likewise led a precarious existence because of its internal chaos and its exposure to external aggressors. Cut off from India, China, Indo-China, and Siam by stark mountains and steaming jungles, Burma's destiny historically depended upon the maritime nations rather than invaders by land. As far back as 1612 the East India Company had agents and factories near Rangoon, and in 1862 the provinces in Burma were amalgamated under a British chief commissioner. Later unified and attached to India as a governor's province, it was separated from India on April 1, 1937. Its new administrative system provided for modest political reforms and

limited self-government, but it did not have enough time before World War II to correct abuses in the civil service or to satisfy the demands of the nationalist leaders.

British rule opened Burma to the outside world and it brought undeniable evidences of modernization and material improvement. But it obliterated an ancient political system, weakened the Buddhist religious influences on the people, and permitted the growth of agricultural conditions which fomented protests and revolution. Peasants suffered from excessive tenantry and indebtedness to alien *chettyars* or Indian landlords and rebelled against a central government which enforced impersonal law and heartless contracts. Seeds of nationalism took root in the fertile soil of social discontent.

Before World War II, Burman national leaders were influenced by the self-determination philosophy of President Wilson and they became increasingly distrustful of British intentions. They made political capital out of anti-British, anti-Indian, anti-Western, and anti-Christian sentiments. They pointed out that the British used "divide-and-rule" tactics to play Burmese against minority groups and exploited the resources of Burma to enrich their own coffers. On prewar investments of £50,000,000, the British derived an annual payment of £1,000,000 for services rendered and £10,000,000 in dividends and interest. Burman nationalists accused Indians and Chinese also of monopolizing the best jobs in Burma and siphoning off profits for personal benefit without any regard for the national welfare of Burma. The economic crisis of 1931 added an immeasurable impetus to political leaders who strove to expand their personal following in the name of nationalism.

Dr. Ba Maw, a European-educated, ambitious, colorful Burman, organized the *Sinyetha* or Poor Man's party and U Saw, an astute politician with no more than a common school education, founded the *Myochit* or Patriotic party. U Saw was notoriously anti-British and pro-Japanese and he succeeded to the premiership in 1939. On his special mission to London in 1941, he failed to obtain an unqualified pledge of postwar dominion status for Burma. On his return journey—after World War II had begun—he was apprehended by the British and imprisoned in Africa for the duration. He returned to Burma in 1946 and tried unsuccessfully to return to power. He was executed in 1947 following his conviction for engineering the assassination of Aung San. In 1939 Dr. Ba Maw organized a "Freedom Bloc" dedicated to the achievement of immediate and unconditional independence. He was imprisoned by the British and he escaped from jail after the Japanese occupation. He was chosen by the Japanese to head

their puppet regime, and he was doomed to political obscurity in the first years of Burman independence because of his activities as a collaborator.

The *Dobama Asiayone* ("We Burmans' Association") or *Thakin* party created among the students and workers the strongest sentiments for nationalism. The party members addressed each other as *Thakin*, meaning "master" or "lord," and implied in other ways that Burmans rather than British should be the masters of Burma. The Thakins were socialistically inclined and they made contacts with Communist leaders in India. They clung to their Buddhist faith and they condemned as strongly as the British the corrupt practices of the old-line politicians. They were not anti-Western and they recognized the value of Western learning and its technological achievements. But they were completely against British imperialism and they participated surreptitiously in Dr. Ba Maw's Freedom Bloc. Some were caught and sentenced to British jails; others, on the invitation of the Japanese consul, fled Burma to Formosa before the outbreak of World War II, where they received training for the collaborationist role which the invading Japanese assigned to them in 1942.

The Japanese focused attention on Burma primarily because the Burma Road was the chief avenue for supplies to Chiang Kai-shek. Fewer than 1,000 Japanese lived in Burma; so there was no elaborate fifth-column preparation for the invasion. Burmans often assisted Japanese because of the hatred of British rule and the promise of independence. After a swift campaign, the Japanese hoisted the Rising Sun flag in Rangoon early in 1942. They installed Dr. Ba Maw as the leader and they named leading members of the Thakins to his cabinet. Aung San became Minister of Defense and his brother-in-law, Than Tun, became Minister of Communications. Thakin Mya, a leading Socialist, and Thakin Nu, later strong man of Burma, joined forces with the Japanese.

In August, 1943, Burma proclaimed its independence, signed an alliance with Japan, and declared war on the forces of the Allied nations. In Burma, as elsewhere, Japanese activities belied Japanese propaganda. Japanese advisers served as puppeteers, and militarists bled the economy of Burma for Japan's purposes. Japan respected the forms of independence but administered the country as conquered territory. Burmans became disillusioned and organized a resistance movement under the noses of the Japanese. Aung San organized an Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL), which was the strongest force in Burma when the Japanese withdrew.

Burma suffered irreparable damages because of the Japanese invasion and occupation. Petroleum wells, river boats, mines, railways, and harbors were damaged or destroyed owing to actual fighting and scorched earth

tactics. Debts were paid off in worthless currency; in the chaos landlords, creditors, or labor bosses were driven out or left the country. Although the exodus of British and Indians left the field to Burmans and Chinese their gain was more illusory than real. Education was neglected, public health suffered, the social services deteriorated, and the cruel struggle for existence erased ethical values from the business of living. The loss of markets and the stoppage of ordinary economic activities drove young men into the labor corps for the Japanese or into banditry. The psychology of war stimulated racial discord and hastened the process of political disintegration. Bombing by both sides drove people into the jungle and forced a generation to learn to live by guns instead of plows. The Burmans hated the Japanese for individual excesses and brutality, but they credited Japan's national policy with hastening the day of their own freedom.

Immediately after the liberation of Burma, the British returned—dedicated to a strong civil and military government and to the immediate reconstruction of Burma's economy (particularly British interests). They promised ultimate dominion status for Burma, but postponed political reforms pending rehabilitation. They miscalculated the extent to which Burma had been influenced by the impact of the Japanese and they underestimated the psychological importance which the Burmans attached to the problems of rice, guerillas, and the return of the chettyars. The British denied the demand of the AFPFL for dominant representation in the Burman political setup, and in their own understandable shortsightedness, they contributed to the steady increase of strikes, lawlessness, and banditry. Aung San organized the Burman Army into a People's Volunteer Organization (PVO) and came right out for immediate independence. Speedy measures on the part of the Attlee government in London averted a civil war. London agreed to the election of a constituent assembly and to negotiation for independence within or without the British Commonwealth of Nations.

A constitution for the Union of Burma, composed of Burma proper and the Shan, Karen, and Kachin States, was approved on September 24, 1947. It provided for a French-style presidency and a British-style cabinet. It called for a bicameral legislature—a Chamber of Deputies and a Chamber of Nationalities. The former was made up of 250 members elected by all citizens over eighteen and the latter consisted of 125 members representing the various ethnic groups of Burma. The constitution guaranteed customary human rights and civil liberties and laid the foundations for a socialized welfare state.

Separatist tendencies asserted themselves in Burma from the time of the founding of the Union. Mon separatists in Arakan warred to forestall in-

corporation into a state dominated by a Burman majority, and extreme Communists, called Red Flag Communists, under an elder statesman, Thakin Soe, revolted rather than co-operate with Aung San in his efforts to reach an understanding with Great Britain. On July 19, 1947, gunmen hired by U Saw machine-gunned Aung San and six of his colleagues on the Executive Council, and Thakin Nu—subsequently called U Nu—took over the reins of government. He went to London and concluded with Prime Minister Attlee a treaty by which Great Britain recognized the complete independence and full sovereignty of its former colony. The Nu-Attlee agreement also covered matters of citizenship and finances. Great Britain canceled many of Burma's debts, but insisted upon the sanctity of its contracts and payment for British properties lost by nationalization. A supplementary defense agreement, extended in 1954, stipulated that Great Britain alone would send appropriate military missions to Burma and would provide supplies and needed assistance. On January 4, 1948—at the exact moment determined by Buddhist astrologers—the Union of Burma came into existence.

In resentment against the residual ties with England, Thakin Than Tun withdrew the remaining Communists—the White Flag Communists—from the government fold. In accord with decisions taken in Calcutta in the spring of 1948, the Communists fomented strikes and descended to terrorism and revolt. Then Thakin Nu's PVO split into two factions: the White Band PVO joined in civil war and the Yellow Band PVO remained loyal to the premier. In the midst of this chaos, the Karens revolted when they received less than complete autonomy within the Union. Fortunately for the government, its enemies were as bitter against each other as against the central authority. Slowly the government expanded its authority beyond Rangoon, subdued its enemies one after another, and took the lead in bold political, economic, and social reforms. It suppressed lawlessness, held elections, revitalized the Buddhist faith, pioneered industrialization, and gave the country an honest administration.

The government distinguished itself for its moderation. It was tempted to expropriate all foreign property without compensation, but it discovered quickly its need for foreign capital. It shifted its policies to treat investments with consideration and announced its aims as joint operation rather than immediate nationalization. It tackled the problem of land reform so as to break the grip of the landlords and to provide the peasants with a fair price for their rice. Burma's economy depended primarily on the international rice market—expensive rice meant hardship for rice importers like Japan, India, and China, but depressed prices for rice meant hardship for the Burma peasants and near-bankruptcy for the Burma Union. A Burma

State Agricultural Marketing Board bought the rice from the peasants to put Chinese middlemen out of business and sold the rice abroad for four or five times its purchase price. The profits kept Burma's finances in the black, but greed cost Burma some of its best customers. When the bottom fell out of the rice market, as it did in 1954, the Communists used the economic calamity for their political advantage. They spread tales among the rice growers to the effect that the rice monopoly was corrupt and inefficient, and they urged support for the communistic Burma Workers' and Peasants' party. They tried to influence the government to adopt more friendly attitudes toward China and Russia and to seek more lucrative markets behind the Iron Curtain.

Burma adhered to a general line of neutralism in its postwar foreign policy. It was the first nation outside the Soviet satellite bloc to extend recognition to the People's Republic of China, but it maintained cordial, correct relations with the United Kingdom and the United States. The Conference of the World Federation of Trade Unions at Peking in November, 1949, named Thakin Nu together with Nehru, Hatta of Indonesia, and Phibun of Thailand as stooges of the imperialists. Burma was not over-friendly with Thailand, with which it had waged centuries of bloody wars. It maintained close relations with Indonesian nationalists, criticized Dutch police action, and banned Dutch planes from Burma's airfields. It extended early recognition to the Indonesian Republic. It refused to attend the San Francisco Peace Conference with Japan and was required until November 1954 to make its own settlement of reparations and trade relations and to conclude a separate treaty of peace. It seemed to be sympathetic to the nationalism of Ho Chi Minh, but indifferent or worse to Bao Dai and Chiang Kai-shek.

Burma's relations with China were poisoned by the altercations which centered in the Nationalist guerilla marauders under Li Mi on the Burma-China borderland. Burma charged Formosa, Thailand, and the United States with aiding the guerillas and brought action in the United Nations to force their evacuation.

Burma refused to take sides in the cold war. It interpreted its internal Communist problem as a domestic matter, well within the government's power to regulate and control. The masses would be unlikely to accept communism unless it came to terms with Buddhism. They hated Communist discipline, but they accepted its invitation to disorder as an easy excuse for *dacoity*, or banditry. The Communists beguiled the peasants with a slogan of "No Rents, No Taxes," and they tried to capture the leadership of the nationalist movement. They were divided by their own opportunism and reduced to a powerless, noisy surface organization of

workers and peasants. The underground needed more propitious international circumstances to divulge its hand. Burma believed that the Communists would be unable to achieve much in a military way unless supported by Chinese troops. In that case the problem would no longer be one of ideology or internal rivalry, but one of international aggression and, as such, subject to the jurisdiction of the United Nations.

Sponsored by the United States and Great Britain, on April 19, 1948, Burma became the fifty-eighth state to join the United Nations. It supported the original United Nations resolutions to take action in Korea, but it voted against branding Red China as a participant in aggression. It accepted American aid for economic purposes until 1954, and it accepted a Fulbright agreement for the international exchange of students and teachers. It rejected American assistance programs after it lost its only gunboat (obtained from the United States) to a Karen bazooka (also obtained from the United States by way of Li Mi's guerillas). It avoided any close identity with the international policies of Great Britain and the United States. The Premier, U Nu, registered no objection in principle to closer economic ties or assistance programs with Iron Curtain countries and expressed no attachment to any alien ideologies. His ambassador in the United States declared Burma's policy to be coexistence and concentration on Asia's real war, the war against want. He said Burma wanted no part of America's crusade against communism and no diminution of the fight against colonialism. He defined colonialism as a form of control and a state of mind which treated Asians as second-class citizens and made decisions for Asians without their consent or consultation.

Indonesia

In many respects, the postwar developments of Burma reflected themselves in the history of Indonesia. Indonesians took advantage of the Japanese invasion to rid themselves of colonial rule and to embark upon a new existence as an independent state.

Before the war the Dutch recognized the strength of the Indonesian demands for self-government, but they genuinely believed that the interests of the Indonesians and themselves would best be served by the continuation and improvement of the Dutch regime. The Dutch brought material benefits to the Indies, and they gave their island empire paternalistic administration designed to preserve the idyllic way of life of the native population and to pace modernization to their own pleasure. They afforded modest educational opportunities, and made slight concessions in the direc-

tion of local self-government. They exercised fair but firm control, kept important civil service jobs in their own hands, and made no pretense at preparation for independence. Nationalism and independence were taboo—linked with communism—and likely avenues to jail or exile.

In spite of Dutch opposition, nationalist movements of strong but divergent native groups appeared in Java in the early years of the twentieth century. A cultural society, known as *Budi Outomo* or “Beautiful Endeavor,” adopted *merdeka* or “freedom” as its slogan shortly after the Russo-Japanese War. A fanatical Moslem society, called *Sarekat Islam* or “Islamic Association,” used its common religious bond to promote more rapid development of self-government. Some local agitators hoped that these organizations would lead to a more liberal Dutch policy, others hoped for a greater share in the profits of Dutch enterprises, and still others used the young nationalist movements as a social weapon against the Christian Dutch and the infidel Chinese. Few looked for independence. After World War I, the Communists took a leading role in nationalist protests against the Dutch and instigated strikes and riots. Their excesses invited strict measures of repression and forced even mild independence advocates underground. The great depression made the Dutch increasingly suspicious of all liberal reform movements.

The Japanese conquest and occupation destroyed the prestige of the Dutch and gave new life to the independence movement. In its exile the Dutch government promised Indonesia equal status within a Dutch Commonwealth after the war, and from their distant vantage points in India, Australia, and the United States, the Allied governments radioed to the Indies the propaganda of the Four Freedoms. The young firebrands of Indonesian nationalism took matters into their own hands in dealing with the Japanese. Sukarno and Hatta collaborated with the Japanese, while Sjahrir and Sjarifuddin led the guerillas. Both groups merged after the war to carry on the independence struggle against the Dutch.

While still under the Japanese—on August 17, 1945—Indonesia declared its independence. The Japanese gave their blessing to the Indonesian constitution and left quantities of arms in native hands. On his last broadcast on August 21, the Japanese commander in chief said, “Dai Nippon is and always will be the friend of Indonesia, immutably and forever. We will never forget our oath in life or in death.” For six weeks, between August 17 and September 29, 1945, when the first British troops arrived, the self-styled Indonesian Republic enjoyed an independence inherited from Japan. It worked feverishly to elaborate a rudimentary government while armed bands terrorized the countryside and viciously slaughtered the Dutch in-

ternees. It was crystal-clear that the Dutch could not restore the *status quo ante bellum* in flaming Indonesia.

Within a year, British troops restored law and order and the Dutch worked out a preliminary political understanding with the Indonesian Republic. By the Linggadjati (Cheribon) agreement, initialed on November 15, 1946, the Dutch recognized the government of the Republic of Indonesia as exercising *de facto* authority over Java, Madura, and Sumatra. They agreed to co-operate to ensure a sovereign, democratic United States of Indonesia as a new federal union to comprise the entire territory of the Netherlands Indies organized into three component states: (1) the Republic of Indonesia, (2) Borneo, and (3) the Great East. The Linggadjati agreement looked to the early establishment of a Netherlands-Indonesian Union to consist of the Netherlands, the Netherlands West Indies, Surinam and Curaçao, and the Federated United States of Indonesia. Additional arrangements were made for the restoration of property rights, maintenance of peace, and reduction of armed forces.

By July, 1947, each side accused the other of bad faith, and the Dutch announced their determination to restore order by "police action" in the territory of the Indonesian Republic. The Dutch blamed the Republican Army for arson, pillage, and plundering of the estates and declared that "neither we nor any decent Indonesian wants this country which used to stand out for its clean and honest administration and for its credit in the world to be the bad example of graft and confusion and terrorism it has become."

Letters from India and Australia brought the Indonesian conflict to the attention of the United Nations. On August 1, 1947, the Security Council issued a cease-fire order and called upon the disputants to settle their difficulties by peaceful means. The Dutch were infuriated by outside pressures but submitted to negotiations conducted with the assistance of mediators from the United States, Australia, and Belgium. A truce was signed on January 18, 1948, on the decks of the "U.S.S. Renville" as neutral territory which established demilitarized zones, called for cessation of hostilities, and listed a set of principles for a political settlement. The Renville agreement provided for a sovereign, democratic, federated United States of Indonesia with sovereignty in the hands of the Dutch until after a stated interval the Kingdom of the Netherlands should transfer its sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia.

The Indonesian leaders sought the strongest possible position for their republic within the federal structure; the Dutch tried to offset the position of the republic by emphasizing the other member-states of the federation and the federal structure itself. It was planned to conduct plebiscites to de-

termine whether various groups on the main islands wanted to become part of the republic or some other state within the federation. The Dutch accused the Republicans of infiltration into their zones, and general bad faith in the secret promotion of disorder. The Republicans accused the Dutch of interfering with their promised rights of election and of enforcing a blockade as a maneuver toward permanent retention of sovereignty. The Indonesians insisted that the Dutch never had any real intention of relinquishing their control over their rich colonial possession. The Dutch took the line that the Republican cause had been taken over by Communists determined never to compromise and to make the local Indonesian political strife a part of the world revolution. But the Indonesian nationalists took action to purge their leadership in September, 1948, and after a kidnaping incident lined the most notorious Communist leaders, Muso, Sjarifuddin, Alimin, and Suripno, against a wall and shot them. On December 19, 1948, the Dutch again undertook police action with the express purpose, in their words, of eliminating Republican terrorist activities. The Dutch quickly scattered the Republican armies and put the Nationalist leaders, Sukarno and Hatta, in jail.

The United Nations entered the picture again and passed a new resolution for a cease-fire. The United States added to the pressure by suspending economic aid to the Dutch in Indonesia, and the Asian nations sent delegates to New Delhi to consider united action for the Indonesians. Responding to these outside forces, the Dutch released the imprisoned members of the Republican government, returned the control of the capital city of Jogjakarta to Republican control, and agreed to a round-table conference to grant full independence to the island peoples.

Ten weeks of meetings in The Hague led to the signing of an agreement on November 2, 1949, by which the United States of Indonesia was to become a sovereign federal republic of sixteen states, enjoying the rights of an equal partner with the Netherlands under a common sovereign. Only Irian or Dutch New Guinea was omitted from the territory of the federal government. Co-operation was to be worked out in the fields of foreign affairs, defense, finance, economics, and cultural relations. The United States of Indonesia promised to recognize and protect Dutch commercial and investment interests and to arbitrate future disputes. The new state changed the name of its capital from Batavia to Jakarta, and received its full sovereignty from the Netherlands on December 27, 1949. It received immediate recognition from the United States and was admitted to the United Nations in June, 1950.

The Hague agreements were dead letters within six months. The Indonesian delegates had agreed to a federated United States of Indonesia,

but the temper of the people at home demanded a unitary republic. They discarded the idea of a federation and they christened their state the "Republic of Indonesia." They made no attempt to reduce the political position of Java, Madura, and Sumatra, and they took no pains to limit the power of the oligarchy which dominated the central administration. The Hague agreements called for a union under the Crown, but the Indonesians took no steps to formalize the union. They bided their time, until August 10, 1954, to cut all formal relations with the Netherlands and to establish an ordinary state-to-state diplomatic relationship. The Dutch economic interests in Indonesia were not given treaty protection but were subjected to the sufferance and the whim of the Indonesian government.

The structure of government created under the Japanese continued in power. The constitution was based on "divine omnipotence, humanity, national consciousness, democracy and social justice." Its bill of rights prohibited slavery, torture, and illegal arrest and guaranteed freedom of religion, speech, and assembly. Political power in the legislature—which was appointed in 1945—was divided between the *Masjumi* or Moslems, the Nationalists, the Communists, the Greater Indonesia Association, and the Socialists. Temporary realignments of parties or working coalitions made and unmade premiers and cabinets after the manner of France. The president himself, Sukarno, represented the strong factor of continuity in administration, and he attracted to himself a palace guard more distinguished for personal loyalty than political or economic acumen. Government politics became a kind of "poker game played by a few thousand people all of whom have known each other much too long and too well." Elections were planned but delayed. Registration officials were often killed. It was ruled that the hammer and sickle symbol should be used for Communists and for independents but the Moslems objected—with knives.

The young republic's difficult problems inherited from the Dutch regime were compounded by the cruelties of the Japanese invasion. Problems of scattered territory, mixed population, and pressure of growing population on limited land taxed the ingenuity and abilities of untrained leaders. Lack of education and experience prevented the accumulation of a human reserve for the top echelons of political and economic administration. Disorder and disunion convulsed Indonesia beneath its deceptively placid surface. Trigger-happy young men, with little more ideology than banditry, stalked the countryside. Moslem fanatics of *Darul Islam* ("World of Islam") defied the government in the interest of an avowed theocratic state. The Communists organized "Volunteers" and demanded guns to put down the guerillas of *Darul Islam*. The government lamented that for decades "we have longed for our authority and now that we have it we don't respect it." The army became a political football between Socialists

and Moslems on the one hand and Nationalists and Communists on the other. The Nationalist leaders generally—who derived their major support from the middle and lower rank civil servants, the lawyers, doctors, and engineers—enjoyed the support of the Communists, but they encountered the most bitter opposition from the Moslems and the Socialists.

Political problems were complicated by a condition of perennial economic crisis. The prewar trade patterns were destroyed, and the large plantations and other foreign enterprises were curtailed by the prevailing postwar philosophy of national socialism. While all local political parties united to vent their spleen on the evils of colonial capitalism, business went to rack and ruin. Tea was unpicked, rubber trees untapped, and sugar mills were idle. Estate stocks were commandeered, planters were subjected to sabotage or terrorism, and even the Chinese were victimized by extortions and campaigns of hate. Government revenues fell off, and disastrous declines in the price of rubber and tin forced reduction in general economic operations. Labor grew restive and extraordinarily receptive to the seductions of communism.

The Communists contented themselves with United Front tactics, short of sabotage and terrorism, after the elimination of their leaders in 1948. They encountered the stiff religious opposition of the Moslems, and they chose to work unobtrusively with their favorite targets—the peasants, workers, and soldiers. They gained substantial control of the urban workers, the estate-laborers, and the farmers' unions. They placed sympathizers (if not party members) in cabinet posts, and they organized scattered armed units as nuclei of a possible separate army. They were not free from internal party schisms nor from the dilemma of trying to follow the leadership of both Moscow and Peking.

Indonesians by no means achieved a unanimity of approach in their attitudes toward foreign affairs. Without exception they opposed the last vestiges of imperialism and determined to recover Irian. They resented the Dutch assumption that New Guinea was a Dutch colony and they objected to a Dutch-Australian agreement for the joint development of New Guinea. Indonesians whispered about the eventual return of irredentist territories of Portuguese Timor and British Borneo, and they rebelled inwardly against the continuance of foreign capital in their economic life. However, they recognized the undeniable value of foreign investments and technical skills and they subordinated their emotions to their practical needs. On the slightest provocation, they flared up against foreign interests and they blamed the Dutch and the Chinese in particular for their accumulated ills. They terminated the services of a Dutch postwar military mission on the grounds that the mission was no longer needed.

As was the case in Burma, the Nationalists resisted strenuously any com-

mitment in the cold war. They accepted United States technical aid, but they rejected the American concept of mutual security. They were extremely sensitive to the potentialities of their Chinese minority groups, and they believed that an uncritical adoption of American policies would increase rather than reduce the danger of Chinese imperialism. They shunned entangling alliances with anyone, and determined to live their own lives *and to grow in the direction of their own needs and interests. They signed a treaty of friendship pledging perpetual peace and everlasting amity with the Philippines, and they conducted normal diplomatic intercourse both with the free world and the Iron Curtain countries. A Russian ambassador presented his credentials to President Sukarno on September 20, 1954. They liked Australia under the Labor government but they felt few bonds of sympathy with conservative Australian elements who regarded Indonesian Nationalists as visionaries and Communists and less welcome as neighbors in New Guinea than the solid, reliable Dutch.*

Indonesia dedicated itself to the "cause of peace" and pursued its objective in its own independent manner. It respected Nehru because of his contributions to anticolonialism and his open and ardent espousal of the Indonesians against the police actions of the Dutch. It refused to follow his leadership blindly and in the United Nations often voted on the opposite side from India. On repeated occasions, Indonesia actively opposed the USSR and supported the Western bloc. Its main sympathies rested with the Asian-Arab bloc, and it regarded colonialism as a greater menace than Communist aggression. It refused to distinguish sharply between the Russian position in North Korea and the American position in South Korea and did not participate in the condemnation of China as an aggressor in Korea. Indonesia turned its back upon the projected American alliance of Southeast Asian nations and considered a general nonaggression treaty against Communists and non-Communists alike or a Southeast Asian Locarno as a preferable alternative.

Some Indonesians entertained the idea of a joint Indonesia-India-Burma nonaggression agreement with China, but the Moslem groups objected strenuously to policies which would have directed Indonesia left of the neutralist center. The Moslems became increasingly fearful of Communist imperialism and hopeful for substantial economic assistance from those nations in position to grant it. To all Indonesians peace looked more attractive when clothed with prosperity. They therefore sought to conclude peace with Japan which would bring reparations, trade, and commercial credits. They wanted to expand their markets in China and the USSR as well as in the free world, and they argued vigorously for the practical application of the oft-repeated platitude that the expansion of indiscriminate economic ties would pave the way to understanding and peace.

Suggested Reading

- W. MACMAHON BALL, *Nationalism and Communism in East Asia* (Melbourne, 1952).
 WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, *North From Malaya* (New York, 1953).
 WILLARD H. ELSBREE, *Japan's Role in Southeast Asian Nationalist Movements, 1940-1945* (Cambridge, 1953).
 J. S. FURNIVALL, "Twilight in Burma: Independence and After," *Pacific Affairs* (New York, June, 1949).
 WILLIAM L. BOLLAND, ed., *Asian Nationalism and the West* (New York, 1953).
 GEORGE KAHIN, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca, New York, 1952).
 AGNES KEITH, *Three Came Home* (Boston, 1947).
 KENNETH P. LONDON, *Siam in Transition* (Chicago, 1939).
 MARGARET LONDON, *Anna and the King of Siam* (New York, 1943).
 ALEXANDER McDONALD, *Bangkok Editor* (New York, 1949).
 LENNOX A. MILLS AND ASSOCIATES, *The New World of Southeast Asia* (Minneapolis, 1949).
 ROBERT PAYNE, *Red Storm over Asia* (New York, 1951).
 RAMA RAU, SANTHA, *East of Home* (New York, 1950).
 LAWRENCE ROSINGER AND ASSOCIATES, *The State of Asia* (New York, 1951).
 SOETAN SJAHRIR, *Out of Exile*, translated, with an introduction by Charles Wolf, Jr. (New York, 1949).
 PHILIPS TALBOT, ed., *South Asia in the World Today* (Chicago, 1950).
 PHILIP W. THAYER, ed., *Southeast Asia in the Coming World* (Baltimore, 1953).
 VIRGINIA THOMPSON, *Thailand, The New Siam* (New York, 1941).
 H. J. VAN MOOK, *The Stakes of Democracy in Southeast Asia* (New York, 1950).
 DAVID WEHL, *The Birth of Indonesia* (London, 1948).
 CHARLES WOLF, JR., *The Indonesian Story* (New York, 1948).
 MAURICE ZINKIN, *Asia and the West* (London, 1951).

CHAPTER 31

The Republic of the Philippines

The Republic of the Philippines—less populous than Indonesia and less critically located than either Thailand or Burma—came to occupy a unique place in the interests and affections of the United States. A half century of intimate relations forged political, economic, and psychological bonds between the two peoples and gave them a common outlook on world affairs. The two nations differed in size, power, and relative influence, but they had the wit and the wisdom not to permit their differences to outweigh their mutual acceptance of spiritual values and political ideals. For fifty years the United States carried the burdens of sovereignty in the Philippines, and then in accordance with its promises granted independence to its former wards.

The end of one chapter was the beginning of another. The Americans closed the record book of their own stewardship and stepped aside to survey the accomplishments and shortcomings of their administration. They stood ready to help—not as alien masters but as invited guests—whenever they were asked for military support or technical assistance. As Americans sloughed their responsibilities, the Filipinos grew in training and experience for self-government. The commonwealth period, 1935–1946, marked the twilight of the Philippines as American territory, but it heralded the dawn of the Philippines as an independent nation.

The birth pangs of the new republic were extraordinarily painful. The process of preparation was faulty and incomplete—but perhaps not even the wisest and most perfect planning could have anticipated the difficulties of the young nation which had determined to walk alone. Its political structure had an imposing façade of democracy, but it was built on shaky foundations of personal rule and oligarchic privilege. Its economic life brought little more than the barest necessities of existence to the masses, while it

blessed the "upper class" with disproportionate wealth. The country stirred with rumblings of discontent and with a growing demand to make political independence an avenue to greater social justice.

The recognized need for reform completely overshadowed any danger of rebellion. American and Filipino forces of law and order accepted the challenge for improvement without prodding from *Sakdalistas* (forerunners of the Hukbalahaps) or threats of enemy invasion. Problems were difficult but in the process of solution when the Japanese struck. For four years, the Philippines writhed under the invader's heel. Filipinos learned the hard way the horrible price of tyranny and the deep meaning of freedom.

The exhilaration of the independence ceremony of July 4, 1946, was tempered by the tragic memories of the war and the dread uncertainties of the future. But the new nation, with the help of its strong American friend and ally, rebuilt its political edifice, reconstructed its economic framework, and set about the rehabilitation of its drooping spirit. It made itself a force for security in the western Pacific and for progress and stability in the region of Southeast Asia. At the same time it carved for itself a respectable niche in the councils of free nations.

The Commonwealth Period

Six weeks after the legislature of the Philippines accepted the Philippine Commonwealth and Independence Law (the Tydings-McDuffie Act), President Quezon and his *Nacionalista* followers won a sweeping victory in general elections. His government called a Constitutional Convention which drew up the fundamental law for the eventual republic and the interim commonwealth. The constitution of 1935 followed closely the American model and it breathed the spirit of Roosevelt democratic philosophy. It placed the good of the state above the rights of the individual and provided a structure for self-government. According to its provisions, the president of the Philippines took over the duties of the governor-general and a high commissioner became the direct representative of the president of the United States in the islands.

During the commonwealth period, political power was centralized in the national government headed by President Manuel Quezon. He and a chosen few of his colleagues in Manila could give the word and change overnight an entire national attitude on a specific issue. He matched jobs and personnel all over the country like a child fitting together the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle. Rivals for a particular plum were obliged to fight it out

against each other at the polls, but judicious allotment of spoils prevented widespread revolts. His personal charm and magnetism accounted for his political magic. When driven into a tight spot, he had a most disarming way of turning apparent defeat to his own advantage. He often chided his meticulous vice-president, Sergio Osmena, for being so careful that he would not let his own mind know how his heart felt. Quezon was *flexible, inconsistent, and mercurial*, but he championed successfully the cause of the *tao* or the Filipino peasant. Just about every ordinary person in the Philippines warmed instinctively to the colorful, dynamic *presidente* who could make them laugh or cry and make them believe that he brought them independence.

During the commonwealth period there was little doubt about the attitude of Filipinos toward the United States. The *Nacionalistas* monopolized the independence issue, but they depended upon tax refunds from the United States and American expenditures for their political existence. Opportunists used the independence issue for political maneuvering, but sensible and restrained leaders acknowledged "the boundless gratitude of the Filipino people to the United States for the measureless benefits she has bestowed upon us." On August 13, 1938, the fortieth anniversary of Occupation Day, President Quezon stated in the course of an address:

Peace and prosperity have come to this favored land. Materially we have developed education, sanitation, and agricultural and industrial enterprises. Security and happiness, freedom from financial pressure, and a higher mode of life—all are ours. . . . All of this we owe to that starry flag and the great people it represents. When it finally comes down from Santiago in 1946 it will find somewhere in its folds the grateful hearts of a people—a new and vibrant republic facing with optimistic hope its rising dawn.

Under the commonwealth, the civil service suffered from nepotism and favoritism. The legislature too often played the ignominious role of rubber stamp and stooped to corruption and political expediency. Despite the spirit of the constitution and overt devotion to democratic processes, legislatures were handpicked and all too ready to do the bidding of the *presidente*, his kitchen cabinet, or some of his influential cronies who wielded a tremendous amount of power and influence even though they never held political office. The courts assumed the outward characteristics of the American judicial system, but they permitted the existence of many questionable practices.

Preparations for political independence were not paralleled by measures for economic independence. For prosperity the Philippines leaned upon the United States. More than 8,000 Americans lived in the islands and their

investments contributed immeasurably to the public welfare. About four fifths of the foreign trade of the Philippines was conducted with the United States. The old Spanish land grants were respected by the American authorities, and new American investors often adopted the traditional practices of landlordism. While benevolent America built schools and roads (largely with local taxes), introduced modern sanitation, and cut down disease, imperial America perpetuated a medieval economic system incompatible with the development of a healthy economy. The economic situation deteriorated more and more as the date for independence drew near. A Joint Preparatory Committee on Philippine Affairs made recommendations which resulted in the Economic Adjustment Act (the Tydings-Kocalkowski Act) approved by President Roosevelt on August 7, 1939. That act lengthened the period of free entry or favored treatment of Philippine exports in the American market even beyond the proposed date of independence. By the end of 1941 the Philippines faced a first-class economic crisis which prompted talk of "re-examination" or dominion status in place of complete independence.

The economic structure of the Philippines determined its social organization. At the top of the pyramid was a small group of landowners and businessmen—mainly American, Chinese, Spanish, and mestizo (part foreign, part Filipino). Immediately below them were the compradors, the bureaucracy of government employees, and a negligible middle class. These groups lived in modern cities, sent their children to modern schools, built up their fortunes, and controlled Philippine politics. At the base of the pyramid was the vast majority of peasants and urban workers. The spreading gap between the masses and the small governing class led to social unrest of serious proportions. The government undertook measures of relief. It opened the Koronadel Valley in Mindanao for settlement. It bought, for resale to tenants, home sites in rural villages and large estates where tenancy troubles were evident. President Quezon launched a "social justice" program which established a court of industrial relations, provided for welfare of tenants on rice lands, improved labor standards and conditions, authorized land distribution, and taxed sugar refineries and planters for the benefit of the workers.

In spite of this legislation, labor demonstrated a certain uncasiness and farm tenants resorted to riots. Socialist-Communist leaders in central Luzon brought to the fore the issue of totalitarianism, and protested against the philosophy of Francoism which permeated Manila. They criticized particularly the Emergency Powers Act of August 10, 1940, which in their view transformed the government into an agency of fascism. All political,

social, and economic problems were pushed into the background abruptly by the invasion of the Japanese.

Under Japanese Occupation

*Prior to the outbreak of the war, approximately 30,000 Japanese lived in the Philippines—18,000 of whom congregated in Davao, a province in Mindanao. The Japanese sought land titles in unoccupied areas and developed the *abaca* (Manila hemp) industry on a lease and contract system. Under this system a Filipino (often a government official) or an American would obtain a lease on land near a central Japanese establishment like the Ohta or Furukawa plantation companies which were forbidden by law from leasing land in their own names. He would then execute a contract with the Japanese company whereby the latter guaranteed to clear the land, plant and manage the crop, pay all taxes, and return to the original lessee 15 per cent of the gross revenue. On occasion, Japanese would marry Filipinas and the wives would lease the land; or the Japanese would purchase the use of the name of a willing Filipino or a dummy corporation.*

The Japanese companies carried out their enterprises in an efficient manner, put in roads and other public improvements, and assigned small lots to Japanese farmers, often of Okinawan extraction. At a minimum capital cost the Japanese came into control of almost half the agricultural land in Davao. As American interest waned and the Filipinos remained apathetic, the Japanese expanded their economic foothold and they placed their interests in charge of the Japanese consul, who was also the president of the local Japanese Association. By 1940 practically all Japanese banks, commercial houses, and shipping companies had agencies in the Philippines, and Japanese retail bazaars were established in every city and town. The Japanese had a limited interest in mineral production and bought Philippine chrome, manganese, copper, and iron ore. They had a practical monopoly of offshore commercial fishing, and they developed tremendous logging and lumber concessions. They operated a fish cannery, a brewery, a bicycle factory and several rubber-footwear plants, and they often attracted distinguished Filipinos as attorneys, stockholders, or partners.

The coming of the war was the result of conflicts of policy between the United States and Japan, and the Philippines were caught in the middle. The commonwealth government and the United States high commissioner took measures to prepare the populace for the possibility of invasion. Differences of opinion compounded with public apathy prevented efficient bolstering of civilian morale. Military leaders gave cautious but clear warn-

ings that in the event of hostilities, the Philippines would be incapable of successful resistance.

When bombs fell on Manila early on the morning of December 8, 1941 (Manila date [December 7, Washington time]), the Filipinos were brave, without rancor, and fantastically hopeful. It was unthinkable that an Oriental army could dislodge the United States from its show window of democracy in East Asia. It was rumored that the pilots of the airplanes were Germans and that the shiny new machines represented the total strength of the Japanese Air Force. When the inevitable occupation of Manila came, the grim lines on the faces of the once-gay Filipinos registered disbelief. Said Carlos Romulo, “. . . on the rim of Asia, it seemed to us that the tremendous tide rising in the Far East would wash us out along with our dreams of democracy for which we had fought from Balintawak to Bataan. The white man was whipped—disgraced.” Bataan and Corregidor brought heartaches and death to individuals, but they meant glory and defiance for the Philippine nation. The Filipinos’ hatred of the Japanese grew with each brutality that gave the lie to smooth Japanese propaganda.

The Japanese by leaflets, radio, loud-speakers, public speeches, and moving pictures castigated America for its greed, cowardice, and racial discrimination. They urged Filipinos to reject the “American sugar-coated labels of justice and democracy” and to join their Oriental brethren in the Co-Prosperity Sphere in an Asia for the Asiatics. Their attractive appeals were nullified by the slaps, bows, and barked orders which were the hallmarks of the militarists. The Japanese set up a new political party on the totalitarian model and installed a puppet government. They tried to de-Americanize the islands. Dewey Boulevard was given a Japanese name and Taft Avenue became the Road of Greater East Asia. American flags were dishonored or destroyed, textbooks were scissored, American holidays were tabooed, American films were banned, and American music was forbidden. American sovereignty was proclaimed at an end and American civilians were interned. After two years of intensive de-Americanization, the Japanese ambassador was obliged to admit that the program was a failure because the Filipinos were too steeped in the American way of life.

The Japanese economic program led to poverty, discontent, and disaster. The Japanese could not extract from the Philippines all the riches they had counted upon in spite of all they pilfered, stole, and expropriated. The Japanese subjected Manila to treatment infinitely worse than they received later in Tokyo at the hands of the American army of occupation. The Japanese occupied residences and public buildings and shipped off to Tokyo all the pianos, chairs, refrigerators, and automobiles they could not use on the spot. They chained the economy of the Philippines to the Japanese war

machine. They mined copper for Japan, raised rice and vegetables for the Japanese Army, conscripted labor for defense works, and utilized all local industries for their own needs. Ragged Filipinos starved as consumers' goods disappeared and as the "Mickey Mouse" currency lost the last shred of its purchasing power.

The social program of the Japanese was negative and ineffective. The Japanese offended the religious inclinations of the Filipinos, and they could not make Spartans out of tropical people who loved to dance and to enjoy the good things of their easygoing life. The bloodletting which accompanied the liberation was the climactic legacy of the Japanese to the Philippines. The documented story of pillage, slaughter, inhumanity, torture, and cold-blooded murder made the sack of Manila one of the most cruel orgies of the war.

The Japanese occupation left the Philippines a house divided, collaborators versus guerillas. There were few Quislings at the time of the Japanese entry into Manila. Those politicians who remained conducted themselves with courage during the brief month of resistance, but after surrender practically every leader of the *Nacionalistas* slipped into the camp of Japan. Of the elected members of the House of Representatives, 30 per cent accepted positions under the Japanese; of the Senate, 75 per cent served in the puppet government. Their "new independent republic" made a pact of alliance with Japan and declared war on the United States. It avoided conscription and sent no armies into the field against the United States. The collaborators argued that they had no alternative, that America had let them down, and that they served Filipino interests best by resisting as cleverly as possible. Many of the landowners, industrial tycoons, and compradors did a flourishing business in "buying and selling" with the Japanese. The major opposition to the Japanese came from poorer elements, whose attachment to America could not be accounted for by their mere material interests. Organizations of guerillas, including the Hukbalahaps or *Huks* ("People's Anti-Japanese Army"), conducted genuine and effective resistance and provided an endless stream of information for the American forces.

On the day before Christmas, 1941, President Quezon, his family, and some of his highest officials left Manila for Corregidor and eventually for the United States. The legal and symbolic importance of keeping Quezon in the American camp overbalanced the psychological repugnance of running away. Quezon's health was precarious and his every instinct impelled him to stay with his people. It required more courage to follow the orders of the White House than to stay and face the Japanese. Quezon and Osmena headed the government-in-exile in the United States throughout

the war. They represented the Philippines in international gatherings, such as the meeting of the Pacific War Council, and they exerted every effort to persuade Americans not to overlook the Pacific in their concentration on Hitler in Europe. Quezon died in August, 1944, and the scholarly, aging, cautious vice-president, Osmena, inherited the problems incidental to the restoration of the Philippine-American regime.

The United States adhered to its firm policy to redeem the freedom of the Philippines and to re-establish and protect their independence. The American Congress set up a Filipino Rehabilitation Commission to investigate and make recommendations covering all matters affecting postwar economy, trade, finance, economic stability, and rehabilitation. When American troops landed on Leyte, they brought with them President Osmena and the commonwealth government. The Philippine Congress met for the first time in four years in June, 1945. Between the landings on Leyte and the end of the war, the American Army was obliged to retain its controls in the Philippines and to give first priority to the job of making the islands a staging area for the attack on Japan. The army guaranteed order, distributed food and water, and prevented epidemic diseases. The commonwealth government could do little more than listen to personal complaints and tales of woe, apportion jobs, and try to re-create some semblance of a political machine.

President Truman made no significant changes in the postwar policies which had been contemplated by President Roosevelt. He appointed a new high commissioner (Mr. Paul McNutt) and drafted a series of directives to him and to the heads of various government departments and agencies on October 26, 1945, recommending specific steps to carry out a program of assistance. President Truman directed the high commissioner to investigate agrarian unrest; the alien property custodian to make lawful disposition of enemy property; the attorney general to investigate, charge, and try the collaborators; the secretary of war to assist in reorganizing the constabulary on a nonmilitary basis; and the secretaries of war and treasury to redeem emergency currency. He also directed the surplus property administrator to give supplies to the commonwealth government; the administrator of veterans' affairs to recommend legislation for aid to veterans; the president of the Export-Import Bank to make suggestions on restoring normal economic conditions; the War Shipping Administration to supply adequate shipping; and the chairman of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to direct the United States Commercial Company to carry on its program of exports on credits for two more years. These directives were issued after V-J Day, after the army had been relieved of its

heaviest responsibilities and after all these agencies had a reasonable opportunity to enter the war-ravaged Philippines.

The Philippines prepared for new national elections as the first step in the fulfillment of their transition to an independent republic. On April 23, 1946, 2,500,000 voters expressed a preference for the Liberal ticket—Manuel Roxas for president and Elpidio Quirino for vice-president—over the *Nacionalistas*, headed by Osmena. The collaboration issue dominated the campaign. *Roxas personified the collaborators and the Osmena faction enjoyed the support of the guerillas. Although Roxas was cleared by the American Army and restored to his one-star rank, he was bitterly attacked in some quarters as a prominent adviser to puppet-president Laurel. The election was hotly contested, but Osmena had neither the strength nor the will to fight as he had fought as a youth. His coalition consisted of his own wing of the Nacionalistas, the Democratic Alliance, and the United Front, including the Huks. Osmena himself was interested in unity—he thought of healing rather than aggravating the wounds of his people. He retired gracefully in favor of his younger opponent, who gained the support of the veterans, the press, the landlords, the compradors, the civil service, the remnants of the old Nacionalista machine, General MacArthur, High Commissioner McNutt, and many other influential Americans.*

After four centuries of Spanish rule and nearly five decades of American sovereignty, the Philippines began a new existence as a sovereign state on July 4, 1946. The American flag came down and the tricolored banner of the Philippines took its place. The high commissioner's office in Manila and the resident commissioner's office in Washington became ordinary diplomatic embassies. Roxas was looked upon as the man of the hour—in spite of his record—who could heal old schisms and lead vigorously in the paths of prosperity and reconstruction. But while he pleaded for "malice toward none and charity for all" in his inaugural address, seven opposition congressmen and three opposition senators were debarred from their seats. Minority leader Tomas Confesor was moved to declare, "Fascism is on the march in the Philippines. . . . [The majority senators] have laid the foundation of a totalitarian regime."

The Philippine Republic

In all Southeast Asia, the war left its ugliest physical and psychological scars in the Philippines. President Roxas declared:

There is hunger among us. . . . Plagues of rats and locusts gnaw at our food supplies. Public health and sanitation have been set back a quarter of a cen-

tury. Housing . . . is shocking in its inadequacy and squalor. Our communications are destroyed, stolen or disrupted. . . . Schools have been burned and teachers have been killed.

The primordial struggle for existence gave a degree of lawlessness and criminality to every section of the country. Robberies, kidnappings, and daylight assaults on buses, trucks, and trains were daily occurrences. The traditional respect for individual freedom and human rights was insufficient to counteract the petty criminals, the bandits, and the Communist-led groups which debauched the cities and harassed the countryside. The large problems of national security and national welfare were made secondary to the immediate tasks of providing food, shelter, clothes, jobs, and protection for individuals.

American relief money brought life and hope and a measure of joy to millions of individuals. Nylons, lipsticks, and new shirts brought a spiritual uplift, but they were the economists' despair. Prices were high, jobs were good, the national cash position was strong because of GI dollars. The future was neglected or overlooked in the exuberance of the moment.

The United States passed the Tydings bill, which became the Rehabilitation Act of 1946. It created a War Damage Commission to pay \$400,000,000 in claims; provided for turning over \$100,000,000 in surplus property to the Philippines; and authorized spending of \$120,000,000 by eight United States agencies in various rehabilitation and training projects in behalf of the Philippines. The Americans spent astronomical sums for reconstruction. Streets and buildings took on a new appearance, homes and schools were rebuilt, mines and industries were rehabilitated, and agricultural production was started on the return to normality.

The restoration of trade was essential for the rebuilding of a sound economy. The Philippine Trade Act (the Bell Act) passed by the United States Congress in 1946 made provision for duty-free trade until 1954 and for favored trade relations for another twenty years. This act contained a "parity" clause which annoyed some Filipinos because it gave Americans equal rights with Filipinos in the disposition, exploitation, development, and utilization of all public lands and natural resources. Trade picked up but Philippine imports raced far ahead of exports and created a serious deficit in the international income account. The government launched a well-meaning corrective program which called for agricultural improvement and total economic mobilization. It empowered the National Development Corporation to take an active lead in industrialization, established a Central Bank, and inaugurated exchange and import controls. It inaugurated a legislative program which discriminated against aliens—particularly

Chinese—and which sought a greater share for Filipinos in the economic life of the nation. Neither a barrage of paper measures nor a halfhearted government policy was adequate to stave off an impending crisis. The mounting *cost of living*, which made Manila the most expensive city in the world, contributed to labor unrest and peasant dissatisfaction.

President Roxas died in office on April 15, 1948, and was succeeded by the vice-president, Elpidio Quirino. The new chief executive gave little indication of having the ability to cope with his frightening responsibilities. His administration was marred with scandals and presented an unsavory record of inefficiency and corruption. Nevertheless, his political machine produced a victory at the polls and returned him to power for a second term. In the election of 1949, the Liberals won the presidency, sixty-eight seats out of one hundred in the House of Representatives, and preserved a majority in the Senate. Jose Laurel, who had been president of the Philippines under the Japanese, as the nominee of the *Nacionalistas* gave Quirino a close race and might well have won had there been less fraud and intimidation in the election process. While the real issues before the people should have been rehabilitation, recovery, and economic development, the political battles raged about personalities. The Liberals took all the credit for the joint United States-Philippine rehabilitation achievements, obscured or underplayed the approaching domestic economic crisis, and adroitly brushed aside the criticisms of waste and corruption.

After his political victory, President Quirino agreed to an all-American Economic Survey Mission to study conditions in the Philippines. The United States was uneasy because in the summer of 1950 the Communist menace flared from Korea to Southeast Asia. The report of the mission (the Bell report) stated frankly that unless positive measures were taken to cope with the fundamental causes of economic difficulties, it must be expected that the economic situation would deteriorate further and political disorder would inevitably result. The Bell mission recommended financial assistance subject to continued supervision and control of an American technical mission. It specified that government finances should be placed on a sound basis, agricultural production improved, the national economy diversified, social services expanded, and public administration improved and reorganized to insure honesty and efficiency. These suggestions sounded like platitudes, but they had to be considered seriously because of the spreading social cancer of the Huks.

In an agricultural country like the Philippines, land problems are paramount. In the thickly populated areas of Luzon, the average tao earns about \$250 a year, half of which is his to spend if he is lucky. Ninety-eight per cent of the land belongs to 3 per cent of the population. Illiterate

tenant farmers long insisted upon overdue reforms in matters of excessive rents, usury, and absentee landlordism. Without knowing anything of the subtleties of Marx and Lenin, or anything about the power or promises of the USSR, they indulged in peasant uprisings before World War II. They received scant satisfaction from the program of "social justice" under the commonwealth and they took matters into their own hands during the Japanese occupation. When the landlords turned to the Japanese for protection, the landlords, in the eyes of tenants, became not only the exploiters of the masses but also traitors to their country.

Leaders of the peasants, like Pedro Abad Santos, Juan Felco, and Luis Taruc joined forces with labor leaders like Mariano Balgos, Guillermo Capadocia, and Mateo del Castilla (the latter two Moscow-trained) to organize the Hukbalahaps as the fighting guerilla arm of a United Front of the Socialist and Communist parties, the Civil Liberties Union, labor unions, peasant groups, some intellectuals and middle-class elements, religious organizations, groups representing the large Chinese colony, and others. Although Communists and communism had existed in the Philippines since 1930, communism or lack of it in the Huk leadership was of less consequence than the struggle for survival. The Huks fought vigorously against the Japanese, and after the war they resisted the return of the collaborationist landlords. They were well-armed, they protested against the fraternization between the Americans and the *hacenderos*, and they opposed the Roxas administration as a mere puppet of American imperialists. The Huk leaders adopted an agricultural program, but they took a political stand which went far beyond the requirements of agrarian reform.

The Huks supported the losing *Nacionalista* ticket of President Osmena in 1946, and they ran their own candidates for Congress. Seven of their candidates, including Luis Taruc, were elected but were refused their seats by the Committee on Elections. Violence ensued and President Roxas ordered the constabulary to give neither rest nor quarter to the hooligans and bandits who sought power through force. He proceeded from the premise that they were Communists and as Communists deserved no place in the scheme of government.

The Huk situation went from bad to worse. The rice-bowl provinces were kept in a state of constant uneasiness, and the farmers were victimized both by the Huks and the constabulary. In March, 1948, the Huks were outlawed and their forays for food became increasingly brutal and vicious. President Quirino attempted a policy of amnesty, and promised an energetic government program of agricultural reform. But there the communistic, nonagrarian character of the Huk leadership asserted itself with vigor. Taruc launched vitriolic attacks on President Quirino, accusing him of

graft and corruption and of utter subservience to the "fascistic imperialism" of the United States. He rechristened his army the People's Liberation Army, and he turned his propaganda into the familiar jargon of the Chinese "New Democracy." Quirino's efforts at suppression of the Huks by force proved ineffective, and when the Bell Economic Survey Mission visited the Philippines, the situation seemed at its very worst.

In September, 1950, Ramon Magsaysay took over as Minister of Defense. Scrupulously honest, rough, and tough, he inaugurated spectacular new attitudes in the government's drive against the Huks. He said:

They are fighting the government because they want a house and land of their own. All right, they can stop fighting because I will give it to them. And if they are not satisfied with that, by golly, I have another big deal for them. I am going to make the Huk a capitalist. I am going to set up a carpentry shop and let the Huks run it.

In a series of campaigns he seized the initiative from the Huks. He discovered and arrested their liaison officers in the cities, he cut off their food supplies, and he gave comfort and protection to terrorized villagers. The military threat of the Huks was on the wane when in February, 1953, Magsaysay resigned his office, "not as a millionaire, but as a poor man." His parting blast was, "The government is full of crooks and grafters who suck the blood and money of taxpayers to enrich themselves." When Magsaysay gave up the portfolio of National Defense, he stepped into the larger arena of presidential politics.

President Magsaysay

The American heritage to the Philippines included the abuses and imperfections of democracy as well as its blessings. During the Roxas-Quirino administrations, stuffed ballot boxes, padded election lists, five-percentism, and peddling of influence outraged the Filipinos' sense of decency and created a surging public demand for honesty and efficiency in government. President Quirino made it crystal-clear that he intended to maintain himself and his Liberal friends in office. In spite of all his dexterity in political intrigue and his uninhibited use of the pork barrel, he met defeat at the hands of a campaigner who captured the hearts and the imagination of his people.

Ramon Magsaysay was born in 1907 in Iba, the provincial capital of mountainous Zambales in western Luzon, the son of a trade-school teacher. His ancestry was a combination of Ilocano, Tagalog, Chinese, and Spanish

strains. He was educated at the University of the Philippines and Jose Rizal College and he worked his way in part as an auto mechanic. During the war, he was commissioned as a captain in the guerilla forces, in which position he learned many of the tactics he later used against the Huks. After the war, he was elected to Congress as a Liberal, where he served until he was made minister of national defense in 1950.

He increased the strength and improved the morale of the army. His shake-up of the military establishment amounted to an upheaval. He removed deadwood, promoted deserving young officers, and dug into the needs and complaints of the private soldiers. He made numerous unheralded trips all over the country to investigate conditions at first hand. The entire nation became aware of his indefatigable energy, his intense devotion to public welfare, and his fearless, impeccable character. His imaginative tactics and his success against the Huks catapulted him into national prominence.

Acting under Quirino's orders and in command of the armed forces, he made the elections of 1951 astonishingly clean. Within two years, Magsaysay switched his allegiance to the *Nacionalista* party because he wanted a decent government free from dishonesty and graft. In April, 1953, he and Senator Carlos P. Garcia, of Bohol, were nominated by the *Nacionalistas* as candidates for the presidency and vice-presidency. Their views on public issues were less important than Magsaysay's personality and proved integrity. He was presented to the people as "the man of the masses, the spirit of Juan de la Cruz, . . . the embodiment of Bonifacio and Del Pilar."

The campaign of 1953 was well organized and vigorously conducted. Magsaysay was backed by a strong political machine guided by veterans like Senators Laurel, Recto, and Tanada and General Carlos Romulo. He attracted the support of thousands in a Magsaysay-for-president movement, and he profited from high-minded civic groups dedicated to fair play and free elections. His support and inspiration came from impoverished and discontented ordinary folk and enabled him to destroy the monopoly of political power which was jealously guarded by the party bosses and the economic elite. Typical campaign statements were: "I will get officials and bureaucrats out of their offices and into the barrios where people need their help"; "I shall welcome you into Malacanan [the presidential palace] even if you have no shoes for your feet"; "I don't care if the hand I shake is dirty and muddy, if it is the dirt and mud of honest toil"; and "Plans we have plenty of—we need men to work."

He talked with thousands, jeeped and flew from one end of the country to the other, and took vaudeville acts with him to amuse his audiences and harpoon his opponents. He flavored his demagoguery with hardheaded

common sense, and he demonstrated that a non-Communist could beat the Communists at their own game of mass appeal.

Magsaysay won handily and his party carried both houses of the Congress by substantial majorities. He appointed outstanding persons to his cabinet and he concentrated the major part of his legislative program on internal problems. He conceived his major jobs to be to restore confidence in government, to reduce unemployment, to increase production, to improve conditions in the barrios, and to destroy the last vestiges of the Communist-led Huk rebellion. He determined to reduce the deficit in the budget, increase trade, and erase the adverse balance in the income account. He announced a five-year economic program involving two billion dollars which he hoped would help get the government out of business, attract private investors, and provide jobs for 300,000 people.

His administration inevitably ran into rough sailing. He was not able to purge and prosecute his predecessors as he had hoped. Following his announcement that the Huks must be disarmed and put on trial and his promise that a new life would be offered to those pardoned or cleared, Luis Taruc surrendered. Taruc said, "I must admit that our nation is now ushered into the right path and it is the duty of every citizen to support Magsaysay." He stated that he had been in rebellion because of social evils and not because of the USSR and that "I am a Filipino first and last." The twilight of the Huks did not signal the end of fundamental economic maladjustments nor the social protests to which they gave rise. Nor could the heterogeneous political coalition created to put Magsaysay in Malacanan be expected to endure indefinitely. The force and drive which were welcomed in Magsaysay as a candidate were resented in Magsaysay as incumbent in the presidential office. Members of his own party in the Congress talked about his "stubbornness" and sought to curb his power by the creation of a constitutional system of parliamentary responsibility. His internal program which called for austerity and higher taxes antagonized entrenched interests, whether Liberal, Democratic, or *Nacionalista*. In the realm of foreign affairs, Magsaysay determined to steer an independent course, and he encountered the partisan opposition of the Liberals as well as the bitter prejudices of the party by which he had been adopted.

Philippine Republic in World Affairs

Before the war, the Philippines concerned themselves but slightly with foreign affairs, security, and national defense. These functions were reserved to the United States. Quezon had an army which guaranteed

internal security, and he had in General MacArthur a commander in chief who at one time assured Quezon that the Philippines had nothing to fear by way of foreign invasion. The political atmosphere in Manila was one of sublime indifference to the implications of the geographic nearness of Asia. The Philippines were in the Far East but not of it. No thought was given to the relationship of local Chinese to China politics on the mainland. Southeast Asians—from Indonesia, Indo-China, Malaya, or Thailand—were given occasional kudos in the press as brothers, but scant heed was given to common attitudes on colonial problems or mutual interest in the social changes which were brewing in the Orient. Japanese residents were looked upon as good citizens and underestimated as a potential fifth column.

The war changed all that. Invasion and liberation gave the Filipinos a new appreciation of their own nationalism. In the future it would not be enough to be anti-Spanish or anti-American or anti-Japanese. Filipinos would have to be pro-Philippine. They could not afford to be exclusively a passenger on an American ship; they would have to sail their own craft and they would have to cope with the tides and currents of Asia in which they lived. They would have to prepare against the revival of a powerful Japan; they would have to take cognizance of the swelling tide of communism; and they would have to seek new friends and allies in the Western world.

The Japanese problem was most immediate. Aside from the psychological tensions involved, the Philippines had insuperable budget problems without the added costs of rearmament against a resurgent Japan. The government of the Philippines demanded more reparations and it insisted upon hard goods rather than upon services or technical assistance. It appreciated Japan's value as a market and a customer and as an anti-Communist ally, but it objected to the alleged betrayal of Philippine claims in the interest of America's new darling, Japan. A front page editorial in the *Manila Chronicle* showed the depth and intensity of the Philippine bitterness:

Fifty years from now when the Japanese once more ride over Asia and the Far East as lords and masters, they should set aside one day to pay tribute to the great American heroes of 1951, chief among whom is John Foster Dulles who was responsible for Japan's resurgence as an economic and military power. By that time, thanks to the United States, the Philippines will have become a nation of slaves worshipping at the temple of the Japanese goddess, Amaterasu Omikami, and paying obeisance to the emperor of Japan.

The Philippines signed the peace treaty with Japan because "we had to act in a painfully limited area of choice," but they delayed ratification

pending a bilateral understanding on reparations. Commercial relations between the two countries revived to the point where Japan took 7 per cent of all trade with the Philippines.

As internal problems multiplied, there grew the perfectly understandable tendency to look to the United States as the source of help, perhaps, but also as the source of trouble. The Philippines protested against the satellite economic relationship and took exception to certain features of the American aid program. Some Filipinos approved the favored trade relations of the *Bell Trade Act* and asked for its extension or slight revision; others objected to its "inequities" and demanded a new treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation based on time-honored relationships of equality and reciprocity. Most Filipinos believed that Americans exaggerated the amounts and importance of aid extended and argued that the United States did no more than its own conscience, welfare, and common justice demanded.

After the Economic Survey Mission made its recommendations, the United States and the Philippines entered into the Quirino-Roster (William C. Roster was a special Economic Co-operation Administration or "ECA" official) agreement designed to assist the Filipinos in their efforts toward greater economic and social progress. On April 7, 1951, a Special Technical and Economic Mission (STEM) was established. The mission was organized into six divisions: Agriculture, Public Health, Industry and Public Works, Labor and Social Welfare, Finances and Trade, and Public Administration. STEM operated under the Mutual Security Administration (MSA), subsequently under the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) and co-operated with its counterpart in the Philippine government, the Philippine Council for United States Aid (PHILCUSA).

Technicians swarmed through the city and across the countryside. Dozens of worth-while projects were begun; important new laws were argued through the Philippine Congress; dams and industrial enterprises were started, fertilizers were distributed to thousands of farmers, and efforts were made to spread new ideas of farming methods; and experts were imported from American universities to aid in education, engineering, business administration, and public administration. Skyrocketing inflation pressures were brought under control, taxes were increased, and trade relations were brought more nearly into balance. Psychologically the Philippines emerged from an atmosphere of economic despair and tackled their problems with self-confidence and hope. The shortcomings and achievements of these economic agencies constituted a substantial portion of the diplomatic relations between the United States and the Philippines and

determined the failure or success of the Philippine government's own efforts at social and economic reform.

American reports frequently drew fire from the Quirino administration. The Rivera-McMillan report on "feudalistic" conditions in the villages stated that nearly half the village residents were "worse off today than ten years ago." The Hardie report on land reform (September, 1952) intimated that the United States might have to intervene unless something drastic was done about land reform. The report asserted that the pernicious problem of land tenure threatened the very existence of the republic and the stand of the United States against communism in the Pacific. Unless conditions were corrected, the report found, the United States could conceivably be forced to take direct, expensive, and arbitrary steps to insure against the loss of the Philippines to the Communist bloc.

Military assistance was deemed as vital as economic aid from the American point of view. In 1947 the United States negotiated the first of its military assistance pacts with the Philippines and obtained a ninety-nine-year lease on fifteen bases in the Islands. The Americans argued that these measures were for *mutual* security, but some Filipinos charged, "The United States has turned over to us arms deteriorated, battle-worn, insufficient, and inadequate even to cope successfully with internal order." Until the American action in Korea, there was a real fear that the United States would leave the Philippines as exposed as they were in 1941, and that the Americans would be tempted to abandon their position "unless their own national security and interests were directly and vitally threatened or unless their national honor or prestige were formally committed." Until the Philippines obtained the American signature on a mutual defense treaty on August 16, 1951, it was considered sheer madness to rely on the vacillations and empty promises of American policy makers.

The "great debate" in the evolution of Philippine foreign policy after the war centered precisely on the point of relations with the United States. President Quirino and his able representative in the United States, General Romulo, sought to make the Philippines a respected member of the international community, loyal to the principles of the United Nations, dedicated to the maintenance of international peace and security, with the fullest support of the peoples of Asia and elsewhere in their struggle for independence and freedom. They endeavored to foster a regional consciousness in Southeast Asia as shown in their attendance at the New Delhi conferences on Asian relations and on Indonesia, the convocation of the Baguio conference on cultural relations, and active participation in the sessions of the Economic Committee for Asia and the Far East and other United Nations agencies in Southeast Asia. Quirino explored with Chiang Kai-shek

and Syngman Rhee the possibilities of a firm anti-Communist stand in Asia. Above all, the Filipino officials worked to prevent the impact of independence from resulting in chauvinistic nationalism and the severance of close ties with the United States. They insisted that they were not subservient to the United States, that they were not mendicants with hat in hand inviting foreign intervention to do what their government could not do for itself, and that full and free participation in the struggles of the free world was a preferable alternative to the myth of neutralism.

Thus, while President Quirino involved himself constantly in quarrels with the United States (on Japan policy, trade preference, and interference in local affairs), he was at the same time a target for the *Nacionalistas* and their most eloquent spokesman, Claro M. Recto, who reminded Quirino constantly that the foreign policy of the Philippines must be dedicated to the permanent peace and safety of the Philippines, not of the United States. Recto was not by any means anti-American, for he openly expressed his hope for a *pax Americana* in East Asia. However, he proclaimed his patriotic devotion to the welfare and security of his own country first. If war should come, he asked, "Into what burrow could the Philippines crawl to hug the illusion of security in an atomic world?" His plea for equality and for independence in judgment and action was framed in graphic words:

If America really believes that war is inevitable, then let her give Asia a resolute leadership we can trust; let her give us the same unconditional pledges and guarantees and the same actual evidence of a spiritual equality and common fate that she has given her kinsmen and allies in the Atlantic community; and we shall have justification for the risk of war and incentive to make common cause.

Otherwise, we must restrain our enthusiasms, dissemble our sympathies, moderate our words and actions, and in fulfillment of the primitive duty of self-preservation, make no enemies where we can make no friends, and hold our peace.

Political expediency in 1953 placed President Magsaysay in the same party with both General Romulo and his outspoken devotion to the "free world" and Senator Recto and his "neutralism." The president could scarcely heed the conflicting counsels of both distinguished advisers. When the Americans sounded out the opinion of the Philippines for a possible nine-nation stand against the Communists in Southeast Asia, President Magsaysay said that the security of the Philippines required its commitment to the *principle* of associating itself with the free nations of the world. Senator Recto argued that the Philippines should stop being a pawn in the game of power politics and asked, "What would the United States do

if Red China were provoked to aggression?" He said, "All that the Philippines know about the situation in Indo-China are the moss-covered views of the Pentagon."

The president showed unmistakably that he did not intend to permit his advisers to maneuver him into any possible position of anti-Americanism. He was as solicitous as the Liberals for the continued good will and assistance of the United States, without any compromise of the dignity or independence of his country. He preferred a rift with the politicians—primarily Recto and Laurel—rather than a categorical divergence in policy from the United States. He rejected the old seductive slogan of the Japanese, "Asia for the Asiatics," as part of his foreign policy, and condemned both colonialism and communism. He sought closer cultural and economic relations with freedom-loving Asian countries and endorsed the idea of aid—without imperialism—from the West. He dedicated his government to the rights of independence and self-determination for all Asian nations and to closer co-operation among themselves within the framework of the United Nations. He was outspoken in his advocacy of a pact with teeth in it at the Manila Conference for the Southeast Asia Organization in 1954.

He opposed all forms of colonialism but recognized that "the colonialism which threatens Asia today is world communism." Because of the dangerous possibility of the loss of freedom, he wanted a strong Asian nationalism as a rallying point against the forces of aggression and subversion. President Magsaysay proved as uncompromising in principle in foreign affairs as in domestic policy—and as impervious to blandishments which would distract him from the best interests of his country.

Suggested Reading

HERNANDO J. ABAYA, *Betrayal in the Philippines* (New York, 1946).

ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE UNITED STATES HIGH COMMISSIONER TO THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

DAVID BERNSTEIN, *The Philippine Story* (New York, 1947).

GAREL A. GRUNDER AND WILLIAM E. LIVEZEY, *The Philippines and the United States* (Norman, Oklahoma, 1951).

JOSEPH RALSTON HAYDEN, *The Philippines: A Study in National Development* (New York, 1942).

ALLISON IND, *Bataan, The Judgment Seat* (New York, 1944).

SHIRLEY JENKINS, *American Economic Policy Toward the Philippines* (Stanford, 1954).

JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (monthly, Manila).

MANILA BULLETIN.

MANILA CHRONICLE.

MANILA TIMES.

PHILIPPINE FREE PRESS (weekly, Manila).

MANUEL QUEZON, *The Good Fight* (New York, 1946).

BERNARD SEEMAN AND LAURENCE SALISBURY, *Cross-Currents in the Philippines* (New York, 1946).

LUIS TARUC, *Born of the People: An Autobiography* (New York, 1953).

COLONEL YAY, *The Crucible: An Autobiography* (New York, 1950). (An account of a female guerilla leader.)

CHAPTER 32

The Decline of Imperialism

After the Philippines, Burma, and Indonesia won independence, only the Federation of Malaya, the colonies of Singapore and Hongkong, British Indonesia, Macao and Timor, and Indo-China remained as the vestiges of imperialism. Whether from apathy on the part of the native peoples, political expediency, or the strength of the ruling powers, these areas were the last to experience the agitation and unrest of the revolt of Asia. Malaya endured years of guerilla warfare without significant progress toward any well-defined goals of self-government or nationalism; Singapore and Hongkong maintained a determined but uneasy colonial status; and Indo-China suffered an agonizing civil war. Viet-Minh, Viet-Nam, and France fought bitterly to bring to an end the old type of imperialist relationship without, at the same time, succumbing to the tentacles of international communism.

In all the former quasi-colonial areas of East and Southeast Asia, foreigners revolutionized the concepts of a way of life. They developed neglected or unsuspected natural resources which were demanded by Western appetites or required by Western technology. They employed thousands of workers on single plantations and in forests, mines, and industrial enterprises. They constructed the commercial and financial network necessary for economic development. They shipped vital raw materials home to Europe and America, and they left Asia with millions of dollars paid in wages and in taxes. When they erected their economic superstructure on the foundations of native life, they set in motion the political and social forces which led eventually to the demise of their privileged position.

The decline of imperialism was far from an unmixed blessing. Native peoples in the employ of foreigners were usually better paid and better cared for than their brothers who scratched a meager living from the soil. Europeans and Americans monopolized the best jobs, but their capital in-

vestments and technical skills created jobs for others. Urban workers and plantation laborers lured from the villages developed a psychological outlook which made them amenable to the political manipulations of nationalists, Communists, or ordinary demagogues. Foreigners served as political governors and administrators, but they afforded protection for life and property and they guaranteed a rule of law. They made it a cardinal principle of policy to protect the masses against the native aristocracy, which ordinarily possessed a notably dulled public conscience. Foreigners disrupted the traditional patterns of social relationships, but they elevated living standards and they introduced new concepts of individual welfare and progress.

In Malaya and Indo-China, as in India, Burma, Indonesia, and the Philippines, the colonial powers planted the seeds of nationalism and fostered conditions for their flowering. Foreigners stirred the lethargic masses and gave them a consciousness of their national soul. They presented the national groups with the awareness of their common heritage and spread before them the limitless vistas of their future potential. They created the new nationalistic elite composed of intelligentsia, economic *bourgeoisie*, and military leaders, and inspired it with confidence in its own abilities. This elite competed with the ancient colonial collaborationist aristocracy like the Malayan sultans, Bao Dai, and the king of Laos for the loyalty of the awakening masses and for leadership in the struggle against alien domination.

Asian leaders rejected any idea of isolation and they determined to cast in their lot with the dynamic Western world with all its troubles and unsolved problems. However, they were a century behind in political experience, and they were inclined to idealize the utopian values of independence and nationalism in an age when the Western world came to recognize the superior merits of co-operation and interdependence. Furthermore, it seemed impractical and of questionable wisdom to overthrow one imperial master at the risk of exposure to another. Whereas the Philippines, Burma, and Indonesia insisted upon immediate independence regardless of consequences, Malaya and Indo-China hesitated lest independence should betray them into a new and more subtle tyranny.

Malaya

For a country less than 50,000 square miles in area with a population under 6,000,000, Malaya occupied a position of unusual importance. Its economic role as the world's leading producer of rubber and tin and its

strategic location astride the sea lane from the Middle to the Far East made it immeasurably valuable to the British Commonwealth of Nations. Malaya was the leading earner of American dollars in the sterling bloc, and it was the strongest strategic guardian of the route to Hongkong and Australia after the loss of India, Ceylon, and Burma. At the same time, this closer integration of Malaya in the Commonwealth aroused resentment on the part of articulate Malaysians of all races who demanded greater economic and political autonomy.

In spite of the prewar administrative hodgepodge of Straits Settlements, Federated States, and Nonfederated States, the British government ruled Malaya with a benevolent despotism. It was a paradise of high profits and low taxes, apparently immune to the ferment of nationalism. The existence of four separate ethnic groups militated against political unity. The Malays contented themselves with farming and fishing; the Europeans and Chinese owned and operated the rubber plantations, the tin mines, and the commercial establishments; and the Indians provided an influential number of lawyers, businessmen, dock workers, and plantation laborers.

Economic differences were aggravated by religious differences. The Malays were Moslem, the Europeans were Christian, the Indians were Moslem or Hindu, and the Chinese were blithely indifferent. In spite of the tensions which resulted, the British *raj* preserved an atmosphere of tranquillity and tolerance. The colonial hierarchy grasped power firmly in its own hands. It bestowed political favors upon the Malays to protect them against the more aggressive Chinese, and it hesitated to adopt the forms as well as the practices of representative government. The British held the highest positions and the Malay aristocracy provided the officialdom. British advisers guided the sultans in all matters save the Moslem religion and Malay customs. The great majority of indigenous Malays remained indifferent to political currents, while the alien Asians, the Chinese and the Indians, furnished an embryonic, dynamic political force.

During the crises of the depression era, nationalist elements in Malaya first dared to protest against the self-centered but powerful British colonial overlordship. Improvement in world trade and in the price of tin and rubber, together with increased expenditures for the strengthening of the defenses of Malaya, erased the causes of discontent. Then the disasters of World War II shook the foundations of the British position. The British were unprepared for war, and they had not permitted the native population to raise an army or to provide for its own military defense. The overwhelming majority in Malaya remained loyal to British rule, but it had no alternative but to acquiesce when Japanese officials replaced the British by force of arms.

The sinking of the "Repulse" and the "Prince of Wales" burst the bubble of British naval invincibility. Japanese land troops poured into the Malayan Peninsula and beat their way through the jungles to the gates of Singapore. On February 15, 1942, General Percival surrendered to General Yamashita. The Japanese treated Malaya as a colony without any prospect of independence. They wanted its resources and its military advantages. They assumed direct rule over the Malays and tolerated the sultans, coerced or induced Indians to join military and labor battalions, and persecuted Chinese and intimidated them into donating huge sums for support of the Japanese war effort. The tyranny and oppression of Japanese rule stimulated Malayan nationalism. All three races were led to feel that they would be happier without foreign control, but their mutual antagonisms were aggravated by the deliberate Japanese policy of divide and rule. Japanese propaganda was venomous in its denunciation of British imperialism.

The Chinese, supplemented by a few Indians and Malays, organized a resistance movement with the Chinese-dominated Communist party at the center. They organized an Anti-Japanese Union and a Malayan Peoples' Anti-Japanese Army as its guerilla force. Late in the war this army was supplied with arms and officers by the British, and the experience and weapons obtained were later used with calamitous effects against the British themselves. The outstanding Communist organizer, Chen Ping, was invited to London to participate in the victory parade.

For six months after the Japanese surrender, the British governed Malaya with a military administration dedicated to the restoration of the public services, distribution of food supplies, and the revival of the country's tin and rubber economy. London underestimated the political effects of the Japanese occupation and prepared for the easy return of the prewar *status quo*. In October, 1945, the British government sent Sir Harold MacMichael to negotiate treaties with the sultans, whereby Great Britain obtained full power and jurisdiction. In their psychological state of fear and confusion, the sultans transferred their complete rights of legal sovereignty to the British government, which thereafter could go so far as to retain or depose each sultan at its own discretion. On the basis of these treaties, which represented more speed than wisdom, the British set up a Malayan Union, transferred sovereignty formally from the sultans to the British Crown, and created a common Malayan citizenship for Malays and Chinese. The nine Malay states, together with Penang and Malacca, were to be combined in the Malayan Union, but Singapore was to remain a separate Crown colony.

The British proposals aroused a storm of protest. English-educated Malays (notably Dato Onn Bin Jafaar, Prime Minister of Johore) organized a United Malay National Organization, the UMNO, to oppose

the derogation of the position of the sultans and the proposed grants of equal citizenship rights to the Chinese. Chinese merchants, though they appreciated the political benefits of the union plan, objected to the separate status of Singapore. Chinese Communists opposed the union on principle, and the Indians objected that insufficient attention was being paid to their rights. An extreme Malayan nationalist organization, PUTERA, was equally hostile to British rule and to the sultans and hoped eventually to unite Malaya with the Indonesian Republic.

In an astute strategic retreat, the British transformed the Malayan Union into a new Federation of Malaya which was set up on February 1, 1948, by the joint action of King George VI and the nine sultans. The king retained complete control of defense and foreign affairs, and the sultans, although restored to fictional sovereignty, engaged to govern in accordance with British advice. The high commissioner of the Federation of Malaya, with the seat of his government at the capital at Kuala Lumpur, was assisted by an Executive Council and a Legislative Council. The former was still advisory in nature and the latter was dominated by appointed members. The British promised elective procedures and transition to self-government as soon as possible. In each state within the federation, the sultan was assisted by an Executive Council and a Council of State or miniature State Assembly. Citizenship rules were tightened to discriminate against the Chinese.

Singapore, with three quarters of its population Chinese, was destined to remain a free port and a separate Crown colony. Singapore was placed under a governor, not a high commissioner, and he was assisted by partly elected Legislative and Municipal Councils. Any trend toward dominion status for the federation would not necessarily include Singapore, but Singapore was given the option of joining the federation at its pleasure. Under the constitutional arrangements instituted in 1948, the three most important British civilian officials in Southeast Asia were the commissioner-general for Southeast Asia, with headquarters in Singapore, the high commissioner for the Federation of Malaya, and the governor of the Crown colony of Singapore.

British colonial ingenuity was taxed by the ordinary problems of welfare and development and the extraordinary difficulties presented by communalism and communism. Labor governments and conservative governments showed little difference in outlook and policies. According to the London *Economist*, November 12, 1949, the British position in Malaya became the testing point of the existing order in Southeast Asia:

Devising the pattern of British policy for Malaya is therefore no light matter. It must be firm enough to keep the bandits at bay, progressive

enough to keep a jump ahead of Communism; tactful enough to suggest that a time limit (*i.e.*, for the achievement of self-government) is always in mind, popular enough to keep Malaya in the Commonwealth and the sterling area.

In their financial crisis at home at the close of World War II, the British depended upon the dollar earnings of the rubber and tin industries of Malaya. They imposed controls on a traditionally *laissez-faire* economy and ordered the regulation of trade to husband their reserves of hard currency. *The interests of Malaya were subordinated to the general requirements of the Commonwealth.*

Both the rubber and the tin industries were hard hit by the war and they needed encouragement and assistance for rehabilitation. Accumulated capital reserves were depleted, marginal producers were forced out of business, and rising costs made it difficult to compete with the war-born synthetic rubber industry. In the case of tin, dredges were destroyed, labor was dispersed, costs were tripled, and areas of operation were drastically limited. Tin producers resented the smelting operations in Texas and the growing competition from Bolivia. Because of the urgent need for dollars, Commonwealth officials entered into price control and marketing agreements with Americans, which Malayan producers considered detrimental. Instead of being helped, they were penalized by international commitments.

The planting and mining interests also complained of the new taxes which were levied for expensive development schemes and for the political purposes of the local government. When rubber prices were firm, Malaya was prosperous; but when rubber prices slipped, Malaya faced a budgetary crisis. Periods of prosperity meant profits and immediate dividends; periods of recession meant curtailment of operations, unemployment, and an upswing in the curve of local communism. The British in London and Singapore urged upon the United States a stable purchasing policy and a guaranteed price as incomparable weapons in the cold war. Trade controls halted much activity on the Singapore waterfront with disastrous effects upon Chinese and Indians, who were more dependent than the British upon a high level of commercial activity. The economic dilemma of the non-Malay Asian communities intensified their interest in the political future of Malaya.

The British did not ignore the rumblings of nationalism and they adjusted themselves cautiously to the evolving situation. They assured themselves of the loyalty of the Malayan community by continued evidences of political and economic favoritism. The Malays in the federation kept their majorities on the Executive and Legislative Councils, and a member of the Legislative Council replaced the high commissioner as speaker. The British gracefully accepted incessant demands on the part of the Chinese and the

Indians for greater political recognition without appreciably loosening their grasp on the central administration. New citizenship laws were placed on the statute books in 1952. Any Asian or Eurasian, one of whose parents was born in a Malay state, automatically became a subject of the ruler of that state and a federation citizen. Any Asian or Eurasian could become a subject of a state ruler and a federation citizen if born in a Malay state, even though the parents were foreign-born, by taking an oath of allegiance. A person could become naturalized if he had ten years of continuous residence, could make himself understood in Malay or English, made a declaration of permanent settlement, and took an oath to the ruler and the federation. These regulations relaxed the requirements for obtaining citizenship by application and granted citizenship privileges to an estimated 1,100,000 Chinese and 180,000 Indians. The citizenship group was thus increased by half and included nearly three quarters of all aliens in the federation. In November, 1951, the population figures for the federation were 2,631,154 Malays; 2,043,921 Chinese; and 586,371 Indians.

Early in 1953 some progressive Malaysians called for a Malayan National Congress for self-government. To forestall this the *Mentris Besar*, or prime ministers of the nine states, called a national congress of their own, ostensibly for the same purpose. This conservative group determined upon some modest recommendations in the direction of more self-government and the high commissioner appointed a Committee on Elections to study and report. Their report urged transition to an elected, representative government. It recommended the vote for all citizens over twenty-one without regard for literacy or property qualifications, but it suggested that for a four-year transition period only half the members of the Federal Legislative Council should be elected. The first election was suggested for 1955. In the meantime, municipal elections were held in a half dozen cities throughout the federation and about 1 per cent of the 10,000 towns and villages were introduced to the beginnings of self-government at the level of town and village councils. Too often only a small percentage of the electorate concerned itself with the proceedings, and the party which provided the most cars for transportation to the polls won.

Singapore chose not to exercise its option to join the federation in its evolution toward self-government. Under a new constitution in 1954, Singapore came to be governed by a Legislative Council of thirty-two members, of whom twenty-five were elected. The executive consisted of a council of nine ministers, six of whom were elected members appointed on the recommendation of the leader of the majority party. The governor was bound to accept the decision of the Council of Ministers except in the limited fields of foreign relations and defense.

The two major parties, the Progressive and Labor parties, were organized on an intercommunal basis. They were separated less by burning issues than by personalities and general attitudes. In a typical election, a Chinese labor leader ran on the Labor ticket against an Indian lawyer on the Progressive ticket, and in fashionable Tanglin, where wealthy Chinese and British homes predominated, a British ship captain was Labor's candidate against a Chinese lawyer who represented the Progressives. The Chinese in Singapore anticipated a better future as a separate colony with a distinct destiny rather than as a part of the slower-moving, Malay-dominated federation. In public welfare schemes, Singapore proved itself more alert than the federation to problems of poverty, housing, schooling, and public health.

The sharpening issues of communalism and communism drove the wedge deeper between Malays, Chinese, and Indians and between the factions within each of the communities. Within the ranks of the Malays, the reactionary sultans opposed the more liberal-minded, Western-trained leaders of the type of Dato Onn. Dato Onn organized the UMNO on a communal basis, but he wished to open membership to non-Malays interested in self-government either within or without the Commonwealth. He gave up the active leadership of the UMNO to associate himself with like-minded Chinese and Indians in an abortive intercommunal Independence for Malaya party (IMP). He subsequently identified himself with the Party Negara which stood for a vigorous nationalism but against extreme socialism and against any compromise with communism.

The Chinese community also showed marked divergences under a political and social microscope. Some Chinese immigrants were newcomers whose ties linked them closely with their homeland. Others, whose ancestors lived in Malacca before the coming of Albuquerque, had no ties with the China of Mao Tse-tung except those of faint sentiment and a common national origin. Some Chinese were fabulously rich and conservative, others were poor and inflammable. Some retained loyalty to the Kuomintang, others flirted with the Communists. More were interested in the Chinese opera, feasts, and mah-jongg than in politics, and chose to "wait and see" before expressing any political preference. Chinese were given political privileges but few took advantage of them. Thousands left Malaya rather than enlist for military service. Dato Tan Cheng-lock attempted to protect the common interests of all Chinese by a Malay Chinese Association (MCA). He was a well-to-do, conservative planter and businessman who protested against the assumption that all the Chinese were necessarily Communist sympathizers and potential fifth columnists. He argued that Chinese who supported the guerillas did so only because "they had a gun in their belly."

He disliked the British coddling of Malays, and he shared Dato Onn's conviction that Malaya's future would best be provided for by the rejection of communalism as a basis for political action and the acceptance of permanent Commonwealth status.

While clinging to his leadership of the MCA, Dato Tan co-operated in furthering the aims of the IMP. When the IMP failed to live up to its possibilities as an instrument for joint intercommunal action, the Malays of the persuasion of Dato Onn and the Chinese who shared the inclinations of Dato Tan worked together in an informal Malay-Chinese alliance. They stood for "one country, one people, one government, and one citizenship." They opposed the halting British steps toward self-government as "travesties in the name of democracy." Both Dato Tan and Tengku Abdul Rahman, the president of the UMNO, attended the organization meeting of the Political Action party in Singapore in November, 1954, which dedicated itself to greater speed and more drastic measures in the direction of self-government and independence.

The Communists began their political activities in Malaya in the early twenties and they appealed more to the Chinese than to the complacent Moslem Malays. After their rise to popular acceptance because of the resistance against Japan, they drafted a program broad enough to attract all antiforeign forces regardless of economic position or racial origins. They took advantage of the shortage of rice, the housing crisis, the brutal black markets, and the high cost of living to work for the control of labor unions and to incite widespread strikes. On the day the constitution for the Federation of Malaya was proclaimed at Kuala Lumpur, 30,000 workers were on strike in Singapore. The Communists extended their activities to the civil service and to white-collar workers and adopted anti-imperialism and antidiscrimination as their most effective slogans.

The British postwar administration restored order and revived business to the consternation of the Communists. The British Labor government sent experienced trade unionists to Malaya to orient the local unions toward non-Communist objectives. They were singularly successful, but they made no compromises with the legitimate demands of labor. They attracted unions from the Communist-dominated Singapore Federation of Labor and Malayan Federation of Labor to a non-Communist Trade Union Council. They were instrumental in inaugurating Boards of Arbitration in the rubber industry which exercised jurisdiction over the planters as well as over the workers. After the Communists lost out with their ordinary sabotage procedures—following decisions taken at Communist conferences in India in the spring of 1948—they retreated to the jungle. They launched a civil war which was euphemistically referred to as the "Emergency."

The jungle war was not a popular liberation movement, nor an indication of widespread nationalist sentiment, but was an actual armed uprising conducted by a well-trained, well-disciplined "Malayan Races Liberation Army" under the leadership of hard-core Communists. In its internal aspects it was *anti-British* and *anti-status quo*; in its international aspects it became part of the global cold war. Communist leaders had a disconcerting way of mixing a plausible popular appeal with their blueprint for chaos. They talked of freedom, independence, and the rights of the common man, and they displayed pictures of Queen Elizabeth and Winston Churchill beside those of Stalin and Mao Tse-tung. Armed bands slashed rubber trees, terrorized planters and workers, and kidnaped or murdered rich Chinese, Malays, or Europeans. Against an army of 5,000, the British mobilized 20,000 ground troops, 60,000 police, and 245,000 home guards. The British converted Singapore into a military headquarters and the federation into a steaming, tropical battlefield. They fought the jungle, they fought the stealthy guerillas, and they fought the *min yüan* or "people's organization," which supplied the guerillas with food and information. The British killed some bandit leaders—at an estimated cost of \$100,000 per casualty—and they swept the jungle areas with a giant dragnet which resettled 500,000 people in new villages or districts which could be effectively supervised and protected from roving terrorists. After five years of bitter and expensive fighting, which seriously handicapped British efforts in Korea, the British seemed to gain the upper hand. Incidents decreased in number, Communist leaders surrendered or fled, and the bitter-end Communists in a realistic tactical retreat returned to their underground subversive activities. The victory in the jungle was only the prelude to the job of "laying down the proper foundations for a hundred years to come." The long-run victory demanded more than identity cards, resettlement, security controls, and military successes. It demanded protection, the benefits of good government, and improved levels of living for an entire Malayan nation.

Hongkong

Following is the view of a distinguished British economist, E. Stuart Kirby:

Hongkong is a good example of modernity, efficiency, the benefits of international trade and intercourse, high civic standards, good administration, capitalistic progress, freedom from want, from fear, from persecution, freedom of enterprise, of speech, of belief, of employment—boldly confronting, at the

closest quarters, those who deny all these things. It bears comparison, in many practical respects, with some Western cities. Against the dark and hideous backgrounds of Asian poverty, corruption, uncertainty and oppression, Hongkong's example is even dazzling. It is a living disproof of Communist propaganda: a more effective disproof, surely, than the devastation of Korean or Chinese soil.

The colony of Hongkong, consisting of the island of Hongkong and some neighboring islands, Kowloon Peninsula, and the New Territories, assumed an importance in British Asian policy which belied its miniature size. Its population exceeded that of New Zealand, and its foreign trade surpassed that of all China. After the British return to power following the defeat of Japan, Hongkong regained its primacy as a trade *entrepôt* for China and as a strategic outpost of empire. British wartime policies in China in no way obtruded on China's internal politics for the benefit of any particular party or regime. In an unsentimental way, the British wrote off their wartime losses and offered to re-establish trade with the Nationalists. The Nationalists made that impossible. They closed the Yangtze to foreign shipping, mainly British, and they curbed traditional trading practices with manifold restrictions. On January 16, 1948, Nationalist mobs burned down the British consulate in Canton and as late as April 17, 1951, the British were victims of a mob scene on Formosa. The British felt no cause for gratitude toward the Kuomintang faction and refused to endorse the American policy of sustaining Chiang Kai-shek.

After the Communists took over the mainland, the British reassessed their over-all Far Eastern position. Both the British and the Chinese regarded themselves as engaged in a practical effort to adjust their relations to accord with new and changing conditions. The British regarded "the attitude of some Americans, who insist upon polarizing every situation into a headlong clash of drastic alternatives" as "unrealistic, immature, and hysterical." The British still looked upon the Far East as less vital than regions nearer home and upon China as less of a Rubicon than Malaya or Australia. They regarded the sterling area and the Commonwealth understandings as the safe and sure groundwork for survival not merely of the United Kingdom but also of the Four Freedoms. They were as defiant as the Americans of the Communists and equally confident of their inner strength. They were necessarily more careful in the husbanding and utilization of their meager resources. The British were bound to Asian members of the Commonwealth who had their own relations with China and who rightly or wrongly insisted on thinking of Peking as the representative of all Chinese people. The direct British stake in China shrank to the embassy at Peking, two or three consulates, nearly a billion dollars in residual in-

vestments, and the freehold and leasehold tenancies at Hongkong and Kowloon.

The British determined more firmly than ever to strengthen rather than to relax their position in Hongkong. The colony swarmed with political refugees, propagandists, and secret agents. Kuomintang supporters, Communist sympathizers, and third forces in China carried on their intrigues—*within the law*—under British protection. Daily trains from Kowloon and Canton met at the border to disgorge streams of humanity fleeing the Reds or seeking to return to the mainland for reasons of their own. Almost a third of a million refugees jammed into a squalid, miserable wooden camp which taxed the ingenuity of the police and public health and welfare authorities. Communist booksellers and news agencies worked side by side with those of the Kuomintang under the watchful eyes of the British. The Communists took over the skyscraper of the Bank of China and the property of the China Merchants Steam Navigation Company, and their agents infiltrated into the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce and the Hongkong Federation of Trade Unions. Less than 1,200 British civil servants administered the colony and more than 30,000 members of the defense forces guaranteed its security. The British in Hongkong insisted that they were simple traders who wanted to do their daily tasks. "This may not be very noble," they said, "but at least it does not disturb others. We do not feel that we have a mandate to reform the rest of the world." They believed that much mischief had already been done in other areas in the sacred names of nationalism and independence by conferring upon backward peoples textbook systems beyond the potentialities of their political consciousness. They wanted to "stay put" and to have Hongkong judged by its services and contributions rather than by its political status.

The British resented the accusations of appeasement, and they defended their policies on the basis of reasonableness. They tolerated political indignities, and the great firms practically gave up their efforts to conduct business *inside* China. On the other hand, businessmen and trade missions tried to expand international commercial contacts on Communist terms faithful to the conviction that expanded trade was the harbinger of prosperity and peace. The British refused to go along with the Americans in an embargo on all trade with China, but on June 28, 1951, in accordance with the resolution of the United Nations, they put into effect regulations against strategic trade. In two years Hongkong's total trade dropped by nearly a third and the share of China in that trade dropped by 40 per cent. The merchants derived some compensation for their losses by developing new markets and expanding home industries. Almost a third of Hongkong's exports in 1953 consisted of locally made goods.

The British asked for American understanding of Hongkong's position and protested against allegations of trading with the enemy. Except for smuggling, which was impossible to control because 100,000 junks darted like fireflies in the dead of night back and forth across the waters between China and the offshore islands, the trade patterns remained within legal limits. Hongkong exchanged chemical fertilizers, dyestuffs, medicines, and machines for food, vegetable oils, nuts, seeds, and textiles. Hongkong depended upon daily imports of food to keep its hungry population above the starvation level and profited at least as much from trade as the Communist regime. Both Hongkong and China considered trade legitimate and desirable and sought to expand its scope within the limits permitted by international agreement.

The British in Hongkong appreciated the degree of their dependence upon the United States and their precarious position in the path of the Communist advance. They read of Chinese threats to retake Hongkong, and they saw the evidence of Chinese military might within easy artillery range of the Hongkong reservoirs. Still, they remained surprisingly tranquil and self-assured. On occasions they bent before Communist demands; on others, they stood firm. For example, they impounded the airplanes of the Chinese government at Kai Tak airport, they enforced immigration restrictions and trade controls, they requisitioned ships for service in Korea, and they confined Communist party activities in Hongkong to restricted limits. They believed that the Communists would not dare to attack Hongkong, except in consequence of general war, because of the value of Hongkong as a listening post, a window to the West, and a lifeline to the Chinese communities in Southeast Asia. In the face of imminent danger, the British subordinated demands for more self-government to strategic necessities and served grim notice that they would fight to the death for Hongkong as the linchpin of the free world in Southeast Asia.

Indo-China

France and Indo-China suffered the last convulsive gasps of old-style imperialism in Southeast Asia. Through the years, France followed a double standard in its political practices: it insisted upon liberty, equality, and fraternity at home but denied these blessings to its overseas dominions. France, with its highly centralized government subject to constant change of its party direction, pursued a fixed policy of cultural assimilation, with disturbing and destructive effects on the culture and institutions of its protégés. France gave Indo-China efficient administration and sound fi-

nances; good highways, railways, and irrigation projects; and some modest innovations in education and public health, but it created bases for unrest in destroying the ancient ways of the East. Transgressors were no longer thrown to the elephants and the abuses of mandarin rule were suppressed, but the introduction by the French of a rule of law founded on the philosophy of individualism weakened the traditional family and communal ties. French colonial administration and large-scale economic enterprise magnified the social inequalities without compensating advantages and fertilized the minds of the indigenous peoples for nationalistic and communistic propaganda. The profits on French investments contrasted bitterly with the taxation burdens on the debt-ridden, landless peasants.

Discrepancies between the values of self-realization as taught by the French and the denial of self-government in practice inflamed the French-trained and French-educated native leaders. Indo-China was divided into a direct French colony of Cochin China administered by a French governor, and four protectorates of Annam, Tongking, Cambodia, and Laos ruled by four residents-superior. The entire peninsula was subject to a French governor-general responsible only to Paris. Native voices were disregarded, and such institutions as existed for native participation in government affairs were formal, advisory, and ineffective. The Annamese inherited the memories of a thousand-year struggle for independence against the Chinese, and in modern times they derived inspiration from President Wilson's electric message of self-determination. During World War I, 100,000 Annamese served in France. Their insistent demands for political independence, economic equality, and social justice prompted the French to inaugurate the principle of association. The French continued to strive to bind their colonies closer to the mother country without any pretense at preparation for independence. In 1939 only 500,000 children attended grammar schools; 50,000 of these went on to higher elementary schools and only 5,000 to high schools. In 1937 the University of Hanoi had exactly 631 students.

The nationalism of Indo-China took the form of repeated attacks on influential minorities such as the Chinese or Japanese and on the entrenched French hierarchy. Conservative nationalists limited themselves to demands for reform, but extremist groups co-operated with the Communists. A unified nationalistic movement was impossible to achieve. The peoples of Cambodia and Laos had their own nationalistic traditions, and they were separated from the coastal areas by mountain barriers and linguistic and religious differences. The only thing they had in common was objection to French control. The French suppressed all nationalistic expressions and underestimated the serious consequences of their shortsighted policies.

The fall of France and the installation of the Vichy regime rocked the French hegemony in Indo-China. The aggressive Japanese humiliated the French by the Hanoi Convention of September 22, 1940, and the French-Japanese Mutual Defense Agreement of July 21, 1941. The rapid Japanese military victories damaged French prestige beyond hope of permanent repair. The Japanese forced the French to cede border territories to Thailand, and to put all the resources of Indo-China at the disposition of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

The Decoux regime served Japanese purposes satisfactorily until March, 1945, when the Japanese unseated the French administration. Under the Japanese aegis, Bao Dai on March 11 proclaimed the independence of the empire of Annam, uniting Tongking and Annam. On March 13 the king of Cambodia declared his country independent, and on April 20 the king of Luang Prabang in Laos followed suit. Bao Dai gave his empire the old name of *Viet-Nam* in an effort to capitalize on nationalist sentiment. He tried to rally nationalists to his support, including Ngo Dinh Diem, a prominent Catholic layman and former premier who had resigned that office rather than be subservient to the French. Most of the experienced nationalist and revolutionary Viet-Nameese withheld their support from Bao Dai, because they opposed the Japanese as well as the French.

In 1941 the most active revolutionaries, including the Communists, set up the *Viet-Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi* or the Viet-Nam Independence League in South China to fight against Vichy and Japan. The Communist leader Ho Chi Minh headed the organization which came to be known popularly as the Viet-Minh. The Chinese government of Chiang Kai-shek welcomed the Indo-Chinese revolutionaries on Chinese soil not only for their help against Japan but because of the Chinese impatience with the French. The Chinese distrusted the left-wing leadership of the Viet-Minh and sponsored a more docile Viet-Nameese coalition, the Viet-Nam Revolutionary League, which members of the Viet-Minh also joined.

Ho Chi Minh, the son of a Viet-Nameese government worker, went to sea as a cabin boy, and in France at the time of World War I joined the Communist party. He subsequently spent time in Russia, and he returned to the Far East as an active party worker with Borodin in 1924. He organized the Indo-China Communist party. He explained his program in words which were easily understood by the people of the cities and the country, whether intellectuals, workers, or peasants. "The battle that we fight is not directed against honest Frenchmen but against the cruel domination of French colonialism . . . *corvée*, *gabelle*, forced consumption of opium and alcohol, crushing taxes, absolute lack of liberty, permanent terror, moral and material misery, and shameless exploitation."

He was in and out of jail, and in 1942 he was in a Chinese prison charged

with being a French spy. After his release and his association with both the Viet-Minh and the Viet-Nam Revolutionary League, he joined forces with Vo Nguyen Giap (a Communist who had learned the techniques of guerilla warfare at Yen-an). Together they organized a resistance movement, received military aid from the Allies, and drew up a program for the Viet-Minh. This program called for a republican constitution guaranteeing democratic rights and privileges, a nationalized economy, and a welfare state.

In August, 1945, at the time of the Japanese surrender, the Viet-Minh held a national congress in the fastness of their mountain headquarters in Tongking and "elected" Ho Chi Minh as president of their new regime. As Viet-Minh-sponsored local committees sprang up in Annam, Tongking, and Cochin China, Bao Dai resigned his throne, took the name of Citizen Vinh Thuy, and accepted a position as Supreme Political Adviser to a provisional government organized by Ho Chi Minh in Hanoi. On September 2, 1945, Ho's provisional government, named the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, claiming authority over Annam, Tongking, and Cochin China, issued its declaration of independence.

On March 23, 1945, General de Gaulle made clear the French determination to preserve French sovereignty in Indo-China, and issued a plan for the organization of an Indo-Chinese federation within a French Union. The Potsdam Conference then ordered the reoccupation of Indo-China north of the Sixteenth Parallel by French and Chinese troops and south of the Sixteenth Parallel by British and French troops. The Chinese troops swarmed over the countryside and through the cities and left behind them a heritage of hatred. They withdrew in consequence of the general treaty settlement of February 28, 1946, between France and China. The British retired shortly afterward and left the French in political control to work out new arrangements with Viet-Nam, Cambodia, and Laos. France and Cambodia signed an agreement reestablishing French control over that country on January 7, 1946; and France and Laos on August 27, 1946, agreed to the practical restoration of the prewar protectorate relationship.

Clashes between the French and the Viet-Nameese began from the moment of Japan's surrender. General Gracey, in command of British troops in the south, supported the French and even used Japanese soldiers against the Viet-Nameese. French troops under General Le Clerc landed in Cochin China to continue what he called "mopping up operations"; and Admiral Georges Thierry d'Argenlieu, an ardent Gaullist and Carmelite monk, arrived in Indo-China to be high commissioner. Admiral d'Argenlieu saw no need to negotiate with Ho Chi Minh and his Viet-Minh-controlled

Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam because "we have such a fine expeditionary force."

North of the Sixteenth Parallel, under the Chinese occupation, the Ho Chi Minh organization consolidated its power and launched a program against imminent famine and widespread illiteracy and for broader participation in government. The Chinese disarmed all Frenchmen and refused to allow French administrators to re-enter Tongking. The Chinese still supported two Viet-Nameese xenophobic groups, the old Viet-Nam Nationalist party and the Viet-Nam Revolutionary League, both of which were far more bitter against the French than the Viet Minh. In elections held on January 6, 1946, a national assembly was chosen which approved a national union cabinet under Ho, in which all three rival factions were represented.

On March 6, 1946, Ho's Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and France signed in Hanoi an agreement by which France recognized the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam as a "free state with its own government, parliament, army, and finances, forming part of the Indo-Chinese Federation and the French Union." The French promised a referendum to determine whether the three *Ky* (provinces), Annam, Tongking, and Cochin China, should be united. The Viet-Nameese agreed not to oppose the return of the French Army to Tongking and northern Annam. An annex to the agreement fixed the number of troops at 25,000, of whom 15,000 were to be French and the remainder Viet-Nameese, under over-all French command. The troops were to be withdrawn by 1952.

By the summer of 1946, the French had reached accord with the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, the Kingdom of Cambodia, and the Kingdom of Laos, but rebellions flared in the territories of all three. The Viet-Nameese sought "unity and independence" and the French sought to isolate Cochin China (with its great strategic and economic value) from the rest of Viet-Nam and to relegate Viet-Nam to an unimportant equivocal status within the French Union. Ho Chi Minh himself went to France to conduct negotiations. French policy was made in those crucial days in Paris and Saigon, and Paris was often more liberal in its outlook on Indo-China than private citizens and colonial servants in the field. Admiral d'Argenlieu never accepted the spirit of the March 6 agreement. He made abortive efforts to persuade the Annamese royal family to return to the throne, and he proclaimed an autonomous Republic of Cochin China. In August, 1946, he convened a "federal" conference of Laotians, Cambodians, and hand-picked representatives of Cochin China and southern Annam—much as the Japanese had schemed to create autonomous regimes in North China—to clip the political power of the Viet-Nam Republic.

On September 14, 1946, Ho and Marius Moutet, the Minister for Overseas France, signed in Paris a *modus vivendi* which provided safeguards for the economic and cultural position of Frenchmen in Viet-Nam. It also provided for an Indo-Chinese customs union, a single Indo-Chinese currency, and it called for an end to all acts of hostility and violence in Indo-China. It dodged the major issues of unity and independence.

Meanwhile, within the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, the French joined the Viet-Minh in police and military action to reduce the power of the Viet-Nam National party and the Viet-Nam Revolutionary League, which had been sustained by the Chinese. Ho's personal stature increased and Vo Nguyen Giap strengthened and extended the Viet-Nam Army. The uneasy truce between the Viet-Nameese and the French was broken by an argument over the control of the customs at Haiphong, which ended in a bombardment of the city on November 23, 1946, killing thousands of Viet-Nameese. In their turn, the Viet-Nameese attacked the French in Hanoi on December 19, 1946, killing forty-odd civilians, wounding 171, and kidnapping 169. That incident marked the beginning of the civil war between Ho's Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and France.

Despite early French victories, it became clear that the French would have to launch a political, in addition to their military, campaign against Ho. They evolved a plan to induce Bao Dai, who, as an adviser to the Ho government, was on an interminable mission in Hongkong, to return to Indo-China and to rally all disaffected political groups in opposition to Ho. They appealed to the Viet-Nam Nationalist party, the Viet-Nam Revolutionary League, elements of two nationalistic religious sects—the Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao—and an anti-Communist Catholic League. These groups were anti-Ho, but the difficulty from the French point of view was that they were also anti-French, and they were not particularly charmed with the personality of Bao Dai. Bao Dai developed an ever-strengthening demand for independence within himself, but he held little attraction for Viet-Nam's masses or for the half million uneasy Chinese domiciled in Indo-China. The French envisaged Bao Dai as the key figure in their counteroffensive against the Republic of Viet-Nam, but the majority of the non-Communist Viet-Nameese nationalists regarded Ho and his strongly entrenched Communist minority in the Republican government as the only possible leader against the French.

With French support and French urging, the pro-Bao Dai groups set up a new provisional central government of Annam under the presidency of Nguyen Van Xuan. On June 5, 1948, in the presence of Bao Dai aboard a ship in the Bay of Along, Xuan and the French signed an agreement recognizing "the independence of Viet-Nam, whose task it is now fully to

realize its unity." From that date, the word "Viet-Nam" referred to the government of Bao Dai; the word "Viet-Minh" referred to Ho Chi Minh's Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam which continued to exist in the north. Bao Dai went to France and on March 8, 1949, he exchanged letters with President Auriol to conclude the Élysée agreements which would bring Viet-Nam into the French Union as an Associated State. Associated statehood, accorded at about the same time to Laos and Cambodia, was far removed from independence. Foreign affairs and the armies remained in the hands of the French, and the other prerogatives of sovereignty, finance, communications, trade, and customs were rigorously circumscribed. Bao Dai returned to Saigon and on December 30, 1949, proclaimed himself chief of state. His government was recognized on February 6, 1950, as the government of Viet-Nam by the United States, the United Kingdom, Thailand, and the free world generally, but Ho Chi Minh's Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam continued to receive the diplomatic support of the USSR, China, Yugoslavia, the Iron Curtain countries, and most of its Asian neighbors. Until then, Ho had endeavored to play down the Communist issue and to emphasize the nationalist basis of his appeal. But after the Communist victories in China, the nature and the progress of the fighting between Ho and the French became matters of deep international concern.

The civil war which sharpened into a nationwide war between the French forces and the Viet-Minh cost blood and treasure far beyond French anticipation. A succession of military plans and commanders held out promise of quick and certain victory but eventuated in stalemate and embarrassment. European French and colonial troops, including the Foreign Legion, Moroccans, and Senegalese, augmented by hastily trained Vietnamese, fought simultaneously at least four different types of heartbreaking warfare against the hordes of the Viet-Minh. They fought for the control of cities in the important delta areas of the Red and Mekong rivers, they exchanged artillery fire in isolated outposts like Dien Bien Phu, they skirmished along jungle trails and well-marked highways, and they played a cat-and-mouse game with guerilla bands which knew no battle line nor positional front. The guerillas harassed the French throughout the length and breadth of the land, across mountains, plateaus, and rice fields. The rivals surrounded each other in a confused mélange of fortresses, fortified villages, and hostile pockets. French casualties decimated their officer class, reduced their contribution to Korean fighting, and limited their military influence in Europe. Accountable costs approached two billion dollars per year and strained the French national budget. The French spent in Indo-China more than they received in direct aid from the United States.

At first the French distrusted American attitudes toward Indo-China. They believed that fundamental American sympathies were with the people of Viet-Nam and against French colonialism, and they feared that Americans might harbor some designs against Viet-Nam's rich economic potential. They insisted that any American aid should be given to the Viet-Nameese only through the French; otherwise, the Viet-Nameese and the Viet-Minh might engage in the secret buying and selling which had cursed the American program in China. On June 27, 1950, with the outbreak of the war in Korea, President Truman called for an acceleration in the furnishing of military assistance to the forces of France and the Associated States in Indo-China and the dispatch of a military mission to provide close working relations with those forces. The Americans assumed an increasing proportion of the economic costs of the fighting and reached a point where they provided at their own expense 80 per cent of all the supplies and equipment.

In spite of the lawlessness and destruction, the government of Viet-Nam carried on its ordinary political functions and pressed for independence. It was frequently the despair of its friends. It gave top priority to military matters, representative government, and enlightened social legislation. The government argued that "with our Buddhist traditions, Confucian culture, and Liberal tendencies, we are ferociously anti-Communist—we do not need A-bombs or H-bombs, but we need I-bombs for independence and L-bombs for liberty." Bao Dai endeavored to win the *attentistes*, or wait-and-see advocates, by more insistent demands for unequivocal independence. On April 28, 1954, he and President Coty of France announced a joint declaration of agreement for total independence and the conclusion of treaties and pertinent accords on juridical, military, economic, and cultural affairs. But the French still insisted on independence within the French Union, while the nationalists in Viet-Nam demanded the complete severance of the umbilical cord and the negotiation of new treaties on a basis of equality and reciprocity.

Inside the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, the Viet-Minh organized a larger coalition called the *Lien Vet* or National United Front. The *Lao Dang*, or Communist party element, determined the internal program, controlled foreign policies, and conducted the war. The organization of Ho's state reflected that of China, and its philosophy and propaganda echoed the thought of Mao Tse-tung. Ho's advisers and military supplies streamed across the border from China, and Ho obtained from the USSR the help and the equipment which the Chinese were not in position to advance.

Cambodia and Laos were as foreign to the Viet-Minh and the Viet-

Namee as the latter were to France. Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam were not Associated States with one another, but they were Associated States with France. The youthful king of Cambodia made and unmade his prime ministers and he determined his own policies. He was anti-Communist, but distrustful of the Viet-Namee. He said he had no quarrel with the Communists if the Communists would let him alone. But he was plagued by the *Issarak* or "Freedom" dissidents in his own territory and he was threatened by Viet-Minh invaders. He wanted to conduct his own foreign affairs, and he objected to looking at the world through the distorting prism of a foreign country (France). He wanted to receive aid direct from the United States—not through France—and he wanted to establish his own legations abroad. He championed a project for an alliance between Buddhist countries, primarily Thailand and Burma, on the common interest of anticommunism. On May 9, 1953, he signed with France a series of protocols still short of absolute independence but giving Cambodia full sovereignty in military, judicial, and economic matters. No foreign troops were to remain on Cambodian soil but some French officers were to advise the Khmer Army Headquarters. French civilians in Cambodia were to serve in an advisory capacity and not as representatives of sovereign France.

On October 22, 1953, France and Laos signed a treaty declaring Laos to be fully independent but within the French Union. The treaty described the French Union as "an Association of independent and sovereign peoples, free and equal in rights and duties, in which all the associates place in common their resources to guarantee the defense of the union as a whole." Laos did not contribute greatly in resources to the French effort because it was isolated from the rest of Indo-China by the guerilla wars and it depended upon supplies from Thailand for its food. But it mobilized 40,000 of its 1,500,000 population, many of them primitive mountain people, for the defense of its territory. It was determined to maintain its independence against Viet-Minh invaders and an insurgent Viet-Minh-sponsored regime under a renegade distant relative of the king.

The situation in Indo-China with its pyramiding complexities progressed to the center of the stage of world affairs. From April 26 to July 21, 1954, an international conference of delegations from Viet-Nam, Laos, Cambodia, the USSR, the Chinese People's Republic, the Viet-Minh, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France concluded agreements which provided for the ending of hostilities and the organization of a system of international control and supervision of the armistice arrangements.

The agreement for the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam provided for a complete, over-all, and simultaneous cease-fire. It called for a temporary demarcation line above the Seventeenth Parallel along the Ben Hai River

thirteen miles north of Colonial Route 9, which crosses the forty-mile waist of the country from Quang Tri on the ocean to Savannakhet in Laos. The Viet-Minh were to regroup their forces north of the line; the French and the Viet-Nameese to the south. Three hundred days were allowed for regrouping because of the heavy French concentrations in enclaves around Hanoi and Haiphong. It was calculated that it would require almost 1,000,000 tons of shipping to move the French and their supplies out of the Red River delta region. The Viet-Minh were to hold positions in south Viet-Nam as long as the French remained in Hanoi and Haiphong. Civilians on either side of the Seventeenth Parallel were given a year to decide *whether to remain or to shift their domiciles. They were guaranteed freedom from reprisals if they remained and assistance if they chose to transfer.* During the period of the armistice, military reinforcements and additional military supplies were prohibited. No new military bases were to be established in the regrouping zones. Both sides undertook to see that the territory assigned to them should not be involved in any military alliance nor be utilized for restarting hostilities or for carrying out aggressive policies. Arrangements were made for the exchange of prisoners of war.

Separate agreements defined terms for the cessation of hostilities in Laos and Cambodia. The agreement for Laos provided for the complete withdrawal of troops and transfer of military supplies within 120 days. Laotian combat units (resistance forces) were to be moved into the two provinces of Sam Nua and Phang Saly, and no reinforcements were to be brought in from the outside. The French were permitted to leave a military training mission of not more than 1,500 officers and noncommissioned personnel in Laos and to maintain two military posts at Xieng Khouang and Seno with not more than 3,500 men. The agreement for Cambodia provided for withdrawal of foreign troops and foreign personnel within ninety days. The Khmer resistance troops were to be rehabilitated on the spot within thirty days by incorporating them into the regular army or the local police.

All three agreements provided for the supervision of the cease-fire by a joint commission of equal numbers of representatives of both sides and by an International Supervisory Commission of India, Poland, and Canada. Decisions of the international commission were required to be unanimous in issues which might lead to the resumption of hostilities. The task of the commission was to carry out the functions of supervision, inspection, and investigation in connection with the various provisions of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities. If the commission encountered willful obstruction on either side, it could appeal to the nations which signed the Geneva agreements and which acted as guarantors.

In addition to these agreements, six unilateral declarations were placed on the record by Laos, Cambodia, and France. Laos and Cambodia each issued a "Declaration on the Rights of Citizens" which promised integration of all citizens without discrimination into the national community, guaranteed protection of their constitutional rights, and promised them participation in general elections to be held in 1955. Each also issued a "Declaration on Nonparticipation in Aggression" which affirmed that (1) it would never pursue a policy of aggression or permit its territory to be used in furtherance of such a policy; (2) it would never join in an agreement which would include the obligations to participate in a military alliance contrary to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations or to establish bases on its territory for foreign powers unless its security were actually threatened; (3) it would settle international disputes by peaceful means; and (4) it would not request foreign aid in war materials, personnel, or instructors except for self defense and to the extent defined by the "Agreements on the Cessation of Hostilities."

The French issued a "Declaration on Readiness to Withdraw Troops" and a "Declaration on the Respect for the Independence and Sovereignty of the States of Indo-China." By the former, the French announced their readiness to withdraw their troops at the request of the governments concerned and within agreed-upon periods. By the latter, the French stated unequivocally that for the settlement of all problems connected with the re-establishment and consolidation of peace, the French government would proceed from the principle of respect for the independence and sovereignty, the unity and territorial integrity, of Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam.

The delegate from Viet-Nam, Tran Van Do, made no declarations and registered his protests against decisions which in his view harmed Viet-Nam and sacrificed the interests of his country to those of France and his Communist enemies. On the other hand, the Viet-Minh delegate, Pham Van Dong, displayed an undisguised cordiality toward the Viet-Nam representative and toward the French. In his closing speech, he said:

With France in particular, a country famous for its glorious tradition of liberty, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam ardently desires to form ties of confidence and friendship. . . . We stand for the establishment of economic and cultural relations with France on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.

The "Final Declaration of the Conference"—with which the United States refused to associate itself—took note of the agreements and declarations and underscored the provisions regarding elections in Laos and Cambodia in 1955 and in Viet-Nam in 1956. It recognized that the demarca-

tion line in Viet-Nam was for military purposes only and did not constitute a political or territorial boundary. The "Final Declaration" reflected the basic interest of the Western world in the welfare of the individuals in Indo-China who were the helpless victims of the war and pledged all the members of the conference to respect the sovereignty, the independence, the unity, and the territorial integrity of Laos, Cambodia, and Viet-Nam. Finally it called upon the members of the conference to consult one another on any question which might be referred to them by the International Supervisory Commission in order to study such measures as might prove necessary to ensure that the cessation of hostilities agreements were respected.

The conclusion of the armistice in Indo-China, as in Korea, left many problems unsolved, but it prepared the way for peace in the event the belligerents chose to accept it. The French parliament gave Premier Mendes-France an overwhelming vote of confidence, and the British hailed Secretary Eden as a hero on his return from Geneva. Russia and China derived satisfaction from the conference agreements, but the United States tended to regard Geneva as a Far Eastern Munich. Cambodia and Laos accepted with gratitude the acknowledgment of their right to continued existence as sovereign states, but Viet-Nam looked upon the future with foreboding.

An armistice did not heal its internal schisms or guarantee the return of peace and prosperity. Viet-Nam was pleased with the nominal end of French imperialism, but it was exposed to the inescapable dilemma which faced every new nation in Southeast Asia. It was obliged either to discharge the responsibilities of freedom and independence or succumb to civil war or worse. The state was truncated and the government was unstable. The government of the Viet-Minh moved from the isolated hills of northwest Indo-China into the cities of Hanoi and Haiphong and assumed formal responsibility for law and order and the individual welfare of a major part of the Viet-Nam people. Guerilla warriors became administrators and government officials. Theirs was the choice to develop independence of thought and action, to strengthen ties with France and the West, or to plunge headlong into policies indicated by China and the USSR. The residual territory in the south encased a political and economic volcano which was further strained by the influx of refugees from the north. In a matter-of-fact way the government of neighboring Thailand brought to the attention of the Security Council of the United Nations the situation in Indo-China, which in the estimation of Thailand constituted a threat to its security and a danger to international peace.

Suggested Reading

- COLONY OF SINGAPORE, *Annual Reports* (London).
- PHILIPPE DEVILLERS, "Vietnamese Nationalism and French Politics," in W. I. Holland, *Asian Nationalism and the West* (New York, 1953).
- E. H. G. DOBLY, *Malaya and the Malaysians* (London, 1947).
- RUPERT EMERSON, *Malaysia, A Study in Direct and Indirect Rule* (New York, 1937).
- FEDERATION OF MALAYA *Annual Reports*, *Kuala Lumpur*.
- ELLEN J. HAMMER, *The Struggle for Indo-China* (Stanford, 1954).
- HONGKONG, *Annual Reports* (London).
- HAROLD INGRAMS, *Hong Kong* (London, 1952). Obtainable from British Information Services, New York.
- HAROLD ISAACS, *No Peace For Asia* (New York, 1947).
- NORMAN LEWIS, *A Dragon Apparent* (New York, 1951).
- IAN MORRISON, *Malayan Postscript* (London, 1942).
- BERNARD NEWMAN, *Report on Indo-China* (London, 1953).
- VICTOR PURCELL, *The Chinese in Southeast Asia* (New York, 1951).
- , *Malaya Communist or Free* (London, 1953).
- CHRISTOPHER RAND, *Hongkong, The Island Between* (New York, 1952).
- JOSEPH R. STAROBIN, *Eyewitness in Indo China* (New York, 1954) (Mr. Starobin was correspondent for the Daily Worker).
- TAN CHIENG LOCK, *Malayan Problems from a Chinese Point of View* (Singapore, 1947).
- SIR CHARLES WEBSTER, MAJOR GENERAL SIR IAN JACOB, AND E. A. G. ROBINSON, *United Kingdom Policy: Foreign, Strategic, Economic* (London and New York, 1950).
- RICHARD WINSTEDT, *Malaya and Its History* (London, 1948).

CHAPTER 33

Korea and the Quest for Security

Crises in Southeast Asia resulted from the lingering effects of an ancient illness, but the crisis in Korea was the initial campaign in a world-wide struggle to determine the shape of things to come. Korea shared the aversion of Southeast Asia to colonialism, but it emerged from World War II entirely free of the political shackles of its former imperial master. Japan was a loser, not a victor, and was therefore obliged to surrender its overseas empire. Korea was accorded political independence, but it was ill prepared to discharge the responsibilities of self-government and economic development. In its weakness it was exposed to propaganda, civil war, and foreign invasion. Its land was soaked with blood as it became the hapless battleground between North Koreans and South Koreans, between enemy aggressors and forces of the United Nations.

From the date of its opening by Japan, Korea was the innocent victim of great power conflicts and ambitions. The geographical location of Korea attracted it to China, Russia, and Japan, and its political helplessness doomed it to the control of its strongest neighbor. From 1910 until Pearl Harbor, no one challenged Japan's position in Korea. Japan gave Korea a stable, paternal, ultracolonial administration and exploited Korea's rich agricultural and mineral resources for the benefit of Japan's economic and military machine. Korea's fundamental problems of land, livelihood, and population were obscured by Japan, and the persistent demands by Korean leaders for personal consideration and political rights were ignored by militant Japanese overlords.

Emergence from World War II

By the Cairo Declaration of November, 1943, it was agreed that "in due course Korea shall become free and independent." The USSR publicly

acceded to this principle when it entered the war against Japan. Korea was not severely damaged because of military action during World War II, but its economic life was completely disrupted and its resources depleted. As a result of a military understanding first discussed at Potsdam, the USSR accepted the surrender of the Japanese and occupied Korea north of the Thirty-eighth Parallel, while the United States accepted the surrender of the Japanese forces and established military government in Korea south of the Thirty-eighth Parallel. The line of division served an immediate, useful, military purpose, but it destroyed the economic viability and political unity of the Korean nation. North Korea, with a population of 7,000,000, contained most of Korea's raw materials, power installations, and industrial potential, but South Korea, with three times as many people, contained the capital city, the best seaports, and most of the vital agricultural acreage. North Korea shared a common border with the USSR and, with its railways, ports, power, and factories constituted a vital link in an economic chain which the USSR (with Siberia) and China (with Manchuria) proposed to forge in Northeast Asia.

In the interim between the end of hostilities and the installation of the occupation regimes, Koreans in north and south, with the encouragement of the Japanese, set up people's committees to maintain order. In the north, the Russians utilized these committees and imported Korean Communists from China and the USSR to strengthen them. In the south, the Americans addressed themselves to the problems of the Japanese surrender and the preservation of order. The Americans ignored the committees and permitted the Japanese to remain temporarily in control. "It would have been better to rule us through wooden dummies," some Koreans protested. The Americans took back to Korea some leaders—Kim Koo and Kim Kiusic—from exile in China, and they returned Syngman Rhee by special plane from the United States. Political factions multiplied and intrigues sprouted which baffled the military governments.

Korean affairs were referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow, which on December 27, 1945, agreed to establish a US-USSR Joint Commission to assist the formation of a provisional Korean democratic government. It was provided that in preparing their proposals the commission should consult with the Korean democratic parties and social organizations and that it should be the task of the joint commission to work out a four-power trusteeship of Korea for a period of up to five years. After five years Korea was to be given a fully independent government.

Toward an Independent, Democratic, and Unified Korea

Koreans, north and south, reacted violently against the insulting trusteeship arrangement. They declared that they had kept alive the flame of independence for nearly forty years and that they had no intention of accepting a shoddy substitute for their rightful heritage. In February, 1946, representatives of the people's committees in the north met in their capital, Pyongyang, and set up a Democratic People's Republic dominated by Communists and led by Kim Il-sung, a young Soviet-trained Korean, who *assumed the name of a famous anti-Japanese guerilla leader*. Nationalistic South Koreans paraded in the streets of Seoul in protest against the Moscow declaration, and the leftist organizations participated until the Communist line ordered the acceptance of the four-power decision. In the midst of a seething political situation and a critical economic impasse, the joint committee made no progress in its economic consultations.

In North Korea, the Russians acted as they pleased. They ran the country as a police state through their Korean puppets. At election time, 99 per cent of the voters dropped ballots into carefully guarded black and white ballot boxes. The Russians lived off the land and they drafted young Koreans into the army. In August, 1948, they held elections for a Supreme People's Assembly which created a Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Its constitution was patterned after that of the USSR, and it asserted sovereignty over the whole of Korea. Kim Il-sung was designated prime minister, and his government was accorded recognition by the USSR and its satellites. The Russians withdrew their troops, and on March 17, 1949, signed pacts with North Korea for economic aid and cultural relations. The Russians refused to bind themselves to a general treaty of friendship and mutual assistance such as they signed with China one year later, *after* the Communist victory. The most eloquent testimonial to the quality of the regime in North Korea was the daily stream of refugees to the south.

In South Korea, the United States organized a partially elected interim legislature and admitted more Koreans into administrative and judicial positions. Because of absolute inability to reach an understanding with the USSR, the United States brought the Korean question to the attention of the United Nations. On November 14, 1947, the General Assembly recognized the urgent and rightful claims to independence of the people of Korea and established a United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) to facilitate a program for a national government of Korea and for the withdrawal of all occupation forces.

In South Korea UNTCOK co-operated with the Commanding General

of the United States Army Forces in Korea to lay the groundwork for the first democratic election in the long history of Korea. On May 10, 1948, almost 1,000 candidates contested 200 seats in the National Assembly. One hundred seats in the Assembly were kept vacant to be filled by the electorate of North Korea after unification. Nearly 80 per cent of eligible voters cast their ballots. Parties were based on personal allegiance and many candidates chose to run as Independents rather than to commit themselves to any individual or platform. Issues were inconsequential except that everybody stood for immediate independence.

The Hankook Democratic party, headed by Kim Songsoo (an influential landlord and industrialist), captured the most seats, followed by Syngman Rhee's National Association for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence and by the Korean Independence party led by Kim Koo. Various "youth" groups won a few seats, but the extreme leftists, including the South Korean Labor party, either boycotted the elections or went underground.

The Assembly promulgated a constitution on July 17, 1948, which set up a single-chamber legislature and which provided that the president should be chosen by the legislature. Dr. Rhee was chosen president by an overwhelming majority, and on August 15, 1948, the Republic of Korea was inaugurated in Seoul. The American military government transferred authority to the new administration, and the Americans prepared to withdraw their troops from South Korea. On December 12, 1948, the United Nations declared that the government in South Korea was the only lawful government in Korea, recommended the withdrawal of troops as early as practicable, and resolved that a new Commission on Korea should be appointed to lend its good offices to bring about the unification of Korea and the further development of representative government.

On New Year's Day, 1949, the United States extended full recognition to the Republic of Korea. The United States launched a broad program of relief and economic assistance and undertook to withdraw its troops. Why? On September 9, 1947, General Wedemeyer had warned President Truman that the military situation in Korea was potentially dangerous to United States strategic interests and that large-scale, Communist-inspired or abetted riots in the south were a constant threat. However, he said that American forces supplemented by quasi-military Korean units were adequate to cope with such trouble except in the currently improbable event of an outright Soviet-controlled invasion. He advised the creation of an American-controlled and officered Korean scout force, sufficient in strength to cope with the threat from the north, and the provision as early as

practicable of moral, advisory, and material support to China and South Korea.

In considering the extent of advice and assistance, the Department of State asked the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the military occupation of South Korea from the standpoint of the military security of the United States. On September 26, 1947, Secretary Forrestal replied, "The United States has little strategic interest in maintaining the present troops and bases in Korea." He added, "In the event of hostilities in the *Far East*, our present forces in Korea would be a military liability and could not be maintained there without substantial reinforcements prior to the initiation of hostilities. Moreover, any offensive operation the United States might wish to conduct on the Asiatic continent most probably would bypass the Korean Peninsula." He reasoned that it would be more feasible and less costly to neutralize enemy bases on Korea by air action than by ground forces and that the men then stationed in Korea could well be used elsewhere. "At the present time," he continued, "the occupation of Korea is requiring very large expenditures . . . with little, if any, lasting benefit to the security of the United States."

The views of Secretary Forrestal were those of Army Chief of Staff General Eisenhower, and they determined American policy until the time of the invasion. The military officers in Korea believed that the Korean Peninsula was a military liability—"another Bataan"—and Major General Charles L. Bolte in Washington, the Director of Plans and Operations of the General Staff, testified to a Congressional Committee that the "Army is not only agreeable to the withdrawal of the tactical formations from Korea but is heartily in favor of it."

In 1948 the United States was engrossed in a presidential election in which Far Eastern affairs played little part. Such attention as was paid to the Far East concerned itself with the end of the Occupation in Japan or the civil war in China rather than the annoying embarrassments of Korea. The Berlin airlift sketched the first ominous designs of the impending cold war. Then the United Nations passed the resolution for the withdrawal of all troops from Korea as soon as practicable; the ground swell of public resentment in Korea added to the thankless tasks of the occupation forces, and so it was decided by the National Security Council, with the approval of the president, that preparation should be undertaken to permit complete withdrawal of United States troops not later than June 30, 1949. On May 2, 1949, the United States set up in Seoul a Military Advisory Group for the advice and training of Korean security forces.

Some Americans emphasized the hazardous risks of the decision to pull out of Korea. A journalist warned in the *Saturday Evening Post* that after the Americans were gone, the Korean Communists would precipitate riots,

and at the proper time the Communist-trained Korean troops would seize strategic positions and institutions and within forty-eight hours would be in complete control of the Korean government and the Korean Peninsula. Professor McGovern of Northwestern University reported bluntly to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives that if the United States were to permit the Russian-aided and supported Communists to secure all of Korea, all efforts to aid and rehabilitate China and Japan would be useless.

After the retirement of the occupation armies, the Republic of Korea in the south strengthened its ties with the United States, but it made discouraging progress toward unification, prosperity, and democracy. The South rejected Communist overtures for unification and nurtured a growing confidence in its ability to overcome the North in the event of a military clash. Economic difficulties harassed Dr. Rhee's regime as prices spiraled and food production failed to keep pace with the increasing population. Tenants agitated for land reform and cultivators begged for fertilizer which had previously come from the north. Textile mills and light industries closed down for lack of power which the Russians refused to transmit. Koreans suffered from the lack of trained technicians to take the place previously filled by competent Japanese. The national budget showed mounting deficits, and the printing presses turned out bales of paper money to pay for salaries and public services. Korea appealed to the United States for aid, but its appeal was rejected by a single vote in the House of Representatives on January 19, 1950. Representative Nixon, of California, was on the negative side. After further consideration, and in view of the snowballing effects of the Chinese Communist victory throughout the Far East, the Congress authorized \$160,000,000 in financial assistance for the fiscal year 1950.

The internal problems of South Korea called for a "strong hand" like that of President Rhee. His measures suggested a police state, but they applied to an unsophisticated populace in critical circumstances. He had to cope with ordinary political rivals and a ruthless Communist conspiracy dedicated to his overthrow. He dominated the cabinet and he bullied the Assembly. Some assemblymen resigned, others died or disappeared, and many were jailed for alleged subversive activities. Dr. Rhee merged his supporters into the *Il Min Hoi* or People's party to overwhelm his restive opposition. Reports of police brutalities were commonplace and assassinations were distressingly frequent. Newspapers were censored or closed and thousands of arrests were made under the National Security Law. In the elections in South Korea on May 30, 1950, the pro-Rhee parties in the Assembly dipped from 81 to 48 and the avowed opposition from 65 to 22, but the Independents increased from 64 to 140. Dr. Rhee continued

as president, but he confronted a deeply discontented and perennially hostile Assembly.

On the eve of the invasion President Rhee hinted that in answer to the cries of his brothers in distress in the north, he would strive to reunite the country by force if peaceful means were not to be found. William C. Foster, a top official of the Economic Co-operation Administration in Korea, told a Congressional Committee that South Korea had 100,000 soldiers who were prepared to meet any challenge from the north, and General William L. Roberts, the chief of the Military Advisory Group in Seoul, testified that arms were not given to President Rhee for fear that he would order an attack against the North. The United Nations Commission on Korea lamented that conditions were no better in Korea in 1950 than they had been for the last two years, and urged the Koreans to settle their differences by peaceful means. The American ambassador in Korea in his warm but firm manner told President Rhee that the United States would be deeply concerned if democratic processes were not followed in the fight against communism or if economic problems were not attacked. Secretary Acheson told the Press Club in Washington that Korea and Formosa were outside the defense perimeter of the United States, but he added that it would be utter defeatism and utter madness from the viewpoint of our interests in Asia if we should stop halfway through the work which we had begun in Korea. He said that aggression against any area outside the perimeter would be a matter for the United Nations.

Meanwhile in North Korea, the People's Democratic Republic showed marked trends toward communism in organization and practice. North Koreans conducted raids across the strategic parallel and stirred intrigues, riots, and guerilla forays in the south. Radio Pyongyang called for a conference to unite all Korea and announced that the North would hold elections in the south sometime in August. The Russians continued to control the build-up of the army, economic policies, elections, and propaganda. Within a week after Ambassador Dulles assured the South Korean Assembly, "You will never be left alone so long as you continue worthily your part in the great design of human freedom," the Communist army of the North spilled across the frontier and launched its military drive against the South.

"Cynical, Brutal, Naked Attack"

As early as 1949 two divisions of Chinese Volunteer Groups of Korean origin which had been part of the Chinese Red Army moved into North

Korea and were followed by more veterans from the Chinese Communist forces. The North Koreans were also augmented by 10,000 to 20,000 Soviet military personnel (according to the United States Department of Defense), and their strategy was determined largely by Kim Il-sung (an officer of the Soviet Army) and Nam Il (also a Soviet citizen and Soviet Army officer). The planes, tanks, and artillery at the disposition of the North Koreans were of Russian origin. The responsibility of Communist imperialism for the aggression in Korea was clear and unequivocal, in the opinion of American officials, although it was impossible to state who pressed and lagged or whose finger squeezed the trigger. Some argued that Kim Il-sung precipitated the crisis; others, that Stalin or Mao Tse-tung cast the die. Ambassador Warren Austin stated his conviction that the influence of the Chinese Communists compared to the Russians was one to ninety-nine.

Before the invasion, the USSR seemed to exert relentless pressures against the free world along the entire periphery of the Russian-dominated Eurasian heartland. Washington sweltered in the heat of summer and the heat of arguments about foreign policy. European capitals cringed before the menace of Soviet expansion, and the United Nations machinery scarcely operated because of a Russian boycott. For five months the Soviet delegate refused to attend the meetings of the Security Council. Overnight the Russians lost their psychological advantage as the Americans galvanized into action. Americans prepared to fight, Europeans showed new determination, and Asians found new enthusiasm and new confidence.

On Saturday afternoon, June 24, 1950, which, because of the fourteen-hour time differential between Seoul and Washington, was daybreak Sunday, June 25, in Korea, North Korean tank columns slushed through the mud and the rain into South Korea. The United Nations Commission on Korea called this invasion an act of aggression, without warning and without provocation, in execution of a carefully prearranged plan. The State Department telephoned the news to Secretary-General Lie of the United Nations, who is reported to have remarked, "By God, that's a violation of the Charter."

On Sunday, June 25, Washington time, while Seoul watched enemy planes overhead, the United States asked for an emergency session of the Security Council and authorized General MacArthur in Tokyo to make military supplies available to South Korea. Late that afternoon, with the USSR and Yugoslavia abstaining, the Security Council passed a resolution calling on North Korea to cease hostilities and to withdraw the invasion forces. The resolution also called upon all members of the United Nations to render every assistance in the exercise of this resolution. That night President Truman called his senior advisers to Blair House, the temporary

White House, and told them that the time had come to put an end to drifting and to dickerings. In his view, successful resistance in Korea would serve:

To demonstrate that aggression will not be accepted by us or by the United Nations, and to provide a rallying point around which the spirits and energies of the free world can be mobilized to meet the world-wide threat which the Soviet Union now poses.

To deflate the dangerously exaggerated political and military prestige of Communist China which now threatens to undermine the resistance of non-Communist Asia and to consolidate the hold of communism on China itself.

To afford more time for, and to give direct assistance to, the organization of non-Communist resistance in Asia, both outside and inside China.

To carry out our commitments of honor to the South Koreans and to demonstrate to the world that the friendship of the United States is of inestimable value in time of adversity.

To make possible a far more satisfactory peace settlement for Japan, and to contribute greatly to the post-treaty security position of Japan in relation to the continent.

To lend resolution to many countries not only in Asia but also in Europe and the Middle East who are now living within the shadow of Communist power, and to let them know that they need not now rush to come to terms with Communism on whatever terms they can get, meaning complete submission.

To inspire those who may be called upon to fight against great odds if subjected to a sudden onslaught by the Soviet Union or by Communist China.

To lend point and urgency to the rapid build-up of the defense of the Western world.

To bring the United Nations through its first great effort in collective security and to produce a free-world coalition of incalculable value to the national security interests of the United States.

To alert the peoples behind the Iron Curtain that their masters are bent upon wars of aggression, and that this crime will be resisted by the free world.

On Monday, June 26, Washington ordered the evacuation of American citizens from Seoul and in a secret message by telecon that night ordered General MacArthur to send the United States air and sea forces into action. At noon the next day the president in anger told the press that it was plain that communism had passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and would now use armed invasion and war. He announced that, in addition to sending American forces into combat in Korea, he had ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa, had directed the reinforcement of United States bases in the Philippines, and had ordered the acceleration of military aid to Indo-China. When he read his

message to Congress that afternoon, the legislators cheered and the country applauded. Far away in Tokyo, General MacArthur objected to the irresponsibility but not the morality of the president's decision because the general felt that "we had no plan—no policy—nothing." The general admitted, however, that

the decision of President Truman lighted into flame a lamp of hope throughout Asia that was burning dimly toward extinction. It marked for the Far East the focal and turning point in this area struggling for freedom. It swept aside in one great monumental stroke all of the hypocrisy and the sophistry which has confused and deluded so many people distant from the actual scene.

That same day Seoul capitulated. The South Korean Army collapsed and 70 per cent of its personnel disappeared as casualties, prisoners, or deserters. Thousands of innocent civilian refugees joined the government in the long trek to the south. That night the Security Council passed a second resolution, with only Yugoslavia voting in the negative, which branded North Korea as an aggressor and recommended that the members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as might be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.

The United States tried one further diplomatic maneuver; it sent a note to the USSR asking the USSR to use its influence to call off the North Koreans. The Russians took the attitude that all UN activities were illegal because of the absence of the Russian delegate and the presence of the wrong Chinese delegation. The Russians maintained that the situation in Korea was an internal affair and therefore beyond the competence of the United Nations. The newspaper *Pravda* called President Truman's orders acts of aggression.

On Wednesday, June 28, the American Congress completed its legislation extending the draft and worked on an emergency budget. The same Congress which had refused \$150,000,000 for economic assistance appropriated \$6,000,000,000 for military activities. Secretary Acheson called the North Korean attack the "most cynical, brutal, naked attack by armed forces upon an undefended country that could occur." Senator Taft agreed with the administration in principle in its Korean policy, but he still believed that the president had usurped the powers of Congress in dispatching forces to Korea and he still called for the resignation of Secretary Acheson because of the "disastrous American policy in China." President Truman discounted Senator Taft's arguments and told the American people that they were not at war but were engaged in a police action under the United Nations.

On Friday, June 30, the president authorized the air force to attack specified military targets in North Korea, authorized the use of United States ground troops in the fighting, and ordered a naval blockade of the entire Korean coast. On July 7, the Security Council asked President Truman to establish a unified command for all the forces of the United Nations in Korea, and the next day the president appointed General MacArthur. Although the president had kept individual members of the Congress informed at every step, he did not present the official record to the Congress until July 19. By that time, sixteen nations had offered ground troops, naval units, or aircraft to participate in the fighting, and a dozen others had contributed food, clothing, or hospital units. The Chinese Nationalists offered soldiers, but the United Nations rejected the offer for reasons of military and political expediency.

The Korean War, one year of actual fighting, developed in six well-defined stages. In the first six weeks the Communist blitzkrieg drove the forces of the United Nations into a tiny area around Pusan. The second stage was a grim holding operation when a tiny push from Russians or Chinese might have cleared the entire peninsula. On September 15, General MacArthur initiated the third stage by a brilliant amphibious landing at Inchon, near Seoul. The Russian press sneered that a corporal could have commanded the operation because of the twenty-to-one advantage on the side of the United Nations. The counterattack swept on, recapturing Seoul, crossing the Thirty-eighth Parallel, and capturing the important cities of Wonsan, Hamhung, and Hungnam on the east coast. The general felt that the war would be over by Thanksgiving, and he comforted his shivering command with the hope that the boys might be home by Christmas. His troops captured the North Korean capital on October 19 and they pushed on to the shadow of the Manchurian border.

The fourth stage was in reality a new war. On November 26, 1950, thirty Chinese divisions launched a new offensive and rolled back the United Nations armies beyond Seoul. Correspondents wrote about the bleak, unadulterated misery of this land which corroded the human spirit and chilled the blood stream. General S. L. A. Marshall wrote:

Beyond the mountain there is only another mountain. Off the flank of the next ridge, there is only the next ridge. . . . But the greater part of Korea is up-ended in a complex of ridges, hogbacks, sugar-loaf peaks, and barren domes too low to be called mountains and too formidable to be classified as hills. . . . God got tired when He was making the world, hence Korea.

Hills and snows and bitter winds added to the miseries of retreat and death. General Matthew Ridgway came to the scene at just the right

time. He said some polite words about the United Nations and some very earnest words about why Americans must fight; then he introduced the note, "The job is to kill Chinese." This slogan dimmed the luster of the idealism but it electrified the fighting spirit of the troops.

In the fifth stage of the war, the men of the United Nations regrouped, liberated Seoul, and pushed the Chinese back across the parallel. Even victory brought casualties and destruction. The Republic of Korea Army, or the "ROKS," lost 50,000 killed, the Americans half that number, and the others suffered 2,500 dead. Wounded and missing were numbered in tens of thousands. Factories, homes, and entire cities were consumed by flames, to say nothing of the physical losses in North Korea due to thousands of bombing attacks. Korea paid a terrible price for its freedom, even if it did emerge from the war with the strongest, best-trained army which the free world had at its disposal in Asia. The last stage of the fighting was the stalemate in the vicinity of the Thirty-eighth Parallel.

The position of the United States among the United Nations with regard to Korean policy was no more than *primus inter pares*, or first among equals. Diplomatic decisions and military contributions were based upon free will and independent judgment. The British governments of Clement Attlee and Winston Churchill supported the American lead but they limited their help to capacity to pay. Their obligations in Europe, the Middle East, and Malaya crippled their military efforts in Korea. The British agreed to the moral condemnation of aggression, but they shied away from the imposition of embargoes or sanctions. They insisted upon the restriction of the area of conflict and approved the armistice. Prime Minister Churchill promised the American Congress "prompt, resolute, and effective action" if the armistice were violated. The British were hampered by the Bevan opposition in the House of Commons and by a China policy which recognized the government of Mao Tse-tung instead of the government of Chiang Kai-shek. France restrained its enthusiasm for Korea, because it felt that substance spent in Korea might be better utilized in Indo-China. In French eyes, Korea seemed distant and relatively unimportant. Of the Asians, Thailand, the Philippines, and Japan were most friendly toward American purposes and procedures. Japan in particular expressed its gratification at American action and stated that in two worlds in conflict, it would have been suicidal for the democracies to stand idly by. Japan pledged all possible co-operation to the United Nations. The Arab-Asian bloc differed with the United States on the importance of Korea and the cold war and strove unceasingly for a cease-fire and a negotiated settlement. It considered the United States as "precipitate and injudicious." India, in the person of Nehru and his dis-

tinguished representatives, advocated peace, localization of the conflict, and more consideration for the views of Red China.

All the while that fighting progressed, the Security Council and the General Assembly addressed themselves to the problems of Korea. The various commissions of the United Nations poured a stream of useful information into headquarters at New York and the commander in chief of the United Nations Army in Korea reported regularly about military affairs. The members of the political delegations naturally echoed the official policies of their respective countries, with the result that the rights of the rostrum and the microphone were often abused for propaganda purposes. Russian speeches denounced the United States for aggression in Asia, manipulation of the United Nations, germ warfare, bombing, and keeping the Peking government out of the United Nations. American speeches denounced the USSR for aggression, blocking action in the United Nations, and for trying to get the Peking government into the world organization.

On October 7, 1950, in the flush of victory, the General Assembly passed a basic resolution on Korea. It recommended that steps be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea; that all constituent acts be taken, including the holding of elections, for the establishment of a unified, independent, and democratic government in the sovereign state of Korea; that United Nations forces should not remain in Korea otherwise than so far as necessary for achieving the above objectives; and that all necessary measures be taken to accomplish the economic rehabilitation of Korea. The resolution set up a new United Nations Commission on Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK), and recommended that the Economic and Social Council make plans for long-term relief and rehabilitation measures. The resolution gave South Korea the assurance which President Rhee demanded to the effect that "a unified, independent, and democratic" government was the declared objective of the United Nations. The resolution allayed his fears that the powers would content themselves with a compromise with the aggressors and accept the continuance of a divided Korea. But the resolution side-stepped the issue whether the forces of the United Nations should drive on to the Manchurian border. The Indian delegate warned that crossing the Thirty-eighth Parallel would jeopardize the strategic interests of China and provoke Chinese intervention. Therefore, the resolution used the phrase, "ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea," which General MacArthur promptly interpreted as a green light to advance to the Yalu River.

On November 10 the Security Council called attention to the grave consequences of the Chinese intervention and passed the Korean problem

to the General Assembly. The Assembly set up a United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) and requested the president of the General Assembly to appoint a group of three persons to determine the basis on which a satisfactory cease-fire could be arranged. Just after the fall of Seoul to the Chinese (January 4, 1951), the Assembly proposed a conference on Korea and other Far Eastern problems. It was impossible to reach a satisfactory settlement with the Chinese on either the cease-fire arrangements or the conference proposals, so the General Assembly, on February 1, passed a resolution which condemned China for engaging in aggression in Korea. The resolution also requested the Good Offices Committee to continue its efforts to seek a peaceful settlement and authorized a Collective Measures Committee to explore the possibility of sanctions. This resolution was a lead from weakness because the existing military balance of forces disclosed the improbability of victory and underscored the attractiveness of an armistice.

From the field, General MacArthur informed Washington that in his opinion there was no substitute for victory and that victory would require the risk of total war. He recommended four further measures: reconnaissance flights over the coast of China and Manchuria; bombing Chinese supply routes, coastal cities, and the privileged sanctuary in Manchuria; an economic and naval blockade of China; and the use of the troops of Chiang Kai-shek for diversionary pressures on the mainland of China.

Washington rejected these recommendations on grounds of political—not military—strategy. Some allies of the United States doubted the efficacy of the MacArthur recommendations and feared the possible moral reactions on the part of Asians. The secretary of defense opposed the risk of inciting the USSR and China to invoke their alliance, and the chief of staff said that a war against China would be the wrong war in the wrong place at the wrong time against the wrong enemy. Denied, in his judgment, the possibility of victory, General MacArthur sought to arrange a military truce with his adversary. President Truman believed General MacArthur to be unco-operative and insubordinate and relieved the distinguished general of all his posts in the Far East.

The resulting political furor scarcely interfered with the continuing processes of exerting political pressures on the enemy and probing for a possible armistice. On May 18, 1951, the General Assembly recommended that every state apply an embargo on the shipment to North Korea and Communist China of arms, ammunition, implements of war, atomic energy materials, petroleum, transportation materials of strategic value, and items useful in the production of arms, ammunition, and implements of war. This recommendation permitted each state to draw up its


own list of strategic or critical materials and led to bitter arguments between those who favored a liberal interpretation (Hongkong, for example) and those who wanted an absolute embargo on all trade, direct or indirect, with the enemy.

After invitations and taunts, the Soviet delegate to the United Nations on June 23, 1951, told an American radio audience that "the Soviet peoples further believe that the most acute problem of the present day—the problem of the armed conflict in Korea—could be settled." He suggested that discussions should be started between the belligerents for a cease-fire and an armistice providing for the mutual withdrawal of forces from the Thirty-eighth Parallel. Within a month, the long, bitter struggle for an armistice began in the primitive, isolated tent cities of Kaesong and Panmunjom.

Fighting for Peace

Incidents occurred and casualties mounted even while discussions dragged on. Neither side was victorious in the fighting, so neither side could impose its will on the other at the conference table. There was no substitute for endless bickering, name-calling, and propaganda. It took months to determine that the demarcation line should be the existing battle front rather than the Thirty-eighth Parallel and to reach agreement on measures to prevent renewed outbreak of hostilities. These measures included the definition of the demilitarized zone, provision for neutral inspection teams, construction of air fields, rotation of troops, and designation of ports of entry. It required more months to discuss political recommendations which the armistice terms should make to the governments involved and to set up satisfactory procedures for the exchange of prisoners of war. The deadlock was broken only after a new administration came into power in the United States and after Malenkov succeeded to the position of Stalin in Russia.

When in the spring of 1953 both sides indicated a genuine inclination to compromise, President Rhee showed concern lest he be deserted by the United States and the United Nations. He demanded a defense pact with the United States, a positive commitment of American aid and guarantees of Korean unification, and the withdrawal of Chinese troops as prerequisites for an armistice. On June 6 President Eisenhower told the fiery patriarch that the United States would negotiate a defense pact *after* the armistice and would have to place the matters of unification and Chinese withdrawal before a political conference. He said bluntly that acceptance



of the armistice was required of the United Nations and of the Republic of Korea.

President Rhee looked upon the approach of the armistice as a death warrant for the Korean nation, and he backed the Korean Assembly which voted a resolution by 129 to 0 to reject any armistice plan which would not implement President Rhee's proposals. In Seoul noisy mobs shouted, "Go Home, Damned Yankees" and "*Buk chin*," or "Drive on to the North." President Rhee, on his own responsibility, released 25,000 prisoners without consulting the United Nations Command or waiting for the agreed-upon armistice terms to become effective. In anger he warned that he would pull his troops out of the United Nations Command if the truce were effected against his will. A representative of the Department of State journeyed to Seoul to mollify President Rhee before the armistice was signed on July 27, 1953.

The armistice provided for (1) establishment of a neutral zone; (2) a cease-fire; (3) withdrawal of forces from designated coastal islands and waters; (4) no reinforcements; (5) a Military Armistice Commission, composed of five officers from each side, to supervise the armistice and settle any violations; (6) a Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission composed of officers of Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, and Czechoslovakia; (7) a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission composed of officers of Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and India and a regular procedure for repatriation of prisoners of war; (8) the convening within three months of a political conference of representatives of both sides to negotiate on the withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea and the peaceful settlement of the Korean question and others.

The sixteen nations which provided troops for the United Nations in Korea—Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States—declared formally on the same day that they would support efforts to bring about a unified, independent, and democratic Korea and would work with the United Nations in assisting the people of Korea to repair the ravages of war. They affirmed that "if there is a renewal of the armed attack . . . we should be united and prompt to resist. The consequences of such a breach of the armistice would be so grave that in all probability it would not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea."

President Rhee expressed his apprehension about the "appeasers in the bosom of the United Nations who perched on the branches of the tree of freedom and constantly hatcheted at its trunk," and he demanded bilateral

understandings with the United States as additional guarantees for the security of Korea. On October 1, 1953, the United States and Korea signed a mutual defense treaty which required the parties to consult together whenever either one "is of the opinion that the political independence or security of either is threatened by external armed attack." The heart of the treaty was worded as follows:

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on each of the Parties in territories now under their administrative control, or hereafter recognized by one of the respective Parties as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

This wording was designed to restrain South Korea and at the same time to take cognizance of the possibility of an eventual unification of Korea by processes recognized as lawful by the United States. The treaty accorded the United States the right to dispose of land, sea, and air forces in and about the territory of Korea as determined by future mutual agreement. Unlike the American treaty with Japan, there was in the treaty with Korea no obligation to participate in the internal security of the Korean Republic or to take any military measures as a result of the violent overthrow of the government or a *coup d'état*. There was, in fact, no obligation for the United States to maintain any armed forces whatsoever in Korea.

The United States initiated a five-year, billion-dollar assistance program to supplement the relief and rehabilitation activities of the Korean government, the United Nations Civil Assistance Command (UNCAC, later KCAC or Korean Civil Assistance Command), and the United Nations Korean Rehabilitation Agency (UNKRA). The facts of economic destruction and distress overshadowed the facts of liberation and national salvation. Since the outbreak of the war, more than a million civilians in South Korea had lost their lives, hundreds of villages had gone up in smoke, 2,500,000 had become homeless refugees, and 5,000,000 helpless, heart-broken creatures had come to depend in whole or in part upon relief to stay alive. The details of economic chaos duplicated the worst features of postwar China. Retail prices increased 7,200 per cent from 1947 to 1954, with all the suffering, bribing, and black-marketing which that ugly fact implied.

The resources and capacities of battered Korea could not have been expected to cope with the tasks of economic reconstruction. The Korean government made impressive budgetary appropriations and printed vast quantities of paper money, but throughout the war period it relied upon

UNCAC for immediate relief and upon UNKRA for longer-range rehabilitation. Koreans tried in vain to participate in the control of disbursement and to direct reconstruction into spectacular projects. The government of President Rhee was obliged to turn to the United States for direct assistance because of the inadequacy and the uncertainty of UNKRA's budget. In response, the United States designated an economic co-ordinator to serve as the representative in Korea for the Foreign Operations Administration and as the overseer of all activities of KCAC, UNKRA, and private philanthropic agencies. On December 14, 1953, the economic co-ordinator signed with the government of Korea an *Economic Reconstruction and Financial Stabilization Agreement* which was designed to halt inflation and stimulate recovery. The agreement created a Combined Economic Board, consisting of the American economic co-ordinator and the Korean prime minister, which gave the Korean government a voice in the gigantic program of imports and construction. By the end of 1954 ships bound for Korea carried cargoes of building materials, machinery, plants, and equipment, in the hope of providing Korea with a sound economic basis for a brighter political future.

Politics within Korea clouded the prospects for an independent, unified, and democratic government. President Rhee commanded the support of Korea's masses and he could always rally "the people" against "the politicians." He considered himself as the patriot and he brooked no opposition in his interpretation of Korea's vital interests. His political opponents looked upon his totalitarianism as a continuation of the brutality and corruption which they had endured too long under the Japanese. In spite of their objections to his policies, they had no choice except to submit to his leadership.

In 1952, when time approached for the election of the president by the Assembly, President Rhee proposed two constitutional amendments, one providing for a bicameral legislature and the other providing for the direct election of the president by the people. Many assemblymen objected. Some were arrested on various charges and others were made targets of public demonstrations. A few officials resigned or fled in fear of their lives, but most bowed to the will of the president. Both amendments were approved by the Assembly but the second one was not put into effect. On August 10, 1952, President Rhee was selected by an overwhelming majority in Korea's first popular presidential election. Thereafter, he dominated internal politics as completely as he controlled foreign affairs. He dictated financial policies and he became the unchallenged master of Korea's powerful army. In 1954 President Rhee's party won a two-thirds majority of the National Assembly, a victory which throttled the opposition

for another two years at least. In view of the long colonial background of Korea, the personality of its president, and the cruel facts of political inexperience, economic crises, war, and invasion, it was difficult to breathe life into Korea's democratic forms and procedures.

Article 60 of the armistice agreement recommended that a political conference of both sides be held to settle the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, and so forth. The "so forth" failed to specify whether the conference should discuss questions limited to Korea, as the United Nations desired, or questions about the entire Far East, as the Communists demanded. The General Assembly of the United Nations undertook to implement Article 60 and recommended that the United States government should arrange with the other side for the political conference to be held as soon as possible. The president of the United States sent a former law partner of Secretary of State Dulles, Arthur Dean, to Panmunjom to fix with the Communists the place, time, and composition of the conference. After more than two months of bitter wrangling, Mr. Dean left the preliminary talks in indignation. On February 18, 1954, the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, France, the United States, and the USSR, meeting in Berlin, proposed a conference to meet in Geneva to reach a settlement of the Korean question and to discuss the problem of restoring peace in Indo-China.

Negotiations for peace in Korea were more baffling than the earlier efforts to reach the armistice agreement. Delegates from the USSR, Red China, and North Korea met in Geneva on April 26, 1954, with the delegates from the United Nations. Mr. Eden tried to emphasize the common desire for unification and peace, but neither side was willing to depart from its own proposals. Nam Il, of North Korea, suggested a plan for nationwide elections which Mr. Dulles called a Chinese copy of the Soviet scheme for the unification of Germany. Dr. Pyun Yung Tai, of South Korea, repeated his firm opposition to any "sell-out" or "Munich-style appeasement." Mr. Dulles took an uncompromising stand against "any surrender at the conference table at Geneva of the freedom for which so many fought and died." Mr. Eden suggested that because of no possible agreement on the authority of the United Nations and the principle of free elections, the Korean question should be returned to the United Nations.

On November 27, 1953, President Rhee in the course of a visit to Formosa announced with Chiang Kai-shek their determination to mobilize all their resources to defeat the aggressor in Asia. He declared that there could be no peace for Korea as long as there was one Chinese soldier on Korean soil. He said, "I am not bluffing," and added, "We must march

to the Yalu to fight, whether against Chinese or Russians." He would never admit that his real enemies were his distressed brethren in the north and he reserved his spleen for their foreign masters.

With all his stubbornness, he exhibited a keen appreciation of the possible and the practical as contrasted with the ideal. He confessed that "guilty feelings haunt us day and night, because the current international situation does not permit us to take the action we so desperately want to take."

He had no patience with the Geneva Conference and commented that it was beyond reason that any intelligent, free man could look at the record of the Communists and still maintain that there was any point in negotiations. In June, 1954, he invited eight nations to an unofficial anti-Communist conference at his summer capital in Chinhae and told the delegates:

If we stand on principles of right and justice and on the determination to defend the Pacific world and Asia against Communist aggression, we will not lack for support. . . . I am fully confident that the people of the United States and all the rest of the free world will co-operate and will stand together in a great crusade to end oppression and bring that world of tomorrow into existence today.

In a bellicose mood, President Rhee said that he was ready in a moment's notice to send two divisions into Indo-China and that he believed that the United States would supply the arms, munitions, and implements of war if Asians would take up the fight against Asians. He appealed for "action—now—tomorrow may be too late." He came to the United States in late summer, 1954, and appealed to the American people to support his call for an immediate military crusade. The silence of the American response further embittered his soul and sent him home a disillusioned and saddened statesman.

He understood the repugnance of the entire world for the method of war and the preference of his own people for the paths of peace. He gloried in the endurance and resiliency of the Koreans in their cruel circumstances, and he recognized that the auspicious settlement of Korea's problems was far beyond the human frailties of these rather heroic pawns in the game of power politics. In his own lifetime he wished to accomplish unification for all his people who were of "one race, one language, and one culture." The job of reconstruction challenged every ounce of President Rhee's amazing vitality. Perhaps the former Christian minister shared a faith that the ways of his people were right and would triumph in spite of his inability to see exactly how or when.

Suggested Reading

- JOHN CALDWELL IN COLLABORATION WITH LESLEY FROST, *The Korea Story* (Chicago, 1952).
- RENE CUTFORTH, *Korean Reporter* (London, 1952).
- LELAND M. GOODRICH, "Korea, Collective Measures against Aggression," *International Conciliation Pamphlet No. 494* (New York, 1953).
- ANDREW J. GRAJDANZEV, *Modern Korea* (New York, 1944).
- KOREAN AFFAIRS INSTITUTE, *The Voice of Korea* (monthly Washington).
- GEORGE M. MCCUNE, *Korea Today* (Cambridge, Mass., 1950).
- S. L. A. MARSHALL, *The River and the Gauntlet* (New York, 1953).
- JAMES MICHENER, *The Bridges at Toko-Ri* (New York, 1953).
- ROBERT T. OLIVER, *Syngman Rhee* (New York, 1954).
- CORNELIUS B. OSGOOD, *The Koreans and Their Culture* (New York, 1951).
- JACQUES SOUSTELLE, "Indo-China and Korea: One Front," *Foreign Affairs* (New York, October, 1950).
- ADLAI E. STEVENSON, "Korea in Perspective," *Foreign Affairs* (New York, April, 1952).
- I. F. STONE, *The Hidden History of the Korean War* (New York, 1952).
- DONALD G. TEWKSBURY, compiler, *Source Materials on Korean Politics and Ideologies* (New York, 1950).
- UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, *Korea and the United Nations* (New York, 1950).
- U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, *Guide to the United Nations in Korea*, Publication 4299, *Far Eastern Series 47* (Washington, 1951).
- U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, *United States Policy in the Korean Conflict*, Publication 4263, *Far Eastern Series 44* (Washington, 1951).
- U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, *United States Policy in the Korean Crisis*, Publication 3922, *Far Eastern Series 34* (Washington, 1950).
- U. S. SENATE, *The Mutual Defense Treaty with Korea*, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, 1954).
- U. S. SENATE, *The United States and the Korean Problem*, Documents 1943-1953, Senate Document No. 74, 83rd Congress, 1st Session (Washington, 1953).

CHAPTER 34

The USSR and Communist Imperialism

During World War II, the common enmity to Hitlerite Germany and to Japan guaranteed a basic unity between the USSR and the Western Allies in spite of their rivalries and divergent approaches to world affairs. Russian soldiers fought for their lives and perished by the hundreds of thousands in the bitter battles against invaders who slaughtered their people, burned their cities, destroyed their crops, and despoiled their homes. Stalingrad became a symbol of victory and the Red Army a synonym for military might. The West saluted the USSR as a fellow-guardian of peace and freedom, but the USSR never deviated from its conviction that the war itself was no more than a recurring crisis in the development of monopoly capitalism. France and the United Kingdom joined the USSR in long-term treaties of alliance and mutual aid, and the United States extended billions in lend-lease; but the Soviet government limited its co-operation to the immediate necessities of survival.

As a result of the war, the USSR struggled to make its frontiers impregnable and to extend as far as possible its outer zone of influence and control. It gained by annexation Petsamo, Karelia, Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Koenigsberg, East Poland, Ruthenia, Bukovina, and Bessarabia in the west and the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin in the east. It occupied zones in Germany, Austria, and North Korea, and through its armies and political manipulations converted Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, and Czechoslovakia into satellites. The Western nations tried to convince themselves that the aims of the USSR were essentially defensive and that the Russians were not interested in any insane ambition to rule the world.

On January 28, 1945, the *New York Times* declared that Russia in cross-

ing the Oder served a common purpose and that, regardless of suspicions, jealousies, and possibly conflicting aims, "our armies fight for Russia on the Western front and hers fight for us on the Eastern front." The paper continued, "The historic choice was between a strong Russia and a strong Nazi Germany. It has been made and well made." As Winston Churchill's suspicions arose, he said, "Terrible indeed would be the fortunes of mankind if some awful schism arose between the Western democracies and the Russian people, if all future world organizations were rent asunder and a new cataclysm of inconceivable violence destroyed what is left of the treaties and liberties of mankind."

The USSR manifested no such worries and concentrated on the strengthening of its power position. It abandoned any idea of the withering away of the state as long as its capitalist enemies encircled the Socialist fatherland. Stalin permitted no relaxation to his weary and dispirited people and he drove them ruthlessly toward grandiose military and economic goals. He sketched an ambitious Five-Year Plan and then heartlessly announced that it would take three such Five-Year Plans to stand up to the United States. He used the economic monopolism of the state, the severity and ubiquity of the secret police, and the iron discipline of the party to perfect his internal dictatorship. He took advantage of the siege psychology to counteract internal tensions and he conjured up visions of a brighter tomorrow and a gaining revolution as incentives to greater sacrifice. He played the game of power politics in the east, the south, and the west. When checked in Europe, he brought pressure in the Middle East, and when thwarted in the Middle East, he achieved astounding success in Manchuria and the rest of China.

The USSR, like the United States, faced the dilemma of Europe-first or Asia-first. The collapse of Germany and Japan exposed the flanks of the USSR, and the strong military build-up in western Europe engendered feverish activity in the Baltic, Germany, Poland, and the Balkans. Airplane assembly lines, shipyards, arsenals, tank factories, oil refineries, and steel mills were spaced to supply European Russia first as the area of greater danger. No friendly power appeared in Europe as China appeared in Asia, and the USSR seemed effectively debarred from the industrial potential of the Ruhr and from the assistance of the skilled proletariat of Italy, Belgium, and France. China's millions gave a psychological boost to the Russians, but they constituted an economic liability and a military question mark. Chinese man power could fight, but it drained the USSR for supplies and equipment. As China grew in strength, it insisted upon the control of the Asian power fulcrum in Manchuria for itself and it rivaled the USSR for the position of primacy in the border areas. Russia's

uneasiness about the pro-Western orientation of Japan overbalanced its satisfaction in the spread of Communists into Southeast Asia. Japan represented military potential, industrial might, and technical know-how, while Southeast Asia offered strategic position, untrained peoples, and underdeveloped resources. The bargaining power of the USSR at the conference table was greater with regard to Asia than to Europe because of the multiplicity of Western views about Asia. The Far East was at a greater and safer distance from Moscow, and Moscow was the heart and soul of the Soviet state and the world revolution. The USSR saw Europe as a tinder box of world conflagration and Asia as a low, smoldering fire.

In the postwar period, the USSR argued and fought for the greatest possible sphere of influence among the great powers, and it posed as the "unchangeable champion of peace, freedom, and independence of peoples." It spoke of its own camp as the camp of the democracies and the opponent's camp as the camp of the imperialist aggressors. It utilized all the tactics of military threat, propaganda, and economic and financial pressure as adjuncts to diplomacy, and it demonstrated all the adamant attitude, inconsistency, and obstructionism which had characterized the Communists before the war. The USSR rejected the liberal doctrines of the nineteenth century based on appeals to justice and reason, and reverted to the older concepts of absolute sovereignty and unbridled power. Its weakness or sense of insecurity as compared to its American rival drove it to extremes of pettiness, suspicion, and unilateral action. Wartime co-operation was replaced by an atmosphere of rivalry in the political arena. Soviet policies reflected no abstract love of peace and stability, but they evidenced a cautious, persistent pressure toward the disruption of all rival influence. Russian procedures of vilification and prevarication and their reliance upon chaos in the guise of liberation precluded any opportunity for diplomatic intimacy or friendly intercourse.

The USSR dealt one way with its satellites and another toward outsiders, and it always recognized Communist-dominated regimes in other states on the theory that any other kind of government would *ipso facto* fail to represent the interests of the people. The USSR relied upon old-fashioned intrigue to play off one capitalist power against another, to prevent an anti-Soviet coalition, to encourage colonial rebellions (in the name of nationalism), and to keep the Western world at the nervous edge of crisis just short of the danger of global war. The USSR seemed to reason that time was on its side and that it could afford to disregard the compulsions of a timetable. It refused to be hurried or pushed into any peace arrangements with regard to Austria, Germany, or Japan, and it acted

patently in its own selfish interest in the United Nations. It opposed plans for limitation of armaments and control of atomic weapons, displayed a studied recalcitrance in matters of international commissions, played practically a lone hand with regard to the questions of Iran, Greece, Indonesia, and Korea, and withheld its support from many of the specialized agencies. It exercised the veto repeatedly, particularly against the requests for admission of new states like Portugal, Ireland, Trans-Jordan, Italy, Austria, Finland, Ceylon, Nepal, and the Republic of Korea.

In the postwar period, the USSR continued and magnified the dual nature of its foreign policy—it was directed toward the vital interests of the Soviet state (Russian imperialism) and toward the rapid achievement of the world revolution (Communist materialism). Communists looked upon the United States as their implacable, ideological enemy. Diplomatic *detentes* or military ventures were always weighed in the light of their effect upon the inner strength or power position of the United States. Policies in peripheral areas like Korea or Southeast Asia were not determined by theoretic correctness, moral equities, abstract justice, or the welfare of indigenous peoples, but by the major overriding consideration which was the destruction of the capitalist system and its American stronghold.

In his speech on the thirty-sixth anniversary of the October Revolution (November 6, 1953), Kliment E. Voroshilov, President of the Supreme Soviet, stated: "One of the most important conditions for the victorious building of Communism in our country is the further strengthening of the Soviet state. . . . We must perfect the work of the soviets, must strengthen their ties with the broad masses of the people . . . [and] must strengthen in every way the armed forces of the Soviet state." He castigated the United States for its "filthily unbridled, slanderous campaign against the USSR" and praised the USSR as "a mighty bulwark of the oppressed peoples of the Far East in their struggle for freedom, democracy, and genuine independence." But his closing salute was to peace among peoples everywhere. "Under the banner of Lenin and Stalin, under the leadership of the Communist Party—forward, toward the victories of Communism."

As Stalin had written, "The world revolutionary movement consists of the Soviet Union plus the Communist movement everywhere else. The place of the Soviet Union is that of a part in a larger whole, more important than any other part, but not so important as the whole." The possibilities of expansion either of the power of the Soviet state or of world communism were directly related to the balance of forces in Asia and in the world at large.

For a brief time during World War II, it seemed as if the USSR had agreed to abandon its international revolutionary activities. On June 10,

1943, the Communist International or Comintern was officially disbanded "to expose the lie of the Hitlerites that Moscow intended to intervene in the life of other nations." The Comintern was a league of Communist parties which had an office in Moscow with a Secretariat and a powerful Central Executive Committee. It was dominated by the Communist party of the USSR. But it had become unnecessary, or at least embarrassing to a country which in desperation sought extensive aid from its capitalistic allies.

On October 5, 1947, the Comintern reappeared as a Communist Information Bureau or "Cominform," a center for the exchange of ideas and experience. The manifesto of its establishment said that the Cominform had become advisable because the United States and Great Britain had lost sight of their war aims of building strong democracies in Europe and Asia, liquidating fascism, and preventing renewed aggression, and had substituted different goals of eliminating Germany and Japan from the world market and consolidating their own dominant position. The Cominform offered an international headquarters for planning, manipulating, and synchronizing the movements of Communists throughout the world.

The Communists, through their quasi-military organization and tactics, expanded phenomenally. In 1917, when the Bolsheviks represented extremist offshoots of the Russian Social Democratic party, they numbered 80,000 adherents within Russia and an insignificant scattering of supporters abroad. Within less than four decades they grew in strength until they gained control of the governments of one third of the population and one quarter of the area of the world. The Communist movement consisted of a vast network of national Communist parties with some 24,000,000 members in sixty countries. The network was enhanced by a variety of national and international mass organizations playing direct and indirect roles, wittingly or unwittingly, in the global Communist conspiracy for world dominion. The growth was a story of spurts and setbacks, marked by an inexplicable capacity to survive through adversity and an uncanny ability on the part of a highly disciplined hard core to influence "fellow-travelers," to disrupt the ordinary processes of government, and (as in China) to gain and exercise dominion over thousands of millions of their compatriots.

Communist, as distinct from Russian, objectives in the Far East were conditioned by the military victories which they achieved in China, the desire of Asians for improvement as opposed to the coalescence of non-Communist forces, and the determination of the West to resist as shown in Korea. The Communists tried specifically to alienate Asians from the West, win Asian support for world Communist policies, persuade Asians to lean to one side toward the USSR, weaken non-Communist regimes, unleash

military operations wherever advisable, and create a potential everywhere for the armed struggle which they assumed to be inevitable. Their tactics varied from legal, parliamentary participation in government, as in Japan and Indonesia, to the waging of civil war, as in China, Malaya, Burma, Korea, and Indo-China. Everywhere they resorted to agitation among the underprivileged, the armed forces, and the labor unions. They welcomed anyone on their side who was not irrevocably committed to the camp of their enemies.

In the postwar period, the Communists made spectacular progress, but they committed avoidable errors. Their promises seemed attractive, but their callousness produced bristling reactions. The Communists were not particularly foresighted, but they were adroit in taking advantage of the mistakes of the West. They capitalized on the opportunities afforded by the kaleidoscopic changes in the world situation. They were handicapped in the same manner if not to the same extent as the West by inadequate knowledge, indecision, shortsightedness, and opportunism. Their propaganda owed its success to its adaptation to local conditions rather than to any particular technical skill or ideological appeal.

The Nineteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR met in October, 1952, with delegates present from forty-four countries. It made no significant pronouncements which clarified or modified classic lines on such issues as coexistence and the inevitability of war. Stalin gave between fifteen and twenty interviews after 1946 affirming his belief in peaceful coexistence of capitalism and communism and he left the warmongering and saber-rattling to lesser figures. He told a correspondent of the *New York Times* in 1953, at the beginning of a new year and a new administration in the United States, "I still believe that war between the United States of America and the Soviet Union cannot be considered inevitable, and that our countries can continue to live in peace."

His assurances did not erase the effect of Lenin's dogmas that "coexistence is unthinkable," that "coexistence is a manifestation of strategic calculation," nor his own order on the day (May 1, 1946) when he warned the Soviet people "not to forget for a single minute the intrigues of international reaction which are hatching plans for a new war." Eugene Varga also wrote that the fact that the Soviet Union and the highly developed capitalist states were in the same camp during the war only meant that the struggle was relaxed and did not signify, of course, that the struggle was ended. Stalin expressed his confidence that the capitalist states could no longer encircle the USSR even if they wanted to and that the capitalists would fight among themselves and perish of their own weakness. The wise

tactics described in the magazine, *The Bolshevik*, on September 15, 1948, were to

avoid a decisive encounter whenever one is not yet ready for combat; but never overlook a single opportunity to engage the enemy in combat when it is to the enemy's disadvantage; keep the enemy constantly tense, disorganize and demoralize his forces; and at the same time temper and increase one's own forces in daily battles with the enemy.

The Moscow University Herald of December 9, 1951, set forth a seven-point blueprint for Communist aggression. It began with instructions to incite nationalism and to promote a United Front and traced the steps to complete Communist domination. Its philosophy—"remember that true national independence can be achieved only in unity with the Soviet Union; there is no third, middle, or neutral road"—denied the possibility of neutralism and of coexistence.

On March 11, 1953, Stalin died. Correspondents reported that Russians spoke in hushed whispers because they had lost their leader—and the Russians seem to have need of a great leader. Stalin was the balance wheel, the symbol of the Soviet state, and, by implication, of the eventual triumph of communism. The transfer of power was a delicate operation which resulted in the elimination of Beria and the selection of Malenkov as Stalin's successor. Malenkov purged Beria's followers throughout the world, apparently curbed the secret police, relaxed party discipline, and inflated the prestige of the army. He attempted to ease the internal tensions which had accumulated through the years of privation and austerity. He ordered the manufacture of more consumers' goods and more consideration for the welfare of the peasants. He reduced taxes, lowered prices, and scaled down the quotas to be delivered by individuals to the state. He followed fundamental Stalin lines in diplomacy, but he manifested a conciliatory attitude which permitted the conclusion of armistices in Korea and Indo-China. He announced his view that coexistence was possible and that there were no insoluble differences between the USSR and the Western world. On February 9, 1955 Malenkov resigned in favor of Marshal Bulganin. Marshal Zhukov became chief of the Soviet defense forces and party-boss Nikita Krushchev loomed as the real power behind the administrative screen.

Soviet Policy and China

At the close of World War II, Stalin was skeptical of the ability of the Chinese Communists, and he went out of his way to indicate that the

United States was the only power with resources available for helping Chinese reconstruction. He assured the world that he had no ambitions in Manchuria or Sinkiang and he promised his support to Chiang Kai-shek. He was less cool toward the Chinese Communists than the Chinese Communists were toward him. He described the August 14, 1945, treaties with Kuomintang China as evidences of his unqualified respect for the national sovereignty of his neighbors and an appropriate manifestation of the Sino-Soviet friendship that Sun Yat-sen had stressed in his deathbed message. He suggested no more than representation for the Chinese Communists in a coalition, and he limited his support of the Communists for fear of provoking American intervention.

By September 10, 1945, when the fighting ended in Manchuria, the Soviet high command announced that it had captured 594,000 prisoners, including 148 generals, had killed 80,000 Japanese, and had captured quantities of weapons, including 825 aircraft and 369 tanks. The Russians used their own men, Japanese technicians, and Chinese laborers to strip the Manchurian industries and in supreme irony decorated their headquarters with huge portraits of Stalin, Lenin, Sun Yat-sen, and Chiang Kai-shek. Their deliberate policy of destroying the military and industrial potential seemed to indicate that they did not expect Manchuria to be in friendly hands after Russian withdrawal, or that they did not want to see the master of Manchuria inherit a powerful, independent economic machine. While the Russians protested their support for Chiang Kai-shek and repeated their devotion to the principle of noninterference in internal affairs, they turned over or connived at turning over vast quantities of arms and equipment to the Chinese Communists. The joint declaration of the Council of Foreign Ministers at Moscow in December, 1945, was the last formal agreement on China policy between the USSR and the Western Allies.

The USSR approved the objectives of the Marshall mission, but Russian policies in Manchuria and clandestine encouragement of the Communists aroused the antagonism of the Kuomintang. When the Russian armies withdrew from Manchuria before April, 1946, they left behind a situation of civil war which guaranteed the preservation of their own economic interests. Soviet agencies like the Far Eastern Bank, the Far Eastern Trading Company, and the Far Eastern Transportation and Warehousing Company were established. Soviet officers exchanged their uniforms and shoulder straps for civilian jobs and attractive salaries. Discharged soldiers remained to guard sequestered properties and White Russians en masse were offered Soviet citizenship. The Soviet officials manifested the deep-seated distrust and contempt for Chinese officialdom

which had characterized the attitude of the czarists. The USSR showed that it intended to keep in its own hands the control of the Manchurian cradle of conflict and the security of its 2,000 miles of border with the USSR. The USSR determined to prevent the Kuomintang conquest of China's own territory, Manchuria, and to forestall the possibly ensuing economic encroachments of American engineers, railway specialists, transportation technicians, or mining experts. Throughout the entire year of 1946, the USSR preferred to rely upon its own power and its own devices, and in its press accounts treated the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists in approximately the same manner and with the same caution. It was in no hurry to shift from its avowed policy of assistance to the central government. The USSR made sure of its power position before re-emphasizing the interest of the revolution.

The USSR blamed most of the ills of China on the American interventionists, and gradually began to mention "the American puppets, the Kuomintang reactionaries." It called attention to General Marshall's statement in Honolulu on his way home from China to the effect that there was no evidence of Russian support to the Chinese Communists. In early 1947 the Russians gave increasing publicity to the deepening economic and financial crisis in China, and after the failure of the Marshall mission unsuccessfully tried to place the China question on the agenda of the Council of Foreign Ministers. But it required the convincing military victories of the Chinese Communists in 1948 to induce the Russians to adopt unreservedly the themes of Kuomintang tyranny, Communist reforms in the liberated areas, and American aggressiveness.

The USSR maintained correct diplomatic relations with the Chiang Kai-shek government until the very moment of proclamation of the People's Republic. Even after the collapse of Chiang's power in Manchuria and North China, the USSR was reported to have counseled the Chinese Communists to carry on limited war on a guerilla basis. This would have obliged the Kuomintang to call on the United States for continuing aid, and in the Russian view a losing war was better than a lost war. The Chinese Communists themselves determined to wage total war for the control of the entire country. The Russians were not certain of complete and immediate victory for the Chinese Communists even at the time Chiang turned over the reins of government to Li Tsung-jen, although the Russians refused to respond to last-minute desperation attempts on the part of the Kuomintang to elicit mediation.

The Russians changed their policies abruptly and radically in the spring of 1949. They acknowledged the fact of the success of the Chinese Communists and welcomed the Chinese Communists conspicuously into

fuller participation in the international Communist movement. They featured the Chinese delegations in conferences of the World Federation of Trade Unions and in World Peace Congresses. Their theorists explained the orthodoxy of the Chinese revolution and the identity of purpose between China and the USSR. On October 2, 1949, the USSR withdrew its recognition from the Kuomintang and recognized the Communist regime.

They hesitated to admit that the Chinese "New Democracy" should be an acceptable substitute for the Russian revolutionary model in Asia, and they preferred to assign to China a leading role in an Asian Cominform rather than to risk a preponderant Chinese influence in the European prototype. And when the Chinese delegation came to Moscow to negotiate the new political and economic accords in February, 1950, it was Stalin himself who conducted the negotiations with Mao Tse-tung. The Chinese Communists received more liberal terms from the USSR than the Kuomintang had received in the agreements of 1945, and Molotov hailed the new Sino-Soviet friendship as a "mighty force for the consolidation of universal peace such as has no equal and never had an equal in human history." The Russians replaced the portraits of Chiang Kai-shek and Sun Yat-sen with those of Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai, at the entrance of the old Imperial Hotel in Mukden.

The Russians took up the cudgel for the Chinese People's Republic on the international stage and immediately lashed out against Secretary Acheson's "mendacious and crudely slanderous statement" that the USSR was detaching the border areas from China. The economic assistance given to China and the technical advisers were less spectacular than the championship of China's diplomatic cause which the USSR assumed. The Russians did their best to convince the Chinese that the Chinese had no other friends in the world, and that together the Russians and the Chinese must oppose the imperialist, aggressive schemes of the United States and the United Kingdom in Asia. The United States was specifically blamed for depriving Communist China of Formosa, creating a new menace in Japan, sponsoring a reactionary anti-Communist coalition, and keeping Communist China out of the United Nations. Every Chinese diplomatic maneuver on the Asian continent received the Russian approval.

The Russian delegate to the United Nations began his crusade to unseat the Nationalist representation of China in favor of a Communist immediately after the establishment of the Peking regime. Vishinsky's attacks abandoned all pretense to diplomatic courtesy. His attitude was, "If they say I use slanderous words, it is because I mean them. I will call provocations, provocations, rather than walk through the amusement sections of

literary gardens." When the Russians failed in their objective, they boycotted the meetings of the Security Council and other agencies where Kuomintang delegates were present. Their strategy backfired because the absence of the Russians during June and July, 1950, enabled the Security Council to take nonvetoed action in the matter of Korea. When on August 1, 1950, the Russian delegate returned to assume his position in the Security Council, he succeeded in thwarting effective united action by his uninhibited application of red tape.

While supporting Communist China abroad, the USSR gave ample evidence that it was determined not to lose the support and good will of Mao Tse-tung as it had alienated Tito. The USSR treated Communist China as a junior partner rather than as a satellite. It paid lip service to equality in its treaty relationships, and it gave a *quid pro quo* in its economic agreements. The USSR proceeded cautiously to make sure of China's allegiance to the "world camp of peace and democracy" as well as to its own national interests.

China tended to be aware of its own internal strength—to regard itself as a principal and not an agent—and could not share unequivocally the Soviet concept of the absolute identity of the world revolution and the Soviet national interest. Chou En-lai once remarked, "The unity of the Chinese people and the peoples of Asia will certainly create a powerful and matchless force in the Far East which will rapidly push forward the great wheel of history in the movement for independence and liberation of the peoples of the Asian countries." It was to the mutual advantage of the USSR and China to concert their policies and adjust their differences. Peking possessed a unique value as a co-ordinating center for communism in Asia, which enhanced rather than contradicted Moscow's traditional prestige as the heart of the Communist world.

The evidence does not suggest that the USSR rode roughshod over Chinese sensibilities in the border territories. On February 27, 1946, the USSR concluded a new ten-year treaty of friendship and mutual assistance and supplementary economic and cultural agreements with Outer Mongolia. The USSR exercised a quiet monopoly of influence in Outer Mongolia but refrained from encouraging Mongolian nationalism, which would have complicated the Chinese position in Inner Mongolia. After September, 1949, when the Sinkiang provincial government declared its adherence to the Chinese Communists, its delegates were invited to Moscow to take part in the negotiations for joint Russian-Chinese exploitation of reserves of oil and nonferrous metals. Apparently the USSR followed its own inclinations in the economic development of Sinkiang, but it catered to the Chinese assumptions of political sovereignty. When it

became impossible to ride two horses, the USSR went so far as to acquiesce in the dissolution of its own economic creations, the joint-stock companies. It agreed with China to build a new Central Asian Railway running parallel to the trans-Siberian. And in Tibet, the USSR seemed to abandon its own historic interest in favor of the interests of its Chinese ally.

Manchuria was the fulcrum of the Moscow-Peking axis and the testing ground for Russian-Chinese diplomacy. The Russians bowed before the undeniable political claims of the Chinese and in December, 1952, turned over, in accordance with their promise, their rights in the administrative partnership and their rights in all property belonging to the Chinese-Changchun Railway. Many Russian employees lost their jobs, and an all-Chinese crew took the luxurious "Peace Express" train all the way from Peking to Manchuli on the Russian border. Russia turned back Port Arthur as well as Dairen to China. Russian troops who remained in Manchuria did so at the specific invitation of the Chinese. Russian technical experts continued to work on the railways and in the mines and factories. When new blast furnaces were completed, top-level dignitaries were invited from Moscow and toasts were consumed in perfunctory recognition of Chinese-Russian unity of purpose. But no display of surface friendship could obscure the critical strategic and economic value of Manchuria nor that the trump card of military power was held in Russian hands.

Korea likewise stood high among Russian diplomatic priorities—as a reward of victory, as a strategic protection for Eastern Siberia, as a bastion against Japan and the free world, as an area in the Asian revolution for independence, and possibly as a bone of contention with China. The USSR was not prepared to give up its postwar position of security in North Korea without assurance that the liberation of its puppets and the withdrawal of its troops would redound to its strategic advantage. Thus, the USSR opposed every effort of the South Korean Republic to expand its influence and, conversely, awaited a favorable opportunity to unleash the aggression of the (North) Korean People's Republic. Russia encountered an appalling surprise in the "brave, bold" decision of President Truman and the rally of the United Nations to the defense of collective security.

Throughout the war—commonly called a "police action"—the Russians told their own people only about American losses and atrocities and "the attempt under the flag of the United Nations to form a coalition of plunderers for the bloody suppression of the Korean people." They made no mention of their own guilt or provision of assistance, and they posed as advocates of peace on the basis of immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops and an all-Korean election supervised by the United Nations, the USSR, and the Chinese People's Republic. The Russian position was

advertised as "letting the Korean people settle the Korean question by themselves." The USSR maintained that the Chinese nation not only had the moral obligation to help the Koreans but was compelled to do so in its own interests, owing to the strategic importance of Korea and to the extension of American aggression which could only be halted by force. The Russians called attention to bellicose American pronouncements like those ascribed to Senator Knowland, who was quoted as saying, "The war cannot stop at the Yalu River. We may succeed in driving the Communists across the Yalu River, but we do not think that will be the end of the war." *Pravda*, the leading propagandist newspaper in the USSR, declared:

The sinister flame of war ignited in Korea by the American arsonists has approached the boundaries of China. . . . The transoceanic atomists, drunk with human blood, are repeating the old well-known trick of the Japanese military—through Korea to China.

The record of the USSR in the United Nations with regard to the Korean affair was an unbroken series of anti-American, pro-Chinese polemics. There was not an iota of compromise until its eventual acquiescence in the general desire for armistice and peace. The continuation of the war benefited the USSR by locking up a large part of the available strength of the Western world in the remotest and least important of the threatened fronts, but the moment came when cessation of hostilities seemed advantageous. Communist China needed its strength for concentration in Southeast Asia (an area significantly more distant from the Russian geographic center of influence) and the Russians needed to cut their own losses in supplies and equipment. The peace program promised to win favor in Asia, to upset the pace of industrial production in the United States, to divide the Western Allies, and to attract more support for the Russian campaign to obtain entry for Communist China into the United Nations. Considerations of world politics, rather than the *status quo* in Korea, dictated the trend from war to peace.

As if to placate the North Koreans and to demonstrate that they would do as much for their wards as the Americans would do for South Koreans, the Russians on September 19, 1953, negotiated a new pact to provide a billion rubles (\$250,000,000) for economic rehabilitation. They agreed to assist in the rebuilding of hydroelectric plants, steel mills, oil refineries, shipping facilities, chemical works, and cement factories which had been flattened or blasted by American bombs. The Russians sent educational advisers and public health doctors to North Korea and gave no indication of reducing their own interests or of influencing the north to give in to the south in rival programs for unification. At the Geneva Conference in

1954 the Russians stayed in the background and limited their activities to vigorous support for the Chinese when the Korean question was discussed.

Southeast Asia

The USSR was not able to exercise an effective role in Southeast Asia during World War II, but it boasted that Soviet victories accounted in large measure for the awakening of Asia. In February, 1948, the World Federation of Democratic Youth and the International Union of Students assembled more than 900 delegates in an international conference at Calcutta which adopted a resolution supporting national liberation, national independence, a broader basis for democracy, and freedom for the peoples of colonies and dependencies. This conference was followed by a Congress of the All-India Communist party, and within six months Communist-inspired insurrections broke out in Burma, Malaya, and Indonesia. It seemed as if the Communist directorate had called for immediate action and as if the international leadership were to be lodged in India.

The Communist victories in China and the establishment of the "Asian Cominform" in Peking indicated a basic change in strategy. The Russians shifted from India to China as their partner and agent, and in many instances they seemed to yield tactical leadership to their Asian allies. The Russians often appeared vague in their analyses of Southeast Asian situations and unable to confine the complexities of racial and economic problems within the strictures of their doctrinal framework. They often ignored significant developments or limited their comments to general encouragement of national liberation movements or to criticisms of colonialism. They shifted "lines" without regard for consistency, and they supported popular welfare and nationalism only when it suited their own purposes of amalgamating Asians into the Soviet orbit. The Russians stressed the benefits of trade when they came, hat in hand, offering machine tools for rice, rubber, or tin. They championed nationalism as the apotheosis of anti-imperialism, but condemned nationalism as a protective shield for reactionaries, landlords, compradors, and usurers. They favored nationalism and a limited regionalism only when these developments promised direct benefits to themselves. And on every occasion, the Russians sought to place blame for trouble on the United States as "the gendarme and hangman of the peoples of Southeast Asia and the senior partner of the decrepit colonial powers."

The USSR paid more attention to populous Indonesia than to any other country in Southeast Asia. Immediately after Indonesian independence in

August, 1945, the USSR tended to excuse the bourgeois outlook of the Republican leaders and to counsel co-operation of the Indonesian Communists with the Republican government. Its propaganda accused the British of dire plots in Indonesia and charged the Dutch with trying to strangle their former wards. The Ukrainian delegate tried without success in 1946 to place the Indonesian question on the agenda of the United Nations. When Dutch and Indonesians began to iron out their differences, the USSR opposed. The Indonesian cause aroused sympathy among non-Communists, but its only Communist-sponsored support from abroad came from Australian dock workers who refused to load ships with supplies for the Dutch. When another nation brought the Indonesian question to the Security Council, the delegate of the USSR perversely argued that the United Nations assumed the unworthy role of agent of Dutch and American policy.

Communist tactics shifted from co-operation with the government to revolt against the government, and led to the Madiun incident of September, 1948. The USSR interpreted this uprising first as a popular demand for genuine independence and later as a "dastardly plot provoked by Hatta on the instigation of the United States with the purpose of beheading the progressive movement." In keeping with their persistent objection to *rapprochement*, the Russians maligned the Round Table agreements. But they also opposed Indonesia's transition to a unitary republic, apparently because the Americans had already approved it. Whatever the United States approved, the USSR condemned, and vice versa. When Indonesia accepted American aid, the USSR complained of American imperialistic, militaristic designs. As Indonesia showed independence in judgment and action and an inclination toward neutralism, the USSR avoided further antagonism. It exchanged diplomatic representatives and made overtures for extended trade and cultural relations.

Likewise in Malaya, Russian policies showed little concern for the peoples involved and little sagacity beyond the dictates of the cold war. The USSR castigated the British for their policies of divide-and-rule and as exploiters of the Malayan workers. Sometimes the Soviet press accused the Americans of lowering prices for rubber and tin, thus compelling the British to reduce wages for their employees, and at other times it asserted that Americans and British worked hand-in-glove in their aggressive colonial designs. The Russians ignored the complications of race relations, and interpreted the "Emergency" as the stirrings of broad masses against the imperialists and their feudal allies. To show the extremes of their fantasy, they claimed that the People's Liberation Army occupied 75 per

cent of the entire country, although it never acquired a sufficient foothold to set up a government anywhere outside the jungle.

The USSR established diplomatic relations with Burma in 1951 and held out constant hints for improved trade and the possibility of Russian economic assistance for Burma. The Russians were not personally popular with the Burman government because they had cast aspersions on Burman sincerity in negotiating independence from the British. The Russians called Aung San a British puppet as long as he lived, but after his death he became a "misguided patriot" assassinated by the "hirelings of the British secret service." The Russians insisted that he was really killed because he wanted the Communists to rejoin the Anti-Fascist Freedom League.

Thakin Nu was described as more pro-British than his predecessor and was accused of delivering his country to the military might and the financial shackles of the British and the Americans. To counter the effects of these allegations, which were resented by the Burmans, the Russians intimated that local chaos was due to British instigation of minority groups, Chinese Nationalist guerillas, and American attempts to "Marshallize" Southeast Asia. In Burma the Russians showed that they were not disposed to support just any nationalist leader, but that they would oppose even a prime minister with socialistic or capitalistic views on democracy and economic development. They were sufficiently astute to divert antiforeignism, always a popular sentiment in Asia, from themselves to the British, Americans, and Chinese.

The USSR met with little success in its relations with the Philippines and Thailand. It boasted of the Communist initiative in creating the *Huk-balahap* as the fighting instrument of a United Front. It criticized the landlords, Fascist oligarchs, and collaborators in the Philippines who opposed reforms and accepted a satellite relationship with the United States. Because of the strong military and economic ties between the United States and the Philippines, the USSR called Philippine independence fictitious and withheld recognition. It followed the precise policy in the Philippines which it condemned the United States for following with regard to Communist China. The Soviet press wrote in favor of workers, peasants, and anti-imperialist forces and blasted the Philippine government for its corruption, inefficiency, and subservience to the United States. Communist influence in the Philippines declined in proportion to the remedial measures prescribed by the Filipinos for their own recovery.

The USSR made no substantial headway in Thailand, but it stood ready to gain from any civil war in Thailand or any advance into Thailand from Indo-China. Thailand was also in position to turn to the USSR and to Communist China in the event the United States and its allies were driven

out of Southeast Asia. For a price, the Thais might be given their lost provinces and confirmed as the political organ of a Greater Thailand or a Democratic Thai People's Republic. When Pridi Banomyong exercised control in Bangkok, he repealed the law outlawing the Communists and exchanged diplomatic representatives with the USSR so that his country could enter the United Nations. Russian influence receded into the distant background in Thailand as Marshal Phibun Songgram bound his people close to the principles and policies of the free world. From that background, the Russians circulated their propaganda to the effect that Thailand was only nominally independent and under the complete military and economic domination of the United States.

The policies of the USSR in Indo-China illustrated that country's extreme caution and ambivalence in manipulating all its pawns on the global chessboard. At the outset of the fighting in Indo-China, the USSR was more concerned about the "democratic forces" in France than the nationalist forces in Indo-China. The USSR was not interested in backing Ho Chi Minh who enjoyed the support of the French government. The USSR denounced the imperialism of General de Gaulle and of the French banking and rubber interests, but it nurtured the idea that a Communist-inspired liberation movement inside Indo-China might constitute a welcome cog in a Communist-dominated French government. The USSR would subscribe to independence for Indo-China if that implied independence from a capitalistic France, but it would prefer Indo-China's membership in a communistic French Union. That was before the burgeoning of the Asian revolution and the recovery of France assisted by Marshall aid.

When France and its allies rallied behind Bao Dai, the USSR, with Communist China, declared itself unreservedly for the democratic coalition under Ho Chi Minh. It reclassified the Indo-China situation as a war for liberation and accepted no limitations upon its own procedures. French Communists organized strikes and advocated sabotage to prevent French supplies from reaching the front, and Communist deputies in the French parliament openly invited troops to mutiny and desertion. The USSR made no mention of military assistance, but confidently predicted ultimate Viet-Minh victory against the French. After the Korean War, the Russians redoubled their verbal attacks on the Americans, whom they automatically accused of imperialist designs. Without the blare of the headlines which might reveal the extent of Soviet participation, it was noticed that the Communists in Indo-China streamlined their organization and perfected their democratic centralism. The Viet-Minh armies improved their equipment, training, and techniques, and marched from victory to victory. And

on the diplomatic front at Geneva and elsewhere, the USSR, Communist China, and the Viet-Minh spoke with a single voice in negotiating for peace.

Japan

Throughout World War II, the Soviet attitude toward Japan was correct, if not cordial, and was based on the neutrality pact of April 13, 1941. Within four months after the Tehran Conference on March 30, 1944, when Stalin promised President Roosevelt that he would enter the war against Japan, the USSR and Japan signed an agreement which limited Japanese fishing rights in Soviet waters and surrendered to the USSR Japanese oil and coal concessions in northern Sakhalin. In exchange the USSR agreed to pay Japan 5,000,000 gold rubles for the concessions and to deliver to Japan 50,000 tons of oil annually for five years.

By the end of 1944 Stalin labeled Japan the aggressor in the Pacific, and in February, 1945, he participated in the secret bargain at Yalta. On April 5 Molotov handed the Japanese ambassador the formal denunciation of the neutrality pact because Japan was the ally of Russia's enemy and the enemy of Russia's allies. The Soviet government turned a deaf ear to Japan's overtures for peace, and on July 26 at Potsdam it subscribed to the terms of unconditional surrender.

To the USSR the Potsdam Declaration was the basic document which conditioned all postwar policies toward Japan, and its alleged abandonment by the United States was the root cause of all international misunderstandings with regard to Japan. The USSR hastened to declare war on Japan on August 8, two days after the atomizing of Hiroshima, and Soviet troops overran Korea and Manchuria as far south as the Great Wall. The Soviet press exulted that its armies accomplished in a matter of days the total defeat of Japan which was more than the Allies had been able to accomplish in four years of fighting. Soviet propaganda films showed the Japanese surrendering to a Russian general aboard an unnamed battleship while a Russian band played and a Red flag snapped in the breeze.

Before the end of 1945, the USSR engaged in arguments with the United States about problems resulting from the defeat of Japan. The Russians objected to the rapid repatriation of Japanese from the Asian mainland and the Southern Regions and to the conversion of the Japanese mandated islands into American-administered trust territories. The Russians wanted immediate substantial reparations and a share of the Japanese merchant and fishing fleet. They wanted a position of control in the occupation of Japan and they proposed a Russian commander to be equal with

General MacArthur. Then they argued for a separate zone of occupation—as in Germany—to which the Americans replied with a suggestion to include Russian troops, like Commonwealth troops, in the organization of the Eighth Army under American commanders. The USSR settled for a place on the Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Control Council in Japan. The major Russian preoccupation was to abolish forever the Japanese menace to Russian security which had existed for two generations.

The USSR incorporated the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin immediately into its area of sovereign jurisdiction and dispatched a large mission to Japan. The chief of the mission, Lieutenant General Derevyanko, also served as a delegate on the Allied Council. He used his dual position to attack fundamental American purposes and policies. Whereas the Americans wanted a parliamentary democracy in Japan founded upon free enterprise economy, the Russians propagandized for a “democracy” as understood by the Communists. The Russians permitted Japanese Communists to do most of the talking in continuing disputes like the abolition of the power of the emperor, the fulfillment of the Potsdam program, land reform, the punishment of war criminals including the emperor and the leading zaibatsu, and the liberation of small business from monopoly capitalism. The Russians directed their own heated charges against what they described as the American failure to demilitarize and democratize Japan and the American attempt to make of Japan an American colony and a bastion for American aggression in the Far East.

In expressing opposition to the Americans, the Russians were careful to refrain from antagonizing the Japanese. Objections were worded in a manner to place the onus for Japan's difficulties on the shoulders of the United States. “The occupation authorities are creating obstacles impeding the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people, directly aiming at the activities of democratic organizations in general and the labor unions in particular.” They accused the United States of reviving fascism in Japan, restoring the old guard to power, and reviving the thought police. From an economic point of view, they declared that the stabilization program caused unusual hardship for the Japanese wage earners and that the drive for increased production benefited the armament makers to the detriment of the peacetime industries. The Russians objected to the alleged economic servitude of Japan to the United States no less than to the military alignment of the two countries. The Russians protested against the modernization of naval and air bases in Japan and against the re-creation of the Japanese armed forces under any name or pretext whatever.

The USSR desired a general peace treaty with Japan as soon as possible

and an early end to the privileged American position during the Occupation. *Pravda* accused the United States of blocking a peace settlement because "American rulers are relying principally on Japan as a base for military adventures against the Soviet Union and the national liberation movements of Asia. The Americans are even more impudent aggressors than the Japanese samurai." On the other hand, the Americans wanted a peace settlement on their terms as soon as possible. The Russians interpreted the American peace proposals as thinly disguised measures to rearm Japan, enslave the Japanese economy, deprive the Japanese people of their democratic rights, preserve the American military position in Japan, deny Formosa to Red China, deprive the USSR of the fruits of Yalta, and create in the Pacific an aggressive grouping against the USSR and Red China. Gromyko summarized the Russian objections and the Russian proposed amendments at the San Francisco Conference, but he was unable to prevent the conclusion of the peace settlement between Japan and most of its former enemies.

The USSR was not in position to wield significant influence in postwar Japan. The United States was firmly in control and there was little the USSR could do to alter the situation in its favor. It devoted its major attention to Red China and Japan's neighbors, pending more favorable opportunities in Japan itself. The USSR expressed good will toward Japan and sympathy for its helplessness vis-à-vis the United States. It acquiesced in the difficult, diminished role of the Japanese Communists, and it suggested the possibility of expanded Russo-Japanese trade. The USSR and China through the Peking radio suggested a treaty of peace with Japan and a nonaggression pact in the interest of coexistence. The attraction of Russian overtures depended significantly upon the status of American relations and the condition of Japan's internal economy. The USSR held in its hands two powerful trump cards: the one was the proximity of the Russian armed forces in Siberia, and the other, the possible termination of the legal state of war. A condition of mutual understanding promised to be more welcome to Japan than the ever-present, ominous threat of war.

Summary

The postwar extension of the area of Sovietization resulted from the weakness of the opposition as well as from the positive contributions of the USSR. The Russians used others to fight their battles and caused an important drain on the economic resources and military strength of the free world. Since 1939, some 600,000,000 people of some fifteen nations

were brought into the camp of dictatorships, and in no way was this the result of voluntary action. This phenomenal, frightening record left many problems unresolved. As *Pravda* declared:

The whole world knows, however, that the Soviet leaders determine their action not out of consideration for the strictness or softness of the policy of one or another country toward the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, but proceeding from the basic interests of the Soviet people, from the interests of peace and international security.

Would the USSR have the statesmanship to prevent a clash between the national interests of the USSR as a power center and the international interests of the world revolution? The solution of the dilemma was most vital in the instance of the Moscow-Peking axis, because the adjustment of rivalries in Manchuria would determine the controlling element in the economic development of East Asia. Japan was erased momentarily as a power factor, but its tremendous military and economic potential were available to the highest bidder. The USSR offered remarkably little toward constructive solutions for the ills of Southeast Asia. The USSR complained that colonial masters did nothing for their backward areas, but, paradoxically, it denounced all forms in which capital had been invested. It opposed technical assistance, yet it suggested no means by which poverty-ridden peasants could accumulate desperately needed capital from their meager earnings. The Communist jargon proved useful for fomenting riots, but it was an impossible substitute for hard work and careful saving which were necessary for an improved level of living. It was questionable whether Russians, Chinese, and indigenous Communist leaders gave convincing proof that they could establish a workable basis of co-operation or an acceptable hierarchy of command in coping with the tasks of peaceful reconstruction.

At the Berlin and Geneva Conferences in 1954, the USSR and its allies pursued a monotonous, relentless attack on the United States and argued persistently for their own short-range objectives. They wanted Europe for the Europeans on the theory that there "might be peace if the shepherds were sent home and the wolves permitted to roam at will," and they wanted Asia for the Asians, a policy which would have exposed the Asians to the mercies of the new Communist colonialism. They wanted recognition for Red China and its entry into the United Nations and they wanted peace in Korea and in Indo-China on terms which would ensure their own hegemony. As part of their over-all offensive in the cold war, they accused the United States of seeking to create a system of alliances in Southeast Asia "in no way related to the security of the United States but for the purpose of spreading colonial wars and driving Asians into

fratricidal fighting in the interests of a handful of American monopoly capitalists."

The Russians seemed to be impervious to bluffs, unresponsive to compromise, and indifferent to atomic war. They spoke of coexistence, but they failed to deliver persuasion by deeds. Deep-seated issues like Korea, Indo-China, and Malaya in Asia; peace treaties for Austria and Germany in Europe; the smooth functioning of the United Nations and disarmament—these called for more than high-sounding phrases of peaceful intentions.

During the first decade after World War II, the USSR was one of the two super-powers in world affairs. It attracted to itself undue attention and perhaps engendered disproportionate fears. It could have, if it had so willed, bestowed upon suffering mankind surcease from worry and the opportunity to live in peace. Instead—either from sublime confidence in its own destiny or from haunting awareness of its own stresses and strains—it chose to perpetuate and to aggravate the international atmosphere of uncertainty and the threat of war.

Suggested Reading

MAX BELOFF, *Soviet Policy in the Far East, 1944–1951* (New York, 1953).

ANTHONY T. BOUSCAREN, *Imperial Communism* (Washington, 1953).

HENRY CHUNG, *The Russians Came to Korea* (Washington, 1947).

JOHN R. DEANE, *The Strange Alliance* (New York, 1947).

RAYMOND DENNETT AND JOSEPH JOHNSON, ed., *Negotiating with the Russians* (Boston, 1951).

GERARD FRITERS, *Outer Mongolia* (Baltimore, 1949).

C. GROVE HAINES, ed., *The Threat of Soviet Imperialism* (Baltimore, 1954).

HU SHIH, "China in Stalin's Grand Strategy," *Foreign Affairs* (New York, October, 1950).

WILLIAM MANDEL, *Soviet Source Materials on USSR Relations with East Asia, 1945–1950* (New York, no date).

ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, *Defense in the Cold War: The Task for the Free World* (London and New York, 1950).

HUGH SETON-WATSON, *From Lenin to Malenkov: the History of World Communism* (New York, 1953).

RODGER SWEARINGEN AND PAUL LANGER, *Red Flag in Japan: International Communism in Action, 1919–1951* (Cambridge, Mass., 1952).

U. S. CONGRESS, 83RD CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION, SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AFFAIRS, Committee Print, *Strength of the International Communist Movement* (Washington, 1953).

U. S. CONGRESS, 83RD CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION, SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AFFAIRS, Committee Print No. 2, *Strength of the International Communist Movement* (Washington, 1954).

UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON, FAR EASTERN INSTITUTE, Soviet Press Translations.

CHAPTER 35

The United States and the Far East

After four interminable years of warfare, names like Guadalcanal, Leyte, Kunming, Tientsin, and Tokyo became household words in the United States, and the comfortable illusion of unconcern in the affairs of Asia disappeared. Americans agreed on the futility of isolation, but they failed to appreciate the expenditure of effort and dollars required to protect their vital interests and to promote the general welfare in the presence of a convulsive Orient. GIs from Sydney to Shanghai could “hardly wait for the Golden Gate,” and the government weakened its diplomatic position in the frenzied demobilization of the formidable American fighting machine. The continuing quest for security met crisis after crisis—in Japan, China, Korea, and Southeast Asia—and behind them all lurked the shadow of the USSR and Communist imperialism.

To the United States, the end of World War II meant the destruction of the old balance of power in Asia. Friendly China represented power-in-being and ex-enemy Japan was reduced to a vacuum or a liability. Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands were reduced in power and prestige, and the chaotic, impotent, new, independent nations offered little but promise as stabilizing factors. The United States became the new symbol of military might in East Asia except in the limited areas exposed to the Russian Army. A gigantic ground swell of unrest complicated the power struggle and intensified the rivalry between the United States and the USSR.

In guaranteeing that “it [Pearl Harbor] shall not happen again,” the United States passed a National Security Act in 1947 which sought to unify the three branches of the armed services and to blend the civil and military authorities in the formulation of policy. This act established the National Security Council directly under the president as the supreme arbiter in

diplomatic, military, and economic decisions. Its first responsibility in the Pacific was to provide for adequate defense. The conception of a defense triangle, Hawaii-Alaska-Panama Canal, was expanded to a "defense perimeter" stretching from Alaska, through the Aleutians, past the vulnerable Kuriles, to Japan and Okinawa. The perimeter then extended from Formosa to the Philippines, and it was buttressed in the South Pacific by agreements with Australia and New Zealand. Effective military control was assured by installations in Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, Samoa, and the Trust Territories. On April 2, 1947, a Trust agreement between the United States and the United Nations provided for the conversion of the former mandated islands of Japan into a Trust Territory administered by the United States as a strategic area. The United States was given the right to establish naval, military, and air bases and to erect fortifications in the Trust Territory; to station and employ armed forces in it; and to make use of volunteer forces, facilities, and assistance from it. Conversely, the United States assumed the obligations to promote self-government or independence, whichever seemed more appropriate; to promote economic advancement; to protect rights and fundamental freedom; and to aid in the development of education. Pending the passage of an Organic Act by the Congress, the president placed part of the Trust Territory under the Department of the Interior and part (for strategic reasons) under the Department of the Navy. Under its right of military jurisdiction, the United States closed Eniwetok atoll for the conduct of tests of atomic and hydrogen bombs. Subsequent negotiations of bilateral pacts with Japan, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and Korea and of a Southeast Asia Treaty Organization were intended to supplement the post-war American security system which was built upon the Rio pact with Latin American nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The United States was often obliged to sacrifice the ideal in the interest of the possible in its Far Eastern relations. American capacities were far from unlimited, and American commitments in the Far East were conditioned by global requirements. The idea of compromise or truce was occasionally repugnant, but it was inescapable in view of the demands of Europe for military assistance. Europeans constantly reminded Americans of the strategy of "Europe First" and regarded the Far East as of lesser consequence. On the contrary, some Americans thought that successful containment of the enemy in Asia was an assurance of his ultimate collapse in Europe.

This argument between advocates of "Europe First" and of "Asia First"—academic as it seemed—illustrated differences in attitudes and estimates of national interest which frequently divided the councils of the Allies.

The Allies pointed out that the United States was the only major power which emerged from the war with its homeland unscathed and with its economic machine in stronger position at the war's end than at the war's beginning. They contended that they were as adamant as the United States in their opposition to communism, but they insisted upon consideration of ideas which were often displeasing to Americans. The Allies were often willing to go further than the Americans in the direction of "appeasement" in order to lessen the dread possibility of unlimited war.

The British were not inclined to interpret the cold war as their only diplomatic preoccupation, or even their major international embarrassment. They had to concern themselves with security problems in western Europe and the Middle East, costly experiments in colonial development and welfare in Africa, the "Emergency" in Malaya, the exposed position of Hongkong and Singapore, the expenses of modern armament, and the persistent dollar gap in their international trade. The French could not attach the same scale of priorities as the Americans to the Far East because the French were less concerned about Indo-China's effect on the spread of communism in Asia than its effect upon the remaining French foundations of empire in Madagascar, West Africa, and Morocco. Sometimes divergent national interests permitted similar tactics among the Allies, as in the Occupation policies in Japan and the United Nations action in Korea, and sometimes they necessitated conflicting procedures, as in the matter of the recognition of Red China. But the Allies of the United States would not be bullied by atomic superiority, military predominance, or the club of economic assistance.

The most vexing differences of opinion arose between the United States and the neutralists. India, as the outstanding spokesman of the uncommitted world, protested its devotion to the ideals of democracy but frequently condemned American efforts to construct an inflexible, unambiguous, anti-Communist bloc. In 1954 the Colombo powers—Ceylon, India, Pakistan, Burma, and Indonesia—smarting with memories of war and imperialism, declared their unshakable determination to resist interference in their internal affairs by external Communist, anti-Communist, or other agencies. This neutralism appeared like genuine independence to the nations involved, but it appeared like shortsightedness, blindness, or worse to the United States.

The United States and Soviet-Communist Imperialism

Direct relations between the United States and the USSR played a comparatively small part in the over-all problems of the United States in

the Far East. But the power rivalries between the United States and the USSR; the conflicting concepts of government, freedom or tyranny; and the clash in ideologies between democracy and communism—these conditioned every American maneuver. On all three levels, only the first was susceptible to military defense and a line of containment. A precise line might be drawn against the advance of the Russian nation-state, but a preponderance of physical power was useless against the spread of a hostile form of government or a corroding ideology.

Changing patterns were clearly discernible in United States-USSR international relationships. Before the German invasion of Russia, the United States considered Stalin only slightly less menacing than Hitler. After the invasion, the United States stock-piled its political differences with the USSR in the interest of co-operation against the common enemy. As long as President Roosevelt lived, he predicated his hope for lasting peace on harmony and co-operation between the great powers, but the USSR showed its preference for a sphere-of-influence policy. The Moscow agreement of December, 1945, was the beginning of the end of wartime understanding based upon expediency. The next two years constituted a period of tests and probes, measuring Soviet intentions and observing the dwindling area of agreement. In 1946 and 1947 the Council of Foreign Ministers seldom succeeded in defining or meeting real issues as the USSR showed itself to be blatantly repetitive and obstructionist. Tempers wore thin. At one meeting the New Zealand delegate asked, "How long must we listen to this quack, quack, quack?" and later Vishinsky retorted that "the suggestions from the other side of the table sound like the twittering of the sparrows on the Paris roof-tops." As a result of the Soviet's propaganda tactics in the United Nations and its lack of co-operation in Europe and the Far East, the United States reached the reluctant conclusion that the USSR was aggressive and expansionist and must be treated as a rival and not as a partner in the political arena.

The pattern of the cold war emerged between 1947 and 1950. The United States resolved to proceed with reconstruction in Europe and in the Far East, even at the cost of outright Soviet alienation. The Soviet counteroffensive consisted of the play for a central, Soviet-controlled government in Germany, the obstructionist tactics in Japan, and the sponsoring of the Red regimes in China and North Korea. The American airlift in response to the Berlin blockade showed that the United States lost complete confidence in the possibility of a diplomatic settlement and determined to make no concessions and to consider no proposals under the shadow of continued Soviet coercion. After President Truman's re-election in 1948, the American strategy was to avoid multilateral negotiations which the Soviet government could utilize for its propaganda advantage and to work for

situations of strength through bilateral military and economic assistance pacts.

Most American problems in the Far East were directly attributable to the menace of Soviet-Communist imperialism. When the Soviet government turned to the use of force in Korea, the United States assumed the leadership in the free world in the removal of the element of force. The thwarting of the Soviet objective reduced the Communists on all fronts to the low level of allegation and invective which characterized Russian diplomacy just before the death of Stalin.

New leaders in the USSR and in the United States brought temporary relief and inaugurated a new series of tests and probes. The Republican administration came into office in 1953 dedicated to liberation of enslaved peoples or a "roll-back" and committed to relentless rivalry with the USSR. President Eisenhower responded to Premier Malenkov's overture for coexistence by calling upon the Soviet government for deeds, not words. He echoed the desire for understanding, and in somber phrases sketched the unimaginable costs of maintaining a posture of military preparedness. He said:

Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired, signifies—in the final sense—a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. This world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children.

The cost of one modern heavy bomber is a modern brick school in more than thirty cities. It is two electric power plants, each serving a town of sixty thousand population. It is two fine, fully equipped hospitals. It is some fifty miles of concrete highway. We pay for a single fighter plane with a half-million bushels of wheat. We pay for a single destroyer with new homes that could have housed more than eight thousand people. . . . This is not a way of life at all, in any true sense. Under the cloud of threatening war, it is humanity hanging from a cross of iron.

The Soviet reply in the form of an article in *Pravda* fixed the blame on the United States for blocking peace in Korea, sinning against historical laws by defining national liberation movements as simple inspirations of Communists, keeping Kuomintang "scarecrows" in the United Nations, and subverting the United Nations to an instrument of American policy. It further contended that the United States extended a pennyworth of alms to this or that country and thereby sought to subject its economy and its budget to the so-called dynamic aims of United States foreign policy. In typical Soviet fashion, *Pravda* insisted that the United States was martial and that the Soviet Union was the bulwark for universal peace, and it

asked, "Is it in the Soviet Union that the fear of peace exists and where shares of stock decline with the hope of peace?"

In agreeing to the meeting with the Communists at Berlin and Geneva, Secretary Dulles made it unmistakable to the American public that he had no intention of consenting to a Far Eastern Munich. He told his critics, "We need not, out of fright, lay down the tools of diplomacy. . . . Our cause is not so poor . . . that our nation must seek security by sulking in its tent." He did not propose to permit the Communists to draw the United States into another Korea in Indo-China or anywhere else, but he advocated a new look at world strategy which would enable the United States to "depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate instantly by means and at places of our own choosing." In his opinion, this policy did not oblige the United States and its allies to match the Communists man for man and gun for gun. In warning an aggressor that every local situation is a potential threat of global war, it provided a maximum deterrent at a bearable cost.

Total Diplomacy

The United States endeavored to mobilize all its assets and capabilities in a total diplomacy to cope with the triple menace of aggressive nationalism, totalitarianism, and communism associated with the USSR. It was as essential to captivate the minds of Asians as to halt the march of aggressive armies. Psychological and economic programs were no less vital than military training missions and cargoes of implements of war. Asians were inclined to attach more importance to American traditions of freedom and tolerance than to American military assistance. A distinguished Indian asked, "Why, when you have such a feast to provide, do you offer us only the crumbs?"

In the realm of psychology and propaganda, the Americans repeatedly affirmed their dedication to principles which were meaningful to the peoples of Asia. By press, radio, and pamphlets, American agencies like the Voice of America, the United States Information Agency, and the privately sponsored Committee of Free Asia (Asian Foundation) assured Asians that Americans were not interested in the imperialism of the past or the reaction of the present but were devoted to the idea that the Asians should achieve their own goals and ambitions in their own way. They wanted Asians to choose and operate their own governments and to discover and cherish the individual liberties which Americans held dear. The job was to convince Asians that in resisting the Russians the Americans aimed to unmask and

to thwart a new and subtle imperialism which was the eternal enemy of personal liberty and national independence.

The United States was caught in the contradiction between devotion to the ultimate ideal of freedom and the immediate reality of containment. Americans wavered between the one and the other. They issued conflicting statements of policy which shattered Asian confidence in American leadership and sense of direction. One American official assured Asians in the shadow of aggression, "You can count on us," but another broadcast the ominous word "disengagement." On a single day the vice-president visiting Formosa asserted that the Nationalist government was the only government which the United States regarded as truly representative of the Chinese people, and the secretary of state in Washington declared that he did not believe the Eisenhower administration had ever said that it would forever be opposed to the recognition of Red China. Within a week after Mr. Nixon indicated that the United States might have to intervene in Indo-China, his chief referred to involvement in Indo-China as a great tragedy. In the minds of skeptical Asians it was difficult to reconcile the ardent American pretensions with the close American relationship with local national figures who, to Asians, represented the lingering remnants of the old regime. Asians were not readily inclined to reject leaders on the sole basis of their leaning toward Moscow nor to accept others whose prime merit was an avowed opposition to communism.

At the working level, psychological warfare meant a maximum of mischief short of outright hostilities. It included propaganda balloons behind the bamboo curtain, fleet maneuvers, staging bomb tests at strategic junctures, starting new military aid programs for Nationalist China or Thailand, making shipments of food, supplying printing presses, radio sets, or even guns to anti-Communists in Communist areas or in imminent danger. A wide gap separated the theorist in ideological warfare and the practitioner in the art of liberation.

The Americans also used economic programs—unilaterally or in co-operation with the Colombo plan and the United Nations—to ensure against further aggression and to reduce local tensions and fears. The Americans extended direct military and economic aid to Formosa, Thailand, the Philippines, and Indo-China. In addition they supplied funds, supplies, and help for health centers, harbor improvements, education, and economic surveys in Burma, and for sawmills, fishing craft, ploughs, dental equipment, and economic programs in Indonesia. In ten years in the Far East, Americans spent more than six billion dollars in economic and technical assistance, but the money was a measure of American interest rather than a yardstick of diplomatic success.

The mutual security program was designed to provide overseas military bases, combat-ready man power, more strategic materials, added industrial capacity, and healthier, stronger, partner nations. It was not expected that dollars alone would win friends, but it was hoped that "millions of people who reside within a 600-mile radius of Communist China will not turn Communist if we give them faith, if we strengthen them militarily and economically, and if we give them a basis for believing in our support." The policies of technical co-operation and assistance to underdeveloped areas as envisaged in the Point Four programs sprang from the deep conviction that communism flourished in poverty and could be best attacked by striking at its roots.

The United States government was obliged to temper its judgments and actions in the Far East in accordance with the bristling climate of public opinion. Government officials had little freedom to bargain at a conference table because of rock-ribbed, uncompromising determination that no concessions of any kind should be made to the Communists or the principles which they represented. The slightest hint at concession evoked an avalanche of criticism and threatened political suicide.

Most Americans applauded General MacArthur for his capable conduct of the Occupation, and most approved the considerate treatment accorded the Philippines. Most supported the decision of President Truman to call a halt to aggression in Korea. Beyond these generalities, Americans argued angrily about the definition of national interests and the tactics which should be employed for the protection and promotion of those interests. Disagreements became identified with considerations of loyalty and security, with the result that reasonable perplexities and differences of opinion were often buried in silence or glossed over by platitudes. Issues were sometimes obscured or forgotten in the heat of personal attacks or calculated innuendo. The China issue was the springboard from which Senator McCarthy leaped into national prominence, and the Korean issues were potential steps to the White House for General MacArthur.

In some cases, opinions about Far Eastern affairs were based on personal interests; in other cases, opinions derived from unselfish devotion to the public welfare. Individuals and organizations, ranging from the president of the Harvard Alumni Association to a union of Pullman porters, exercised their cherished right to express themselves freely and frankly. Some praised Chiang Kai-shek, some condemned him; some favored Bao Dai, some opposed him.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, it was to be assumed that conflicting opinions stemmed solely from concern for America's future and were in no way related to an affinity for Communist causes. Democrats

differed from Democrats, Republicans from Republicans, and the man on the street habitually criticized whichever government happened to be in Washington. President Truman and Secretary Acheson were blamed for "selling China down the river" and "coddling Communists in the State Department." President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles were condemned for losing Indo-China and for vacillating between indifference and belligerence. Within the government itself, congressmen debated with congressmen, Congress often took issue with the president, the Pentagon opposed the State Department, and the European desks within the State Department imposed their will in the settlement of Asian affairs. This condition was a normal occupational hazard in a democracy and was the necessary prerequisite for the hammering out of successful policy. After lines of action were determined, arguments within the government ceased. Whatever their personal ideas might have been, officials were constrained to the faithful execution of their orders.

The Far East entered into partisan politics with the Congressional elections of 1950. The Republicans began to take advantage of the China policies and the "soft" policies toward Communists of the Truman administration. Congressional investigations permitted the full play of partisan rancor. In the 1952 presidential campaign, the Republicans added a political barrage against "Mr. Truman's war in Korea." A Republican wit said that the Democrats had remained in office for twenty years by running against Mr. Hoover, and he saw no reason why the Republicans should not stay in power for at least ten years by campaigning against President Truman and Secretary Acheson. Both parties were in fundamental agreement in their inflexible opposition to Soviet-Communist principles and practices, recognition of Red China and its entry into the United Nations, and any possible appeasement in Southeast Asia.

The Republicans faced in Indo-China the same dilemmas which the Democrats faced earlier in China, and many politicians in both parties hoped to keep foreign affairs above partisanship. In 1954 the Republicans could not resist appealing to the voters with the thought that "if the Democrats had not lost China, there would have been no Korean War and no Indo-China crisis." It was one thing to say that the "Democrats lost China" and quite another to admit that "the Communists rose to power in China while the Democrats were in office in the United States."

American Policy and China

China's wartime woes were painfully clear to American representatives. Reports from Chungking described adequately the weariness and help-

lessness of the Chinese masses and the surge toward a place in the sun which rumbled beneath China's troubled surface. China was a nation rooted in the distant past, which yearned for modernization; a victim of weakness and anarchy which longed for strength and stability; and an exhibit of semicolonialism which insisted upon the right and dignity of independence. The desire to help China was universal but the means were elusive. China was a world in itself and not simply an object of American action; so the possibilities of American assistance and the area of American responsibilities were distinctly limited. The aftermath of the Stilwell affair, the faulty estimation of the Chinese Communist movement, and the cavalier treatment of Chiang Kai-shek in the conclusion of the Yalta agreement offset the prestige which the United States had accumulated in China as the result of the victory over Japan. As a matter of fact, China was slightly piqued that the final drive against the Japanese enemy had bypassed the China mainland and had failed to take advantage of the experience and advice which China had to offer.

In August, 1945, the United States considered alternative courses for the maximum practical assistance to Chiang Kai-shek. No one suggested seriously that the United States should turn its back on Chiang or abandon China to its own devices. Equally unrealistic was the suggestion that the United States should move into China with overwhelming force and compel a satisfactory settlement of the civil war. Reasonable suggestions were that Chiang should be obliged to reach a political settlement with the Communists, or should be limited to China south of the Great Wall or should be given American aid without restriction as to its end use. Sixty thousand American soldiers and fifty thousand marines in China helped Chiang disarm and repatriate Japanese. Military supplies and equipment entered China to strengthen Chiang's troops and a thousand American officers formed a Joint United States Military Advisory Group to assist and advise the Chinese government in the development of modern armed forces.

With the general approval of the American press and the American people, President Truman sent General Marshall to China in December, 1945, to exert the influence of the United States for the unification of China by peaceful, democratic methods. A dispatch dated December, 1945, signed by Generals MacArthur, Wedemeyer, and Spruance, suggested that the United States assistance to China "... be made available as a basis for negotiation by the American ambassador to bring together and effect a compromise between the major opposing groups in order to promote a united, democratic China." This was participation in the internal affairs of China, but it was justified on grounds that China, torn by civil strife, was not a proper place for American assistance. Chiang Kai-shek welcomed the

Marshall mission, and at that time the world was not aware of the coalition road to national domination.

The odds were against General Marshall, but he contributed to a quick cessation of hostilities and an apparent improvement in internal political differences between the Kuomintang and the Communists. The military situation in Manchuria and North China deteriorated beyond General Marshall's power to control and exposed him to violent criticism from both sides.

He and Ambassador Stuart labored arduously and patiently as mediators, but they were helpless in the face of China's decaying military, political, and economic situation. They tried to bring pressure on Chiang to make concessions to the Communists and went so far as to order an embargo on the further shipments of arms and ammunition to the central government.

At the same time they dangled before Chiang the promise of assistance in agrarian reform and industrialization. As further evidence of good will, the United States concluded with China in November, 1946, a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation on the basis of complete equality and reciprocity. The Marshall mission failed because neither the Kuomintang nor the Chinese Communists accepted the principle of compromise. In January, 1947, General Marshall returned to the United States to become Secretary of State when it became clear that no solution short of fighting it out was practical in China. Chiang and the Nationalists were confident of victory.

Secretary Marshall sent General Wedemeyer to China in the summer of 1947 to investigate disquieting reports of Nationalist retreats and Communist advances. General Wedemeyer found apathy and defeatism among the Kuomintang leaders, and he urged reform, to be accompanied by further grants of American military and economic assistance. He sensed the futility of the Chinese Nationalist effort in Manchuria and he suggested the trusteeship arrangement. Following his advice, the United States sent substantial quantities of supplies and military equipment, some of which was wasted and some utilized to excellent advantage. Most Americans, including both Democrats and Republicans, believed that they were doing all that was feasible for China, and they were reassured by reports from observers in the field who testified that not one battle was lost due to lack of arms and ammunition. The Chinese did not lament until later that the American effort was too little and too late. The United States was busily engaged in the presidential elections of 1948 during the most critical days of the collapse of Chiang Kai-shek.

The establishment of the Communist regime at Peking and the transfer of the Kuomintang regime to Formosa presented the American government

with a new set of problems. It was necessary to reassess the causes of the decline of the Kuomintang and the rise of the Communists in order to devise new lines of action. To Washington it seemed that the vital factors were not military but political and psychological and that the wisest course to pursue was "to wait until the dust settles." That decision was taken after the situation in China was beyond salvage, but it aroused a storm of Republican protests.

The administration treated the Chinese Communists with increasing intransigence. The Communists detained American citizens, mistreated Foreign Service officers, and unleashed a venomous anti-American propaganda campaign. On January 5, 1950, President Truman issued a statement which infuriated his political opponents. He declared that the United States had no desire to obtain special rights or privileges or to establish military bases on Formosa "at this time" and no intention of utilizing its armed forces to interfere in the present situation. He said that the United States government would not pursue a course which would lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China and would not provide military aid or advice to Chinese forces on Formosa. Exactly one week later, Secretary Acheson delivered his speech to the National Press Club in Washington which heaped upon Chiang Kai-shek the responsibility for the loss of the mainland. The United States recognized that Formosa was important strategically, but did not consider it wise to commit its prestige to an impossible undertaking to keep Formosa out of Communist hands. In February, 1950, President Truman withdrew all American diplomatic and consular officials from China in protest against Chinese seizure of American property in Peking.

The period of "waiting for the dust to settle" was of remarkably short duration. While the United States considered alternative lines of action toward the new regime, the Communists streamed across the border into South Korea. New circumstances demanded new measures, and in the midst of the debate Senate committees began their investigations into possible treasonable influences in the State Department.

The first consequence of Communist aggression on American policy outside Korea was the reversal of the position toward Formosa. On January 27, 1950, the president ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa and called upon the Chinese government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. Later he reaffirmed the disclaimer of American ambitions in Formosa and repeated his desire that Formosa should not become embroiled in hostilities. His position was that Formosa would not be conceded to the Communists as a reward for aggression, and that Formosa's status should be settled after the fighting stopped. As the war in Korea continued, American policy toward Formosa shifted

to unrestricted military and economic aid. In 1953 President Eisenhower canceled that part of the earlier Truman directive which called on the Seventh Fleet to prevent military operations from Formosa against the mainland. It was understood that his action did not presage a crusade for liberation of continental China because nothing more than a holding action on Formosa could be hoped for in view of the limited military strength at the disposal of Chiang Kai-shek. When the Peking radio boasted that the Chinese people would never stop short of liberating Taiwan, President Eisenhower laconically remarked, "Any invasion of Formosa would have to run over the Seventh Fleet."

With regard to Communist China, the United States government proceeded on the assumptions that the Communist regime was firmly in control on the mainland, that it was irreconcilably inimical to the United States, that a split in the Peking-Moscow axis was unlikely, and that the Chinese Communist aim was to expand its influence in Asia. On the basis of those assumptions it withheld recognition from the Peking regime, resisted Communist China's entry into the United Nations, and sought the widest possible application of an embargo on trade in strategic and critical materials.

In American opinion, the question of recognition was an affair of honor rather than expediency. Proponents of recognition advanced the argument that recognition was not a token of friendship or an indication of approval and cited the precedent of the USSR as an illustration of the possibility of conducting negotiations with a nation with whom there was no fundamental sympathy or harmony of outlook. The opponents of recognition insisted that recognition would appear to give approval to the Communists and would "bury alive" the existing, legal government of Nationalist China. They argued that recognition would be premature until it was established that the Communists really had the support of the Chinese people, controlled all China's territory, and intended to live up to their international commitments.

Most Americans were equally passionate in their determination that Red China should not be permitted entry into the United Nations. A minority shared the British view that it was unrealistic to seek collective security in the Far East through the United Nations without the representatives of Red China, but the majority felt that it would be an infamous day for mankind if Communist China were ever allowed in the United Nations. Both the Senate and the House of Representatives passed resolutions unanimously to the effect that Red China should not be accepted in the world organization. Republican Senator Knowland declared he would give up his position as party leader in the Senate to get the United States out of

the United Nations if Red China were admitted, and Democratic Senator McClellan stated his view that "the day Red China walks in, the United States walks out." The United States could not believe that it would serve the interests of world order to bring into the United Nations a regime which was a convicted aggressor, which had not purged itself of that aggression, and which continued to use force in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

The United States was not satisfied with the mere recommendation of the General Assembly of the United Nations for an embargo of arms and strategic materials to Communist China. It prohibited that type of trade between the United States and Communist China, and brought pressure to bear on its allies for similar action. The Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, the so-called Battle Act, was designed to impede the ability of nations threatening the security of the United States to conduct military operations. It prohibited aid to any nation which traded with Communist countries in goods which the United States might choose to regard as strategic. This act reduced trading with the enemy to a minimum but fell short of the absolute blockade of China which some Americans advocated.

The government of the United States shied away from the imposition of an effective blockade because of its costs, the opposition of allies, and the great doubt about its practicality. The United States would have liked to use the blockade and every other weapon within its power to obviate the menace of Communist China, but it was obliged to operate within the framework of its own capacities and the views of its European allies. It was not prepared to modify its posture of hostility until Communist China should produce convincing evidence of accepting the diplomatic standards of peace-loving nations. The United States clung to its tight embargo against China although it reduced substantially the list of items prohibited for export to the USSR and its satellites.

The United States and Japan

The history of the Occupation, the peace settlement, and Japan's return to the family of nations was also the history of the relations between the United States and Japan. The destruction of Japan as a military menace, the resurrection of the Japanese spirit, the salvation of Japan from the grasp of communism, and the guidance of Japan into the paths of democracy were as vital to American interests as to the welfare of the new Japan itself. General MacArthur was the embodiment of American policy,

and Americans in Japan were as diverse in outlook and capabilities as Americans at home. General MacArthur's transition of the Occupation from phase one to phase two served as a criterion for the United States government in adjusting other phases of policy to the harsh requirements of the cold war. His conversion of the Japanese nation to the ideals to which the United States is dedicated laid a hopeful foundation for democracy in Asia. He was quick to detect the condition of diminishing returns in the Occupation, and he inspired the sentiment and guided the tactics which led to the conclusion of peace. His job was so well done that his replacement by General Ridgway caused nothing more than a temporary disturbance in the orderly, continuous conduct of affairs.

The United States, in spite of unavoidable shortcomings, had reason to be pleased with the success of the Occupation. Perhaps the roots of democracy were more delicate than desired; perhaps the vestiges of militarism and totalitarianism were not completely blotted out; yet because of experience with the United States during the Occupation, Japan was better equipped to face its future tribulations. The entire free world was stronger for Japan's contributions in man power, industrial assets, and fanatical devotion to national survival. Many Americans were skeptical of the new attitudes within Japan fostered in ten tiny years and apprehensive about the permanence and the genuineness of the change from yesterday's villains to tomorrow's allies. Yet Japan paid an initial installment for international confidence in its actions and attitudes during the Korean crisis, and it clearly contained a reservoir of wisdom and experience which might prove of inestimable value before all the "dust had settled in Asia."

The United States and Korea

The shift in American interest from China to Korea precipitated one of the most baffling and vitriolic debates in the long history of American foreign relations. On January 2, 1950, former President Hoover's views were made public to the effect that the United States must continue to support the Nationalist government of China and if necessary give naval protection to Formosa, the Pescadores, and Hainan Island. Three days later President Truman issued his statement indicating no further involvement in China's civil war. On April 27 Mr. Hoover with rising temperature called for a reorganization of the United Nations without the Communists or for the creation of a new anti-Communist United Front for the defense of freedom. Thus the political argument took shape before

the actual invasion of South Korea, and it did not attract a great deal of public attention.

The initial defeats in Korea created American fears for the possible loss of Formosa and prompted General MacArthur in his capacity as commander in chief of American forces in the Far East to visit the Formosan segment of his command. He expressed his opinion in a message to the Veterans of Foreign Wars on August 28 that Formosa was ideally located for strategic purposes and that "nothing could be more fallacious than the threadbare argument . . . that if we defend Formosa we alienate continental Asia." He added, in a passage which aroused the anger of the president, "Those who speak thus do not understand the Orient. They do not grasp that it is the pattern of Oriental psychology to respect and follow aggressive, resolute, and dynamic leadership." Within three weeks, on September 15, MacArthur demonstrated his statement with the spectacular landing at Inchon.

In October President Truman and General MacArthur met at Wake Island. The general assured his chief that he could spare some of his best men for service in Europe, that victory would be achieved by Thanksgiving, and that the Eighth Army could be withdrawn to Japan by Christmas. He doubted the entry of either China or the USSR into the war. He said that if they had intervened in the early summer they would have driven the United Nations out of Korea, but the Chinese would be slaughtered if they entered now. On his way home at San Francisco, President Truman was hopeful of lightning victory and, as if to calm the Chinese, he said, "Let this be crystal-clear to all—we have no aggressive designs in Korea or in any other place in the Far East, or elsewhere. No country in the world which really wants peace has any reason to fear the United States." The era of optimism persisted through the period of the Congressional elections, and the Republicans were unable or unwilling to make a campaign issue of Korean policy.

In November the Chinese, supported by Russian-made tanks and planes, jumped into the fray and necessitated new strategic decisions. The administration called for intensified local action and a more positive policy in the United Nations. General MacArthur insisted upon the military need to "neutralize sanctuary protection given the enemy north of the Yalu River," although "no man in his right mind would advocate sending our ground forces into continental China." He demanded specifically (1) the intensification of our economic blockade against China, (2) the imposition of a naval blockade against the China coast, (3) removal of restrictions on air reconnaissance of China's coastal area and of Manchuria and (4) removal of restriction on the forces of the Republic of China on Formosa,

with logistical support to contribute to their effective operations against the common enemy. He did not believe that these measures would increase the risk of spreading the war because he felt that the Communists were already exerting themselves to the limit of their efforts. To him the matter of Soviet intervention was not a question of "what we do in Korea but of cold calculation on the part of the Kremlin." In his words, "Like a cobra, any new enemy will more likely strike whenever it feels that the relativity of military and other potential is in its favor on a world-wide basis."

On December 6 the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered all statements of military leaders to be cleared with the White House. But Mr. Hoover was beyond the effect of the "gag rule" and in a public address on December 20 (the day after General Eisenhower was appointed Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in Europe) he demanded that not one more man or dollar be sent to Europe until Europeans themselves organized armies strong enough to provide a sure dam against the Red flood. He advocated a retirement to the defense of the Western Hemisphere, joining with Japan, Formosa, and the Philippines on the Pacific side and with Great Britain on the Atlantic side. Secretary Acheson said this was "like sitting quivering in a storm cellar for whatever fate others may wish to prepare for us." The verbal barbs became more acrimonious as Chinese hordes swept across North Korea and sent more American boys to their graves.

By March, 1951, the United Nations reversed the tide and indicated a preference for a peaceful settlement to the renewed complications of recrossing the Thirty-eighth Parallel. General MacArthur offered independently to meet the commander in chief of the enemy forces in an earnest effort to find any military means whereby the political objectives of the United Nations might be accomplished without further bloodshed. This offer was not cleared by Washington, and it had the effect of interfering with delicate overtures in Washington looking to an armistice. On April 5 Congressman Martin put into the *Congressional Record* a letter from General MacArthur in which it was stated that global war was fought in Asia while Europe talked. The general told the congressman, "Your view with respect to the utilization of the Chinese forces in Formosa is in conflict with neither logic nor this tradition."

This straw "broke the camel's back," and on April 11 President Truman relieved General MacArthur of all his commands in the Far East. The general returned to receive a hero's frenzied welcome and to present his ideas to the American Congress and the American public. In a moving, masterly oration before the Congress on April 19, he expounded his philosophy of the war as he saw it from Asia and his recipe for victory. He began:

While Asia is commonly referred to as the gateway to Europe, it is no less true that Europe is the gateway to Asia, and the broad influence of the one cannot fail to have its impact upon the other. There are those who claim our strength is inadequate to protect on both fronts, that we cannot divide our effort. I can think of no greater expression of defeatism. (Applause)

In his analysis, the Asian people saw the dawn of a new opportunity to throw off the shackles of colonialism, and the United States must orient its policies in consonance with Asia's basic evolutionary condition. He declared the Asians sought friendly guidance, understanding, and support, not imperious direction, the dignity of equality and not the shame of subjugation. He said:

World ideologies play little part in Asian thinking and are little understood. . . . What the people strive for is the opportunity for a little more food in their stomachs, a little better clothing on their backs, a little firmer roof over their heads and the realization of the normal nationalist urge for political freedom.

Turning to considerations of American security, he repeated his recommendation that under no circumstances must Formosa fall under Communist control. "Such an eventuality would at once threaten the freedom of the Philippines and the loss of Japan, and might well force our western frontier back to the coasts of California, Oregon, and Washington." He traced the growth of nationalism in China, and affirmed that in the last fifty years the Chinese had become militarized in their concepts and their ideals. He believed the Chinese Communist support of the North Koreans was the dominant one and reflected the same lust for the expansion of power which animated every would-be conqueror from the beginning of time. He detailed his proposals for winning the war and concluded with the dramatic truism, "In war there is no substitute for victory."

In the subsequent hearings on the military situation in the Far East before the Armed Services Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, the best-informed and most responsible authorities in the United States government aired their understanding of the facts and their opinions on policies. General Marshall believed that General MacArthur's recommendations would lead to World War III, and General Bradley stated that General MacArthur's strategy "would involve us in the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy." General Wedemeyer felt that the United States should fight to the hilt in Korea or get out altogether. He saw in the Kremlin the source of the crisis and interpreted the lesson in geopolitics as demanding the immediate substitution of global initiative for disastrous holding actions in dis-

advantageous peripheral areas like Korea. As a sidelight, he stated his conviction, "I don't believe the military has ever solved an international problem or ever will—it just expands, perpetuates, and breeds hate and suspicion."

The great debate did not end with the beginning of the armistice negotiations. It broadened in scope and deepened in sentiment as the weary months dragged along at Panmunjom. In the presidential campaign of 1952, the Democratic candidate, Adlai Stevenson, stood on the record of the Truman administration and challenged the Republicans to come forward with constructive measures for Korea. The Republicans talked in favor of some of MacArthur's policies and blamed the Democrats for vacillation and equivocation but showed equal reluctance to assume the responsibility for expansion of the area of hostilities. Republicans, too, deplored the American casualties, the costs of war, and advocated continued effort to conclude an armistice. At Champaign, Illinois, candidate Eisenhower said, "If there must be war there, let it be Asians against Asians, with American support on the side of freedom."

After the election a new group of individuals with a fresh optimism took over the reins of Korean diplomacy. Whether because of greater skills or because of fortuitous circumstances in world affairs, the new administration achieved an armistice settlement in Korea. It undertook a policy of detachment and strategic redeployment of troops and lowered to *sotto voce* its talk of liberating satellites. It provided a temporary respite in Korea only to shunt its major energies to the aggravated situation in Southeast Asia.

The United States and Southeast Asia

At the end of World War II, the United States enjoyed an immense reservoir of good will in Southeast Asia. It was identified with freedom and independence and dissociated from the hated imperialism of its Allies. President Roosevelt was on record as favoring an international trusteeship for Indo-China. He told Secretary Hull on January 24, 1944, "The French have had the country for 100 years and the people are worse off than they were at the beginning." The Americans showed no sympathy with the British in India, Burma, Malaya, or even Hongkong, and they forced the British to soften British attitudes toward unhappy Thailand. Sentimentally, the Americans opposed the restoration of the lost colonies of the Dutch, and they won the hearts of most Asians by redeeming their promise to grant independence to the Philippines on July 4, 1946.

Good will toward the United States increased with the rather generous policies of assistance to the Philippines. The president and the Congress provided for relief and rehabilitation, and one mission after another studied ways and means to improve the fundamental welfare of the Philippines. In 1946 an agricultural mission visited the islands; the next year, a financial commission; and in 1950, the Bell Economic Survey Mission. Filipinos and Americans argued bitterly about the degree of American responsibility for the woes of the Philippines and the wisdom of measures advocated for reconstruction, but even the Filipinos appreciated the supplies which were sent to the Philippines and the aims of the assistance and mutual security programs. The most controversial measure, the Bell Trade Agreement, was extended to January 1, 1956, to provide time to construct a mutually satisfactory basis for economic relations. Thanks largely to the astute diplomacy and the genial personality of Ambassador Romulo in the United States, Philippine-American political and military relations from the beginning were marked by a spirit of cordiality, good will, and mutual respect in spite of occasional heated differences of opinion.

The first ripples on the placid surface of United States-Southeast Asian affairs resulted from disagreements with the British. The British let it be known that they had no intention of relinquishing their primacy in Southeast Asia, and that they would salvage by accommodation what they could not preserve by force. They discharged their last obligations in the war—like accepting the surrender of the Japanese in Indonesia and Indo-China—with efficiency and good grace and without any endeavor to reap profit for themselves from the misfortunes of the Dutch and the French. But they did not take kindly to the easy American tendency to draw a righteous line between Americans and imperialists, and they fought to preserve the few economic assets which remained in their crumbling world. In Malaya the British planters and miners lashed out against the Frankenstein monsters of the American synthetic rubber industry and the Texas tin smelters. The British clung tenaciously to every possibility of garnering American dollars in Singapore and Hongkong, whatever Americans might allege of their penuriousness or lack of idealism.

Then the United States antagonized the Dutch. It sought to harmonize the conflicting interests of Dutch and Indonesians and it alienated the sympathies of both. Dutch marines were trained in the United States and supplied with equipment which bore the familiar star of the American Army. Indonesians protested that their people were being killed because of American guns, and they took little consolation from American pressures in the United Nations to restrain the Dutch. The Dutch also were angered because of the American opposition to the police action and the

suspension of aid to Indonesia through the Netherlands in accordance with the European Recovery Program. Criticism of the United States in Indonesia blossomed into distrust, and it was not allayed by the subsequent economic assistance measures and their military overtones. Other Asians—primarily, Indians, Burmans, and Malays—added the themes of capitalistic exploitation and racial prejudice to anti-American propaganda and gradually drained away substantial portions of the reservoir of good will.

The fundamental dilemmas in American relations with Southeast Asia produced the severest crisis in Indo-China. The United States needed French bases in North Africa, and depended upon France as a strong anti-Communist ally in the European Defense Community. The Americans could not afford to offend the political sensibilities of the French or to undermine the French economic structure by unequivocal support of anti-colonialism in Indo-China. Furthermore, the United States declined to be a party to the new subversive imperialism which masqueraded as the national liberation movement of Ho Chi Minh. Idealism was postponed in the interest of expediency as the United States made the unpleasant choice between the unattainable and the unacceptable.

The support of France and its puppet, Bao Dai, provoked immediate unfavorable reaction in Indo-China. When the American destroyers, "Richard B. Anderson" and "Stickell," steamed into port at Saigon on a good-will visit, 4,000 well-organized demonstrators, carrying the gold-starred banners of the Viet-Minh tore down French and American flags and ripped them to pieces. After the outbreak of the war in Korea, President Truman announced accelerated military assistance to the forces of France and the Associated States of Indo-China. When that assistance was given, without insistence upon unqualified and absolute independence, the United States was inextricably enmeshed with imperialism. No amount of explanation could erase those implications or neutralize the effectiveness of the Communist propaganda. The disastrous flaws were fully revealed after the armistice in Korea, when it appeared that the United States and its ally, France, did not possess an unassailable moral or military position.

American leaders mired themselves deeper in contradictions as they tried to retain the confidence of their own people in the ability to stem the advance of Communist armies through Indo-China, the area of "transcendent importance" in Southeast Asia. The Americans tried to bolster the faltering morale of the French, but the Americans were less realistic than the French in facing the reality of military defeat.

American statements resembled a game of bid and raise, bluff and call. Some advocated intervention and warned against the deadly uncertainties

of a coalition government within Viet-Nam or an arbitrary partition. On September 2, 1953, Secretary Dulles told the American Legion Convention that if the Chinese should send their army into Indo-China, such a second aggression could not occur without grave consequences which might not be confined to Indo-China. At the beginning of 1954, the United States sent technicians to Viet-Nam for the servicing and repair of airplanes, but President Eisenhower insisted that "no one could ever be more bitterly opposed to getting the United States involved in a hot war in that region than I am."

The president used restrained words but his subordinates were more restive. Mr. Dulles called for "united action"—presumably military intervention—but the British and the French balked. Vice-President Nixon said, "If this government could not avoid it, the administration must face up to the situation and dispatch forces." Some Congressmen cautioned that the United States would be naked and alone if it stooped to surrender on the installment plan, but others warned just as earnestly that "we cannot be a gladiator for the whole world," and it "will be suicide to go it alone." Some publicists and commentators praised the interventionists as courageous, but others referred to them as "gibbering idiots."

The French called for the immediate commitment of American planes and fliers and asked for an air strike to relieve the pressure on the besieged fortress at Dien Bien Phu. Secretary Dulles replied that "present conditions there do not provide a suitable basis for the United States to participate with its armed forces." He hedged on the possibility of intervention by attaching the following conditions: full account must be given to the aspirations of the peoples of Asia, the United Nations must be consulted to clarify the moral issues, the French must make exhaustive efforts to continue the fight, the native peoples must do all they can, the United States must be invited by Asians to participate, the Congress must give its assent to presidential action, and American action must be part of a collective effort. The United States could do little more than permit the French to make the best bargain they could with the Communists and concentrate its own efforts on preventing the rest of Southeast Asia from collapsing like "falling dominoes."

The Geneva Conference began in April, 1954, with the French in a mood of peace at almost any price and of resentment against the United States. The United States blamed the United Kingdom for not taking a positive stand for immediate action, and the British criticized the Americans for "passing the buck." The settlement reached at Geneva on July 21, 1954, was interpreted by most Americans as one of the greatest Communist victories of the decade. Undersecretary of State Walter B. Smith refused

to join in the declaration of the conference, but he asserted that the United States would refrain from the threat or use of force to disturb the agreements reached. Further, he declared that the United States would view any renewal of aggression in violation of the agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security. As the French and the Communists arranged a cease-fire and gave the world its first release from a hot war anywhere in twenty years, the United States halted its shipments of war materials to Indo-China, diverted shipments already en route, and announced its decision to maintain its mission at Saigon and to send diplomatic envoys to Laos and Cambodia.

Secretary Dulles redoubled his efforts to consummate the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty after the tragedy of Indo-China. He was unable to unite Southeast Asia, Nationalist China, Japan, and Korea in a solid anti-Communist front. Nor could he hope to gain for his ideas the support of those, including Nehru, who believed that the American schemes would promote tensions and who preferred the alternative British proposal for an Asian Locarno which would bind both sides—Communists and anti-Communists—to a common commitment to preserve the peace.

On September 8, 1954, eight nations—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Thailand—signed the Manila pact. The signatory powers repeated their oft-stated promises to settle international disputes by peaceful means, to develop their capacity to resist armed attack, to prevent and counter subversive activities, to strengthen their free institutions, and to co-operate with one another in the promotion of economic progress and social well-being. Each party recognized that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area (from western Pakistan to the Pacific Ocean as far north as 21 degrees 30 minutes north latitude, thus excluding Hongkong, Formosa, and Japan) against any of the parties would endanger its own peace and safety and agreed that it would in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. The United States specified that it understood *aggression* to mean Communist aggression.

The Manila pact offered protection against subversion as well as against aggression. It provided for consultation if "the inviolability or the integrity or the sovereignty or political independence of any party in the treaty area . . . is threatened in any other way than by armed attack." To prevent unwarranted intervention in the purely internal affairs of another state, it was added that "no action on the territory of any state . . . shall be taken except at the invitation or with the consent of the government concerned."

A council, on which each party was represented, was established to provide for consultation with regard to military and any other planning and

to consider all matters concerning the implementation of the treaty. A separate protocol extended the mantle of protection and promised the benefits of contemplated economic measures to Laos, Cambodia, and the free territory under the jurisdiction of Viet-Nam, which were debarred by the Geneva agreement from entering into military commitments.

In addition to the defense treaty, the Manila Conference at the insistence of President Magsaysay approved a "Pacific Charter." The delegates endorsed the principle of equal rights and self-determination and promised to promote self-government and independence of all countries whose people desired it and were able to undertake its responsibilities. They pledged their governments to the orderly achievement of the foregoing purposes; to economic, social, and cultural co-operation; and to the prevention of any attempt to subvert their freedom or to destroy their sovereignty or territorial integrity.

Mr. Dulles was ready to make a forthright declaration for the end of colonialism, but the Commonwealth countries insisted upon a watered-down statement in view of their relations with Malaya, New Guinea, and the mandated territories. The Manila pact attempted to salvage whatever strength remained for the free world in Southeast Asia, but it could not in itself produce miracles. It created no new military forces to protect exposed positions. Furthermore, it could not become effective until it was ratified, and its ultimate influence would depend upon the will and the intention of all the signatory powers to carry forth its spirit.

The American record in Southeast Asia and elsewhere in the Far East was an uneven record of accomplishment and failure. It accepted the truisms that Americans could not lead the good life at home without concern for the events of Asia and that American interests in Asia were best promoted by the growth of strong, prosperous, and enlightened Asian states. Americans repeated time and again that they harbored no aggressive designs against any one and that they acted uniquely according to the demands of self-defense. Only Asians could determine for themselves what they wanted in their struggle for improved well-being. Americans were often overeager to assist and were the unwitting victims of their own better impulses. They learned bitterly that military strength in itself was powerless to prevent the capture of the sparkling ideas of freedom and prosperity by a cancerous ideology. They were shown that economic assistance contained within itself the seeds of misunderstanding as well as the promise of friendship. Asians cherished spiritual and cultural values in the turmoil of kaleidoscopic changes, and they sought new guidance from those who manifested a fundamental disposition of understanding and respect. Asians believed that present events were transitory and im-

permanent and that the evil would disappear and the good remain. They interpreted the history of their distinguished past as the prelude to a glorious future. In their own philosophy they challenged the United States to demonstrate its own unswerving faith in itself as the dream of youth and the hope of tomorrow.

Suggested Reading

- BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, *Major Problems of United States Foreign Policy* (Washington, annual).
- MCGEORGE BUNDY, *The Pattern of Responsibility* (Boston, 1952).
- JAMES F. BYRNES, *Speaking Frankly* (New York, 1947).
- VERA MICHELES DEAN, *The United States and Russia* (Cambridge, 1948).
- JOHN FOSTER DULLES, *War or Peace* (New York, 1950).
- JOHN K. FAIRBANK, *The United States and China* (Cambridge, 1948).
- HERBERT FEIS, *The China Tangle* (Princeton, 1953).
- KENNETH SCOTT LATOURMETTE, *The American Record in the Far East, 1945-1951* (New York, 1952).
- RICHARD REVERE AND ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., *The General and the President* (New York, 1951).
- EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, JR., *Roosevelt and the Russians* (New York, 1949).
- U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, *United States Relations with China (The White Paper)* (Washington, 1949).
- U. S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, *A Decade of American Foreign Policy, Basic Documents, 1941-1949, Senate Document 123, 81st Congress, 1st Session* (Washington, 1950).
- U. S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, *Hearings Before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, 82nd Congress, 1st Session* (Washington, 1951).
- U. S. SENATE, *Military Situation in the Far East, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, 5 volumes* (Washington, 1951).
- U. S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, *State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation, 81st Congress, 1st Session* (Washington, 1950).
- HAROLD M. VINACKE, *The United States and the Far East 1945-1951* (Stanford, 1951).

References

The following selected list of primary references and periodicals is intended primarily for beginning students in the Far East, and for teachers and libraries with only limited funds at their disposal.

BIBLIOGRAPHIC AIDS:

- HUGH BORTON, SERGEI ELISSEEF, WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD AND JOHN C. PELZEL, *A Selected List of Books and Articles on Japan in English, French and German* (Harvard University Press, 1954).
- JOHN F. EMBREE AND LILLIAN DOTSON, *Bibliography of the Peoples and Cultures of Mainland Southeast Asia* (Yale University Press, 1950).
- JOHN K. FAIRBANK, *Bibliographical Guide to Modern China: Works in Western Languages* (Harvard University Press, 1948).
- CECIL HOBBS, *Southeast Asia, An Annotated Bibliography of Selected Reference Sources* (Library of Congress, Washington, 1952).
- R. J. KERNER, *Northeastern Asia: A Selected Bibliography*, 2 volumes (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1939).
- EARL PRITCHARD AND OTHERS, *Bulletin of Far Eastern Bibliography*, 5 volumes (American Council of Learned Societies, Washington, 1936-1940). Continued in *The Far Eastern Quarterly*.

COLLECTIONS OF TREATIES:

- CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, *Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China, 1919-1929* (Washington, 1929).
- HERTSLET'S *China Treaties*, 2 volumes, 3rd ed. (London, 1908).
- INSPECTORATE GENERAL OF CUSTOMS, *Treaties and Conventions between China and Foreign States*, 2 volumes (Shanghai, 1917).
- LEAGUE OF NATIONS, *Treaty Series* (London, 1920 ff.).

- J. V. A. MACMURRAY, ed., *Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China, 1894-1919*, 2 volumes (New York, 1921).
- WILLIAM M. MALLOY, ed., *Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols and Agreements between the United States and other Powers, 1776-1909*, 2 volumes (Washington, 1923).
- DAVID HUNTER MILLER, ed., *Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America*, 7 volumes to date (Washington, 1931-1942).
- W. W. ROCKHILL, *Treaties and Conventions with and Concerning China and Korea, 1894-1904* (Washington, 1904).
- U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, *Treaty Series*.

GENERAL REFERENCES:

- BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS (London, 1841 ff.).
- BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (London, 1801 ff.).
- CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.
- DOCUMENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST, PARTICULARLY "THE JUDGMENT" AND DISSENTING OPINIONS.
- MISCELLANEOUS EXECUTIVE AND CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS INCLUDING REPORTS OF COMMITTEES AND HEARINGS HELD BEFORE COMMITTEES.
- PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES (Washington, 1861 ff., annual and special editions).
- PUBLICATIONS OF GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS (Tokyo, 1945-1951).
- PUBLICATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS.
- J. D. RICHARDSON, ed., *Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1908* (Washington, 1908).
- UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY (PACIFIC SECTION).

PERIODICAL REFERENCES:

- AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW.
- AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Washington, D. C.).
- AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW.
- ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE (Philadelphia).
- CHINA YEARBOOK (London, Tientsin, and Shanghai, 1912 ff.).
- CHINESE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW (Peking).
- CHINESE YEARBOOK (Shanghai, 1936 and after).
- CONTEMPORARY JAPAN (Tokyo).
- DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS, annual, published by World Peace Foundation, Boston.
- FAR EASTERN QUARTERLY (New York).
- FAR EASTERN SURVEY (New York).
- FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, Bulletins and Reports.

- HARVARD JOURNAL OF ASIATIC STUDIES (Cambridge, Mass.).
- JAPAN YEARBOOK (Tokyo).
- JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN ORIENTAL SOCIETY (New Haven).
- JOURNAL OF MODERN HISTORY.
- MAJOR PROBLEMS OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY, annual, published by the Brookings Institution, Washington.
- ORIENTAL ECONOMIST (Tokyo).
- PACIFIC AFFAIRS (New York).
- PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEW.
- PHILIPPINE SOCIAL SCIENCE REVIEW (Manila).
- POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY.
- PROBLEMS OF THE PACIFIC (New York).
- SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS and its companion volume, DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, annual, published for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London.
- TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT (London).
- TRANSACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE JAPAN SOCIETY (London).
- TRANSACTIONS OF THE ASIATIC SOCIETY OF JAPAN (Tokyo).
- TRANSACTIONS OF THE KOREAN BRANCH OF THE ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY.
- UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS.
- UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS annual, published by the Council on Foreign Relations, New York.

Index

- Abaza, Admiral Alexei, 109
 ABCD encirclement, 406, 413
 Abe Nobuyuke, General, 243
 Abe Yoshishige, 818
 Acheson, Dean, 468, 579, 704
 Adams, John Quincy, 119, 124
 Aikawa Gisuke, 226
Akahata, 332
 Alaska, 120f.
 Alcock, Sir Rutherford, 133
 Alexiev, General Eugene, 109
 Alimin, 601
 Allied Council for Japan, 440, 441
 Amami-Oshima, 485
 Amau Declaration, 233, 389
 America-China Development Company, 373
 Amherst, Lord, 71
 Amur River incident, 334
 Anglo-Chinese War of 1839, 73ff.
 Anglo-Chinese War of 1856, 83f.
 Anglo-Japanese Alliance (*see* Treaties)
 Annam, 18, 270
 Anti-Communism of Japan in China, 236
 Anti-Communist Government of East Hopei, 233, 244
 Anti-Comintern Pact, 263, 279, 339
 Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League, 594
 Anti-Japanese sentiment in Hawaii, 377
 Araki Sadao, General, 222
 Arita, Foreign Minister, 264, 340
 Arrow incident, 83
 Arsenal for democracy, 397
 Ashida Hitoshi, 449
 Asia for the Asiatics, 215, 247, 416
 Asian Cominform, 556, 687
 Asian Foundation, 701
 Astoria, 119
 Atlantic Charter, 265, 398, 422 f.
 Atlantic Conference of 1941, 265
 Attlee, Clement, 596
 Atomic bombs, 429
 Austin, Warren, 659
 Australia, 461, 469, 475, 491
 Axis Pact, 278, 341, 396
 Baguio Conference, 584
 Baku Congress, 310
 Ba Maw, 416, 593
 Bao Dai, 641, 644, 645
 Barnby Mission, 263
 Bataan Peninsula, 415
 Battle Act, 709
 Battle of Britain, 396, 397
 Battle of the Atlantic, 398
 Belgians in China, 275
 Bell Mission to Philippines, 616, 622
 Beresford, Lord Charles, 128
 Bezobrazov, Ivan, 108
 Bingham, Judge John A., 174
 Blucher, General Vassily (*see* Galens)
 Bolte, General Charles L., 656
 Bonaparte, Louis Napoleon, 270
 Bonin Islands, 192
 Borodin, Michael, 314, 502
 Bose, Subha Chandra, 416
 Boxer Indemnity, 108, 373
 Boxer Protocol, 108
 Boxers, 108, 129, 146
 Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of, 289
 Bridgham, Reverend Elijah, 119
 British East India Company, 66, 71
 British in Asia, 66, 67, 249
 British life line, 252
 British trade and investments, 252f.
 Brussels Conference, 238, 296, 393
 Bryan, William Jennings, 208, 380

Burlingame, Anson, 126

Burma

- anti-Fascist Peoples Freedom League, 594
- British in, 592
- chettys, 593, 595
- Communists in, 596
- ducity*, 597
- economy, 596
- geography, 18
- independence, 596
- and Japan, 466
- Japanese in, 594
- and Red China, 597
- rehabilitation, 597
- and United Nations, 598
- and USSR, 689

Burma Road, 265

Cairo Conference of 1943, 425

California, anti-Japanese sentiments, 385

Calcutta Communist Conferences, 687

Canberra Conference, 468

Canton, 81, 82

Casablanca Conference of 1943, 423

Catchcart Mission, 69

Catholic interests in China, 273

Catroux, General, 282

Central China Promotion Company, 245

Chamberlain, Joseph, 257

Chang Chih-tung, 146

Chang Hsüeh-liang (*see* Young Marshal)

Chang Kuo-t'ao, 507

Chang Tso-lin, 153-216

Chang Wen-t'ien, 520

Changkufeng incident, 335

Charter Oath (Japan), 176

Cheka, 291

Ch'en Ch'eng, 568, 572

Ch'en Kuo-fu, 512

Ch'en Li-fu, 512

Ch'en Ping, 630

Ch'en Tu-hsiu, 498

Ch'en Yi, 570-571

Chennault, General Claire L., 423

Chiang Ching-kuo, 572

Chiang Kai-shek

- anti-Communist campaigns, 503
- head of Nanking government, 153ff.
- resistance to Japan, 242, 414
- retirement to Formosa, 571
- rise of the Kuomintang, 152
- Sian incident, 323, 509
- United Front, 563
- and USSR, 564

Chicherin, 309

China (*see also* Treaties)

- agriculture, 5, 6, 33
- antiforeignism, 67f., 81, 91, 160, 169
- autonomy movements, 233f.

China (cont.)

- civil war, 512, 564
- concept of law, 38
- concessions and settlements, 81, 91, 161
- constitution of 1947, 566
- constitution of 1954, 521
- cultural vitality, 7, 8, 29
- diplomatic intercourse established, 84
- dynastic cycles, 39
- early history, 26ff.
- economic institutions, 31ff.
- embassies to China, 69ff., 99
- emigration (*see* United States immigration)
- examinations, 38
- extraterritoriality, 72, 81, 162, 167
- foreign troops in, 163
- geography, 3, 5
- inland navigation, 163
- losses of sovereignty, 160
- losses of territory, 160
- Manchu Dynasty, 144
- Maritime Customs, 162
- missionaries, 82, 83, 84, 119
- modernization, 39, 163
- most-favored-nation clause, 79
- non-alienation agreements, 87, 89
- opium traffic, 72, 73, 74, 75, 82, 84, 124
- politics and government, 35ff.
- railway concessions, 90
- reform movement, 146
- resources, 5, 6, 33
- Revolution of 1911-1912, 115, 148
- Rites Controversy, 64
- scramble for concessions, 106, 257
- secret societies, 33, 147
- social organization, 31ff.
- spheres of interest, 87, 129, 160
- standards of official conduct, 38
- tariffs, 69, 84, 162, 167, 168
- treaty ports, 80
- warlords, 148, 149

China-Burma-India Theater of War, 419

China National Government

- economic and cultural policies, 156
- and Japan, 230, 459, 461, 475, 489, 579
- organization, 572
- and Peking regime, 576
- and Philippines, 579
- and United States, 575, 580, 706f.

Chinchow-Aigun Railway, 374

Chinese Changchun Railway, 548

Chinese Communists

- agrarian reform, 505, 506f.
- armed forces, 505f., 509
- beginnings and rise, 321, 498f.
- declaration of war against Japan, 508, 510

Eighth Route Army, 509

- Chinese Communists (cont.)
 Juichin, Kiangsi Republic, 503
 Long March, 322, 507
 relations with the USSR, 314, 321, 324, 499
 united front, 152, 155, 322, 500, 502
 wars against Kuomintang, 153
 Chinese Communist Government of China (Chinese People's Republic)
 agrarian reform law, 534
 armed forces, 533
 Common Program, 521
 Constitution, 521
 economic policies, 522
 education and propaganda, 530
 five-anti's campaign, 536
 five-too-many movement, 528
 Five Year Plans, 537
 flag, 515, 525
 foreign policies and relations
 Formosa, 556
 general, 540ff.
 India, 557, 559
 Japan, 459f., 467, 488, 557
 Korea, 553
 Southeast Asia, 558
 Tibet, 557
 United States, 552f.
 USSR, 546ff.
 industrialization, 537
 labor, 538
 local government, 524ff.
 minorities and overseas Chinese, 533
 Organic Law, 521
 police state, 528
 political organization, 521
 private capital, 522f.
 regimentation, 532
 social policies, 531
 three-anti's campaign, 528
 trade, 537
 transportation and communication, 538f.
 Chinese Eastern Railway, 104, 114, 312, 317, 322, 333
 Ching-Doihara agreement, 233
 Chin Shu-jen, 307
 Chosen (*see* Korea)
 Choshu, 133
 Chou En-lai, 499, 520, 544, 684
 Christmas memorandum, 261
 Chuenpi, Battle of, 75
 Chu Teh, 503
 Churchill, Sir Winston, 265, 399, 400
 Cochin China, 270
 Colombo Conferences of Prime Ministers, 584, 698
 Colombo Plan, 491
 Cominform, 678
 Comintern, 290, 296, 390f.
 Communist Imperialism, 674
 Confesor, Tomas, 614
 Congress of Toilers of Far East, 311, 500
 Consortiums, 373, 381
 Coolidge, President, 386
 Cooper Bill, 366
 Corregidor, 415
 Council of Foreign Ministers, 424, 441, 459, 564, 567, 653, 699
 Craigie-Arita formula, 264
 Cushing, Caleb, 124, 130
 Dairen (Dalny, Talienwan), 204, 548f.
 Dalbank, 317
 Dalburo, 303
 Dan Takuma, Baron, 185
 D'argenlieu, Admiral, 642
Darul Islam, 602
 Democratic Centralism, 500
 Democratic People's Republics (*see* Mongolia, Korea, China, Viet-Nam)
 Derevyanko, General, 692
 Destroyers for bases, 396
 Dewey, Commodore, 123
 Dien Bien Phu, 645
 Dimitrov, 323
 Dobama Association, 594
 Dodge, Joseph, 453
 Doihara, Kenji, 217, 219
 Dollar Diplomacy, 372
 Dominions in formation of British policy, 251
 Doolittle Raid, 417
 Dulles, John Foster, 460, 462, 465, 471, 621, 658, 701, 717, 718
 Dumbarton Oaks, 426
 Dutch East India Company, 64
 Dutch
 in Asia, 64ff., 268
 in Indonesia, 64ff., 268
 out of Indonesia, 599
 East Hopei Anti-Communist Autonomous Government, 233, 244
 Eden, Sir Anthony, 671
 Eighth Route Army, 509
 Eisenhower, President, 484, 714
 Elgin, Lord, 255
 Emergency in Malaya, 635
 "Empress of China," 118
 Ethical Policy, 269
 Evatt, Herbert, 475
 Extraterritoriality (*see* China, Japan, Siam)
 Far Eastern Commission, 440
 Far Eastern Republic, 290, 327
 February 26 incident, 185
 Federation of Malaya (*see* Malaya)
 Federation of Trade Unions (Japan), 494

- Feng Yu-hsiang, the Christian General, 316
 Five Year Plans (USSR), 294
 Five Year Plans (China), 537
 Forbes, W. Cameron, 367
Formosa
 general, 8
 Japanese in, 193, 194, 570
 Nationalist government, 570
 raids on mainland, 574
 United Nations and, 576
 Forrestal, James, 656
 Foster, William C., 622, 658
 Four Freedoms, 397f.
 Fourth Army Incident, 511
 Fourteen Points, 382
 France (*see also* Treaties)
 and China, 275f.
 and Japan, 276, 280
 and Southeast Asia, 66, 84, 270f., 282
 Frozen assets, 402
 Fujita, Tataro, 489
 Fu Tso-yi, 569

 Galens, General, 314, 339
 Gauss, Clarence, 421
 General Council of Trade Unions (Japan), 494
 Geneva Conference (*see* Indo-China)
 Gentlemen's Agreement, 378
 Germany (*see also* Treaties)
 and China, 279
 and Japan, 277, 279
 and Manchukuo, 227
 mediation in Sino-Japanese controversy, 239
 Pacific Islands, 124, 350, 382
 Gilbert and Marshal Islands, 418
 Glynn, Commander, 130
 Goodnow, Dr. Frank, 148
 Gordon, Charles George, 145
 "Grave consequences," 386
 Great Britain (*see also* Treaties)
 China rights and interests, 251, 252, 254
 Chinese Communist relations, 545
 Japanese relations, 255, 259, 263, 441, 468
 and Korea, 663, 671
 and Southeast Asia, 252, 591, 595, 599f., 630, 636, 642
 and Stimson doctrine, 262
 Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, 11, 395
 Grew, Joseph C., 390, 396, 399, 404
 Gromyko, 468, 693
 Guadalcanal, 417
 Guam, 123

 Hainan, 240, 273, 281
Hakko Ichiu, 414
 Hanoi, 282, 644
 Hanoi Convention, 282
 Hara, Takashi, 183
 Harbin, 309
 Harding, President, 382
Hardie Report, 623
 Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act, 368
 Harriman, E. H., 373
 Harris, Townsend, 132
 Harrison, Francis Burton, 367
 Hart, Admiral Thomas, 405
 Hashimoto Tetsuma, 473
 Hatoyama Ichiro, 479
 Hatta, Mohammed, 599, 601
 Hawaii, 121
 Hay, John, 128, 372
 Hayashi Senjuro, General, 235
 Higashi-kuni Naruhiko, Prince, 442
 Hippisley, Alfred E., 128
 Hiroshima, 429
 Hirota Hoki, 185, 234, 330
 Hitler, Adolf, 278, 298f., 299, 339, 428
 Ho Chi Minh, 272, 641
 Ho Lung, 509
 Ho-Umedsu agreement, 233
 Homma, General, 445
 Hongkong, 253, 636
 Hoover, President Herbert, 368, 712
 Hopkins, Harry, 428
 Horvath, General, 310
 Hsin Min Hui, 246
 Hughes, Charles Evans, 382
 Hu Han-min, 155
 Hukbalahaps, 607, 612, 617
 Hukuang Railway Loans, 373
 Hull, Cordell, 388, 391, 392, 400, 401
 Hump, 421
 Hurley, Patrick J., 422, 432, 513
 Hu Shih, 157
 Hutuktu, Living Buddha, 115, 306

 Ignatiev, General Count, 101
 Ili, 103
 Imperial Rule Assistance Association, 186, 413
 India, 461, 475
 Indian Independence League, 416
 Indo-China (*see also* Viet-Nam)
 administration, 17, 18, 271, 640
 civil war, 644
 communism, 645
 Geneva Conference, 647ff., 694, 717
 geography, 17f.
 Japanese and, 402, 584
 nationalism, 640
 United States aid to, 646
 USSR in, 690
 Indonesia
 cold war and, 604

Indonesia (cont.)

- communism in, 601
- geography, 19, 20
- government and politics, 600
- Japan and, 282f., 284, 395, 461, 470, 475, 599, 602, 604
- nationalism in, 599
- population and resources, 20, 21
- Republic of, 598
- separation from the Netherlands, 602
- United Nations and, 600
- United States and, 715
- United States of, 600
- USSR and, 687f.

Inner bloc, 11, 414

Inner Mongolia (*see* Mongolia)

International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), 213, 220, 228, 239, 330, 444

Inouye Junnosuke, 174, 185

Inukai Takishi, 183

Irian, 603

Ishii Kikujiro, Viscount, 205, 380, 386

Issarakis, 647

Italy, 275

Ito Hirobumi, 178, 201

Ito Ritsu, 482

Iwakura, Lord, 173, 174, 176

Iwojima, 419

Japan (*see also* Treaties)

- agriculture, 10, 53f.
- art and architecture, 50
- attitudes toward Peace Settlement, 472
- bakufu*, 47
- bureaucrats, 182
- cartels (*see* *Zaibatsu*)
- Charter Oath, 176
- China affair, 232, 235, 237
- China Affairs Board, 242, 245
- clans, 175f.
- communism in, 185, 331, 338, 455f., 480f., 487
- constitution of 1889, 178
- constitution of 1947, 447f.
- cultural vitality, 48f.
- deconcentration of industry, 451
- demilitarization, 444
- Democratic party, 480
- democratization, 446
- Diet, 178
- diplomatic relations with U.S., 1941, 388
- early history, 44
- economics, 178ff., 184, 186f., 453, 492
- education, 180
- education rescript, 180
- elections, 449, 479
- emperor, 444, 448
- extraterritoriality, 173

Japan (cont.)

- February 26, 1936, incident, 185
- genro, 178
- geography, 9
- government and administration, 55
- immigration, 377, 386
- imperial institution, 50, 55
- industrialization, 493
- inner bloc, 11, 414
- labor movement, 185, 494
- Lansing-Ishii notes, 205, 380, 386
- loans to China, 207
- Manchukuo, 222
- Manchurian incident, 217f., 329f.
- mandated islands, 350
- Manhood Suffrage Bill, 183
- Meiji emperor, 44
- militarism, 52
- Minseito, 183
- missionaries, 57, 189
- mobilization for World War II, 186f.
- monopolies (*see* *Zaibatsu*)
- naval rivalry, 354, 382
- Netherlands East Indies and, 395
- New National Structure, 185
- New Order in China, 240, 247, 394
- Occupation (*see* Occupation of Japan)
- opium, 228
- paramount interests in China (*see* Lansing-Ishii notes)
- patriotic societies, 186
- peace overtures, 429
- Peace Preservation Law, 184
- people's characteristics, 42f.
- police state, 43, 56, 188
- political parties, 182, 449, 479f.
- population, 10, 53
- positive policy, 183, 211
- Progressive Party, 479
- rationalization, 187
- recognition of Manchukuo, 221
- religion, 45, 49, 50, 180, 189, 478
- reopening by Perry, 131
- reparations, 444, 450, 463, 470, 491, 597, 604, 621
- repatriation after World War II, 471, 691
- retrocession of Liaotung, 104, 199
- seclusion policy, 56
- secret agreements, World War I, 350
- Seiyukai, 182
- self-defense forces, 485
- Shinto, 45, 50, 180
- shipping, 179, 495
- social code, 43f., 50f.
- Social Democrats, 449
- Socialists, right wing and left wing, 479
- special interests in China, 214
- Supreme War Council, 404

Japan (cont.)

- surrender, 429
- tariff and trade, 492
- tenancy, 10, 53f., 452
- Tokugawa shogunate, 43, 48, 55, 175
- tonari gumi*, 52, 483
- troops in Siberia, 205, 313, 326, 381
- Twenty-one Demands, 94f., 204
- ultranationalism, 185, 446, 478
- unconditional surrender, 429
- war with China, 86, 237
- war with Russia, 109, 111, 200
- war-crimes trials (*see* IMTFE)
- wartime internal conditions, 413
- withdrawal from League of Nations, 387
- World War I, 207f.
- World War II, 411
- yen bloc, 224f., 246
- Japanese characteristics, 42ff.
- Japanese Monroe Doctrine, 191, 375
- Jardine, William, 74
- Jehol, 230
- Jesuits in the Far East, 57, 63ff.
- Joffe, Abram (Adolf), 311, 327
- Jones Act, 366
- Juichin, 322, 503
- Julutao, 215
- Kalgan, 566
- Kamikaze*, 419
- Kanghwa, Treaty of, 196, 198
- Kang Teh (Pu-yi, Emperor of Manchukuo), 219
- K'ang Yu-wei, 146
- Kao Kang, 521
- Karakhan, Leo, 309, 314, 328
- Karens, 595
- Katayama Tetsu, 449
- Katsura Taro, Count, 182
- Kearney, Commodore Lawrence, 125
- Kellogg-Briand Pact, 320, 354
- Kerensky, 288
- Khabarov, 98
- Khabarovsk Protocol, 320
- Kiakhta, 99
- Kiaochow (Shantung), 106
- Kim Ilsung, 654
- Kim Kiusic, 653
- Kim Koo, 653
- Kim-Ok-kium, 197
- Kimigayo, 478
- Kimmel, Admiral Husband E., 405
- King, C. W., 130
- Knox, Philander C., 373, 374
- Kobayashi, Ambassador, 284
- Koizumi Shinzo, 473
- Kolchak, Admiral, 290
- Konoye Fumimaro, Prince, 186, 236, 403, 429
- Koo, V. K. Wellington, 312
- Korea (*see also* Treaties)
 - annexation by Japan, 200
 - Cairo declaration, 426, 652
 - crisis of 1950 and Japan, 456
 - declaration of independence, 202
 - geography, 14
 - Japanese in, 110, 112, 195f., 652
 - Japanese negotiations after World War II, 465, 489
 - North Korea, 653, 654, 658, 685
 - South Korea, 654, 657, 663, 669
 - United Nations and, 654f., 659, 664, 669
- Koronadel Land Resettlement scheme, 609
- Kota Bahru, 19
- Koxinga, 194
- Kowloon Peninsula, 84
- Kra Isthmus, 17
- Krushchev, Nikita, 680
- Kuang Hsü, 144
- Ku Chu-t'ung, 511
- Kuldja (Ili), 102f.
- Kungchintang (*see* Chinese Communists)
- Kuomintang
 - beginnings, 150, 314
 - CC' clique, 512
 - collapse, 513, 562
 - General Marshall and (*see* Marshall, General George)
 - northern expedition, 152, 315, 501
 - Political Science Clique, 512
 - split with Communists, 153
 - united front with Communists, 152, 155, 315, 322, 562
 - Whampoa Cadets, 152, 512
- Kurile Islands, 463
- Kuropatkin, General Alexei, 107
- Kurusu Saburo, 405
- Kwangchow, 273
- Kwangtung Province, China, 6, 168
- Kwantung Army, 216, 218
- Kwantung Leased Area (*see* Liaotung), 214
- Lake Khasan incident (*see* Changkufeng)
- Lansing-Ishii notes, 205, 380, 386
- Laos, 271, 646
- Laurel, Jose, 614
- League of Nations
 - Brussels Conference, 238, 296, 393
 - Experts in China, 156
 - Lytton Commission, 218, 331
 - Manchurian Incident and, 217f.
 - Shanghai incident and, 238
 - Sino-Japanese controversy and, 225, 232
 - USSR and, 296, 300
- Leith-Ross, Sir Frederick, 263
- Lend lease, 398
- Lenin, N., 288, 293

- Leyte landings, 418
 Liaotung Peninsula, 86, 104, 199, 203
 Lien Vet, 646
 Li Hung-chang, 87, 105, 134, 193
 Li-Ito Convention, 196
 Li Li-san, 321
 Li Mi, 591, 597
 Li Ta-chao, 498
 Li Tsung-jen, 568, 569, 572
 Limitation of Armaments Conference (*see*
 Washington Conference)
 Lin Piao, 509
 Lin 'Tse-hsü, 74
 Lin Yu-t'ang, 87
 Linggadhati (Cheribon) agreement, 600
 Litvinov, Maxim, 296, 324
 Liu Ch'iu (Loo Ch'oo, Riukiu, or Ryukyu)
 Islands, 131, 193, 419, 463
 Liu Po-ch'eng, 509
 Liu Shao-ch'i, 499, 520
 Lobanov-Rostovsky, Prince, 105, 107, 110
 Lominadse, Besso, 321
 London Naval Conference of 1930, 354
 London Naval Conference of 1935, 356
 Long March, 322, 507
 Lou, F. F., 134
 Luang Phibun Songgram (*see* Phibun Song-
 gram)
 Luang Pradit Manudharm (*see* Pridi
 Banomyang)
 Lukouchiao (Marco Polo Bridge) incident,
 235, 509
 Lvov, Prince, 288
 Lytton Commission, 218, 331

 Macao, 82
 MacArthur, General Douglas, 402, 418,
 431, 457, 660, 665, 705, 709
 Macartney, Lord George, 69
 MacMichael, Sir Harold, 630
 Madiun Incident, 688
 Magic messages, 400
 Magsaysay, President Ramon, 618
 Malaya
 Communalism in, 634
 Communism in, 634, 635
 Emergency, 635
 Federated and Unfederated States, 629
 Federation of, 631
 geography, 19, 628
 government, 630
 Great Britain in, 629
 Independence of Malaya party, 634
 Malay Chinese Association (MCA), 634
 MCA-UMNO Alliance, 635
 Union plan, 630
 United Malaya National Organization
 (UMNO), 630
 USSR and, 688

 Malenkov, 680, 700
 Malik, Jacob, 554
 Malinovsky, Marshal, 563
 Manchukuo (*see also* Manchuria)
 bandits, 223
 border clashes, 223
 British attitude on formation of, 226,
 262f.
 Chinese in, 227
 Concordia Society, 228
 economy, 224
 education and propaganda, 227
 formation of, 218f.
 Industrial Control Act, 226
 Industrial Development Company, 224,
 227
 Japanese in, 222
 Koreans in, 217
 Manchuria Petroleum Company, 225
 Open Door, 225
 opium, 228
 Organic Law, 220
 police state, 228
 political structure, 220
 recognition, 221, 225, 226
 Manchuria
 Communist-Nationalist hostilities, 563
 geography, 4
 integral part of China, 4
 Japanese in, 200, 202, 204, 214, 217,
 221
 Knox neutralization plan, 373, 374
 Pauley Mission in, 451
 population and resources, 231
 privileged sanctuary, 711
 railway and financial diplomacy, 93, 113,
 202f., 372
 Russian-American rivalry before World
 War II, 371f.
 Russo-Japanese relations in, 94, 112, 347
 Sino-Japanese relations, 213f.
 Sino-Russian hostilities, 1929, 317
 Twenty-one Demands, 94, 204
 Washington Conference discussions, 312
 USSR in 1945 in Manchuria, 564, 681
 Manila, 415
 Manila Bay, 123
 Manila Pact, 718
 Mansion House Speech, 265
 Manuilsky, 321
 Mao Tse-tung, 322, 432, 499, 503, 510,
 515, 546, 569
 Marco Polo Bridge Incident, 235, 236, 509
 Marianas Islands, 418
 Maring (Sneevliet), 311
 Maritime Customs Administration, 162
 Maritime Provinces, 101, 102
 Maritime Safety Board (Japan), 484

- Marshall, General George, 513, 563, 565, 681, 705
Masjumi, 602
 Matsui, General, 238
 Matsuoka Yosuke, 341, 400
 May 30 incident (1925), 261
 McGovern, Professor William, 657
 McKinley, President William, 123, 365
 McNutt, Paul, 613
 Meiji emperor, 44, 175
 Mengchiang or Mengkukuo, 234
 Midway Islands, 417
 Mif, Pavel, 322
 Minami Jiro, General, 218
 Minobe, Professor, 188
 Minseito party, 183
 "Missouri" surrender, 412, 432
 Mitsubishi, 179, 451, 493
 Mitsui, 179, 451, 493
 Molotov, 288, 330, 341, 567
 Mongolia, 4, 94, 114, 305
 Inner Mongolia, 233
 Outer Mongolia, 113
 Mongolian People's Republic, 549
 Morgan, J. P., 373
 Morrison, John Robert, 119
 Mounbatten, Lord Louis, 424
 Mukden, Battle of, 112
 Mukden incident, 335
 Muraviev, Nikolai, 98
 Muso, 601

 Nagasaki, 429
 Nakanura Shintaro, Captain, 217
 Nakanishi Ko, 482
 Nambara Shigeru, President, 473
 Nam Il, 659
 Nanking, 153, 238, 315
 Napier, Lord, 71f., 74
 National Government of China (*see* China)
 National Police Reserve, 483, 484
 Naval rivalries, 354, 382
 Nesselrode, Count, 100
 Netherlands East Indies (*see* Indonesia)
 Netherlands-Indonesian Union, 601
 Neumann, Heinz, 321
 Nevelskoi, General, 101
 "New Democracy," 518
 New Economic Policy (USSR), 292
 New Guinea, 418
 New Order in China, 240, 247
 New Zealand, 461, 469
 Ngo Dinh Diem, 641
 Nicholas II, Czar, 104
 Nikolaievsk incident, 328
 Nimitz, Admiral, 417
 Nine-Power Treaty, 166, 384
 Nishi-Rosen Protocol, 111
 Nixon, Richard M., 657, 702

 Nomonhan incident, 335
 Nomura Kichisaburo, Admiral, 400
 Nonrecognition doctrine, 208, 225, 262, 380, 382, 387, 576
 North China Development Company, 245
 Northern Expedition of Kuomintang, 315, 501
 North Korea (*see* Korea)
 Northeast Asia, 12
 Nozaka, Sanzo, 481

 Occupation of Japan
 Communists and, 455f.
 Constitution, 447f.
 Deconcentration of industries, 451
 demilitarization, 444, 445
 democratization, 446
 depurging, 457
 economic policies, 449
 Economic Stabilization Program, 453
 elections, 449
 labor, 452
 land reform, 452
 political reorientation, 446
 purges, 446
 remilitarization, 455
 reparations, 449f., 464f.
 SCAP-staff sections, 442
 ultranationalism, 446-478
 USSR and, 691f.
 Okinawa (*see* Liu Ch'iu Islands)
 Old China Hands, 251
 Onn Bin Jafaar, Dato, 630
 Open Door
 beginnings, 91f., 128
 Japan and, 206, 225, 378, 394
 Manchukuo and, 225
 USSR and, 563
 Opium, 72, 73, 74, 75, 82, 84, 124, 228
 Oshima, General, 278
 Osmena, Sergio, 608, 612
 Outer Mongolia (*see* Mongolia, Treaties)
 Overseas Consultants, 451

 Pacific Charter, 719
 Pago Pago, 122
 Paikes, A. K., 310
 Pakistan, 461
 Palmerston, Lord, 76, 82
 "Panay" incident, 393
 Paris Peace Conference (*see* Versailles Conference)
 Parker, Dr. Peter, 119, 126
 Parkes, Sir Harry, 133
 Pauley, Edwin H., 451
 Peaceful coexistence, 679
 Pearl Harbor
 Lease to United States, 121
 World War II, 406, 414

- Peking
 old capital before 1928, 161f.
 People's Republic capital after 1949, 515
 Treaties (*see* Treaties)
- Peking-Moscow axis, 551f.
- P'eng Teh-huai, 509
- People's Consultative Conference, 513
- People's National Congress, 521
- People's Republic of China (*see* Chinese Communist Government of China)
- People's Volunteer Organization, 595
- Percival, General, 630
- Perry, Commodore Matthew C., 131
- Pescadores, 195, 463
- Phibun Songgram, 587
- Philippine Islands
 annexation by the United States, 365
 geography, 21
 independence, 367, 606, 614
 Japanese occupation, 610
 population and resources, 21
- Philippine Republic
 establishment, 614
 Hukbalahaps, 607, 612, 617
 internal policies, 615f.
 international relations, 620f.
 Rehabilitation Act (Tydings Act), 615
 Trade Act (Bell Act), 615, 622, 715
 United States and, 615, 622
 USSR and, 689
- Pilgrim's Dinner, 403
- Plehve, Vyacheslav, 108
- Politburo, 300
- Port Arthur, 106, 548
- Port Lazarev, 109
- Portsmouth Treaty (*see* Treaties)
- Portuguese in Asia, 61f., 268
- Potsdam Conference, 428
- Pridi Banomyong, 587
- Provisional Government, Peking, 241
- Putiatin, Count, 101
- Pu-yi, Henry, 147, 219
- Pyun Yung Tai, 671
- Quadrant Conference, 424
- Quarantine Speech, 393
- Quebec Conference, 424
- Quezon, President Manuel, 368, 416, 607, 612, 613
- Quirino, President Elpidio, 578, 614, 623
- Raffles, Sir Thomas Stamford, 251
- Rainbow Plan, 406
- Rama IX, King (Phumiphon Adundet), 590
- Recto, Claro M., 623
- Reed, William B., 126
- Renovation Government, Nanking, 241
- Renville Agreement, 600
- Reorganized National Government of China (Wang Ching-wei), 242
- "Repulse" and "Prince of Wales," 415, 630
- Rezanov, Nicholas, 100
- Rhee, President Syngman, 202, 489, 653, 657, 658, 671
- Ridgway, General Matthew, 457
- Rights recovery program in China, 159
- Rivera-McMillan Report, 623
- Roberts, Edmund, 118, 130
- Roberts, General William L., 658
- Robertson, Walter S., 485, 530
- Rockhill, W. W., 128
- Rogers, Admiral John, 134
- Romulo, Carlos P., 469, 611, 623, 715
- Roosevelt, President Franklin D., 388, 393, 396, 427 (*See* particularly Chapters 21 and 22)
- Roosevelt, President Theodore, 112, 366, 369, 375, 379
- Root, Elihu, 378
- Roxas, Manuel, 614
- Roy, M. N., 315
- Russia (*see also* USSR, Treaties)
 Alaska, sale to United States, 120
 in Central Asia, 102
 concessions in China, 323
 expansion into Siberia, 12, 97, 98, 294, 298
 in Korea, 109, 198
 in Manchuria, 103, 107, 203
 in Mongolia, 114f.
 Port Arthur and Dairen, 89, 105
 rivalry with the United States, 371
 Russian revolutions, 287f.
 war with Japan, 200
- Russo-American Fur Company, 99, 102
- Russo-Asiatic Bank, 312
- Russo-Chinese Bank, 105
- Russo-Japanese War, 200
- Ryokufukai* (Green Breeze Society), 480
- Ryukyu Islands (*see* Liu Ch'iu Islands)
- Saigo Takamori, 177
- Saionji Kimmochi, Prince, 182
- Sakdalistas, 607
- Sakhalin Island
 Cession to Russia, 102
 Conflict between Japan and Russia, 335, 340, 342
 Treaty of Portsmouth, 112
 In Yalta agreement, 427
- Salisbury, Lord, 128
- Salt Administration in China, 162
- Samoa, 122
- San Francisco anti-Japan sentiment, 1906, 378
- San Francisco Conference, 1945, 428

- San Francisco Conference, 1951, 462
Sarekat Islam, 599
 Santos, Pedro Abad, 617
 Satsuma Rebellion, 177
 Sazonov, Foreign Minister of Russia, 114
 SCAP (*see* Occupation of Japan)
 Scramble for concessions, 106, 257
 Seiyukai, 182
 Selective Service Act, 396
 Semenov, Anton, General, 290, 445
 Seward, William H., 120, 126, 134
 Shameen incident, 169
 Shanghai
 International Settlement, 161
 Sino-Japanese incident, 1932, 225, 232, 508
 Sino-Japanese War, 1937, 238
 Shansi-Hopei-Chahar Border region, 509
 Shantung
 Germany in, 87, 273f.
 Japan in, 203
 Twenty-one Demands, 94
 Versailles Conference, 164, 209
 Washington Conference, 167
 Shaw, Samuel, 118
 Sheng Shih-ts'ai, 307
 Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Area, 509
 Shidehara Kijuro, Baron, 210, 385
 Shigemitsu Mamoru, 399, 479
 Shimabara Rebellion, 58
 Shimizu Ikutaro, 474
 Shimonoseki, Treaty of (*see* Treaties)
 Shinto and Shintoism, 45, 50, 478
 Shufeldt, Commodore Robert W., 134
 Siam (Thailand) (*see also* Treaties)
 Chinese minorities, 16, 587
 communism in, 591
 and France, 282, 586
 and Great Britain, 591
 and Japan, 282, 415, 588
 population and geography, 17
 revolution in, 587
 totalitarianism and paternalism, 587, 590
 and the United States, 591
 and the USSR, 591, 690
 Sian incident, 323, 509
 Siberia
 allied intervention in, 205, 313, 327, 381
 geography, 12
 railways, 13, 104
 Russian expansion into, 12, 97, 98
 USSR and, 294
 Singapore, 19, 631
 Sinkiang, 4, 102, 114, 298, 307, 549
 Sino-Japanese Controversy, 236
 Sino-Japanese War, 86, 237
 Sino-Russian hostilities in Manchuria, 317
 Sino-Soviet diplomatic relations (*see* Treaties)
 Sino-Soviet Friendship Associations, 547
 Sjahrir, 599
 Sjarifuddin, 599, 601
 Smith, Walter B., 717
 Solomon Islands, 417
 Soong, T. V., 155, 428
 Southeast Asia (*see* individual countries)
 Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, 718
 Southern Regions, 247
 Spanish in Asia, 62, 268
 Special Customs Conference in China, 1925, 168
 Spender, Percy, 469
 Spratly Islands, 463
 Spruance, Admiral, 705
 Stalin, Josef
 and Chinese Revolution, 315
 death, 680
 and Hitler, 298f.
 and Japan, 487, 691
 and Kuomintang, 314, 324
 and purges, 294, 297
 and Trotsky, 288, 293, 294, 316
 Staunton, Sir George, 71
 Stilwell, General Joseph, 415, 419, 420
 Stimson, Henry L., 262, 320, 387
 Straight, Willard, 373, 379
 Straits Settlements, 629
 Stuart, J. Leighton, 566
 Sukarno, President, 599
 Sumitomo interests, 179
 Sun Fo, 155
 Sun Yat-sen
 conversations with Joffe, 151, 311
 death, 315
 founder of the Kuomintang, 150
 Three Principles of the People, 151
 Sunda Islands, 20
 Sung Che-yüan, 233
 Sungari River, 317
 Suripno, 601
 Suzuki Kisaburo, Premier, 442
 SWNCC (State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee), 442
 Tada, Major General, 356
 Taft, William Howard, 366, 367, 375, 380
 T'ai Pings, 144
 T'aiwan (*see* Formosa)
 T'ai Wun Kun, 197
 Tanaka, Baron, 211, 215
 Tan Cheng-lock, 634
 Tanegashima, 57
 Tangku truce, 221, 232
 Tannu Tuva, 115
 Tarawa, 418
 Taruc, Luis, 617
 Teachers Union in Japan, 482
 Teh, Prince, 233

- Teheran Conference, 425
 Thailand (*see* Siam)
Thakin movement, 594
 Thakin Mya, 594
 Thakin Nu (*see* U Nu)
 Thakin Soe, 596
 Thakin Than Tun, 594
 Tientsin, Treaties of (*see* Treaties)
 Tibet, 4
 Tobacco Massacre (Formosa), 571
 Toilers of the Far East, Congress of, 311, 500
 Tojo Hideki, General, 189, 236, 339, 404, 407
 Tokugawa Shogunate, 175
 Tonghak Rebellion, 197
 Tongking, 271
 Total War Research Institute, 186
 Toyoda Teijoro, Admiral, 402
 Trautman, Dr. Oscar, 239
 Trans-Siberian Railways, 13, 104
 Treaties, conventions, protocols, agreements, and alliances
 China and France
 Treaty of Wanghsia, 81
 Treaty of Tientsin, 1858, 83
 Treaty of Tientsin, 1885, 271
 Agreements of 1895-1898, 87, 88, 89, 271
 Yünnan Railway concessions, 1903, 273
 Treaty of Friendship, 1946, 575
 China and Great Britain
 Nanking Treaty, 1842, 78, 80
 Bogue Treaty, 1843, 81
 Tientsin Treaty, 1858, 255
 Chefoo Convention, 1876, 85
 Agreements of 1898, 88f.
 Treaty of Commerce, 1902, 92
 Treaty of Commerce, 1928, 261
 Treaty of Friendship, 1943, 266, 420
 China and Japan
 Tientsin Treaty, 1871, 85f.
 Treaty of 1874, 194
 Li-Ito Convention, 196
 Treaty of Shimonoseki, 87, 198
 Commercial convention, 1896, 86
 Treaty of Commerce, 1903, 92
 Treaty of Peking, 1905, 93, 203
 Treaties of 1915, 94, 204, 208
 Military agreements, 1917, 208, 312
 Treaty of 1918, 209
 Shantung Agreement, 1922, 167
 Recognition of Chiang Kai-shek government, 1929, 211
 Wang Ching-wei Treaty, 1940, 243
 Wang Ching-wei Treaty, 1943, 421
 Treaty of Peace (Formosa), 1951, 475
 Barter agreements (Formosa), 1953, 489
 Treaties (cont.)
 China and Russia
 Treaty of Nerchinsk, 1689, 98
 Treaty of Kiakhta, 1727, 99
 Kuldja Convention, 1851, 102
 Treaty of Aigun, 1858, 101
 Treaty of Tientsin, 1858, 101
 Treaty of Peking, 1860, 102, 103
 Treaty of Livadia, 1879, 103
 Treaty of St. Petersburg, 1881, 103
 Treaty of Alliance (Li-Lobanov), 1896, 87, 105
 China and Russo-Chinese Bank, 1896, 105
 Agreements of 1898, 89
 Convention of April, 1902, 108
 Treaty of 1911, re Mongolia, 374
 Treaty of 1913, re Mongolia, 115
 Tripartite Pact, re Mongolia, 1915, 115
 Sun-Joffe Agreement, 151, 306, 311
 Treaty of Peking, 1924, 312
 Mukden Agreement, 1924, 313
 Khabarovsk Protocol, 320
 Recognition Agreement, 1932, 322
 Nonaggression Treaty, 1937, 296, 323
 Treaties of August, 1945, 430, 680f.
 Alliance (Red China), 1950, 460, 548
 China and the United States
 Wanghsia, 1844, 81, 124
 Treaty of Tientsin, 1858, 83, 126
 Burlingame Treaty, 1868, 126
 Immigration Treaty, 1880, 127
 Immigration Treaty, 1894, 127
 Treaty of Commerce, 1903, 92, 372
 Treaty of Commerce, 1928, 370f.
 Treaty of Friendship, 1943, 420
 Surplus Property Agreement, 1946, 566
 Treaty of Friendship, 1946, 566, 575, 706
 China and Other Countries
 Germany: leased areas and concessions, 1898, 87
 Germany: Treaty of Peace, 1921, 164
 India, 1954, 560
 North Korea, 1953, 558
 Mongolia, 1952, 556
 Tibet, 1951, 557
 China: Multilateral Agreements
 Boxer Protocol, 371
 Consortium, 1910, 373
 Consortium, 1920, 381
 Nine-Power Treaty, 166, 384
 Reorganization Loan Agreement, 374
 China: moves for treaty revision, 167ff., 170
 China: subject of interpower agreements, 91

Treaties (cont.)

France and

- Annam, 1862, 270
- Annam, 1874, 270
- Annam, 1884, 271
- Cambodia, 1953, 647
- China (*see* Treaties, China and France)
- Cochin China, 1787, 66
- Great Britain, 1896, 254
- Great Britain, 1907, 259
- Japan (*see* Treaties, Japan and France)
- Laos, 1953, 647
- Russia, Treaty of Alliance, 1893, 103, 108
- Russia, 1907, 113
- Siam, 1941, 282
- Viet-Nam, 1946, 643
- Viet-Nam, 1949, 645
- Viet-Nam, 1954, 646

Great Britain and

- Burma, 596
- China (*see* Treaties, China and Great Britain)
- Germany, 1900, 257
- Japan (*see* Treaties, Japan and Great Britain)
- Russia, 1907, 113, 259
- Russia, 1911, 374
- Siam, 1946, 591

Japan and China (*see* Treaties China and Japan)

Japan and France

- Agreement of 1907, 281, 347
- Hanoi Convention, 1940, 282
- Agreement of 1941, 402, 641

Japan and Germany

- Anti-Comintern Pact, 1936, 263, 279, 339
- Cultural Pact, 1938, 278
- Axis Pact, 278, 341, 396

Japan and Great Britain

- Treaties of 1855 and 1856, 131
- Treaty of 1894, 175, 256
- Alliance, 1902, 258
- Renewal of Alliance, 1905, 200, 258
- Renewal of Alliance, 1911, 259
- Termination of Alliance, 1921, 260
- Craigie-Arita formula, 264

Japan and Russia

- Treaties of 1855 and 1857, 102, 131
- Treaty of 1875, 102, 192
- Waiber-Komura agreement, 199
- Yamagata-Lobanov Protocol, 110, 199
- Nishi-Rosen Protocol, 111, 199
- Treaty of Portsmouth, 112, 202, 376
- Treaties of 1907, 1910, and 1912, 113, 347f.
- Treaty of 1916, 349

Treaties (cont.)

Japan and Russia (cont.)

- Treaty of 1925 (recognition of USSR), 328
- Neutrality Pact of 1941, 324, 341, 400
- Agreement of 1944, 691
- Japan and the United States
- Perry Treaty (Kanagawa), 131
- Harris Treaty of Commerce, 132
- Treaty of 1878, 133, 174
- Treaty of 1894, 175, 377
- Taft-Katsura Agreement, 366, 375
- Gentlemen's Agreement, 378
- Arbitration Convention, 1908, 378
- Root-Takahira Agreement, 378
- Treaty of Commerce, 1911, 395
- Lansing-Ishii Notes, 205
- Termination of 1911 Treaty, 1939, 395
- Treaty of Peace, 1951 (*see* Treaties, Japan: Multilateral Pacts)
- Security Pact and Administrative Agreement, 463, 465
- Treaty of Friendship, 1953, 485
- Mutual Defense Agreements, 1954, 485

Japan and Other Nations

- Burma, 1943, 594
- Burma, 1954, 475
- India, 1952, 475
- Korea, 1876, 134, 196, 198
- Korea, Treaty of Chemulpo, 1882, 196
- Korea, Protectorate Convention, 1905, 200
- Korea, Treaty of Annexation, 201
- Siam (Thailand), 1940, 415, 588
- Thailand, 1941, 415

Japan: Multilateral Pacts

- General tariff convention, 1866, 133
- secret agreements, World War I, 209, 350
- Treaty of Versailles, 209, 274
- Five-Power Pact, 352, 383
- Four-Power Pact, 352, 383
- Treaty of Peace, 1951, 459, 462, 475

Korea and

Japan (*see* Treaties, Japan and Other Nations)

- Russia, 1884, 109
- United States, 1882, 134
- United States, 1953, 669

Russia and

- China (*see* Treaties, China and Russia)
- Germany, 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, 289
- Germany, 1939 Hitler-Stalin Pact, 299, 340
- Japan (*see* Treaties, Japan and Russia)
- Mongolia, 1912, 115
- Mongolia, 1915, 114

Treaties (cont.)

Russia and (cont.)

- Mongolia, 1921, 310
- Mongolia, 1936, 323
- Mongolia, 1946, 684
- North Korea, 1949, 654
- North Korea, 1953, 686
- United States, 1824, 119
- United States, 1867 (Alaska), 120
- United States, 1933 (Recognition of USSR), 296

United States and

- Australia and New Zealand, 463
- China (*see* Treaties, China and the United States)
- Hawaii, 1854, 121
- Hawaii, 1875, 121
- Hawaii, 1884, 121
- Japan (*see* Treaties, Japan and the United States)
- Korea (*see* Treaties, Korea and the United States)
- Philippines, Military Assistance Pact, 1947, 623
- Philippines, Quirino-Foster Agreement, 1950, 622
- Philippines, Mutual Defense Treaty, 1951, 623
- Siam, 1833, 119
- Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, 697, 718
- Spain, 1898, 123, 367
- United Nations Trusteeship Agreement, 697
- Trident Conference, 423
- Triple Intervention, 86, 104, 199
- Trotsky, Leon, 288, 294, 315
- Truman, President
 - China policy, 569, 659, 704
 - Korean affair, 577
 - MacArthur controversy, 457, 665, 710f.
 - Potsdam Conference, 428
- Tsiang Ting fu, 577
- Tso Tsung-t'ang, 103
- Tsuji Masanobu, Colonel, 478
- Tu Li-ming, 569
- "Tuckwo," 264
- Tumen River, 110
- Tung Pi-wu, 499
- Turk-Sib Railway, 298
- Turkistan (*see* Sinkiang)
- Tuvian People's Republic, 307
- Twenty-one Demands, 94f., 204
- Two-twenty-six incident, 185
- Tydings Bill, 615
- Tydings-Kocalkowski Bill, 609
- Tydings-McDuffie Bill, 368, 607
- Tz'u Hsi (Empress Dowager), 145

U Aung San, 594

Ukthomski, Prince, 106

Ultrationalism, 185, 446, 478

Umedsu Yoshijiro, 233

Ungern-Sternberg, Baron von, 306

Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR)

(*see also* Russia, Treaties)

advisers in Communist China, 550

Asian revolutions and, 304

border areas, 305

Chiang Kai-shek and, 430, 563, 564

Chinese Communist party and, 311, 314, 324

Chinese Kuomintang and, 314, 323f.

Czarist imperialism renounced, 309

establishment of, 287

Five Year plans, 294

hostilities in Manchuria, 1929, 317

ideological imperialism, 286, 300, 674

industrialization and collectivization, 295

Japan, contemporary and, 487, 691

Japan, general diplomatic hostility, 338

Japan, local conflicts in Northeast Asia, 332

Japan, neutrality, 324

Japan, Occupation and, 691f.

Japan, peace-making difficulties, 459, 468

Japan, World War II, 429

Karakhan Manifesto, 309

Malenkov succession, 680

New Economic Policy, 292

peaceful coexistence, 302

purges, 294, 297

recognition of Ho Chi Minh, 645

recognition of Red China, 546

relations with Red China, 321, 551, 682

Southeast Asia and, 687, 714

Stalin in power, 293

United front, 296

United Front in China, 322, 501, 502, 508, 511, 522, 563

United Front in Communist Policy, 296, 507, 522

United Kingdom, 461, 475, 492

United Malay National Organization (UMNO), 630

United Nations

admission of Burma, Thailand, and Indonesia, 591, 598, 601

China resolution, 1949, 576f.

declaration of January 1, 1942, 423

Indonesia, Good Offices Committee for, 600

and Korea (*see* Korea)

United States (*see also* Treaties)

and the Neutralists, 698

annexation of Hawaii, 122

annexation of the Philippines, 123, 365

attitude toward Red China, 552f.

United States (cont.)

- China aid program, 389, 394, 396
- Chinese immigration, 127
- economic warfare against Japan, 392, 402
- Formosa relations, 706f.
- Immigration Act of 1904, 369
- Immigration Act of 1924, 386
- Immigration Act of 1943, 421
- moral embargo, 394
- neutrality legislation, 390, 391, 399
- nonrecognition policy, 208, 225, 262, 380, 382, 387, 576
- Occupation of Japan, 439
- Open Door (*see* Open Door)
- peace with Japan, 454
- Philippine independence, 367
- Point 4 and economic aid, 702
- recognition of Korea, 655
- recognition of governments in Thailand, 591
- recognition of Viet-Nam (Bao Dai), 645
- security forces for Japan, 466
- Senatorial investigations, 704
- Southeast Asia, 714
- total diplomacy, 701
- trade conditions at Canton, 124
- Trusteeship agreement with United Nations, 697
- "ultimatum" to Japan, 405
- USSR, cold war, 699f.
- United States Armed Forces—Far East (USAFFE), 402
- U Nu, 594
- U Saw, 593
- Versailles Conference, 164, 209
- Viet-Minh, 641
- Viet-Nam, 641
- Vishinsky, Andrei, 683, 699
- Vladivostok, 102, 109, 339, 381
- Vo Nguyen Giap, 642
- Voitinsky, Gregory, 309
- Von Ribbentrop, 278, 341
- Von Ungern-Sternberg, Baron, 306
- Voroshilov, Kliment E., 677
- Voice of America, 701
- Waecher-Komura agreement, 199
- Wallace, Henry A., 426, 513, 564
- Wang, Ching-wei, 155, 241, 243, 315, 414
- Wang, Dr. C. T., 171
- Wang K'eh-min, 241
- Wang Tao, 227
- Wanpaoshan incident, 217
- Ward, Frederick Townsend, 145
- Ward, John, 126
- Warlordism, 149
- Washington Conference
 - Chinese at, 165, 167
 - Chinese Eastern Railway question, 312
 - Japanese at, 210, 352
 - naval questions, 382
 - USSR absent, 291
 - USSR's attitude, 291
- We Burmans Association, 594
- Wedemeyer, General A. C.
 - commander in China, 422, 563, 565
 - mission to China, 567, 705, 706
 - mission to Korea, 655
- Whampoa Military Academy, 152, 314
- Wilkes Expedition, 120
- Wilhelm II, Kaiser, 276
- Williams, S. Wells, 119
- Wilson, President Woodrow, 209, 289, 367, 375, 381
- Witte, Count Sergei, 104, 376
- Wood, General Leonard, 367
- World War I, 164
- Wu Han Government, 316
- Xavier, Francis, 57
- Yakub Beg, 103
- Yalta Conference, 427, 578
- Yalu River, 111
- Yamagata, Prince, 182
- Yamakawa Hitoshi, 474
- Yamamoto, Admiral, 413
- Yamashita, General, 445, 630
- Yang Hu-ch'eng, 509
- Yang ko dance, 570
- Yap, 385
- Yeh Chien-ying, 514
- Yellow Peril, 278, 376
- Yen, Dr. James, 157
- Yenan, 247
- Yermak, 98
- Yin Ju-keng, 233
- Yokohama Specie Bank, 244
- Yonai Mitsumasa, Admiral, 341
- Yoshida Shigeru, 448, 462, 465, 471, 474, 478
- Yoshizawa Kenkichi, 284
- Young Korea Party, 197
- Young Marshal, 216, 317
- Younger, Kenneth, 468
- Yourin, Ignatius, 310, 327
- Yüan Shih-k'ai, 134, 146, 148, 196
- Yünnan Railway, 273, 280
- Zaibatsu, 179, 451, 478, 493

मसूरी
MUSSOORIE.

This book is to be returned on the date last stamped.

[illegible]

327.5
Bus

अवाप्ति संख्या

Acc No. 81222

वर्ग संख्या

पुस्तक संख्या

Class No. _____

Book No. _____

लेखक

Author Buss

शीर्षक

Title The Far East : a history
of Recent and Contemporary
International Relations ...

327.5
Bus

LIBRARY

LAL BAHADUR SHASTRI

National Academy of Administration

MUSSOORIE

Accession No. 105324

1. Books are issued for 15 days only but may have to be recalled earlier if urgently required.
2. An over-due charge of 25 Paise per day per volume will be charged.
3. Books may be renewed on request, at the discretion of the Librarian.
4. Periodicals, Rare and Reference books may not be issued and may be consulted only in the Library.
5. Books lost, defaced or injured in any way shall have to be replaced or its double price shall be paid by the borrower.

Help to keep this book fresh, clean & moving